At this moment the story of the crisis of Lemberg repeated itself in the astounding event which, coupled with Rennenkampf’s inertia, has given rise to the accusations of foul treachery. The Russians had inadequate telegraph and signal arrangements and all their communications were awkward and tardy. But, as we know, they possessed their radio service. Their radio now with bland simplicity proclaimed to the world in two uncoded messages exactly what Rennenkampf and exactly what Samsonov would do or not do on the 25th and 26th. The German wireless station in the fortress of Königsberg listened to these amazing disclosures. In the early morning the first message told them that the Russian First Army would not reach the line Gerdauen-Allenburg-Wehlau until the 26th, thus making it certain that Rennenkampf’s army could not take part in Samsonov’s battles. In the afternoon the second message revealed all Samsonov’s projected movements. It showed that he believed the rearward wheel of the XXth Corps was part of a general German retirement and that he had only to pursue. This was immensely reassuring. It showed that Samsonov’s attack on the XXth Corps would probably not take place until the 26th. ‘In addition to this,’ says Hoffmann dryly, ‘the order confirmed the information we already had as to the strength of the Russian forces, and apart from this we were very glad to know the exact objectives of the individual enemy corps.’ Thus Fortune cast her mischievous foreknowing smile on General Ludendorff at this birth moment of his memorable career. When he arrived on the 23rd, as he believed, and as the world has long believed, to restore order out of chaos, to retrieve disaster and stem the rout, she had presented him with a splendid opportunity ready-made and requiring only his nod of approvel. On the 25th when he hung on the double tenterhooks of Rennenkampf’s menace and Samsonov’s impending battle with the German XXth, Corps, she reassured him on both accounts. Rennenkampf may for two or three days be disregarded, so that all the troops of the German Eastern group may fall upon Samsonov’s right, and Samsonov himself will not attack seriously until the 26th, by which time the whole of the Eighth Army—François on the right and Morgen’s Division deflected to the threatened left—will be in line. Nor need he fear a trap. The movements described by the intercepted radio can be checked by the ordinary contacts and reconnaissances of the field and are found generally to correspond. This is the way to make war.
The German High Command passed the night of the 25th in comparative mental comfort. General von François with his Ist Corps supported by various detachments equal to another division was rapidly arriving on the German right. In order to help the threatened XXth Corps in what was expected to be a hard-fought battle on the 26th, Ludendorff demanded that he should attack the Russian left at dawn. François protested vehemently. Only part of his fighting troops had detrained. Very little of his artillery and none of his ammunition columns had yet arrived. The task set him was severe. Samsonov had guarded his left flank by a new Russian army corps—the Ist—which was now entrenched upon the ridge of Usdau; and its left was prolonged almost to the Polish border by a Guard division, a rifle brigade and two cavalry divisions. François, in attacking the Ist Corps as directed, would have to expose first his left shoulder and finally his back to the rest. He wanted to find the true flank of the enemy and make a still wider turning movement. Convinced at length that for this there was neither the strength nor the time, he fell back on a more solid objection. He disliked frontal attacks. Anyhow he would not make one without the fullest artillery preparation. ‘Remember what happened to Mackensen last week at Gumbinnen.’ Ludendorff, determined from the outset to assert the authority of the new command over a competent but notoriously unruly subordinate, curtly insisted. Hindenburg, who presided at this fierce discussion, maintained an august silence. So severe was the tension that he himself felt it necessary to visit François and enforce the orders with his whole personal weight. Under this pressure François adopted a policy of passive resistance. He obeyed—but in such a manner as to make sure he had his own way.
No one could say that he did not attack on the 26th; but in fact he so delayed his movements and restrained his troops that scarcely any progress was made. Indeed, to be blunt, he played with the army staff from dawn till dusk. That this was a calculated and deliberate frustration of their will and not merely the slothfulness of reluctance, is proved by the fact that the wily François asked the XXth Corps on the night of the 25th whether they were really so hard pressed that he must make an attack without artillery support and before he was ready, in order to save them. The XXth Corps replied reassuringly that they were all right, and that there was no need for him to compromise his preparations. Ludendorff passed the morning of the 26th in great impatience, but also in complete uncertainty as to what François was actually doing. It was not until the evening that he realized that he was being fooled. But by the evening other things had happened.
