by Chen Jack W
However, what underlies this odd rhetorical antithesis is the recent mem-
ory of Sui Yangdi, who terrorized his court and indulged himself in ex-
—————
77. See Wechsler, “T’ai-tsung (Reign 626–49) the Consolidator,” pp. 200–202.
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On Sovereignty and Representation
travagant pleasure excursions. Taizong, by recalling the Confucian sense
of “roaming,” is both providing a critique of Yangdi’s tyranny and affirm-
ing his own virtuous conduct. When Taizong speaks of roaming, he in-
vokes the complex history of that term, and his choice to go roaming
metaphorically through the past not only shows his fidelity to the words
of Confucius, but also signals the ever-present possibility of tyranny that
was embodied in Yangdi.
Taizong’s meditation on historical texts may be seen as a kind of Hege-
lian sublation ( Aufhebung) of Yangdi’s sensuous excursions, negating and
translating the physical act of roaming into a spiritual one. Within He-
gel’s philosophy, sublation names the central operation of consciousness
as it progresses towards a higher state of self-knowledge, unfolding in a di-
alectical manner, in which the initial term or thesis is both negated and
preserved in its negation. For Hegel, this progression of consciousness
takes place both in terms of the subjective and of the historical, so that it
is not only the individual mind that experiences this kind of dialectical
transformation, but also epochs of human civilization. 78 What may be
understood by the term sublation, however, is not just the progression of
consciousness through a metaphysical history, but precisely the dialectical
form of a logic that simultaneously preserves what is negated. It is this log-
ic that underlies Taizong’s historical revisionism and tropological con-
sciousness insofar as Taizong envisions his own role through a complex
awareness of past models that he seeks to overcome in the course of mak-
ing his own claims of sovereignty. Throughout the “Golden Mirror,” he
makes mention of virtuous rulers, such as the sage-kings Yao, Shun, and
Yu 禹, and contrasts them to tyrants such as Jie (the last ruler of the Xia
dynasty) and Zhou (the last ruler of the Shang). Though Taizong con-
cludes that the Heaven-endowed natures ( xing 性) of the sage-kings were
good and those of the tyrants not good, any determinism is balanced by
the essay’s insistence on constant self-examination and reform. His own
self thereby becomes the prism through which the past must be compre-
—————
78. The concept of Aufhebung is present throughout Hegel’s writings. A succinct discussion can be found in Hegel’s “Preface” to his Phenomenology of Spirit, § 59–66. See Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 36–41. A sublative logic also underlies the description of epochal historical development in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, pp. 124–31.
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On Sovereignty and Representation
85
hended; he is the Hegelian synthesis in the dialectical operation of his-
torical consciousness.
Just as both sage-king and tyrant are aspects of the sovereign, Taizong
recognizes that the imperial body is simultaneously the microcosm of em-
pire and empire’s potential destruction, that it is both sovereign and lo-
cust. As Taizong notes, the very supremacy of the sovereign is what also
poses the greatest dangers:
The sovereign of men resides in an honored and lofty position and wields the
power over reward and punishment. Using the capacities and the might of the
people, what could he undertake that would not be completed? What could he
seek that would not be obtained?
人君處尊高之位，執賞罰之權，用人之才，用人之力，何為不成，何
求不得？
Praise for the sovereign’s power is haunted by the knowledge that power
can always be abused. The Warring States thinker Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 313–
238 bc) once argued that in a world of unlimited desires ( yu 欲) but lim-
ited material resources ( wu 物), there had to be a means by which the in-
evitable chaos could be controlled. This was the function of ritual (li 禮),
which apportioned things according to social hierarchy, thus allowing de-
sires and resources to co-exist in equilibrium.79 While Xunzi describes the
portions and insignia allotted to the sovereign within the ritual order, he
does not acknowledge the more basic problem of how the sovereign can
be limited within this order. What Taizong understands is that the sover-
eign is the one figure whose limitless desires can always be realized, since
the whole world is, in a sense, his portion.
For Taizong, the only solution is the vigilant practice of imperial self-
restraint. The sovereign may use “the capacities and might of the people,”
but this also makes him absolutely dependent upon his subjects for the la-
bor and the revenue that constitute the foundations of his power. The re-
lationship between sovereign and subject is supposed to be a closed econ-
omy of reciprocity, one in which the resources contributed by the empire
are managed wisely by the sovereign and reinvested for the welfare of all.
To waste the contributions of the empire in order to satisfy private desires
would be to lead the empire to ruin. It is at this point that Taizong turns
—————
79. See the opening passage of “Discourse on Ritual” 禮論篇, in Xunzi jijie, 13.19.346.
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86
On Sovereignty and Representation
to the contrast between the example of the tyrant and that of the sage.
