Table of Contents
Title Page
Foreword
1 - Why Are You Truthful?
1 - Why Are You Truthful?
2 - A Puzzle
2 - On Things in General
3 - Miscellaneous Fragments
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
Notes
4 - A Query
Notes
3 - Three Fantasies
5 - Simplicus and the Tree—An Open Air Symposium
Notes
6 - An Epistemological Nightmare
7 - A Mind-Body Fantasy
Notes
4 - To Be or Not to Be?
8 - To Be or Not to Be?
9 - The Zen of Life and Death
Authority and Revelation
Analysis, Science, and Types of Survival
Wishful Thinking?
Personal Views
Some Eastern Approaches
Some Chinese Thoughts on the Subject
Notes
10 - What Is There?
Ontology
And What about the Devil?
Medieval Ontology and Solipsism
Chaudhuri’s Ontology
Appendix
Notes
5 - Concluding Pieces
11 - Dream or Reality?
Notes
12 - Enlightened Solipsism
Notes
13 - 5000 B.C.
Part I
Part II
Afterthoughts
Copyright Page
Foreword
When I was in high school, one elderly gentleman, hearing that I was interested in philosophy, said, “You say you are interested in philosophy. Tell me, how would you define philosophy?” Before I had time to answer, he continued, “Yesterday, someone from Columbia asked me how I would define philosophy and I told him …” The gentleman went on talking interminably without ever letting me get a word in edgewise. When he was finished, he said, “Well, it was nice talking to you,” and left.
I am quite fascinated by the psychological phenomenon of a person asking a question without the slightest interest in receiving an answer. I am also reminded of Ambrose Bierce’s definition of a bore: one who talks when you want him to listen. In this particular case, though, it was probably a good thing that the gentleman didn’t let me answer because I would be sore pressed if I had to give an informative definition of philosophy. The literal definition, “love of knowledge,” doesn’t really give much feeling for what the subject is all about.
The pieces in this volume (at least most of them) are very much what the title suggests—philosophical fantasies. Many of them have the flavor of science fiction. There seems to be a new literary form in the air—a form that might aptly be called philosophical fiction. I am thinking not only of this book but of such books as The Mind’s I, not to speak of Hofstadter’s earlier work Gödel, Escher, and Bach. One advantage of this form, quite aside from the great entertainment value, is that important philosophical issues can be made perfectly comprehensible to the general reader. This book, for example, is completely self-contained. No prior acquaintance with philosophy is presupposed.
Not all the pieces of this volume are fantasies. Chapter 3, for example, is a free-wheeling, light-hearted, rambling collection of miscellaneous observations, anecdotes (some of them autobiographical), jokes, puzzles, and paradoxes. Chapter 4 will be found to contain a historical surprise for many a reader. The fantasies proper are mainly in Parts 3 and 5. Chapter 10 has a special and unusual status.
Although the spirit of this book is almost the opposite of that of a textbook, much of the material has been successfully used in introductory courses in philosophy. Many of the traditional philosophical questions are considered and many different viewpoints are presented—mainly through the various characters of the book. I do not take much of a position myself; I prefer to let my characters argue matters out among themselves. Of course, some of my own biases cannot help but show through on occasions, but I have tried to match opposing characters as evenly as possible.
I am interested in all this as much from a psychological and dramatic perspective as from a philosophical one. Many of the pieces are not so much analyses of philosophical problems as dramatizations of philosophical types. As such, I have thought of them largely as theater pieces and I have had great fun presenting them on stage, assisted by various actors and actresses. Audience responses have been most gratifying. I have long believed that the possibilities of successfully using philosophical themes for exciting live dramatic presentations have not yet been fully realized. If this book suggests new possibilities along these lines, then it will have fulfilled one of its principal objectives.
I wish to thank my wife, my friends and colleagues over the years, and Thomas McCormack and Kermit Hummel of St. Martin’s Press for their many helpful suggestions.
1
Why Are You Truthful?
1
Why Are You Truthful?
MORALIST: I have gathered you good people together on this occasion because I know that you are among the most truthful people on earth, and so I propose that we hold a symposium on truthfulness. I wish to learn from each of you your reasons for being truthful. Adrian, what is your reason for being truthful?
ADRIAN: My reason is quite simple. It says in the Bible that one should be truthful, and I take the Bible seriously. Since my greatest duty on earth is obedience to the will of God and God commands me to be truthful, my reason for being truthful is obvious.
MORALIST: Very good! And you, Bernard, why are you truthful?
BERNARD: I also take the Bible very seriously. The one thing in the Bible that impresses me most is the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would have others do unto you. Since I wish others to be truthful with me, I am accordingly truthful with them.
MORALIST: Excellent! And you, Carey, what are your reasons for being truthful?
