Embedded in this reasoning is the concept of the authorization for jihad exemplified by the historic struggle of Saladin against the Crusaders—a coincidence magnified by the frequent pejorative references to “Crusaders” by contemporary radical Muslim advocates of revolutionary jihad, who, associate any kind of Western influence with the Crusades. Fundamentally, though, the rationale is that the duty to protect Islam and the territory of Islam is every Muslim’s, and that this universal duty is what gives particular spokespersons for revolutionary action the right to call for jihad. In doing so they are not claiming the authority to declare offensive jihad, for this would be a usurpation of a right the classical tradition reserves to the imam of all the dar-al-Islam; rather, they are simply calling for all Muslims to do their duty to defend Islam from attack.35
That bin Laden’s approach probably is the most effective available to him has largely gone unrecognized in the West, although the Muslim scholar Professor Khalid Abou El-Fadl has written in the journal Ethics and International Affairs that “it is important to note that the notion of defensive jihad is well-rooted in the classical [Islamic] juristic tradition and that contemporary Islam has not had a problem in adopting the idea of a defensive jihad.”36 Indeed, the Islamic world accepted the concept of a defensive jihad without reserve when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and it has revalidated that acceptance by its unstinting support for Islamist fighters in Bosnia, Kashmir, and Chechnya.
Aside from El-Fadl and Professor Bernard Lewis, perhaps only Professor Magnus Ranstorp has recognized the potential impact of bin Laden’s words. “In an effort to mobilize the masses to support this ‘self-defense struggle,’” Ranstorp maintains, “bin Laden taps into the collective Muslim psyche by skillfully exploiting massacres of Muslims in Iraq, Bosnia, Chechnya, and even Qana (Lebanon), linking these to historical battles between Muslims and their enemies by then remolding them into a contemporary context. These themes naturally invoke broad Muslim grievances, especially as the phraseology refers to crusades and ‘martyrdom.’”37
Dealing with the Devil
Bin Laden has a clear strategic goal—defeating the United States—and the most important issue for him is attaining that goal. He has not, however, scripted the tactical means for accomplishing the goal. On the road to success, bin Laden has made it clear that odd bedfellows will turn up and that religious purity and identical beliefs will not be required from all of the jihad’s allies, associates, and contacts, noting that in more than fourteen centuries of Islamic history “there were many types of dealings between the Muslim nation and other nations in times of peace and war, including treaties and matters to do with commerce.” British journalist Mark Huband has noted that bin Laden’s approach is not unique; before World War II, for example, Algeria’s senior association of ulema cooperated with Algerian Communists against the French.38
While bin Laden may not exactly be a proponent of an “ends justify the means” policy, he is within arm’s length of it. As in all the issues he addresses, bin Laden finds religious justification for such an approach, saying that Islamist leaders should “be using every good as well as sinful person, for God supports this in the interest of the cause of religion.” In his Declaration of Jihad, bin Laden wrote that throughout Islamic history, Islamic scholars have held that there are times when devout Muslims must work with the less devout, and even the sinful, if they are to repel the enemy attacking the Muslim world. For bin Laden, the top Muslim priority is to defeat the Crusaders, and he asserts that the medieval Islamic jurist Shaykh al-Islam Ibn-Tammiyah, as well as the Prophet Muhammad, sanctioned something akin to working with the devil. “If warding off the aggressive enemy,” bin Laden wrote,
becomes impossible without all Muslims of all walks and ranks getting together, then that is their duty and they should in that case overlook some disputed issues. Overlooking such disputes at this stage is less harmful than the continuation of the great heresy afflicting the countries of the Muslims. That is why Shaykh al-Islam, explaining the matter, pointed out a main and great principle which should be taken into account, which is that work should concentrate on warding off the greater of two evils. Referring to the state of the mujahedin and the Muslims, he said that if among them there happened to be very sinful soldiers, that would not justify abandoning the jihad against the aggressive enemy…. That is why one of the principles of the Sunnah and the [Prophet’s] group is to do conquest using every good as well as sinful person, for God supports this in the interest of the cause of religion because, as the Prophet, may God’s prayers and blessings be upon him, said, if conquest can only be achieved with the help of sinful princes or very sinful soldiers, then one of two things must be done: Either abandon the conquest with their cooperation, which means the greater harm of others taking over, or proceed with the conquest along with the sinful princes, and that way the greater harm is avoided and most of the rules of Islam are established, if not all.39
Remembering bin Laden’s just-cited words will stand the reader in good stead as he or she finds the forces of bin Laden cooperating, or at least in contact, with an eclectic assortment of nominal Muslims; heretics; infidels; atheists; European, Russian, and South Asian gangsters; gray-market arms dealers; and narcotraffickers—each of whom has potential for helping facilitate al Qaeda’s anti-U.S. activities. As will be seen, bin Laden’s version of Churchill’s claim that he would speak well of Satan if Satan would attack Hitler will be echoed when al Qaeda is found working with Iraq’s intelligence service; Lebanese and Iranian Shia of the deepest heretical hue; Italian criminal groups; China’s 14K organized crime gang; and Chechen, Albanian, South Asian, and Russian mafia chiefs, among them former Red Army and KGB officers who once could be found cheerfully torturing and killing Afghan civilians and mujahedin when the Soviets occupied Afghanistan.40 In terms of his finances, bin Laden’s willingness to deal with the devil suggests that he has worked through Western banks when necessary and has been able to tolerate earning some interest for the good of the jihad.
