A corps comprised two or more infantry divisions as well as corps troops consisting of artillery, heavy trench mortar batteries, air squadrons, tanks, supply, transport, labour, signalling and medical units and engineers. With five Australian infantry divisions, other units attached, and the corps troops, the Australian Corps by August 1918 was the largest in the BEF and by late September 1918 Monash commanded almost 200,000 men, a formation of army proportions.
The British corps was a very flexible formation, with divisions moved from corps to corps as the situation demanded. This hampered the establishment of a cohesive structure and impaired efficiency. By contrast, the Australian Corps — like the Canadian — had the advantage of being a national formation, which gave it a character and life of its own. The corps was, in Peter Pedersen’s words, ‘socially and structurally homogenous’. Its divisions, with their high level of experience and training, worked together during August, September and October — under the same corps staff — to create Monash’s ‘trinity’ of unity of thought, purpose and tactical method.2 This prepared them well for the conditions of mobile or open warfare that existed after Amiens, the Australian temperament much better suited to ‘the offensive spirit’ than slogging it out in the ‘trenchlock’ of 1916 and 1917.
Lieutenant General John Monash (seated) with senior staff officers of the Australian Corps at their headquarters at Bertangles, 22 July 1918. Brigadier General Thomas Blamey is standing directly behind Monash. (AWM EO2750)
Monash was the right man to recognise, channel and exploit this ‘offensive spirit’, weaving the superb force he had inherited into a finely tuned, cohesive instrument. Sharp, decisive and energetic, he was as meticulous in his organisation and administration as he was in his planning and command of logistics. He instilled into the members of his corps — from his subordinate commanders to the privates in the field — a confidence and sense of empowerment which sustained their morale and allowed them to use their initiative and intelligence. The men felt that he would not let them down with the basics — food, equipment, ammunition, decent shelter — which they needed to carry out their tasks. Monash, expediently, believed he would get more out of them in battle by treating them well.
Monash’s aim was to achieve success without a heavy price tag in terms of casualties, but he could also be ruthless in pushing his men to achieve their objectives, as he considered the objective to be paramount. He insisted that the troops be trained ‘almost to perfection’ and where he readily embraced advances in technology and tactics he ensured that they did likewise.3 Monash claimed that his troops went into battle knowing that ‘whatever might lie ahead, at least everything was right behind them’, a comment suggestive of the integral role of commanders and their staffs in the success of the men in the field.4
Major General Charles Rosenthal, 2nd Division. (AWM H19207)
Working behind the scenes and often little recognised was the corps staff, which Monash believed shouldered the main burden of the campaigns in 1918 and which was instrumental in the efficiency of the corps. By August 1918, with very few exceptions, these men were Australians and most had combat experience and had been decorated in the field. They served operational, administrative and organisational functions and their duties were extensive and complex. A number of specialists — in artillery, engineering and intelligence, for example — were attached to the staff. It operated within a flexible structure that, according to Roger Lee, ‘enabled and encouraged the essential interaction between planners and specialists so necessary to ensure operational success.’ The specialists also ‘possessed the backgrounds and experience needed by planners in the changing tactical and technological environment of the Western Front.’5
The chief planner was Thomas Blamey, the Brigadier General, General Staff. He was by no means the driving force behind the corps’ achievements — that honour must rest with Monash — but he did express strong views on the conduct of operations to his commander. During the Second World War in his various commands, including Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces, he would be far more controversial.
Another of Monash’s staff officers was Major Richard Casey, who would be Governor-General of Australia from 1965 to 1969. By 1918 Casey had substantial staff experience, including a period working as an intelligence officer with the 1st Division and as Brigade Major of the 8th Brigade, where he was required to make frequent visits to the front line under dangerous conditions. He was awarded the Military Cross (MC) in 1917 and the DSO in 1918 before being moved to a training position in the corps.
