by Chen Jack W
leisure. Thomas Allsen, who refers to such hunts as “political hunts,” has
noted how imperial hunts celebrated the “lavish expenditure of energy” in
direct contrast to subsistence hunting, which “was primarily a means of
capturing energy and had therefore to be efficient.”69
There was, however, one major justification for the imperial hunt,
to which Taizong makes reference when he says “military preparations
cannot be forgotten.” That is, the hunt was such a massive mobilization
of men, resources, and armament that it could serve as a demon-
stration of martial power to the emperor’s subjects, and often to foreign
diplomats and envoys. Yet Taizong recognizes that it is difficult to jus-
tify his hunting simply by claiming that he is engaging in military exercises,
and thus he resorts to a second excuse, saying that “this causes not an
iota of bother to the people.” This is a much weaker response, but
it points to the emperor’s realization that the imperial hunt is often dis-
ruptive of the people’s agricultural activities. Because the hunt takes place
in the Rear Garden, on land that has already been reserved for imperial
usage, Taizong claims that he is not interfering with his subjects’ liveli-
hoods.
The central point of this episode, however, is not about the imperial
justification of hunting, but rather about Taizong’s willingness to accept
remonstrance. Wei Zheng remonstrates not against the hunt itself, but
against Taizong’s bad humor in reading the confidential memorials that
criticize his indulgence in hunting. The minister reminds Taizong that
since he has opened the channel for corrections from his officials—a
praiseworthy policy that compares favorably with the former kings—he
might as well see if there are any faults that need to be corrected.
Taizong’s acceptance of Wei Zheng’s criticism then leads to renewed ef-
forts on the court’s behalf to send up remonstrances to the emperor.
—————
69. Allsen, Royal Hunt in Eurasian History, p. 9. Allsen is implicitly drawing upon the work of Georges Bataille here. See Bataille’s “Notion of Expenditure,” in Visions of Excess, pp. 116–29.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
37
Taizong may indeed have loved hunting and not loved hearing about his
trespasses, but his irritation with the court creates the opportunity for
him to demonstrate his true virtue in accepting such criticisms. The struc-
ture of the episode reads much like a morality tale, concluding successfully
with the lesson learned and efforts redoubled.
To be sure, historians would not have celebrated the Zhenguan reign
had Taizong lacked a record of great achievements. The major court initia-
tives have been discussed elsewhere, so I will mention in passing some of the
more significant policies and measures. Important structural changes in-
cluded the rationalization and reduction of governmental offices in the
capital70 and the creation of the circuit ( dao 道) system.71 Taizong ordered
the revision of the Tang legal code, which produced the 637 Zhenguan lü
貞觀律 ( Laws of the Zhenguan Period).72 He also asked for the compila-
tion of the first Tang ritual code, the Zhenguan li 貞觀禮 ( Ritual Code of
the Zhenguan Period), also known as the Xin li 新禮 ( New Ritual Code).
This was initially presented in 633 and then promulgated in its final form in
637.73 Also significant was the establishment of the Bureau of Historiogra-
phy 史館, which oversaw the completion of no less than six dynastic histo-
ries.74
—————
70. See Zizhi tongjian, 196.6043. This is alluded to in Xin Tang shu, 46.1181, and discussed in some detail in Wechsler, “T’ai-tsung (Reign 626–49) the Consolidator,” pp. 203–205.
71. See Jiu Tang shu, 38.1384; Xin Tang shu, 27.959; and Zizhi tongjian, 192.6033. Also see de Rotours, “Les grands fonctionnaires,” pp. 223–25.
72. See Jiu Tang shu, 50.2135–38; Xin Tang shu, 46.1409–10; and Zizhi tongjian, 192.6031, 6126. For an overview of the changes between the two codes, see Wechsler, “T’ai-tsung (Reign 626–49) the Consolidator,” pp. 206–7; and Zhao Keyao et al., Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 176–81.
