But in so far as the question of the powers of the Central Federal State is concerned, there is a subtle difference of motive in the constitutions proposed by the Pandits of India and the Pandits of England. The Pandits of India do not disturb the central authority as it stands at present. All that they desire is that this authority should become fully responsible to the Central Legislature which they maintain intact, and where their majority will become further reinforced on the nominated element ceasing to exist. The Pandits of England, on the other hand, realizing that democracy in the Centre tends to work contrary to their interests and is likely to absorb the whole power now in their hands, in case a further advance is made towards responsible government, have shifted the experiment of democracy from the Centre to the provinces. No doubt, they introduce the principle of federation and appear to have made a beginning by making certain proposals, yet their evaluation of this principle is determined by considerations wholly different from those which determine its value in the eyes of Muslim India. The Muslims demand federation because it is pre-eminently a solution of India’s most difficult problem, that is, the communal problem. The Royal Commissioner’s view of federation, though sound in principle, does not seem to aim at responsible government for federal states. Indeed, it does not go beyond providing means of escape from the situation which the introduction of democracy in India has created for the British, and wholly disregards the communal problem by leaving it where it was.
Thus it is clear that, in so far as real federation is concerned, the Simon Report virtually negatives the principle of federation in its true significance. The Nehru Report, realizing a Hindu majority in the Central Assembly, reaches for a unitary form of government, because such an institution secures Hindu dominance throughout India; the Simon Report retains the present British dominance behind the thin veneer of an unreal federation, partly because the British are naturally unwilling to part with the power they have so long wielded, and partly because it is possible for them, in the absence of an inter-communal understanding in India, to make out a plausible case for the retention of that power in their own hands. To my mind a unitary form of government is simply unthinkable in a self-governing India. What is called ‘residuary powers’ must be left entirely to self-governing states, the Central Federal State exercising only those powers which are expressly vested in it by the free consent of federal states. I would never advise the Muslims of India to agree to a system, whether of British or of Indian origin, which virtually negatives the principle of true federation, or fails to recognize them as a distinct political entity.
The necessity for a structural change in the Central Government was probably seen long before the British discovered the most effective means for introducing this change. That is why, at a rather late stage, it was announced that the participation of the Indian Princes in the Round-Table Conference was essential. It was a kind of surprise to the people of India, particularly the minorities, to see the Indian Princes at the Round-Table Conference dramatically expressing their willingness to join an All-India Federation, and, as a result of their declaration, the Hindu delegates—uncompromising advocates of a unitary form of Government—quietly agreeing to the evolution of a federal scheme. Even Mr Shastri, who, only a few days before, had severely criticized Sir John Simon for recommending a federal scheme for India, suddenly became a convert and admitted his conversion in the plenary session of the Conference—thus offering the Prime Minister of England an occasion for one of his wittiest observations in his concluding speech. All this has meaning both for the British, who have sought the participation of the Indian Princes, and the Hindus, who have unhesitatingly accepted the evolution, of an All-India Federation. The truth is that the participation of the Indian princes—among whom only a few are Muslims—in a federation scheme serves a double purpose. On the one hand, it serves as an all-important factor in maintaining the British power in India practically as it is, on the other hand, it gives an overwhelming majority to the Hindus in an All-India Federal Assembly.
It appears to me that the Hindu-Muslim differences regarding the ultimate form of the Central Government are being cleverly exploited by British politicians through the agency of the princes, who see in the scheme prospects of better security for their despotic rule. If the Muslims silently agree to any such scheme, it will simply hasten their end as a political entity in India. The policy of the Indian Federation thus created will be practically controlled by Hindu princes forming the largest group in the Central Federal Assembly. They will always lend their support to the Crown in matters of Imperial concern; and in so far as internal administration of the country is concerned, they will help in maintaining and strengthening the supremacy of the Hindus. In other words, the scheme appears to be aiming at a kind of understanding between Hindu India and British Imperialism—you perpetuate me in India, and in return, I give you a Hindu oligarchy to keep all other Indian communities in perpetual subjection. If, therefore, the British Indian provinces are not transformed into really autonomous States, the princes’ participation in a scheme of Indian federation will be interpreted only as a dexterous move on the part of British politicians to satisfy, without parting with any real power, all parties concerned: Muslims with the word ‘federation’; Hindus with a majority in the Centre; and British Imperialists whether Tory or Labourite—with the substance of real power.
The number of Hindu states in India is far greater than of Muslim states; and it remains to be seen how the Muslim demand for 33 percent seats in the Central Federal Assembly is to be met in a House or Houses constituted of representatives taken from British India as well as from Indian States. I hope the Muslim delegates are fully aware of the implications of the federal scheme as discussed in the Round Table Conference. The question of Muslim representation in the proposed All-India Federation has not yet been discussed. ‘The interim report’, says Reuter’s summary, ‘contemplates two chambers in the Federal Legislature—each containing representatives both of British India and the states, the proportion of which will be a matter of subsequent consideration under the heads which have not yet been referred to the subcommittee.’ In my opinion, the question of proportion is of the utmost importance, and ought to have been considered simultaneously with the main question of the structure of the Assembly.