The Australian Corps formed a part of General Sir Henry Rawlinson’s British Fourth Army, a formation reconstituted in March 1918 after the British Fifth Army had been decimated in the early days of the German Spring Offensive. Rawlinson’s command for Mont St Quentin-Péronne also included the British III Corps, commanded from 11 August to 11 September by Lieutenant General Sir Alexander Godley, or ‘Bloody Alec’ as the Australians called him, a man with whom Monash had worked many times but had also had his differences.6 The British 58th (London) Division and the 74th Yeomanry Division operated on the left of the Australians on the Bouchavesnes ridge during the battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne.
A division in the BEF comprised three infantry brigades as well as artillery, engineering, supply, sanitary, veterinary, medical and machine-gun units. It was ‘the most effective level of battle control on the Western Front’ because it was ‘the nearest point to the front where co-ordination of all arms took place, where reserves could be committed, held back or re-directed, where plans could be significantly modified’ and was a centre from which higher commanders could be kept abreast of the action.7
Major General John Gellibrand, 3rd Division. (AWM PO1489.001)
Again, the role of the divisional staff was vital. Put simply, their functions included everything from planning and managing the division in action, the drafting and distribution of orders, intelligence-gathering and interpretation, administration and supply, specialist services such as artillery, engineers, medical and sanitation, to discipline, leave and reinforcements.
One of the outstanding divisional staff officers was Lieutenant Colonel Carl Jess from Bendigo, Victoria. Jess was Monash’s and then John Gellibrand’s Chief of Staff in the 3rd Division. While his military career is far too substantial to describe here, a few points will serve to illustrate his calibre. Jess had extensive experience in staff work both before and during the war; indeed, Monash regarded him as exceptional and selected him as his 4th Brigade Staff Captain, with the rank of captain, in 1914. Jess served with Monash at Gallipoli before being appointed Brigade Major for the 2nd Brigade. In addition, he had combat experience as commander of the 7th Battalion; he was gassed but remained on duty at Pozières, an action for which he was awarded the DSO. He was appointed as an instructor to the Senior Officers’ School at Aldershot in March 1917, the first Dominion officer to hold such a position. In October 1918 he commanded the 10th Brigade, at 34 one of the youngest brigadiers in the British forces. For a time in 1919 he relieved William Birdwood as General Officer Commanding the AIF. He received numerous awards during and after the war, culminating in a knighthood in 1935.
By 1918 most divisions were severely depleted in numbers; the Australian formations, with a normal strength of 20,000 men, were reduced to an average of around 12,000. By August 1918 they were commanded by Australians, a part of the ‘Australianisation’ of the corps which helped provide unity and solidarity and contributed significantly to its success in 1918. At Mont St Quentin-Péronne the 2nd Division was commanded by the imposing Major General Charles Rosenthal — affectionately and respectfully known as ‘Rosie’ — an architect and musician born at Berrima in New South Wales; the 3rd Division was commanded by Major General John Gellibrand — ‘Gelly’ — an orchardist from Tasmania, and the 5th by Major General Sir John Talbot Hobbs, ironically known as ‘Blood Lust’ — he was a man of great integrity, justice and compassion — an English-born
architect from Perth.
These three men were integral to the success of the Australians at Mont St Quentin-Péronne. Rosenthal and Hobbs had extensive training in the militia and both were originally artillerymen, serving in that capacity, as commanders, at Gallipoli and in France. Gellibrand, an infantryman, had been educated primarily in England and Germany, had attended the Royal Military College Sandhurst and the Staff College at Camberley. Rosenthal took command of the 9th Infantry Brigade in Monash’s 3rd Division in July 1917. He was well known for his frequent visits to the front line and was seriously wounded for a fourth time in the war in July 1918 while commander of the 2nd Division. Hobbs commanded the 5th Division from December 1916, while Gellibrand commanded the 12th Battalion and the 6th and 12th Brigades before being appointed to the 3rd Division when Monash took over the corps command. These men were battle-hardened soldiers with a wealth of experience behind them, proven track records and who cared for the welfare of their troops. All respected Monash — Rosenthal was a friend and Hobbs served him with unswerving loyalty. They ensured that Monash’s requirements percolated down to the men in the field.
