On March 22 Count Pourtalés, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, handed a brief written communication to Isvolski couched in urgent and peremptory terms. Unless Russia immediately recognized the annexation of Bosnia and persuaded Serbia to do likewise, Germany would let Austria loose upon Serbia, and a war would follow, in which Germany would sustain her ally to any extent that might be necessary. Isvolski, thunderstruck, hesitated to speak. ‘Very well,’ said the German, ‘then it will be war.’ Isvolski on this said he would consult his colleagues and the Czar. The Russian Council of State sat for four hours that same day. In the evening Russia submitted unconditionally to the German demand. She did not even consult with France or England. The Czar and his ministers believed probably with good reason that even a day’s delay would be fatal. They saw themselves about to be attacked and invaded by Germany and Austria. Their army was still recovering from the disasters of the Manchurian campaigns. The revolutionary movement which had shaken the throne and the Russian state had scarcely subsided. This was no time to stand on dignity. Five years before France had dismissed Delcassé in the same dire plight. Now Russia in her turn must answer the stern Teuton summons, ‘Obey or fight.’ Russia obeyed.
When on the 25th a similar request somewhat differently framed was made by Germany to Sir Edward Grey in London, he handed the German Ambassador, Count Metternich, the following brief memorandum upon which the Liberal Cabinet had agreed:
‘The assurance of a readiness to accept Baron d’Aerenthal’s declaration respecting the annexation at a future conference affects only one of the various questions which have been raised by the action of Austria last autumn. At the present moment His Majesty’s Government are deeply interested in the preservation of the peace of Europe and therefore in a settlement of the Serbian crisis in particular. The assurance for which the German Government ask while involving an alteration of the Treaty of Berlin leaves the Serbian question unsettled and makes no provision for the solution of other questions relating to the Treaty of Berlin in which England and the other European Powers are equally interested. His Majesty’s Government are not disposed to give the assurance required until the Serbian question has been settled in a pacific manner on lines satisfactory to them and the other Powers and until a solution has been assured of other questions arising from the annexation of Bosnia by Austria especially the alteration of Article 29.2 When this result has been obtained His Majesty’s Government will be ready to agree to any peaceful settlement based on mutual good-will amongst the Powers.’2
Metternich read the paper with surprise and deepening gloom. ‘This is a very grave decision,’ he said, ‘which imperils peace.’ ‘I replied,’ said Grey, ‘that this could only mean that Austria intended to attack Serbia, or to dictate terms to her, if we did not do what Austria asked. The British Government would never consent to act under pressure of this kind.’ Thus for the first time the opposing wills of Germany and Great Britain met squarely. The two Governments seemed to look into each other’s eyes. A silence followed. This action was taken by Great Britain with the knowledge of the Russian collapse, and without seeking aid from France. Girt with the sea and her naval supremacy as yet unchallenged, she could afford to preserve her self-respect if need be in isolation. She was not in the cage with the eagles.
None the less, all resistance to the wishes of the Teutonic allies was at an end. Sir Edward Grey could do no more than arrange the form of reply which Serbia would have to make to the Austrian demand in terms as little wounding to Serbia as possible. It was only with difficulty that Aerenthal was induced to allow Serbia to include the phrase ‘sure of the peaceful intentions of Austria-Hungary, Serbia will bring her army back to the condition of the spring of 1908.’ He was anxious that it should be clear to all that she had submitted under duress. With this concession Serbia had to be content. She formally declared that she abandoned all protest against the annexation of Bosnia, and promised to live with Austria-Hungary in the future as a good neighbour. A convention was also drawn up between Bulgaria and Turkey in which Turkey recognized the independence of Bulgaria. All the Great Powers thereupon signified their agreement unconditionally to the modification of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin and recognized the annexation of Bosnia. No satisfaction of any kind was provided for Russia from Article 29. She was left to ponder upon events. Isvolski, deeply humiliated before Europe and blamed by his countrymen for exposing Russia to the worst rebuff she had suffered in living memory in time of peace, was only sustained by the indulgence of the Czar; and that only for a time. In 1910 he quitted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and became Ambassador in Paris. Here also he had a part to play. Aerenthal’s triumph was thus complete.
