Suppose now that you and I believe that each other’s world views are perfect (but false). Although it is senseless for us to argue with each other (even on the friendliest possible basis!), does it make no sense for us to philosophize together at all? No, I believe there is something very valuable left to be done. Let me, for the moment, describe the situation from my viewpoint. Since your world view is consistent, then (making an analogy to mathematical logic) there is some interpretation of all your terms under which everything you say is true. Let us assume that our terminology is the same, that is, we use the same words but not necessarily with the same meanings. Indeed, our meanings must be different since some of your statements are refutable in my system. But at any rate, since your system is consistent, then everything you say is true under some interpretation of our language. So instead of my saying, “You are wrong,” it would make more sense for me to say, “You are wrong according to my meanings of our words.” The important point to realize (and I don’t know if I can convey to the reader the startling impact of this realization) is that according to a mere reinterpretation of the language, everything you say is true about the real world! Even if you should deny the existence of a real world and the notions of truth and meaning, there is some interpretation of all this that is true about the real world and that may be of extreme interest and value for me to know. The point, then, is, in mathematical language, to construct a model of your language within mine. Put less precisely, though more expressively, the point is for me to be able to see the world through your eyes. After having gone through such an experience, it is more than likely that my own world view might become considerably enlarged. After all, even in a perfect world view, one has not necessarily decided the truth of every statement; there may be many alternative ways of extending it to produce a more comprehensive perfect world view. The very process of modeling another’s consistent world view within one’s own might be just the thing to decide hitherto undecidable propositions.
To the reader with some knowledge of mathematical logic, I acknowledge that I of course realize that my fanciful analogies have their weak points. For example, I have treated a world view as if it were a formalized first order language, which of course it isn’t (at least I hope it isn’t! I would feel rather sorry for one whose world view is!). Also, the notion of a perfect world view is of course highly idealized; I doubt that anyone even has a world view consistent with all the experiences he has already had! But I believe that all I have said about perfect world views should apply a fortiori to those that are not perfect.
The technique of philosophizing that I am suggesting might be put in the form of a maxim: “Instead of trying to prove your opponent wrong, try to find out in what sense he may be right.” This is a sort of tolerance principle, not too unrelated to that of Carnap.2 To repeat my main point, much may be gained from constructing possible models of other world views within one’s own. I believe that this is in the spirit of much of modern analysis. But I would like to see this applied more to some of the great metaphysical systems of the past.
Notes
1
Brand Blanshard, Reason and Analysis, The Paul Carus Foundation Lecture XII (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Co., 1964).
2
Indeed, it can be thought of as a semantic counterpart of Carnap’s principle of tolerance. His principle says that a language should be regarded as acceptable if it is consistent—or, equivalently, if it has a model. My principle is to try to find such a model—or rather an interesting model of the language.
5000 B.C. AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL FANTASIES. Copyright© 1983 by Raymond Smullyan. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. For information, address St. Martin’s Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010.
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eISBN 9781429952651
First eBook Edition : June 2011
Chapter 5, “Simplicus and the Tree,” reprinted with permission of THE UNIVERSITY of CHICAGO MAGAZINE, copyright 1975. Chapter 6, “An Epistemological Nightmare,” appeared in The Mind’s I, edited by Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett (New York: Basic Books, 1981).
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Smullyan, Raymond M.
5000 B.C. and other philosophical fantasies.
1. Philosophy—Miscellanea. I. Title. II. Title: 5000 B.C. and other philosophical fantasies.
B68.S65 1983 100 82-17071
First Edition
Five Thousand B.C. and Other Philosophical Fantasies Page 18