Conrad has given his own account.
‘On July 1, I again spoke to Count Berchtold, who said that his Majesty also wished to await the result of the inquiry. Count Stürgkh and Count Tisza, said the Minister, pleaded for maintaining cool nerves. Tisza was against war with Serbia; he was anxious, fearing that Russia might strike at us and Germany leave us in the lurch. Stürgkh, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that an inquiry would provide grounds for going forward. I put forward the view that nothing but a powerful attack could prevent the danger threatened from Serbia. The murder committed under the patronage of Serbia was the reason for war. To Berchtold’s anxiety lest Germany and Roumania should leave us in the lurch I replied that if that was how things stood with our alliance with Germany, we should in any case have our hands tied.
‘The Minister said to me that he had prepared a memorandum in which he called upon Germany to secure Roumania for the Triple Alliance. I protested that we must ask Germany before all else whether she would or would not protect our rear against Russia.’6
On June 30 Tschirschky, the German Ambassador in Vienna, had reported to Berlin that he was taking every opportunity to ‘advise quietly but very emphatically and seriously against too hasty steps.’ The Kaiser’s marginal comment upon this is celebrated. ‘Who authorized him to act thus? That is very stupid; it is absolutely none of his business, for it is solely Austria’s affair what she intends to do in this matter. Afterwards, if things go wrong, it will be said that Germany was not willing. Tschirschky will please stop this nonsense! The Serbians must be disposed of and that right soon.’ On July 1 Count Hoyos, the permanent official at the head of the Ballplatz, received a German publicist, a Dr. Victor Naumann, who was in close touch with both Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Secretary, and Stumm of the German Foreign Office. Naumann declared that not only in army and naval circles but also in the Wilhelmstrasse, the idea of a preventive war against Russia was not so entirely rejected as it had been a year ago. An agreement had been reached with England about Africa and the Portuguese colonies and the visit of the British fleet to Kiel had been arranged as a demonstration of the improved relations. Consequently they felt sure that England would not intervene in a European war. Stumm, he said, had spoken very earnestly to him of the danger of the Russian armaments. On account of many difficulties France would probably be compelled to work upon Russia in a pacific sense; but if nevertheless it came to a European war the Triple Alliance was still strong enough now. The Emperor William if he were spoken to in the proper way at the present moment ‘when he is enraged over the murder at Sarajevo will give us every assurance and will hold to it even to the point of war, because he recognizes the dangers to the monarchical principle. The German Foreign Office will not oppose this attitude because they consider the moment favourable to bring about the great decision…. Austria-Hungary was lost as a monarchy and a Great Power if she did not make use of the present moment.’
This very strong hint enabled Berchtold when he received Tschirschky the next day to complain that Austria had been insufficiently supported in the past by Germany and did not know how she stood now. Tschirschky replied that this was due to the Austrian habit of expounding ideas without a definite plan of action. Berlin could make the Austrian cause its own only if Austria came forward with such a plan. To the Emperor on the same day Tschirschky, now fully abreast of the policy of the Wilhelmstrasse, declared that His Majesty could count on having Germany solidly behind the Monarchy whenever the question arose of defending one of its vital interests. The decision on the question of whether such a vital interest was at stake must be left to Austria herself…. ‘My Emperor would stand behind every firm decision of Austria-Hungary.’ It may well be believed that Francis Joseph drank this in with satisfaction. A more open incitement to an ally, whose people were already beside themselves with anger, cannot be imagined. On the one hand, therefore, at this stage we find both monarchs and both Foreign Offices ranged with Conrad on the side of violent action against Serbia, and only Count Tisza opposed.