The brigade was usually commanded by a brigadier general and had a normal strength of around 4000 men, 2500–3000 of whom were usually available for combat. By the time the Australians went ‘over the top’ at Mont St Quentin and Péronne, this number had been drastically reduced. Of the three brigades of the 2nd Division, the 6th was the strongest with 75 officers and 1259 other ranks. In addition, each brigadier had attached to his infantry component a light trench mortar battery, a machine-gun company, a company of field engineers and a field ambulance. The whole formed a ‘brigade group’, providing subordinate commanders with the resources they required even without substantial artillery support.
All the brigadiers who feature in the Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne had military experience prior to the Great War, but were firmly entrenched in their civilian occupations. The 9th Brigade, which was drawn from New South Wales, was commanded by Henry Goddard who, while born in England, was a businessman from Brisbane. Walter McNicoll of the 10th, a Victorian and Tasmanian formation, was a school teacher from Melbourne. The tall, dark, strongly-built sportsman James Cannan was born in Townsville, Queensland, and was a company manager and insurance executive. He commanded the 11th Brigade which comprised men from Queensland, northern New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia. Edward Martin, commanding the 5th Brigade from New South Wales, was born in Launceston, Tasmania, but moved to Sydney and trained as an accountant, while James Robertson, the mostly Victorian 6th Brigade’s commander, was a stockbroker from Toowoomba in Queensland and an excellent polo player. Evan Wisdom, in charge of the 7th Brigade whose men were drawn from Queensland, the Northern Territory, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania, was born in Inverness, Scotland, but had a fascinating career as a gold miner, investor and businessman in Western Australia, while James Stewart of the 14th Brigade from New South Wales was a bank officer from Victoria. The essentially Victorian 15th Brigade’s enigmatic leader, Harold ‘Pompey’ Elliott, was a solicitor from Melbourne. He entered politics after the war but tragically committed suicide in 1931.
Major General Sir John Joseph Talbot Hobbs, 5th Division. (AWM ART02926)
The brigade had a formal staff structure, the smallest formation to do so. Its two key elements were the Brigade Major and the Staff Captain and their responsibilities were substantial, the latter, among other duties, ensuring that the brigade was adequately equipped and supplied and that medical evacuation routes were satisfactory. Usually, within a larger action, the Brigade Major planned the brigade’s operations, interpreting the instructions from higher headquarters and translating them into precise orders. He advised his brigadier on the fighting efficiency of the brigade, the local objectives and the actions and tactics essential to secure them, liaised with flank formations and coordinated any artillery or trench mortar support available. His ability was an important factor in a brigade’s combat effectiveness. Captain Frederick Sale of the 21st Battalion — a 26-yearold architectural draftsman from St Kilda in Melbourne — had already won the MC and bar when he was appointed Brigade Major of the 6th Brigade in January 1918. Sale typified many of the men who performed this function in 1918.
Until 1918, a brigade comprised four infantry battalions each with a nominal strength of about 1000 men, although actual line strength was often much less than strength on paper — anywhere between 550 and 750 rifles — as men could be wounded, sick or on one of the many training courses offered to troops of all ranks. However, by late August, each Australian battalion was lucky if it could field 300 to 350 men, so depleted were its numbers and so few its reinforcements. A battalion was commanded by a lieutenant colonel, although there were several majors filling this role at Mont St Quentin-Péronne; indeed, the 38th Battalion was led by a lieutenant for a time on 31 August and the 56th by a noncommissioned officer (NCO) on 2 September.