Sir Arthur Nicolson, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, writing while the impression of the Russian submission was strong upon him, said:
‘After this easy victory, I should not be surprised if greater demands were made of Russia…. My firm opinion is that both Germany and Austria are carrying out a line of policy and action carefully prepared and thought out. Algeciras had to be revenged: the “ring” broken through and the Triple Entente dissipated…. The Franco-Russian alliance has not borne the test: and the Anglo-Russian entente is not sufficiently strong or sufficiently deep-rooted to have any appreciable influence. The hegemony of the Central Powers will be established in Europe, and England will be isolated. The activity in building up the German navy is significant; and the sudden entry of Germany on the scene here is also significant. When we have passed through the present Sturm und Drang period, I should not be surprised if we were to find both France and Russia gravitating rapidly towards the Central Powers, as neither of the former, distrustful of each other, feels that she can stand alone against the power of the central combination…. The ultimate aims of Germany surely are, without doubt, to obtain the preponderance on the continent of Europe, and when she is strong enough, and apparently she is making very strenuous efforts to become so, she will enter on a contest with us for maritime supremacy. In past times we have had to fight Holland, Spain and France for this supremacy, and personally I am convinced that sooner or later, we shall have to repeat the same struggle with Germany.’3
Such were the reflections of this eminent and accomplished diplomatist, soon after to become the head of the British Foreign Office. They were surely serious conclusions to spring from the trumpery change involved in converting Austria’s sovereignty of Bosnia from fact into form. For all the evils brought to the structure of European peace by this episode, Aerenthal was alone to blame. He could have gained his point in all probability without serious friction. He could have carried Isvolski with him if he had treated him with ordinary consideration, or even good faith. His craft and ineptitude had made his victory dear-bought.
Some of the reactions expected by Nicolson were not to occur. Russia considered that she had a powerful friend to gain in Britain. The relations of the two countries became more intimate. The reorganization and expansion of the Russian army proceeded and her strategic railways, fed by French loans, grew steadily. The Czar undertook a journey of state to Italy by a route which in spite of pressing invitations meticulously avoided setting foot upon Austrian soil. His meeting with the King of Italy at Racconigi proclaimed that common interests existed between the two countries. Germany persevered with ever-increasing energy in her plan of building a fleet of which ‘the strongest navy in the world’ should stand in awe; and Great Britain, after some internal disputing, laid in the single year of 1909 the keels of no less than eight Dreadnought battleships unsurpassed for size and power. During that year the naval rivalry and its consequent tension between Germany and Great Britain became the dominant fact in Europe. The cleavages in the structure of Europe were no longer even concealed. Italy became noticeably detached from the Central Empires. Germany and Austria drew more tightly together; and France, Russia and Great Britain began to be united by individual injuries and common dangers.
CHAPTER III
TOWARD
S THE ABYSS
Nearly five years intervened between the annexation of Bosnia and the crisis which led to the World War. They were years of acutely increasing tension marked at intervals by shocks and tremors. On two occasions, as we can now see, Europe must have come very near to the brink. The processes of decay or disruption in the Austro-Hungarian empire, the effort of Ottoman revival, and the growth of the power and assertiveness of the Balkan states were all continuous. The characteristic of this period is that Austria had now to deal with a Russia profoundly estranged. Beneath the surface of correct diplomacy and much superficial affability all the nations of Europe steadily and rapidly increased and perfected their armaments by sea and land.
In the spring of 1911 a French expedition occupied Fez. This development of the Anglo-French agreement about Morocco irritated German feeling. Some small German commercial interests were alleged to exist around a sandy bay on the Atlantic coast of Morocco called Agadir. The new German Foreign Minister, Count von Kiderlen-Waechter, brought these claims to the notice of the French government. The French declared with truth that there were no German interests at Agadir, nor in its hinterland—not a harbour, not a trading establishment, not a house, not a bale of goods, not a German! Nevertheless, recognizing that Germany had some grievance about French expansion in Morocco they were prepared to offer some territorial compensation in the Congo basin. As for Agadir they proposed a joint visit of accredited French and German representatives to the desolate spot in order to examine the facts or want of facts about the German interests there. Suddenly on July 1 it was announced that the German Emperor had sent a gunboat, the Panther, to maintain and protect German interests at Agadir. The Panther was already on her way.
The alarm which this abrupt, but otherwise trifling action caused throughout Europe is the measure of the strain of those times. The act of Germany might mean nothing or everything. If it meant nothing, why was it done? Clearly it was intended to raise large issues. July and August were dangerous months. By the middle of August the harvests of Europe are largely gathered and the stubble fields are cleared for war. If Germany intended to pick a quarrel with unlimited consequences July 1 was a convenient military date to choose for opening the debate. After the long story of Bismarck’s calculated and successful wars and the various later episodes which have been here recorded, culminating in the summary treatment of Russia in April 1909 and the German Emperor’s ‘shining armour’ speech about it, none of the Chancelleries or General Staffs of Europe could exclude the gravest possibilities from their minds. France became intensely alert and every German movement was watched with silent but profound attention. The British Admiralty, whose eye was already fixed upon German activities at Madeira and in the Canaries, drew the notice of the Foreign Office to the effect which a German naval base on the Atlantic seaboard of Africa would have upon our food and trade routes between South Africa and South America. When Count Metternich mentioned the subject to Sir Edward Grey he was told at once that the situation was so important that it must be considered by the Cabinet; and on July 5 he was further informed that the Cabinet could not disinterest themselves in Morocco, and that until German intentions were made known the British attitude must be one of reserve. This vague but weighty declaration, all the more significant because of the small action which had called it forth, was received in absolute silence by the German Government so far as we were concerned. For some weeks not another word was spoken on the subject between the two countries.