Berchtold always had in mind the chastisement of Serbia as something sharp, swift and local. He pictured to himself an ultimatum and the immediate seizure of some Serbian town or district by Austrian troops at their peace strength without the delay or gravity of mobilization. He had pressed this upon Conrad in 1913 and the Chief of the Staff had explained repeatedly the technical impossibility of such an operation. Nothing could be done without mobilization. ‘What are you thinking of!’ he had exclaimed in October, 1913. ‘If we mobilize, Potiorek will have 80,000 infantry, but now he has only 25,000, and they are scattered all over Bosnia.’ But Berchtold persisted in this idea. He dreaded the sixteen days’ delay which must elapse between the order to mobilize and the crossing of the Serbian frontiers. He feared what might happen in Europe in these sixteen days. It was one thing to march into Serbia and to occupy ‘a sufficient bit of territory,’ thus confronting Europe with the accomplished fact; and quite another to set on foot the formidable process of mobilization. At this moment, undeterred by Conrad’s objections, Berchtold still contemplated ‘military action to be undertaken immediately, that is, without mobilization.’ But to this again Count Tisza would not agree.
It was necessary above all things to make certain of German support and approval, and on July 4 Berchtold sent Count Hoyos, his trusted official confidant, to Berlin for a personal consultation with the German chiefs. Hoyos was armed with two documents, first a memorandum advocating the inclusion of Bulgaria in the Triple Alliance, as urged by Tisza, and secondly an autograph letter from Francis Joseph to William II. Neither of these documents mentioned the sudden inroad upon Serbia which was in Berchtold’s mind, for this would have been contrary to Tisza’s stipulation; but in addition Count Hoyos had verbal explanations to give. These explanations revealed Berchtold’s definite ‘firm plan’ for which Berlin had seemed to wish. The Emperor’s letter requires lengthy quotation.
‘According to all the evidence so far brought to light, the affair at Sarajevo was not the bloody deed of an individual, but the result of a well-organized conspiracy, the threads of which reach to Belgrade; and even if, as is to be presumed, it will be impossible to prove the complicity of the Serbian Government, there can indeed be no doubt that its policy, which is directed towards the union of all Southern Slavs under the Serbian flag, incites to such crimes, and that the continuance of this state of affairs constitutes a permanent danger for my House and my territories….
‘The efforts of my government must in future be directed towards the isolation and diminution of Serbia. The first step in this direction should be to strengthen the position of the present Bulgarian Government, in order that Bulgaria, whose real interests are identical with our own, may be preserved from a relapse into a Russophile policy.
‘If it is recognized in Bucharest that the Triple Alliance is determined not to forgo the adhesion of Bulgaria to it, yet would be prepared to induce Bulgaria to bind herself to Roumania and guarantee the latter’s territorial integrity, perhaps people there will withdraw from the dangerous course into which they have been driven by friendship with Serbia and the rapprochement with Russia.
‘If this succeeds, the attempt might further be made to reconcile Greece with Bulgaria and Turkey; there might then develop under the patronage of the Triple Alliance a new Balkan League, whose aim would be to set a limit to the advance of the Pan-Slav current and to secure peace for our countries.
‘This, however, will not be possible until Serbia, which at present forms the pivot of Pan-Slav policy, has been eliminated as a factor of political power in the Balkans.
‘You too, after the recent frightful occurrences in Bosnia, will be convinced that a reconciliation of the antagonism that now separates Serbia from us is no longer to be thought of, and that the maintenance of the pacific policy of all European monarchs will be threatened as long as this focus of criminal agitation in Belgrade is not subjected to punishment.’7
On
July 5 Conrad had an audience with the Emperor at Schönbrunn.
‘The discussion came at once to the political situation. His Majesty surveyed it in all its aspects and was perfectly clear as to its seriousness. I also expressed to His Majesty my view that war against Serbia was inevitable.
H.M. Yes, that is quite right. But how will you carry on a war if they all then fall upon us, especially Russia?
CONRAD. Surely Germany will protect our rear!
H.M. (looked at Conrad questioningly, and said). Are you sure of Germany?
Conrad here says that the Emperor had charged the Archduke Franz Ferdinand to ask the Kaiser at Konopisht whether Austria could in future count on Germany unconditionally and the Kaiser had avoided answering the question.
CONRAD. But, Your Majesty, we must know how we stand in that matter.