Here is his description of tyrannical rulership:
If he were to build numerous ponds and viewing towers, and seek faraway for rare
treasures, then the menfolk would not get to till and weed, and the womenfolk
would not get to raise silkworms and weave. The fields would grow wild, liveli-
hoods would be abandoned, and the common multitudes would die out. If he
could see their hunger and cold and not sorrow for them, or gaze upon their toil
and suffering and not be moved by them, then he is a sovereign who makes his
people suffer, not a ruler who governs his people.
多營池觀，遠求異寶，民不得耕耘，女不得蠶織，田荒業廢，兆庶凋
殘。見其饑寒，不為之哀，睹其勞苦，不為之感，苦民之君也，非治
民之主也。
Taizong then continues with his description of sagely rulership:
However, if he were to reduce taxation and lighten mandatory labor, all
households would have enough to sustain them. From above, there would
be no harsh orders of exaction; from below, there would be the singing of
ballads in praise. Repressing the desires of the [ruler’s] one body would de-
light the people of the world. The
ruler who worries over his state is the sov-
ereign who delights his people.
簿賦輕徭，百姓家給。上無暴令之徵，下有謳歌之詠。屈一身之欲，
樂四海之民，憂國之主也，樂民之君也。
Both of these models are framed by discussions of the economic and social
impact of the imperial pleasure. As with the anecdote of Taizong’s en-
counter with the locusts, it is the agricultural life of the people that is at
stake. In the example of the tyrant, Taizong relates excessive expenditures
to the ruination of the people’s livelihood. He then shifts to the subjective
response of the sovereign who has inflicted such hardships upon his peo-
ple: if he is able to look upon his suffering people and feel no sympathy on
their behalf, then what he does cannot be said to be “governing” ( zhi 治).
The good ruler, on the other hand, makes sure that state exactions do not
result in famine and toil. Again, Taizong turns from the socioeconomic
order back to the sovereign’s subjective response: if the sovereign worries
( you 憂) over his state, then he will ensure the happiness of his
people.
We now come upon the central point of the argument: “Repressing
the desires of the [ruler’s] one body would delight the people of the
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On Sovereignty and Representation
87
world.” The only solution to the fundamental inequality of sovereignty is
to restrain the sovereign’s singular body (literally, his yishen 一身), an act of imperial askēsis. The very limitlessness of sovereign power is what requires the sovereign to impose such strict limits upon himself; these limits
cannot, after all, be imposed from without. In this way, the imbalance be-
tween the sovereign and his subjects would be corrected and the empire
allowed to flourish. Taizong’s logic here is very similar to the two exam-
ples quoted above from recorded speeches. There is a suspicion that the
sovereign must contain himself in order for the empire to survive and
prosper, that the locus of danger to the world resides in the very body of
the ruler.
Following the discussion of the body, Taizong returns to the topic of
employing capable officials who will advise the sovereign, bringing up
once again the necessity of a strong court that could counter any imperial
tendencies towards partiality and self-deception. The problem is that even
worthy men are never entirely good and the vicious never entirely evil,
which complicates the job of the sovereign in selecting the best person for
each office. The capacity to appreciate talent and to judge character is one
of the qualities that the sovereign is supposed to possess, as his singular
position situates him above the factions and interests of the court. At the
same time, however, this state of exceptionality has other implications:
As for the hardness and softness of temperament, each person is different; and in
terms of nature, some are crooked and some are straight. In the rushing course of
history from ancient times to the present, the noble and the base were not ranked
together. How then could filiality for the one above be the same as that for those
below? The one above rectifies the state and settles the household, setting his
mind on preserving reverence and ritual, while those below wear expressions of
delight and charm, only preserving respect and nurture [for their parents].
夫人剛柔之情各異，曲直之性不同。古今奔馳，貴賤不等，為上之
孝，與下豈均？上則匡國寧家，志存崇禮，下則承顏悅色，止存
敬養。
To speak of all filial virtue as the same is to ignore the complex tensions
engendered by the political situation of kinship. The sovereign’s subjects
are supposed to honor their parents, and although moral conflicts may
arise if, for instance, one’s father decides to commit a crime, these are
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On Sovereignty and Representation
problems that can be resolved by choosing either loyalty to the sovereign
or filiality to the parent.80 Taizong argues that the sovereign, by contrast,
has no power of choice, since the welfare of the empire and its inhabitants
is his only priority—he must always act in the public interest, regardless of
the consequences in his private life.