Meanwhile the telegrams which passed to and fro between the different capitals became increasingly obscure and perplexing. Mr. Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, was gravely alarmed. Hitherto he had headed that section of the Cabinet which was predominantly opposed even to the consideration of war in any form. On July 21, however, with the agreement of the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey, he interpolated in his speech as Chancellor to the Bankers’ Association at the Mansion House an extremely stiff warning to Germany of the dangers which might attend the further progress of her policy. The actual passage, the point of which was entirely lost upon his City audience, was as follows:
‘If a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.’
Germany was not only startled but staggered by this challenging utterance. No government not separated by salt water from the German Army would have dared to utter such words. Following as it did upon the large increases in the British Navy, it revealed an unmistakable antagonism alike to German ambitions and methods. Accustomed to have French Ministers dismissed at his order, the Kaiser immediately sent a fierce and menacing protest through his Ambassador. ‘After the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, no explanation could be made by Germany. If France should repel the hand offered her by the Emperor’s Government, the dignity of Germany would compel her to secure by all means the full respect by France for German Treaty rights.’ ‘Mr. Lloyd George’s speech, to say the least, was a warning to Germany’s address and had, as a matter of fact, been interpreted by the presses of Great Britain and France as a warning bordering on menace.’ Sir Edward Grey replied at once that in view of the tone of the German communication he also was not prepared to offer any explanation. Orders were immediately given to secure the British fleet against surprise attacks.
There is no doubt that in the weeks that followed the Kaiser and his Government measured and weighed the issues of war and peace. They were not used to coming in contact with powers outside the sweep of their sword. They felt they had been openly confronted with a will as stern as their own. They decided eventually that the occasion was not propitious. But as August passed away there were so many reports of German military movements, particularly in the garrisons along the Belgian frontier, that both anxiety and suppressed excitement grew in the Foreign Office and the War Office. The Committee of Imperial Defence on August 23 made a prolonged examination of the military and naval problems likely to be raised by a General European War in which Great Britain might be engaged. This was the first time that such a possibility had ever been squarely faced by the Liberal Government. Colonel, afterwards Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, the Director of Military Operations, explained in close detail, and, as it proved, with perfect accuracy, the German plan of invading France through Belgium, and the part that would be played by the British expeditionary army should Parliament decide to become the ally of France. He also gave an appreciation of the Russian military strength, plans and mobilization time-table which was found disappointing by those who had considered Russia an armed Colossus, but which also turned out to be true.
The British and French Staffs who had been in contact since the Algeciras Conference of 1908 remained in the closest association during these weeks. Most of the leading officers of the British Army had long been convinced that war with Germany sooner or later was certain, and all held that we should without hesitation stand at the side of France, if she were attacked. It was obvious that both the Foreign Office and the General Staff considered the position to be one of acute danger at the moment, and of increasing difficulty in the future. The Cabinet did not share these views and Parliament, unaware of the facts, would instantly have repudiated them.
By the end of September the situation became easier and an agreement between France and Germany was reached based upon territorial compensations in the Congo. It was plain from the resignation of the German Colonial Minister that there had been a severe internal struggle in the German governing organism. Differences of view were found to exist between the General Staff and the Admiralty and an impression was sustained by the Prime Minister and his Government that the disposition of the fleet at the beginning of th
e crisis had left much to be desired. As the result of these pressures I became First Lord of the Admiralty in October and thereafter devoted myself exclusively to the preparation of the fleet for war and to securing its instant readiness. The German Government announced its intention of making further important increases in the Army and Navy.
Sudden and grim as had been this confrontation of Agadir, in an odd way it improved the relations between Germany and Great Britain. As soon as the crisis was over, we set to work to bridge the gulf which gaped between the two countries. We did not wish the inevitable German naval expansion to become a further cause of dispute. We therefore arranged that Mr. Haldane should visit Berlin and explain our naval point of view and intentions to the Kaiser. We also sought to interest Germany in some colonial negotiations which would be to her advantage. All this was done to try to establish relations of mutual respect with even the hopes of goodwill. Amicable conversations ensued about the most delicate and serious naval issues. The policy to which I obtained the assent of the Cabinet was, in brief, to announce a five-years’ programme of Dreadnought ship-building which would secure a superiority of sixteen ships to ten over any existing German naval programme, and an additional construction of two ships to every one that Germany should build under any new naval law. Dominion and colonial Dreadnoughts would be additional and we declared an intention to maintain our cruisers and flotillas at double the German strength. Alternatively we offered to have a naval holiday in which no British or German capital ship should be laid down for a year; or if possible to space out the programmes of both countries so as to leave a blank year between two annual quotas.
The World Crisis Page 4