The two corps of ‘the Eastern Group’ had collided with the Russian VIth Corps protecting Samsonov’s right flank and rear. It was an encounter battle. The Russians had no apprehension of any serious danger. They thought that some portion of the retreating German army might be marching back parallel with, but at a considerable distance from them, while other retreating units would be following on behind them through Rastenburg. Samsonov’s orders drew this picture for them. However, early in the morning of the 26th the Russian VIth Corps received the unexpected news that an enemy brigade was at Lautern and later that it was occupying Seeburg. Full of ardour they attacked these forces with a division, and thus ran into the whole Eastern Group (two army corps and the 6th Landwehr Brigade) who were descending upon them from the north as fast as desperately determined men could march. The battle exploded immediately. The attacking Russian division found itself hopelessly outnumbered. It defended itself bravely till the evening. Its companion counter-marching to help it was involved in its ruin. The Russian corps commander became demoralized. During the night and the next day the whole corps fled southwards, and its divisions did not stop till they reached Olschienen and Wallen, 21 and 25 miles respectively from the battlefield. The first of the blows which destroyed Samsonov had been struck. His right flank guard had been broken down; and this vital information was not imparted to him by the general concerned except in a confused manner and after a delay of many hours.
During this momentous 26th François’ artillery had arrived, and he declared himself ready to attack at daybreak on the 27th. Hindenburg and Ludendorff proceeded to an eminence at the foot of Lake Gilgenburg, on which amid fir trees an aerial perch had been erected whence a clear view could be obtained. They were enormously cheered at 6 o’clock by the news that the Usdau position had already been stormed. This however proved to be false. The fighting troops had mistaken the village of Meischlitz, 2,000 yards to the south-west, for that of Usdau, and the real attack on the latter did not begin till 10 o’clock.
This engagement, which some have called the battle of Usdau, repeated upon the Russian left the disaster which the day before had befallen their right. The whole of François’ artillery, strengthened by heavy guns withdrawn from the fortresses, opened terrific fire upon the Russian entrenchments facing west on the Usdau ridge. These entrenchments, hurriedly dug in continuous lines without traverses or covering rifle pits and thickly manned, were soon choked with dead and wounded, and the Russian corps, to whom the vital protection of the left flank of Samsonov’s army had been confided, showed themselves unable to withstand the artillery storm; the division on the right, followed by that on the left, quitted their trenches before it was even necessary to launch the German infantry assault, and streamed back southward in considerable disorder by the way they had come, in the direction of Soldau. Thus on two successive days both the flanking corps which protected the advance of the Russian centre had been routed, and for Samsonov on the night of the 27th only one flickering hope remained—immediate retreat.
We will pass the night of the 27th at Samsonov’s Headquarters in the little town of Neidenburg. His right-hand corps (the VIth) has alread
y been hurled back in shocking disorder by powerful forces which can only have come from Rennenkampf’s front. His Ist Corps has run away from the Usdau position on his left. In the centre, far in advance of these two faithless guardians, his valiant XVth Corps with a division from the XXIIIrd on its left has been for three days in heavy action with the German centre, and his XIIIth Corps finding little opposition in front has actually stretched forward as far as Allenstein. On both flanks rout, and in the centre, far advanced in danger’s jaws, a doubtful battle and hideous lack of food! How did he re-act to these impressions?
It is inconceivable that an experienced commander would not by this time have realized the mortal peril which confronted his whole army. Immediate orders to the XIIIth, XVth and XXIIIrd Corps to retreat, and to his flank corps to attack, offered the only possible chance of escape. But a sombre spirit of fatalism—characteristically Russian—seemed to have overpowered the doomed commander. He had been misled. He had supposed he had only a beaten foe to deal with. But the die had been cast, fate must decide; better perish than retreat. Perhaps there would be better news to-morrow. An awful psychic lethargy descended upon his weary being; and at midnight on the 27th Samsonov ordered his centre corps to continue their attack. But, as Hindenburg remarks, ‘they were no longer seeking victory, but destruction.’