The battalion structure had changed during the course of the war. From what Paddy Griffith describes as ‘an undifferentiated mass of riflemen’ the battalion had assimilated new weapons and evolved tactics for using them.8 Vickers heavy machine-guns had been removed from the battalion and organised into their own machine-gun battalions and the Lewis gun had been introduced as an infantry weapon. There were sections of scouts, snipers, grenadiers, signallers, gas experts and Lewis gunners all performing a certain function, with many men multi-skilled. This was a result of the availability of expert training for the troops in all these areas. It should be stressed that such expertise was not unique to the Australians — it had become enshrined in BEF doctrine by 1918 — but they had learnt their lessons well.
There were three levels below the battalion structure and these became the ‘grass roots’ elements for the operations at Mont St Quentin-Péronne. The normal establishment of each of the four companies in each battalion was 250 men, although a rifle strength of 150 men was usual. On 31 August 1918, A Company of the 20th Battalion considered itself ‘strong’ when 82 men went into the line.
The role of the company commander was crucial in directing the attack and ensuring that the men knew what to do. The actions of Lieutenant Thomas Slaughter of the 58th Battalion — a 26-year-old farmer from the tiny wheat-growing town of Murtoa in Victoria — on 2 September 1918 during the battle for Péronne, are a case in point. Slaughter began the day as a junior platoon commander — he was only a lieutenant after all and a company commander was usually a captain or a major — but he very early found himself in charge of A Company when all its other officers were wounded. He led his men skilfully, without regard for his personal safety, silencing a number of machine-gun posts and killing or capturing the crews. Taking a few men with him, he reconnoitred the ground, returned to his company and outlined for all his troops their position, formation and objective. This allowed the platoons to work effectively, wiping out one party of Germans and forming a strong defensive position against a possible counter-attack. Every man under Slaughter’s command ‘knew what was expected of him’ so that operations could run smoothly, a key Monash policy now seen in practice in the field.9 For his work in Péronne, Tom Slaughter was awarded a bar to his MC won earlier in the year. His actions were not so different to those of many company commanders; indeed, each day from 31 August to 2 September 1918 was ‘a company commander’s day out’.10
The example of Tom Slaughter illustrates another quality of the Australians: they were trained in such a way that junior officers, and sometimes even NCOs or indeed privates, could lead the attack forward if more senior commanders were killed or wounded. Private (later Lance Corporal) Albert Blackmore, who was killed in the 21st Battalion’s attack on Mont St Quentin on 1 September, won the Military Medal (MM) earlier in 1918 for taking control of a section when the NCO was killed. He led his men forward to an advanced position where they were able to inflict casualties on the Germans. His citation states that he ‘readily grasped the situat
ion and inspired those around him’.11 This flexibility of command, instilled into the Australian Corps by its commanders, drew on the initiative of the men themselves and was instrumental in Australian success.
After the initial attack on Mont St Quentin, the four platoons of each company of the 20th Battalion numbered around 15 men each. Prior to 1918, the establishment of a platoon was 50 to 60 men, although its combat strength was closer to 30, and it was usually led by a lieutenant. Its function, too, had changed in the course of the war, with increasing specialisation within the platoon as men were trained as riflemen, bombers, Lewis gunners or rifle grenadiers and again were often multi-skilled. Each of the four sections of the platoon — a section originally comprised 12 to 15 men and was led by an NCO — was expert in a particular skill and a platoon would usually have one Lewis gun section and three rifle sections whose men supplemented their rifles with the Mills bomb, bayonet and rifle grenade. This again was not peculiar to the AIF, as BEF doctrine and training procedures had established this structure as early as 1917.
A potent synergy
Thus, by 1918 the ordinary soldier was far more skilled than at any time previously. This meant that increased infantry firepower could be used in conjunction with more innovative tactics to achieve success. In order to better understand and appreciate the action at Mont St Quentin-Péronne, it is worth examining those weapons that comprised the infantry ‘weapons system’ as they were to prove integral to this battle.
Beaten Down By Blood Page 5