Another facet of this theme deals with how bin Laden views the certainty that his forces will kill Muslims when attacking Crusaders and Jews. After the heavy casualties caused by the August 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, some Western and Islamic media commentators speculated that bin Laden would be deterred from similar attacks because of the large number of non-U.S. citizens, including African Muslims, killed or wounded in the attacks. The media argued that bin Laden would be more careful next time so as not to risk his popularity among Muslims. This speculation, which certainly has been put to rest by the destruction of the World Trade Center, which housed firms that included Muslim-world employees, fell away as early as December 1998, when Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai interviewed bin Laden for ABC News. In reviewing the East Africa attacks, Yusufzai asked bin Laden “if the targets of jihads are Americans, how can the death of so many Africans be justified?” In response, bin Laden basically said that deaths of this sort, though regrettable, were unavoidable and religiously permissible.
Suppose that the Americans have attacked an Islamic country and kidnapped my children, the children of Osama bin Laden, to use as a shield, and then started to kill Muslims as is the case in Lebanon, Palestine, and these days in Iraq, and also when they supported the Serbs in massacring the Muslims in Bosnia. According to Islamic jurisprudence if we abstain from firing on the Americans lest we should kill these Muslims (used by them as shields), the harm that could befall Muslims at large, who are being attacked, outweighs the good of saving the lives of these Muslims used as shields.
This means that in a case like this, when it becomes apparent that it would be impossible to repel these Americans without assaulting them, even if this involved the killing of Muslims, this is permissible under Islam.41
In terms of the historical application of Islamic law, it appears bin Laden is correct and the speculations of Western experts are ill-founded. Regarding the law covering t
he treatment of Islam’s non-Muslim enemies, J. T. Johnson has held that “the fundamental principle was that after unbelievers in the dar-al-Harb [house of war] had been issued the call of Islam (the da’wa) and refused it, they might be killed combatants and non-combatants alike.” Johnson’s analysis is validated by the late HAMAS spiritual leader Shaykh Ahmad Yasin in precisely the terms bin Laden uses to call for attacks on civilians as well as military personnel. “Any Israeli,” Yasin declared in December 2000, “who walks on the street will be considered a member of the Israeli army…. All the Israeli people are recruits [for military service]. Therefore the spilling of their blood is lawful.”
Although Islamic history has documented cases where non-Muslim civilians were spared by Muslim warriors, the decision was not based on the idea that the individuals had “rights derived from nature or from considerations of fairness or justice, but rather that they are potentially of value to the Muslims [as slaves, hostages, servants, etc.].” J. T. Johnson has explained that the decision to spare a non-Muslim was made solely on the criteria of what would be of most benefit to Muslims; and that, further, even Muslim casualties caused by Muslims during a jihad were acceptable as long as they were not intended.
The general principle that all enemies might nonetheless be killed provided the rationale that permitted the besieging of enemy cities, along with the use of inherently indiscriminate weapons like catapults and bows and arrows, even though this led to the harming of noncombatants….
In the siege or in the storming of an enemy city whatever measures are necessary to subdue the city may be taken: it would be [according to Islamic jurists] “permissible to inundate a city in the territory of war with water, to burn it with fire, or to attack [its people] with mangonels, even though there may be slaves, women, old men and children” or even Muslim merchants or, at the extreme, Muslim children in the city…. But while Muslims may carry on their warfare, they should not intend to harm those who should not be harmed. If such harms occurs, that is the result of war, and the Muslim soldiers do not incur guilt from it.42
Every Little Bit Helps
Bin Laden wants Islam’s defensive jihad against the Crusaders to be waged by Islamist organizations and by individual Muslims, a position he believes God sanctions. The role of Islamist organizations—al Qaeda, the World Islamic Front, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the Taliban, and so forth—to date has been the core element of the jihad. Quoting Islamic scholars and jurists, however, bin Laden has said that God is not content to see the struggle waged only by organizations and that the Koran calls for every Muslim to kill Americans and destroy or steal their property and money; the taking of booty—in terms of material assets and slaves—has long been an integral component of the conduct of jihad, according to Professor James Turner Johnson.43 In several statements, bin Laden has highlighted Shaykh al-Islam Ibn-Tammiyah’s dictum that the Islamic “duty of self defense … is unconditional and is done according to means…. The severest defensive war is the war to repel an invader threatening the sanctities and the faith. This war is the duty of all.” In a do-what-you-can-where-you-can appeal to the Muslim world in his Declaration of Jihad, bin Laden echoed Ibn-Tammiyah’s words. “Brother Muslims worldwide,” bin Laden wrote, “your brothers in the land of the two holy mosques and Palestine seek your help and ask you to participate with them in their jihad against their enemies and yours, the Israelis and the Americans, with everything that would drive them out of the Islamic holy places, with each of you doing what he can.”44