H.M. Yesterday evening a note was sent to Germany in which we called for a clear answer.
CONRAD. If the answer is to the effect that Germany is on our side, do we then go to war against Serbia?
H.M. In that case, yes. (After a moment’s thought, he continued.) But if Germany does not give us this answer, what then?
CONRAD. Then, to be sure, we stand alone. We ought, however, to get the answer quickly, for the great decision depends upon it.
H.M. The German Emperor is on a journey to Scandinavia. In any case, we must wait for the answer.
‘I had the impression that His Majesty did not feel sure of Germany and for that reason was deferring the decision.
‘Whilst the audience so far had gone smoothly, His Majesty now was somewhat moved when I put forward the necessity of declaring martial law as a counter-measure to further Serbian attempts within the monarchy, and in this connection I pointed out that similar occurrences to those in Bosnia were also being prepared in other districts of the monarchy and might be directed against persons, headquarters or important objectives, such as bridges.
H.M. All that (i.e. martial law) will happen on mobilization.
CONRAD. It will then be too late.
H.M. No, that (i.e. martial law) is impossible.
CONRAD. There is nothing else for it, however.
H.M. But I do not do it.
CONRAD. As Your Majesty directs! I was obliged by my duty to propose it.
(On this, the Emperor became calmer again.)
CONRAD. But the least I ask is immediate steps to deal with bombs and the like and legal proceedings against those in possession of them.
H.M. Good. I will instruct the Minister-Presidents concerned in that sense.’
The audience ended upon a genial and holiday note.
‘On Tuesday,’ said the Emperor, ‘I go to Ischl.’ Conrad asked if he himself might go to Tirol. ‘Of course,’ said his master; ‘you too must recuperate.’8
CHAPTER V
THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM
When on the morning of Sunday, July 5, Count Hoyos reached Berlin he consulted with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Szögyény, who asked forthwith for an audience of the Kaiser in order to deliver the letter of the Emperor Francis Joseph. The Kaiser invited the Ambassador to luncheon at Potsdam. Count Hoyos proceeded to the Foreign Office and had a lengthy conversation with Zimmermann. Meanwhile Szögyény reached Potsdam and delivered his letter and memorandum. The Kaiser read them both, and said at first that he had expected some serious step against Serbia, but that possible European complications made it necessary for him to consult the Imperial Chancellor before giving a definite answer. After luncheon, however, William II, without waiting for Bethmann-Hollweg’s arrival, made the following momentous statement, which he authorized the Ambassador to convey to Francis Joseph as a personal message from Sovereign to Sovereign.
The Kaiser, according to the Ambassador, said that Austria might rely on Germany’s full support. He must first hear the opinion of the Chancellor; but he did not in the least doubt that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would agree with him, especially in the matter of the action against Serbia. It was the Kaiser’s opinion that this action must not be delayed. Russia’s attitude would doubtless be hostile, but he had been prepared for this for years; and should it come to war between Austria-Hungary and Russia, Austria could be assured that Germany would stand by her side with her accustomed loyalty. As things stood to-day, however, Russia was in no way prepared for war, and would certainly think twice before appealing to arms, although she would incite the Powers of the Triple Entente against Austria, and add fuel to the fire in the Balkans. “He understood very well that it would be hard for his Imperial and Royal Majesty, with his well-known love of peace, to march into Serbia; but if we had really recognized the necessity of war against Serbia, he would regret it if we did not make use of the present moment, which is all in our favour.”
It did not take Count Szögyeny very long to return to Berlin and telegraph these declarations to Vienna.
The Kaiser was under no illusions upon the gravity of the step he had taken. He had, in fact, decided to court the general European war. He had urged Austria to invade Serbia and had promised to defend her against Russian interference. As the German defence of Austria against Russia meant the immediate German invasion of France and violation of Belgian neutrality, the whole fearful panorama was unrolled. Of course he hoped it would not come to war. Austria would punish Serbia, and be once more indebted to Germany. France and England, in fear of war or love of peace, or from moral or material unpreparedness would persuade Russia to stand aside; and Russia, convinced at last of the worthlessness of their friendship or alliance, would abandon the Triple Entente. The Central Empires would tower up, united and triumphant over a bloodless field. For the future they would have only isolated opponents to confront. The ‘mailed fist’ and the ‘shining armour’ would once again have done their work, and he, the Kaiser, would have proved his mettle to the satisfaction even of his most exacting subjects. But if not, so much the worse for them all!