At dawn on the 28th the whole German army counter-attacked. The XXth Corps reinforced on its left by the 3rd Reserve and Goltz’s Divisions advanced in increasingly successful onslaught upon the Russian centre. Mackensen (XVIIth) and Bülow (I. Res.) were moved westward with the double purpose of helping the XXth Corps and also reaching some position to defend the rear and flank against Rennenkampf who had at last belatedly begun to appear. But the decisive action took place upon the German right, and here again there occurred one of François’ grand disobediences. The 28th did not see Ludendorff at his best. He felt that the battle was won; he sought no decisive victory. Provided he was secure against an attack from Rennenkampf, he was ready to be content with small results. His orders to Mackensen and Bülow, repeated on the 29th, prevented these powerful forces from taking any very effective part in the battle, or from closing the wide gap which was open to the Russian retreat in the south-east.
No one can blame him for taking precautions against Rennenkampf. But it is his orders on the 28th to François which have the worst appearance in the light of further knowledge. François pursuing eastward with vigour all through the 28th had entered Neidenburg by nightfall. He was ordered by Ludendorff to change his direction to almost due North and advance in the direction of Lahna. Now these orders implied the virtual abandonment of any serious attempt to round up the enormous masses of the Russian centre. It moreover condemned François to plunging his corps into the forest area with the certainty that he would become dispersed, would not get far or do much. The order was sent in terms of exceptional impressiveness. It concluded with a solemn adjuration that the corps ‘could render the greatest possible service to the army if these intentions were duly carried out. All depends on the Ist Corps.’ But General von François had quite different intentions. His advance troops were already half-way along the road from Neidenburg to Willenberg. This road running due east was in every way convenient for his purpose. It ran in open country within good rifle shot of the edge of the forests. Along this road therefore during the whole of the 29th General von François hurried his troops, building up as he went, a long line of posts and pickets, to block in the Russian masses. By nightfall François’ line was completed. With 25 battalions he had strung himself out over a length of 50 kilometres. By the night of the 29th, in spite of a further order to advance north-eastward, he had this thin single line of posts between the Russian masses struggling to escape from the forests and whatever hostile troops might be set in motion against it from the direction of Warsaw. Again Ludendorff acquiesced in the decisions imposed upon him by this audacious officer.
We have now reached the last act of the tragedy. The British liaison officer in Russia, General Knox, had been attached to Samsonov’s staff. In the morning of the 28th he motored up from Neidenburg to join the Commander-in-Chief. He found him by the side of the road studying his maps surrounded by his staff officers. Suddenly Samsonov rose, ordered his Cossack escort to provide horses for himself and his staff, and was about to ride off in the direction of the XVth Corps. General Knox prepared to mount and accompany him, but Samsonov took him aside. The situation he said was very critical. He did not know what was going to happen. He did not wish a foreign officer to accompany him. Even if the worst happened here, it would not affect the ultimate course of the war. With that he said good-bye and rode off. Knox adds that both he and his staff were calm. They said ‘The enemy has luck one day, we will have luck another.’ Knox went back with a long train of motor vehicles and just got through Neidenburg in time.
We may accompany General Samsonov a little further. He spent the night of the 28th with the headquarters of the XVth Corps. Throughout the 29th the dissolution of the Russian centre proceeded and large masses of men in utmost confusion surged aimlessly about in the forest. At length the General and his 7 staff officers are alone. Night comes on; they dismount from their horses; they struggle eastward. The General, asthmatic, exhausted, brokenhearted, is supported by his officers. At last he can go no further. Murmuring to himself ‘The Emperor trusted me,’ he turns aside from the others. He is alone. Three days before he had commanded a quarter of a million men. The officers hear a single shot; they search for his body; they never find it. They resume their journey, and some escape to tell the tale.