Taizong goes on to discuss both historical figures who had transgressed
the bounds of conventional morality in service to their sovereigns. These
are examples of heroic loyalty and despicable toadying, ostensibly to high-
light the difficulty of the sovereign’s responsibility in employing worthy
men at court. However, following the discussion of filiality, it is clear that
Taizong also has another motive, one that becomes all the more obvious
when he gives as his first example the Duke of Zhou. Taizong writes,
“Grating against the ruler’s ears in order to tread the Way, he slew ‘those
he cherished’ for the sake of pacifying the state—this was the Duke of
Zhou” 逆主耳而履道，戮孔懷以安國，周公是也.81 Taizong is refer-
ring to the succession crisis of following the Zhou conquest of the Shang.
After the Duke of Zhou took the regency, his elder brother Guanshu
Xian 管叔鮮 and his younger brother Caishu Du 蔡叔度 rebelled in the
name of the Shang. The Duke of Zhou put down the rebellion, killing
Guanshu Xian and banishing Caishu Du.82 The parallel to Taizong’s per-
sonal history and the Xuanwu Gate Incident is clear, even if Taizong’s ac-
tions do not precisely echo those of the Duke of Zhou. That is to say, by
conventional definitions, Taizong may not have behaved with filiality or
fraternity, but since his mind was set on the welfare of the empire, his acts
were, in fact, exemplary in their virtue.
Taizong returns to the theme of the sovereign’s hardships, claiming
that no matter what the sovereign does, he will be criticized by the people
for his failures and perceived weaknesses. He writes,
If he turns his back on the Way and goes against the rites, not only will he injure
himself, but moreover, will be the laughingstock of worthy men. If he humbles
—————
80. See the discussion of this issue in Rui Zhu, “What If the Father Commits a Crime?”
81. The locus classicus of the phrase konghuai 孔懷 is “Dwarf Cherry” 常棣 (Poem 164) in the Classic of Poetry, which thematizes the love among brothers: “Death and loss is so dreadful / Only brothers will cherish one another” 死喪之威，兄弟孔懷. See Mao Shi
zhengyi, 9.2.140b, in Shisanjing zhushu, pp. 407–408.
82. See Shi ji, 4.132.
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On Sovereignty and Representation
89
himself and carries out his tasks assiduously, he truly will be a superior man, but
he will be sneered at by undistinguished men.
背道違禮
，非惟損己，乃為賢人之所笑。卑身勵行，實為君子，又為
庸夫之所譏。
Taizong goes on to enumerate other examples of inevitable fault-finding
by the emperor’s subjects, with the point that the sovereign may occupy
the place of supreme power, but he is also the constant object of his sub-
jects’ gazes. The watchful attention of the sovereign, who looks for talent
and ability among his subjects, finds that his gaze is in fact thrown back
upon him, that as he is evaluating his officials’ performances, they are also
evaluating his own performance. It is this passage that speaks most clearly
to Taizong’s consciousness of the imperial role, which traps the sovereign
in a kind of public unfreedom by elevating him above all other men.
Moreover, the power of the sovereign becomes the very source of his
anxieties, as the decisions that he has to make are often decisions bound in
dilemma. Taizong writes,
Of the lands within the Four Seas, “none are not the king’s lands.”83 The outlying
wildernesses are like branches and leaves, while the kingly domain is the root and
trunk. The ancients said that if the skin is not preserved, on what will the hair
depend?84 One should make the trunk firm and let the roots grow deep, and en-
trust matters to the palace councilors—and so Yi Yin and Fu Yue were the sort
that people hoped to encounter.85 When it comes to subjugating the frontiers of
ice and keeping hold on the borderlands of flying snow, then Wei Shang and Li
Mu are rarely met in these days.86 One may have to send forth men to pacify
—————
83. This line alludes to the poem “North Mountains” 北山 (Poem 205) in the Classic of Poetry. See Mao Shi zhengyi, 13.1.195b, in Shisanjing zhushu, p. 463. This particular verse is quoted throughout classical literature as an expression of sovereign power. See, for example, Mengzi 5A.4 / Mengzi zhengyi, 18.637–38. Taizong returns to this image often in his own writings.
84. For the source of this phrase, see Zuo zhuan, Duke Xi 僖公, 14th year / Chunqiu Zuo zhuan zhu, p. 348.
85. Yi Yin 伊尹 was the minister of Tang, the legendary founder of the Shang dynasty.
See Shi ji, 3.93–99 passim. Fu Yue 傅說 was minister to Wuding 武丁, the first historical ruler of the Shang. Supposedly, Wuding dreamt that he had obtained the services of a sage, and when he searched for this man, discovered him to be a convict-laborer. See Shi ji, 3.102.