73. See Jiu Tang shu, 21.816–17; Xin Tang shu, 11.308; and Du You 杜佑 (735–812), comp., Tongdian, 41.1121. For Taizong’s edict ordering the promulgation of the code, see Songben Cefu yuangui, 564.1625a; Cefu yuangui, 564.6771; Song Minqiu 宋敏求 (1019–79), comp., Tang da zhaoling ji, 81.420; Quan Tang wen, 6.70b–71a; and Tang Taizong quanji jiaozhu, pp. 369–72. Also see Wechsler, Offerings of Jade and Silk, pp. 42–44; McMullen, State and Scholars in T’ang China, pp. 120–23; and Gao Mingshi, “Lun Wude,” pp. 1159–1214.
74. Six were compiled under imperial orders. These were the histories of the Jin, Liang, Chen, Northern Qi, Northern Zhou, and Sui. Two other histories, the Nan shi 南史
( History of the Southern Dynasties) and Bei shi 北史 ( History of the Northern Dynasties), were privately written during Taizong’s reign and accepted into the historical canon during the Song dynasty. The initiative to write histories for the pre-Tang dynasties began in 623 and was later taken up by Taizong in 629; see Wang Pu 王溥 (922–82), comp., Tang This content downloaded from 129.174.21.5 on Sat, 20 Jul 2019 13:01:35 UTC
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38
Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
Finally, Taizong sponsored the creation of a standard edition of texts and
commentaries for the Wujing 五經 ( Five Classics).75
Taizong’s Victory over the Turks
The major political achievement of Taizong’s reign, however, was argua-
bly his defeat of the Eastern and Western Turkish confederacies, which
allowed the Tang to pursue an aggressive expansionist foreign policy, ex-
tend the empire to the western regions, and establish economic power
over the Central and East Asian regions. Following the end of the major
domestic insurgencies, Taizong saw the opportunity to reverse Gaozu’s
policy of Turkish appeasement. During the Wude reign, Gaozu had sent
large amounts of tribute in an effort to buy off the Eastern Turks, while
futilely attempting to win the support of the Western Turks. This, along
with Gaozu’s acceptance of Turkish vassalhood, had bothered Taizong,
and in the eighth month of 626, right after his usurpation of the throne,
he found himself having to deal with a major Turkish incursion led by the
warlike Xieli Qaghan 頡利可汗 (r. 620–30). Most traditional historical
sources describe this as a resounding victory for the young emperor, one
in which he spoke face-to-face with the qaghan at the Wei River and
stared down the Turkish forces without having to engage in combat.76
However, in the Xin Tang shu biography of the general Li Jing 李靖
(571–649), Taizong refers to this encounter as “my humiliation at Wei
—————
huiyao, 63.1090–92; Jiu Tang shu, 73.2598; and Xin Tang shu, 102.3983–84. Also see William Hung, “T’ang Bureau of Historiography before 708”; McMullen, State and Scholars in T’ang China, pp. 165–72; Twitchett, Writing of Official History under the T’ang, pp. 13–
22; Lei Ji
aji, “Tang qianqi guoshiguan xiu tizhi de yanbian,” in Zhongguo Tangdai xuehui, ed., Tangdai yanjiu lunwenji, vol. 2, pp. 279–345; Fairbank, “Ssu-ma I,” pp. 205–241; and Ng and Wang, Mirroring the Past, pp. 108–34.
75. For Taizong’s order to Yan Shigu 顏師古 (581–645) to determine the texts of the Five Classics, see Jiu Tang Shu, 73.2594; and Xin Tang shu, 198.5641; for the promulgation of Yan’s edition of the Classics, see Jiu Tang shu, 3.43. For Taizong’s commission of the subcommentaries, see Jiu Tang shu, 73.2602–603; and Xin Tang shu, 198.5644. See McMullen, State and Scholars in T’ang China, pp. 72–82. Also see Meyer, “ T h e ‘Correct Meaning of the Five Classics’ and the Intellectual Foundations of the Tang.”