CAREY: My reasons have nothing to do with religion. I am truthful on purely ethical grounds. I desire to be virtuous, and since truthfulness is one of the virtues and lying is one of the vices, then to be virtuous it is necessary for me to be truthful.
EPISTEMOLOGIST (who is, strangely enough, in this group though he wasn’t invited): I find this reason peculiar! Carey evidently doesn’t value truthfulness in its own right but only beca
use it belongs to the more general category of virtue, and it is this more general category that he values. Indeed, his very way of putting it: “To be virtuous it is necessary for me to be truthful,” his very use of the word necessary suggests that he is reluctant to be truthful but is nevertheless truthful only as a means to another end, that end being virtue itself. This is what I find so strange! Furthermore, I think—
MORALIST: Sorry to interrupt you, old man, but it was not my intention that we criticize the speakers as they go along. I prefer on this occasion to let the speakers simply state their views; we can reserve critical analysis for another time. And so, Daniel, why are you truthful?
DANIEL: My reasons are also nonreligious—or at least nontheistic. I am a great admirer of the ethics of Immanuel Kant. I realize that his ethical attitudes were, at least psychologically, tied up with his religious ones, but many people who reject Kant’s theistic views nevertheless accept his moral ones. I am one such person. I am truthful out of obedience to Kant’s categorical imperative, which states that one should never perform any act unless one wills that act to be universal law. Since it is obvious that if everybody lied there would be utter chaos, I clearly cannot will it to be universal law that everybody lies. The categorical imperative hence implies that I, too, should not lie.
MORALIST: Very good! And you, Edward, what are your reasons for being truthful?
EDWARD: My reasons are purely humanistic and utilitarian. It is obvious that truthfulness is beneficial to society, and since my main interest in life is to benefit society, then accordingly I am truthful.
MORALIST: Splendid! And you, Frank, why are you truthful?
FRANK: In order to live up to my name. Since my name is Frank, then it behooves me to be frank with people.
MORALIST: Stop being facetious! This is a serious symposium! What about you, George, why are you truthful?
GEORGE: Because I am a selfish bastard!
MORALIST: What!
GEORGE: Exactly! The few times I have lied, I have ended up getting it in the neck! It’s not other people I care about; I care about myself. I don’t want any trouble! I have simply learned from hard and bitter experience that honesty is the best policy.
MORALIST: What about you, Harry?
HARRY: My ethical orientation is rather similar to that of George. But instead of using the rather harsh phrase selfish bastard, I would prefer to classify myself as a hedonist; I perform only those acts calculated to maximize my pleasure in life. I am not as fanatical as George; I place some value on other people’s happiness but not as much as on my own. And I have much rational evidence that in the long run I will be happiest if I am always truthful.
MORALIST: So you are a hedonist! In other words, you are truthful because it gives you pleasure to be truthful, and you avoid lying because you find lying painful. Is that it?
HARRY: Not quite. I do not necessarily derive immediate pleasure from being truthful. Indeed, sometimes it is immediately painful. But I am a thoughtful and rational person; I am always willing to sacrifice my immediate pleasures for the sake of my ultimate good. I always plan ahead. Therefore, I am truthful since as I told you I have rational evidence that my being truthful is best for me in the long run.
MORALIST: What is this evidence?
HARRY: That is too long a story for us to go into now. I think we should instead hear the views of the other speakers.
MORALIST: Very good. What about you, Irving?
IRVING: I am also a hedonist.
MORALIST: That so far makes three of you! George, Harry, and you.
IRVING: Yes, but I am not like the others.
MORALIST: How SO?
IRVING: You mean how not! By temperament, I feel very different from George, and unlike Harry I am not the rational type of hedonist. Rather, I am a mystical hedonist.
MORALIST: A mystical hedonist? That’s a strange combination! I have never heard that one before. What on earth do you mean by a mystical hedonist?
IRVING (sadly): I don’t know!
MORALIST: You don’t know? How come you don’t know?
IRVING: Well, you see, since I am a mystical hedonist, I am also a hedonist. I feel that if I knew what I meant by a mystical hedonist, I would be less happy than I am not knowing what I mean. Therefore, on hedonistic grounds it is better that I do not know what I mean by a mystical hedonist.
MORALIST: But if you don’t even know what you mean by a mystical hedonist, how can you possibly know that you are one?
IRVING: Good question! As you say, since I am unable to define a mystical hedonist, I couldn’t possibly have rational grounds for knowing that I am one. Yet, in fact, I do know that I am one. This is precisely where my mysticism comes in
MORALIST: Oh, my God! This is too complicated for me!
IRVING: Me, too.
MORALIST: At any rate, what is your reason for being truthful? The same as Harry’s?
