Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing: Current Developments and Future Directions

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by Ray Bull, Tim Valentine, Dr Tom Williamson


  alone. The fact that these statements were so different from what actually hap-

  pened to Christel in her granny ’ s house – as far as we can tell from the crime

  scene – and given the semen of an unknown man on Christel ’ s body caused

  the court to acquit the two men in the retrial. The donor of the semen has

  still not been found.

  To determine that the confessions were indeed false, a thorough analysis of

  the tapes of the interrogations and the rest of the case fi le would have been

  necessary. In the Steered balcony murder it could be demonstrated using the

  tapes how the suspect ’ s statements were steered by the police offi cers ’ sugges-

  tions. In the Putten murder case there were no tapes to analyse. That made it

  much more diffi cult to draw fi rm conclusions. But it is not unusual for tapes

  of interrogations not to exist or not always be available. What are the possibili-

  ties then?

  The c ontent of the c onfession: on f orms of k nowledge

  In many countries it is not customary to tape all suspect interrogations. In the

  Netherlands, for instance, taping interrogations was rare until recently. Now

  there are plans to videotape interrogations in all very serious cases, like murder

  and rape. The prosecution, the defence and the court used to rely entirely on

  the police report of the interrogations. The reports used to be, at best, a

  summary of all that was said, but often was no more than a summary of what

  the interrogators deemed relevant at the time of the interrogation.

  Still, these police reports do allow for a check on the truthfulness of a con-

  fession. Let me give an example: the Schiedam Park murder (for a fuller

  description of this case, see Van Koppen, 2003; 2008 ). On 22 June 2000 two

  children, Nienke aged 10 years and her 11

  - year - old friend Maikel, were

  playing in the Beatrixpark in Schiedam, a town near Rotterdam. After a while,

  they thought it was time to go home for dinner. While going to retrieve their

  bicycles which they had left a little distance away, a young man grabbed them

  by their necks and walked them some 90 m into bushes. The attacker ordered

  the children to undress themselves, then he stabbed Maikel several times

  around his neck. Finally, he strangled both children using the shoelaces from

  the army boots Maikel was wearing. Maikel survived by playing dead; Nienke

  was killed.

  After the assailant left, Maikel stepped out of the bushes, naked with the

  shoelace and boot still around his neck. He approached a man who was stand-

  ing on a bridge near the bushes. That man stopped a passing cyclist, Kees

  Borsboom, who then called the police using his mobile phone.

  In the two days following the murder Maikel was interviewed by the police

  in hospital, where he stayed for a few days because of his stab wounds. He

  told the police what had happened and also gave a description of the killer: a

  man aged between 20 and 35 years, 1.80 m tall, extremely pale, with acne and

  a scruffy face, the pustules on the attacker ’ s face were scratched and were

  Finding False Confessions

  63

  oozing blood and pus. As it later turned out, Maikel ’ s statements were extremely

  accurate. The offender description was correct to the point of even describing

  the man ’ s unusual features. Maikel was the only direct witness of the man

  taking the two children into the bushes or attempting to murder them.

  Some weeks before the murder Kees Borsboom, the man who called the

  police, asked a boy in the same park whether he wanted to earn 25 guilders.

  Although the boy said ‘ no ’ , Borsboom said: ‘ If you jerk me off, I ’ ll give you

  25 guilders. ’ The boy ran home. Some time after the murder the boy saw

  Borsboom again, went home and collected his father. His father, a police

  offi cer, identifi ed himself to Borsboom and asked him what he had done to

  his son. Borsboom apologized immediately and told the police offi cer that he

  was in therapy for his behaviour and that he would never do it again.

  Nevertheless, he agreed to attend the police station a few days later. Before

  the meeting, the police offi cer entered Borsboom ’ s name in the police com-

  puter and saw he was a witness in the Nienke murder case. From that moment

  on, Borsboom was the prime suspect. He was prosecuted and convicted both

  by the district court and the Court of Appeals. He was sentenced to 18 years

  in prison, followed by compulsory confi nement in a forensic mental hospital;

  which in this case is effectively a whole - life sentence.

  Borsboom did not fi t the offender description given by Maikel at all and

  was, in fact, innocent. We know this because another man confessed to the

  murder some years later. He had intimate knowledge of the crime and his

  DNA matched samples from the scene of the crime. But let us return to Kees

  Borsboom.

  During a weekend in September 2000 Borsboom made confessions. His

  interrogations were not recorded, nor was his attorney present, even though

  the attorney had asked to attend. The prosecutor refused. Borsboom later

  contended that the interrogations were made under duress. Of course, the two

  interrogating police offi cers denied this. Even at the time, there were indica-

  tions that Borsboom was telling the truth. His confessions should have been

  suspected, not because Borsboom said they were false – a lot of suspects say

  so afterwards – but because his story was so different in so many details from

  Maikel ’ s that the police should never have trusted his confessions. Please

  remember that Maikel was the only true eyewitness of the murder.