The best course, I think, would have been to start with a British Indian federation only. A federal scheme born of an unholy union between democracy and despotism cannot but keep British India in the same vicious circle of a unitary Central Government. Such a unitary form may be of the greatest advantage to the British, to the majority community in British India, and to the Indian princes; it can be of no advantage to the Muslims unless they get majority rights in five out of eleven Indian provinces with full residuary powers, and a one-third share of seats in the total House of the Federal Assembly. In so far as the attainment of sovereign powers by the British Indian Provinces is concerned, the position of H.H. the Ruler of Bhopal, Sir Akbar Hydari and Mr Jinnah is unassailable. In view, however, of the participation of the princes in the Indian Federation, we must now see our demand for representation in the British Indian Assembly in a new light. The question is not one of the Muslim share in a British Indian Assembly, but one which relates to representation of British Indian Muslims in an All-India Federal Assembly. Our demand for 33 percent must now be taken as a demand for the same proportion in the All-India Federal Assembly, exclusive of the share allotted to the Muslim States entering the Federation.
The other difficult problem which confronts the successful working of a Federal system in India is the problem of India’s defence. In their discussion of this problem, the Royal Commissioners have marshalled all the deficiencies of India in order to make out a case for Imperial administration of the army. ‘India and Britain’, say the Commissioners, ‘are so related that India’s defence cannot now, or in any future which is within sight, be regarded as a matter of purely Indian concern. The control and direction of such an army
must rest in the hands of agents of the Imperial Government. Now, does it necessarily follow from this that further progress towards the realization of responsible government in British India is barred until the work of defence can be adequately discharged without the help of British officers and British troops? As things are, there is a block on the line of constitutional advance. All hopes of evolution in the Central Government towards the ultimate goal described in the declaration of August 20, 1917, are in danger of being indefinitely frustrated if the attitude illustrated by the Nehru Report is maintained, that any future change involves putting the administration of the army under the authority of an elected Indian Legislature.’ Further, to fortify their argument, they emphasize the fact of competing religious and rival races of widely different capacity, and try to make the problem look insoluble by remarking that ‘the obvious fact that India is not, in the ordinary and natural sense, a single nation is nowhere made more plain than in considering the difference between the martial races of India and the rest.’ These features of the question have been emphasized in order to demonstrate that the British are not only keeping India secure from foreign menace, but are also the ‘neutral guardians’ of internal security. However, in federated India, as I understand federation, the problem will have only one aspect, that is, external defence. Apart from provincial armies necessary for maintaining internal peace, the Indian Federal Congress can maintain, on the North-West Frontier, a strong Indian Frontier Army composed of units recruited from all provinces and officered by efficient and experienced military men taken from all communities. I know that India is not in possession of efficient military officers, and this fact is exploited by the Royal Commissioners in the interest of an argument for Imperial administration. On this point, I cannot but quote another passage from the Report which, to my mind, furnishes the best argument against the position taken up by the Commissioners. ‘At the present moment,’ says the Report, ‘no Indian holding the King’s Commission is of higher army rank than a captain. There are, we believe, 39 captains of whom 25 are in ordinary regimental employ. Some of them are of an age which would prevent their attaining much higher rank, even if they passed the necessary examination before retirement. Most of these have not been through Sandhurst, but got their Commissions during the Great War; now, however genuine may be the desire and however earnest the endeavour to work for the transformation, the overriding conditions so forcibly expressed by the Skeen Committee (whose members, apart from the Chairman and the Army Secretary, were Indian gentlemen), in the words “Progress…must be contingent upon success being secured at each stage and upon military efficiency being maintained throughout”, must in any case render such development measured and slow. A higher command cannot be evolved at short notice out of existing cadres of Indian officers, all of junior rank and limited experience. Not until the slender trickle of suitable Indian recruits for the officer class—and we earnestly desire an increase in their numbers—flows in much greater volume, not until sufficient Indians have attained the experience and training requisite to provide all the officers for, at any rate, some Indian regiments, not until such units have stood the only test which can possibly determine their efficiency, and not until Indian officers have qualified by a successful army career for high command, will it be possible to develop the policy of Indianization to a point which will bring a completely Indianized army within sight. Even then years must elapse before the process could be completed.’
Now I venture to ask who is responsible for the present state of things? Is it due to some inherent incapacity of our martial races or to the slowness of the process of military training? The military capacity of our martial races is undeniable. The process of military training may be slow as compared to other processes of human training. I am no military expert to judge this matter. But as a layman, I feel that the argument, as stated, assumes the process to be practically endless. This means perpetual bondage for India, and makes it all the more necessary that the Frontier Army, as suggested by the Nehru Report, be entrusted to the charge of a committee of defence the personnel of which may be settled by mutual understanding.