Bin Laden has said he does not expect Muslims to make conventional military attacks against the Crusaders in the jihad’s initial phase. To the members of the Saudi military and security services, for example, he said in 1996 that he was certain they wanted to attack U.S. forces “to restore the nation’s glory and liberate its occupied holy sites,” but he warned that “due to the lack of parity between our regular Armed Forces and the enemy’s forces … it is wise to spare the Armed Forces the task of engaging in traditional fighting with the Crusader enemy’s forces.” It is far better, bin Laden said, for the Saudi military to let “the people’s sons other than the Armed Forces” confront the crusaders by “waging guerrilla warfare.” In his do-what-you-can modus operandi, however, bin Laden made clear there was an important role for each Saudi serviceman. “What your mujahedin brothers and sons want from you at this stage,” he explained, “is to provide every possible support: information and materials and arms needed for their work. And they want the security men—in particular—to turn a blind eye and deceive the enemy about their whereabouts, spread false rumors among its ranks, and do whatever is liable to help the mujahedin against the occupying enemy.”45
Bin Laden also has spent much time urging Muslims to ready individual attacks on Westerners. “It is a great honor,” bin Laden said in late 1996, “for every Muslim to defend his Qiblah [the direction Muslims face to pray] and liberate it from these aggressors who are plundering its riches.”46
Bin Laden has reminded Muslims that Allah has called them to “fight and slay the pagans wherever you find them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war).”47 He also told them to ignore “Crusader” efforts to identify “the mujahedin as terrorists, [for] the following proverb applies to them: ‘She found comfort in accusing me of her own illness.’”48 Following his chief’s lead, Aymen Zawahiri has stressed how easy it is for individual Muslims to attack Crusaders. “Tracking down Americans and Jews is not impossible,” he wrote in his 2001 book Knights under the Prophet’s Banner.
Killing them with a single bullet, a stab, or device made up of a popular mix of explosives or hitting them with an iron rod is not impossible. Burning down their property with Molotov cocktails is not difficult. With the available means, small groups could prove to be a frightening horror for the Americans and the Jews.49
To all Muslims, bin Laden has said, “I confirm that all the youth, and the whole nation [ummah], should concentrate their [jihad] efforts on Americans and Zionists because they are the head of the spear that has been pointed at the nation and delivered into the nation’s heart, and that every effort concentrated on the Americans and Zionists will bring good, direct and positive results. Therefore, if someone can kill an American soldier, it is better than wasting time on other matters.”50 On this point, bin Laden concluded in his February 1998 fatwa: “The ruling to kill Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it…. We—with God’s help—call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever you find them.”51
The Obligation of the Young
Bin Laden has always made a special appeal to Muslim youths, instructing them on their religious duty to participate in jihad and urging Muslim scholars to “teach [young] Muslims that there is no honor except in jihad in the way of God.” In March 1998, for example, he sent a letter to Al-Quds Al-Arabi asserting that this era requires “young men, ulema, notables, traders and tribal chiefs to move out of Muslim countries to work in God’s cause, and run the jihad-for-God’s-cause battalions in order to expel the occupying invaders.” In August 1999, bin Laden added that, “young Muslim men … should devote their life to the religion and should opt for jihad.” Sounding like a biblical prophet, bin Laden told the young “There are a lot of ways to earn this world, but there is only one to earn the life hereafter. Follow that way and the world will fall into your lap.”52
Many Western and some Muslim commentators characterize bin Laden’s appeal to the young as a cynical attempt to manipulate the misery and hopelessness of the most economically deprived segment of Muslim society. They argue that bin Laden’s message does not elicit support from believers ready to defend their faith, but only from disenfranchised youths who have nowhere else to turn. “The difficulty in destroying this threat [from bin Laden and Sunni m
ilitancy],” then-director of Central Intelligence George Tenet said in early 2000, “lies in the fact that our efforts will not be enough to overcome the fundamental causes of the phenomenon—poverty, alienation, disaffection, and ethnic hatred deeply rooted in history.” The director, it must be noted, avoided mentioning the possibility of Islam being part of the militants’ motivation. Similarly, another commentator said that bin Laden’s war “is a war of the disillusioned who blame their grievances on the West…. [F]undamentalism has given deprived youth a chance to escape the feelings of inferiority engendered by the hegemony of Western culture,” while an “unnamed” U.S. official told the Philadelphia Inquirer in 1999 that “bin Laden preaches about a lost Golden Age of Islam, destroyed by the West and its culture. He offers them [young men] hope for a better life and someone to blame for their current predicament.”53
Ascribing the motivation for lethal Sunni militancy to poverty and deprivation appeals to a Western mind used to believing that social problems are always remediable through material improvements. It also suits those in the West who identify people in the twenty-five- to thirty-year age bracket as “youths” and have forgotten that in their own history that it is always the eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds who do the fighting and dying in war. The divide between Western and Islamic culture on this issue is very broad, but bin Laden’s words—as always—provide a useful insight into the reason why fighting falls to the young in his cultural context.
Through Our Enemies' Eyes Page 11