  Let me give a few examples. 1) Maikel told the police that the killer

  grabbed them by the neck and said, ‘ Come on, come with me ’ . He had a

  knife in his hand all the time. Borsboom in his confession, however, said that

  to begin with the knife was in his hand, but put it in his pocket when he

  seized the children. 2) Maikel said that the killer ordered them to undress.

  Maikel had trouble taking off his army boots, so the killer started pulling

  them and jerking his clothes. Borsboom maintained that he did not touch the

  children while they were undressing until they were naked. 3) The killer was

  wearing a blue baseball cap. Borsboom said he was wearing no cap. In fact,

  none of the people who encountered him that day saw him with any hat. 4)

  The sequence in which the killer did everything in the bushes differs between

  Maikel ’ s and Borsboom ’ s versions.

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  Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing

  Why, then, did the police not see all these discrepancies in Borsboom ’ s

  confessions? There is a simple, though illogical, reason: they did not trust

  Maikel. Many in the team thought that Maikel might have killed Nienke. The

  police hired an educationalist, Ruud Bullens, to give guidance on the inter-

  viewing of Maikel and to serve the interests of Maikel during the interviews.

  Almost from the beginning, they did not trust Maikel much, even long before

  Borsboom had been arrested. The major reason for that seems to be that

  Maikel was much more intelligent than the police offi cers; they cons
idered

  him to be a very odd boy. Also, Maikel had displayed behaviour that was

  considered odd: he did not yell at any point in time during the attack, even

  though a lot of people were passing by the bushes. More important, Bullens

  told the police that Maikel had ‘ a big secret ’ , without specifying what that

  secret might be and without explaining – also afterwards – how he knew. The

  police suspected that Maikel had killed Nienke, stabbed and strangled himself

  and, moreover, concealed the knife, which has never been found. After

  Borsboom ’ s arrest, the police tried to explain away the blatant differences

  between the confessions and the statements made by Maikel by rigorously

  interviewing Maikel again. The child did not give an inch, so the explanation

  had to be done by other means. This was done, again, using the statements

  of Bullens and a psychologist who reviewed the tapes of Maikel ’ s interviews.

  Following their expert reports, it was concluded that the perception of Maikel

  has been so blurred by the high emotional tone of the situation, that his state-

  ments could not be trusted. So, the police, prosecution and courts did not

  trust his offender description and all the parts of his statements that contra-

  dicted the confession made by Borsboom.

  Of course, there is no logic to this, but none of the trial participants seems

  to have bothered about this. Either Borsboom was the killer and Miakel was

  innocent and there is no reason to disbelieve him, or Borsboom is innocent,

  and only then is there reason to suspect Maikel and distrust him. Considering

  Borsboom guilty and distrusting Maikel at the same time – the police ’ s choice

  – seems perverse.

  Intimate knowledge of the crime is an important measure for the veracity

  of a confession. In fact, Dutch police offi cers learn during training that a

  suspect saying he committed a crime is of no interest. A suspect ’ s account

  should conform to evidence the police have from other sources.

  Testing a confession in this manner is less straightforward than it seems at

  fi rst sight. First, if suspect ’ s story is in line with evidence from other sources,

  that can only be seen as a sign of the veracity of the confession in combination

  with knowledge that the suspect did not get the information from other

  sources. So, we must know that police offi cers did not feed the relevant infor-

  mation to the suspect. A fi rst step is that interrogations are tape - recorded. But

  then still we need to know that the police offi cers did not disclose intimate

  knowledge for instance when transporting the suspect from prison to the

  police station. Also, we need to establish the suspect did not get information

  from other sources, for instance because he was present at the scene of the

  Finding False Confessions

  65

  crime, but not in the role of perpetrator, or the crime story was told to him

  later by the perpetrator.

  In that sense, it is easier to establish that a confession is false. If a suspect

  does not have intimate knowledge of the crime at all or confesses to all kinds

  of wrong information, as Borsboom did for the killing of Nienke, the conclu-

  sion can be drawn that the confession is false.

  In this vein Han Isra ë ls proposed another form of knowledge that can be used

  to test the confession. He called this police knowledge (Isra ë ls, 2004 ; Isra ë ls &

  Van Koppen, 2006 ), using the Ina Post case to demonstrate how that works.