76. In particular, see Zhenguan zhengyao, 35.259. Also see Jiu Tang shu, 2.30; Xin Tang shu, 2.27; and Zizhi tongjian, 191.6017–20. For Xieli Qaghan’s biography, see Jiu Tang shu, 194A.5155–60; and Xin Tang shu, 215A.6029–38.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
39
River” 吾渭水之恥.77 It would seem that Taizong was, in fact, only able
to get the Turkish forces to withdraw by promising them payments of
gold and silk.78
Following this, Taizong began to prepare for the eventuality of warfare
between the Tang and the Turkish confederations. The Zizhi tongjian re-
cords how Taizong, an accomplished archer, led hundreds of imperial
guards in archery practice in the courtyard of the Xiande Basilica 顯德殿,
addressing his men with the following words:
As for the Rong and Di’s invading and thieving, this has been the case from an-
cient times. The present disaster originated in the borderlands enjoying some
small measure of peace, which allowed the ruler of men to roam at his ease and
forget about warfare. Because of this, when the bandits arrived, there was no one
who could repel them. At present, We do not have you dig pools and construct
parks, but instead allow you to focus on practicing the bow and arrow. If the days
go by and there are no incidents, then I will serve as your teacher; if the Turks invade, then I will serve as your general. Perhaps then the people of the central
states will be able to have some small measure of peace!
戎狄侵盜，自古有之，患在邊境少安，則人主逸遊忘戰，是以寇來莫
之能禦。今朕不使汝曹穿池築苑，專習弓矢，居閒無事，則為汝師，
突厥入寇，則為汝將，庶幾中國之民可以少安乎！
Not surprisingly, Taizong’s new policy drew remonstrances from his offi-
cials, who pointed out that bringing weapons onto the palace grounds was
against the law, not to mention risky, given the class of men who would be
practicing archery by the side of the emperor. The emperor responded to
their concerns, saying,
The king looks upon the Four Seas as one household, and within the borders and
domains, all are Our children. To each and every one of our subjects, We extend
Our empathy and compassion—how could there be suspicion attached to the
men who serve as the palace guards!
王者視四海如一家，封域之內，皆朕赤子，朕一一推心置其腹中，奈
何宿衛之士亦加猜忌乎！79
—————
77. Xin Tang shu, 93.3814.
78. See Zizhi tongjian, 191.6020. This is discussed in Li Shutong, “Tang Taizong Weishui zhi chi benmo kaoshi,” in Tang shi kaobian, pp. 262–63.
79. Zizhi tongjian, 192.6021–22. For a different version of Taizong’s speech, see Jiu Tang shu, 2.30–31.
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40
Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
Taizong addresses the problem of archery practice on the palace grounds
by reminding his officials that he, as emperor, treats all subjects as his own
children, and therefore, will not harbor any suspicion towards his
guardsmen. His implication here is that he is impartial in his love for his
subjects, unlike the narrow and elitist officials, who would see potential
assassins among the lower-class men who make up the palace guards. Here,
too, we may hear an echo of Taizong’s anxiety over biological or clan-
based kinship values, which he would consistently in his reign make sub-
ordinate to the political kinship of the empire.