He was to leave at 9.15 the next morning upon his yachting cruise in the Norwegian fjords. Before that, there was much to do. He had already summoned the Chancellor and the heads of the fighting services. General von Falkenhayn, the Prussian Minister of War, arrived at 5 p.m., Bethmann-Hollweg at six, and Captain Zenker, representing the Naval Staff, a little after seven. Admiral von Capelle, representing the Admiralty in the absence of Tirpitz, and General von Bertrab, the senior General Staff Officer then present in Berlin, arrived between eight and nine the next morning. Baron Krupp, head of the armament works, was commanded to dine with the Emperor at Kiel the following night. To each of these functionaries the Emperor spoke separately, and all of them have recorded their impressions of what he said. On July 5 Falkenhayn wrote to Moltke the Chief of the Staff who was taking a cure, that His Majesty had informed him that ‘Austria-Hungary appears determined not to tolerate any longer the plots hatched against Austria in the Balkan peninsula, and if necessary to accomplish this end, to begin by marching into Serbia; even if Russia will not tolerate this, Austria is not disposed to give way…. Considerable time will elapse before the treaty with Bulgaria is concluded. So Your Excellency need hardly curtail your stay at Carlsbad. Nevertheless I thought it desirable, although I have had no instructions to do so, to let you know that the situation is acute, in order that you may not be quite unprepared for surprises which in the end may come about.’ To the Kaiser’s direct question whether the army was ready for all contingencies, Falkenhayn had replied briefly and unconditionally that it was ready.
Bethmann-Hollweg merely expressed his concurrence with the Emperor’s views, as recorded by him in more guarded language. Captain Zenker reported to his naval superiors: ‘His Majesty informed me… that the Austro-Hungarian chargé d’affaires [sic] had inquired of him whether Germany would fulfil the obligations of her alliance in the event of an Austro-Hungarian conflict with Serbia and the strained relations with Russia that might perhaps result. His Majesty had promised this, but he did not believe that Russia would intervene on behalf of Ser
bia, which had stained itself by an assassination. France, too, would scarcely let it come to war, as she lacked the heavy artillery for the field armies. Yet, though war against Russia and France was not probable, nevertheless the possibility of such a war must be borne in mind from a military point of view. Still, the High Seas Fleet was to start its cruise to Norway as had been planned for the middle of July, and he was going to start on his journey according to schedule.’ Admiral von Capelle recorded that the Kaiser ‘did not believe that a great war would develop. In his opinion the Czar would not associate himself with the murderers of princes. Besides that, neither France nor Russia was prepared for war. The Emperor did not mention England. On the advice of the Imperial Chancellor, he was going to start quietly on his journey to the north, in order not to rouse any apprehensions. Nevertheless, he wished to inform me of the strained situation, in order that I might consider it further. General von Bertrab’s evidence is almost identical. Baron Krupp informed a colleague on his board of directors on July 17 that ‘the Emperor had spoken to him on the conversation with the Austrians, but had characterized the affair as so secret that he (Krupp) would not have ventured to communicate it even to his board of directors…. The Emperor had told him personally that he would declare war immediately if Russia mobilized. The Emperor’s repeated insistence that in this matter no one would be able to reproach him again with want of resolution had produced an almost comic effect.’
These interviews have been made the basis for the report that the Kaiser held on July 5 a Crown Council at Potsdam on the question of peace or war. William II has been at pains to repel this suggestion. Actually the action he took was at once far more autocratic and more slipshod than any Council or Conference. He only saw his Chancellor and officers separately and handled the whole business in a purely personal manner.
The World Crisis Page 7