Again it is significant that the Simon Report has given extraordinary importance to the question of India’s land frontier, but has made only passing reference to its naval position. India has doubtless had to face invasions from her land frontiers; but it is obvious that her present master took possession of her on account of her defenceless sea coast. A self-governing and free India, will, in these days, have to take greater care of her sea coast than her land frontiers.
I have no doubt that if a Federal Government is established, Muslim Federal States will willingly agree, for purposes of India’s defence, to the creation of neutral Indian military and naval forces. Such a neutral military force for the defence of India, was a reality in the days of Mughal rule. Indeed, in the time of Akbar, the Indian frontier was, on the whole, defended by armies officered by Hindu generals. I am perfectly sure that the scheme of a neutral Indian army, based on a federated India, will intensify Muslim patriotic feeling, and finally set at rest the suspicion, if any, of Indian Muslims joining Muslims from beyond the frontier in the event of an invasion.
I have thus tried briefly to indicate the way in which the Muslims of India ought, in my opinion, to look at the two most important constitutional problems of India. A redistribution of British India calculated to secure a permanent solution of the communal problem is the main demand of the Muslims of India. If, however, the Muslim demand for a territorial solution of the communal problem is ignored, then I support, as emphatically as possible, the Muslim demands repeatedly urged by the All-India Muslim League and the All-India Muslim Conference. The Muslims of India cannot agree to any constitutional changes which affect their majority rights, to be secured by separate electorates, in the Punjab and Bengal, or fail to guarantee them 33 percent representation in any Central Legislature. There were two pitfalls into which Muslim political leaders fell. The first was the repudiated Lucknow Pact, which originated in a false view of Indian nationalism, and deprived the Muslims of India from chances of acquiring any political power in India. The second is the narrow-visioned sacrifice of Islamic solidarity in the interests of what may be called ‘Punjab Ruralism’, resulting in a proposal which virtually reduces the Punjab Muslims to the position of a minority. It is the duty of the League to condemn both the Pact and the proposal.
The Simon Report does great injustice to the Muslims in not recommending a statutory majority for the Punjab and Bengal. It would either make the Muslims stick to the Lucknow Pact or agree to a scheme of joint electorates. The Despatch of the Government of India on the Simon Report admits that since the publication of that document, the Muslim community has not expressed its willingness to accept any of the alternatives proposed by the Report. The Despatch recognizes that it may be a legitimate grievance to deprive the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal of representation in the Councils in proportion to their population merely because of weightage allowed to Muslim minorities elsewhere. But the Despatch of the Government of India fails to correct the injustice of the Simon Report. In so far as the Punjab is concerned—and this is the more crucial point—it endorses the so-called ‘carefully balanced scheme’ worked out by the official members of the Punjab Government, which gives the Punjab Muslims a majority of two over the Hindus and Sikhs combined, and a proportion of 49 percent of the House as a whole. It is obvious that the Punjab Muslims cannot be satisfied with less than a clear majority in the total house. However, Lord Irwin and his Government do recognize that the justification of communal electorates for majority communities would not cease unless and until, by the extension of franchise, their voting strength more correctly reflects their population; and further, unless a two-third majority of the Muslim members in a Provincial Council unanimously agree to surrender the right of separate representation. I cannot, however, understand why the Government of India, having recognized the legitimacy of the Muslim grievance, have
not had the courage to recommend a statutory majority for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal.
Nor can the Muslims of India agree to any such changes which fail to create at least Sind as a separate province, and treat the North-West Frontier Province as a province of inferior political status. I see no reason why Sind should not be united with Baluchistan and turned into a separate province. It has nothing in common with the Bombay Presidency. In point of life and civilization, the Royal Commissioners find it more akin to Mesopotamia and Arabia than India. The Muslim geographer Masudi noticed this kinship long ago, when he said, ‘Sind is a country nearer to the dominions of Islam.’ The first Omayyad ruler is reported to have said of Egypt: ‘Egypt has her back towards Africa and her face towards Arabia.’ With necessary alternations, the same remark describes the exact situation of Sind. She has her back towards India and her face towards Central Asia. Considering further the nature of her agricultural problems, which can invoke no sympathy from the Bombay Government, and her infinite commercial possibilities, dependent on the inevitable growth of Karachi into a second metropolis in India, it is unwise to keep her attracted to a Presidency which, though friendly today, is likely to become a rival at no distant period. Financial difficulties, we are told, stand in the way of separation. I do not know of any definite authoritative pronouncement on the matter. But, assuming there are such difficulties, I see no reason why the Government of India should not give temporary financial help to a promising province in her struggle for independent progress.
The Great Speeches of Modern India Page 14