The closing scenes continued during the 30th and 31st. All beaten armies tend to retreat along the path by which they have advanced. But as the Russians, whether as stragglers or in formed bodies, attempted to escape from the southern edge of the forest, they were met by the pitiless fire of François’ cordon and driven back. Again and again by day and night the most desperate efforts were made to escape. Often bands of soldiers, following the cross held aloft by a priest, broke from the woods and rushed towards the German line; but none reached it.
Says a German regimental history: ‘With morning grey a long enemy column of all arms came slowly out of the woods without any protecting troops and offered a target which would never have been permitted at peace manœuvres. Unfortunately fire was opened on it too soon by some excited riflemen; upon which the general fire of both battalions and the machine-gun company was opened. This last was for the first time employed as a complete unit, and with all its six guns it opened continuous annihilating fire. A more fearful effect could hardly be imagined. The Russians tried to take refuge in the woods, abandoning vehicles and horses. The frightened and wounded animals rushed aimlessly over the country, wagons were upset, there was soon wild chaos. The units which were still armed sought to take positions on the edge of the woods, but very soon they exhibited white cloths on poles and rifles, showing that they regarded further advance as useless and wished to surrender.’35
During the 31st they surrendered in enormous numbers. A single battalion of General von François’ corps captured 17,000 prisoners. Large bodies of troops were seen from the air assembling in various open spaces, and alarm was caused at the German Headquarters until it was realized that they were only prisoners and that the bayonet glints were only those of their German escort. The Army Command had no idea how many they had cut off in the forests. Hoffmann on the 30th put the number at 40,000, but Grünert was sure it did not exceed 20,000. Hoffmann offered to pay him a mark for every one under 20,000 if Grünert would pay a mark for every one above. Hoffmann expresses a well-founded regret that this wager was not accepted. In all 92,000 unwounded Russian prisoners and 30,000 wounded Russians were collected by the victors. Of these 92,000, 60,000 were the well-earned prize of François’ corps.
By the evening of the 28th Ludendorff was so satisfied that the victory was complete, that he was already building up a line against Rennenkampf, whose cavalry divisions
were now at last approaching Allenstein and could almost overlook the battlefields where their comrades had perished. It was to be their turn next.
The glory of Tannenberg was during the war and for some years afterwards successfully appropriated by Ludendorff. It was the stepping-stone by which he rose to the effective control of the whole German War. Hindenburg made no personal claims. He was content to allow Ludendorff’s statement to pass unchallenged. It was as follows:
Mackensen
François
Hindenburg
THE TANNENBERG CELEBRATION, AUGUST 24, 1924
‘General von Hindenburg had always agreed to my suggestions and gladly accepted the responsibility of consenting to them.’ But facts which are no longer in dispute prove first that all the movement which concentrated the Eighth Army against Samsonov had already been ordered by Prittwitz’ staff on the initiative of Colonel Hoffmann, and these movements were approaching completion at the moment when Ludendorff arrived at the Army Headquarters. Secondly, that the only orders issued by Ludendorff en route, apart from those relating to minor reinforcements, were to withdraw the headquarters of the Eighth Army as far back as Marienburg and to authorize the various corps to act independently pending his arrival. Both these interventions were unfortunate and led to loss of precious time. During the course of the battle Ludendorff on the 25th endeavoured to force François into a premature attack which if checked would have enabled Samsonov’s army to escape before disaster overwhelmed him. François disobeyed him with magnificent results. On the 28th Ludendorff resigned himself to the escape of the Russian centre. In a fit of nerves he prevented the XVIIth and Ist Reserve Corps from effectually closing the gap to the eastward; and on the same day ordered François to advance in a direction which undoubtedly would have enabled the mass of the Russians to escape to the south-east. In fact Hindenburg, no doubt at Ludendorff’s suggestion, telegraphed on the night of the 28th to the Supreme Command: ‘The battle is won; pursuit will continue. The surrender of the two Russian corps may well not be achieved.’
The World Crisis Page 20