As it would turn out, Taizong need not have feared that the Turks
would ever march upon the capital region during his reign. The Eastern
Turks entered into a period of decline that began in 627 and ended with
their conquest by the Tang, while the Western Turks were involved in in-
ternal struggles that sapped their strength and resources.80 The historian
Xue Zongzheng 薛宗正 points to two linked reasons for the Eastern
Turkish collapse: first, the rebellion of the Nine-Family Tiele 九姓鐵勒
tribes (ancestors of the modern-day Uighurs), who rose up against their
Eastern Turkish rulers; and second, the rift that opened between Xieli
Qaghan and his nephew, Tuli Qaghan 突利可汗 (603–31), who was pun-
ished by Xieli for failing to suppress the Tiele revolt.81 Tuli decided to re-
bel against Xieli, sending a message to Taizong declaring his allegiance to
the Tang. Taizong was able to capitalize on the Turkish disarray, and in
630 he completed the downfall of the Eastern Qaghanate by capturing
Xieli Qaghan.82 Thereupon, Taizong assumed the title “Heavenly Qa-
ghan” 天可汗.83 Following a set of extensive discussions on what to do
with the defeated Eastern Turks, Taizong decided to have them resettled
within Tang borders, in the hopes of integrating them culturally into the
Chinese empire.84
—————
80. See Ma Changshou, Tujueren he Tujue hanguo, pp. 34–49; Wang Xiaofu, Tangchao dui Tujue de zhanzheng, pp. 35–66.
81. Xue Zongzheng, Tujue shi, pp. 251–55.
82. See Wechsler, “T’ai-tsung (Reign 626–49) the Consolidator,” pp. 220–24; and Pan
Yihong, Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan, pp. 176–79.
83. Jiu Tang shu, 3.39; Xin Tang shu, 2.31; and Zizhi tongjian, 193.6073.
84. See Zhenguan zhengyao, 9.36.273–77; Tang huiyao, 73.1311–14; and Zizhi tongjian, 193.6075–77.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
41
While this meant that the power of the Eastern Turks had largely been
neutralized, it also led to the rise of the Xueyantuo 薛延陀 (the strongest
of the Tiele tribes) in the lands vacated by the Eastern Turks. When the
Tang decided to move the Turks back to their former lands, the Xueyan-
tuo, who now regarded the lands as their own, forced the Turks back into
China. In 645, the Xueyantuo rose up against their leader, and Taizong
took advantage of the situation to send a Tang army to conquer the trou-
blesome Tiele peoples.85 In late 646, Taizong commemorated his victory
with a stele upon which he had inscribed a poem written for the occasion.
The Southern Song poet and scholar You Mao 尤袤 (1127–94) records
the following anecdote:
In the autumn of the twe
ntieth year of the Zhenguan reign, the emperor visited
Lingzhou.86 At this time, he had crushed the Xueyantuo, and the various tribes of
the Huihe peoples dispatched emissaries to submit tribute, begging to have the
emperor establish local administration there.87 The emperor composed a poem to
tell of this event, which read: “Washing away shame to requite the hundred kings, /
Ridding evil to repay a thousand antiquities.” The high officials requested that the words be carved on a stele to be placed at Lingzhou, and the emperor allowed it.
貞觀二十年秋，帝幸靈州。時破薛延陀，回紇諸部遣使入貢，乞置官
司。上為詩序其事，曰：“雪恥酬百王，除凶報千古。”公卿請勒石
于靈州，從之。88
Such steles are monuments, material symbols that commemorate the site
of an event.89 By itself, the stele marks the claim of Tang sovereignty over
disputed territory, and with the addition of Taizong’s poetic inscription,
we have a text that relates ancient past to the Tang present, and in doing
—————
85. For a detailed overview of the Tang relationship with the Xueyantuo, see Xue, Tujue shi, pp. 371–408.
86. Lingzhou is located in Ningxia county of Gansu province.
87. The Huihe 回紇 were a Buddhist Uighur people, and here, the ethnonym refers gen-
erally to the Tiele peoples that Taizong had suppressed. It should be noted that while the Huihe are sometimes identified with the Muslim Huihui 回回 people (whose name is, in
fact, derived from “Huihe”), they are two separate groups. See Lipman, Familiar Strangers, p. xxiii.
88. See You Mao, Quan Tang shi shihua, in He Wenhuan 何文煥 (1732–1809), comp., Lidai shihua, p. 53. The couplet is also recorded in Zizhi tongjian, 198.6240; Quan Tang shi, 1.20; and Tang Taizong quanji jiaozhu, p. 97. The inscription of the poem is also mentioned in Jiu Tang shu, 3.59.
89. See Wong, Chinese Steles, pp. 38–40.
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42
Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
so, provides a narratival act of closure. The stele is neither meant to ad-
dress the Huihe, since it was written in Chinese script, nor the Taizong’s