  On the evening of 22 August 1986 the corpse of 89 - year - old Ms. Kolstee

  was found in her apartment in Leidschendam, near The Hague. The police

  investigation soon turned to women who worked at a care institution for the

  elderly and who looked after Ms. Kolstee. She was not only murdered; cheques

  were stolen from her apartment, most of which were cashed. Some (but not

  all) of the carers were subjected to a writing test and only the handwriting of

  Ina Post vaguely resembled the handwriting on the cheques. She thus became

  the prime suspect. She had been interrogated in the apartment, helping the

  police to establish what might have been stolen. On 8 September, Post was

  arrested and on 11 September she confessed. There were no tape - recordings

  of the interrogations; that was unheard of in these days. In the police report

  Post is quoted as saying: ‘ In my previous statements I did not tell the truth.

  Now I am prepared to do so. … I needed the money, my accounts were in

  the red. ’ She told how she opened a cupboard looking for money. When Ms.

  Kolstee entered the room, Post hit her with her walking stick. Ms. Kolstee fell

  unconscious. ‘ I panicked ’ , Ina Post claimed, and she strangled Ms. Kolstee

  with an electric cord.

  The Ina Post case is special in that she was interrogated in the course of an

  ongoing police investigation. A lot was unknown to the police at that point.

  In fact, they were entertaining some strong misconceptions. These can be

  traced in Post ’ s confessions, proving that what she confessed to could not have

  come from her own memory but could only have been suggested to her by

  the police. Let me give some examples.

  Post confessed during the course of several interrogations, starting on the

  night of 11 September. That evening she told the custody offi cer in the police

  station that she wanted to be interrogated under hypnosis. He phoned the

  offi cer in charge of the investigation at home, who with another police offi cer

  returned to the police station. The other police offi cer drove past Ms. Kolstee ’ s

  apartment to collect her mail. In the mail was a bank statement showing that

  all the cheques to that account were presented on 4 September (remember

  the murder took place on Friday, 22 August). So, the police assumed that all

  the cheques were cashed, starting on the Monday after the murder. That

  evening Post confessed that she cashed almost all the cheques during the week

  after the murder, between 1 and 4 September. Only later, when the police

  received the original cheques from the bank, did it turn out that the cheques

  were all cashed not at banks, but at a department store and not in the week

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  Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing

  after the murder, but the very next day, 23 August. What happened next?

  During the next interrogation Post confessed that she cashed the cheques on

  Saturday, 23 August at a department store in The Hague. So, we can be certain

  that Post only told the police she cashed the cheques in the week after the

  murder because she was following police suggestions.

  The same can be seen in several other parts of her confessions. To give a

  second example, Ina Post confessed she stole several items, among which was

  a folder containing bank statements. That seemed intimate knowledge at the

  time, but we know now was based on police suggestion. What happened?

  Scene of crime detectives found the folder and examined it for traces. The

  interrogating police offi cers, however, were under the impression that it was

  missing. Thus Ina Post confessed that she had stolen it.

  Let me give one other example. All the cheques were cashed at the depart-

  me
nt store ’ s money counter for the maximum amount, except one. That one

  was used to buy something in the department store. Ina Post confessed to

  that, but her account was very odd. She confessed that she bought something

  costing 34 guilders – the amount written on the cheque – but did not know

  what she bought. This is alien to how people think: we usually remember what

  we have bought better than we can remember how much it costs.

  Han Isra ë ls defi ned such knowledge as police knowledge: the suspect con-

  fesses to something that can only be traced back to inaccurate suggestions

  made by the police. The police knowledge in Post ’ s confessions proves that

  she got her knowledge of the crime from suggestions made by the police

  offi cers and not from her own memory.

  Police knowledge thus can prove that the confession is false, or at least that

  a certain part of the confession is false. This poses the question of how much

  police knowledge is needed before we can conclude that the whole of the

  confession is false. In the same vein the question can be posed how much

  wrong intimate knowledge of the crime is necessary before we can conclude

  that the whole of the confession is false. I do not have a ready answer to that,

  but some elements seem relevant here. First, of course, it matters whether

  police knowledge or inaccurate intimate knowledge concerns central or periph-

  eral elements of the crime. Second, some knowledge of that kind might be a

  much stronger indication of a false confession than other kinds of knowledge.

  A system comparable to what Olson & Wells ( 2004 ) proposed for alibis may

  be useful for confessions. Third, and last, it must be noted that using police

  knowledge and inaccurate intimate knowledge can logically prove that the

  confession is false.

  Conclusions

  Much knowledge has been gathered on false confessions and why suspects

  make them. Most of that knowledge, however, is concerned with what may

  predict or elicit a false confession. Forensic practice, however, requires different

  Finding False Confessions

  67

  knowledge, namely how in retrospect a true confession can be distinguished

  from a false one. Less is known about how to overcome the problem. In this

 

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