IRVING: The reason is the same, but my justification of the reason is totally different.
MORALIST: I don’t understand. Can you explain this?
IRVING: Why, yes. Like Harry, I believe that my telling the truth is best for me in the long run. But unlike Harry, I have no rational evidence for this. Indeed, all the rational evidence I have is quite to the contrary. Therefore, the rational thing for me to do is to lie. But I have a strange intuition that I had best tell the truth. And being a mystic, I trust my intuition more than my reason. Hence, I tell the truth.
MORALIST: Most extraordinary! And what about you, Jacob?
JACOB: My truthfulness is a matter of contingency, not choice.
MORALIST: I don’t understand you!
JACOB: I have simply never had the opportunity to lie.
MORALIST: I understand you even less!
JACOB: My attitude is as follows: Obviously, no one in his right mind would ever think of lying to his friends; it only makes sense to lie to one’s enemies. If any enemy ever threatened to harm me, I would not for a moment hesitate to lie to divert his attack. But since I have no enemies and never have had any enemies, the opportunity for me to lie has never presented itself.
MORALIST: How singular! And what about you, Kurt; what are your reasons for being truthful?
KURT: I have only one reason. I am truthful simply because I feel like being truthful; I have no other reason than that.
MORALIST: But that is no reason!
KURT: Of course it is a reason! As I just told you, it’s my only reason.
MORALIST: But your reason is no good!
KURT: Whoever said that I had a good reason? I said that it’s my reason; I didn’t say it was a good one.
MORALIST: Oh, but just because you feel like being truthful, it does not follow that you should be truthful. Of course, I believe that you should be truthful but not merely because you feel like it. There are many things I feel like doing, but I don’t do them because I know that I shouldn’t do them. Not everything that one feels like doing is necessarily right! So why is your feeling like being truthful an adequate justification of your being truthful?
EPISTEMOLOGIST: I thought we weren’t supposed to argue with the speakers.
MORALIST: I shall ignore that remark. I repeat my question: Just because you feel like being truthful, why does it follow that you should be truthful?
KURT: Should be truthful? Who the hell ever said that I should be truthful?
MORALIST: Don’t tell me now that you believe that you shouldn’t be truthful!
KURT: Of course not! I don’t give a damn what I should or shouldn’t do!
MORALIST: Oh, come now; surely you want to do what you believe you ought to do!
KURT: What I ought to do! I couldn’t care less! Look, man, I don’t give one hoot for all your ethics, morality, religion, rights and wrongs, oughts and shoulds! As I told you, I feel like being truthful and that is my only reason.
MORALIST: But I am trying to explain to you that that reason is inadequate!
KURT: I don’t give
a damm whether it is adequate or not! It so happens I feel like being truthful! Do you mind?
MORALIST: No, I don’t mind. I don’t mind at all. Only you needn’t be so belligerent about it! Now what about you, Larry? Why are you truthful?
LARRY: Why does a tree grow?
MORALIST: Look now, we are not here to play mystical games with each other. I asked you a serious question.
LARRY: And I gave you a serious answer.
MORALIST: Oh, come now, what does a tree growing have to do with your being truthful?
LARRY: More perhaps than you realize.
MORALIST: I wish that you would stop giving these cryptic responses! What are you, one of these Zen Buddhists or something?
LARRY: Yes.
MORALIST: Oh, no wonder you talk in this strange manner! But you can’t tell me why you are truthful?
LARRY: Can you tell me why a tree grows?
MORALIST: I still don’t see what the growth of a tree has to do with your being truthful.
LARRY: More perhaps than you realize.
MORALIST: So we are back to that again! You Zen men are the most frustrating creatures to talk to!
LARRY: In that case, why do you talk to us? But I’m glad you called me a creature. That at least shows that you have some insight into the true relationship between me and a tree.
MORALIST: Oh, really now, in what significant way are you like a tree?
LARRY: In what significant way am I different?
MORALIST: Oh, surely now, you regard yourself as a little more significant than a tree, don’t you?
LARRY: Not at all.
MORALIST: But do you not realize that a tree is at a lower stage of life than a man?
LARRY: I find your use of the word lower ill advised. It is psychologically misleading and sets an emotional tone that is tantamount to begging the question. I would prefer to say that a tree is at an earlier stage of life.
MORALIST: Let’s not be pedantic and quibble about words! In this context, lower and earlier mean exactly the same thing
LARRY: Oh no they don’t! Objectively they may have the same meaning in this context but subjectively they certainly do not. One would say that a child is at an earlier stage of life than an adult but surely not at a lower stage This latter mode of speech gives the impression that an adult is superior to a child, which I don’t believe many would wish to do.
Five Thousand B.C. and Other Philosophical Fantasies Page 1