A 54th Battalion post in Péronne, 2 September 1918. The destruction of the town is clearly visible. (AWM EO3183)
Harold Ferres, nicknamed ‘Pung’, was a 32-year-old grazier from Toora in the South Gippsland region of Victoria. He was a good footballer, cyclist and horseman and an expert shearer. In 1915 he enlisted as a commissioned officer and by August 1916, when he transferred from the 57th to the 58th Battalion, held the rank of captain. In November 1916 he was mentioned in despatches. However, in 1917 he spent several months in England, moving from hospital to hospital, unfit for anything and suffering from neurasthenia (shell shock). Medical authorities recommended his repatriation to Australia, but he was back in action on the Western Front early in 1918 and awarded the MC in March. In May he was promoted temporary major and received a bar to his MC. By September he was a full major and had been awarded the DSO for his actions at Péronne.
From October to December 1918 Ferres attended the Senior Officers’ School at Aldershot, where he was reported to be ‘an officer well above the average’, determined, cheerful, reliable, conscientious, ‘full of initiative’, with a good tactical handling of troops.12 In December 1918 he married a girl from Edinburgh, where he convalesced after being wounded at Péronne. In December 1919, when his appointment with the AIF was terminated, Ferres was a temporary lieutenant colonel and had been in command of the 58th Battalion since December 1918. He was one of the most decorated soldiers in the AIF.
By 10.00 am on 2 September, with the 58th taking the north-eastern ramparts and Bretagne, Péronne had been captured, although heavy fighting continued in the town all day and Monash remained unsure of the position given the unreliability of communications with the 5th Division. The Australian garrison was weak — only 150 men of the 58th Battalion and 30 of the 54th — but an efficient chain of posts covering all approaches and entrances to the town was in place. The infantry was supported by the 25th Machine Gun Company which used captured German guns in addition to its own. Some 10,000 rounds were fired on German positions and trenches by this company from 6.00 am on 2 September to 6.00 am on 3 September and Pompey Elliott was pleased with the dispositions and the performance of the gunners. The company commander, Captain James Saunders, believed that the heavy machine-guns played a significant part in covering the work of infantry patrols and mopping-up parties and engaged many targets.13
However, the position was still vulnerable as the left flank had not yet swung round and Péronne remained under enfilade fire. An intelligence report stated that the German 78th Reserve Division, elements of which had been assimilated into the 185th, was massing in the high ground just west of Doingt as well as in Flamicourt and Chair Wood with the apparent intention of retaking Péronne. The 15th Brigade was ordered to be particularly vigilant.14 A rumour circulated that all the main buildings in Péronne had been mined and at some point a mine did explode. By the afternoon, however, with some relief on the 14th Brigade front, the line of the 58th was well outside the town on its north-eastern edge, connecting with the 54th which held the line facing the swamp along the south-eastern edge towards Flamicourt.
It was here during the night that men manning a post saw an electric torch flashing on the road to Flamicourt — whoever was holding it was reading a map. The Germans also saw it, opened fire, and the torch was extinguished. Several men from the 54th were sent out to investigate, calling for the intruders to halt with ‘a few well chosen words in the Australian Language and a couple of rifle shots over their heads.’ They were discovered to be three very lost Australians, on bicycles, carrying gas masks to the 53rd Battalion.15
The railway embankment where the 14th Brigade suffered heavy losses on 2 September 1918, with the St Denis sugar factory in left distance. Photo taken 15 September 1918. (AWM EO3752)
The sugar factory
North of Péronne, the 14th Brigade’s difficulties also began before zero hour on 2 September, as the 56th Battalion, now deployed to take the attack forward in place of the decimated 53rd, moved into its assembly position near the Anvil Wood cemetery. At 5.30 am the bombardment opened on the 7th Brigade front and, supposedly, on the north-eastern ramparts of Péronne. Unfortunately the responding German barrage caught the 56th in its assembly lines and caused heavy casualties, including all the officers from three of its companies.
For 21-year-old Second Lieutenant William Nancarrow from Newcastle, New South Wales, there had never been an attack like this ‘under such conditions’. The German barrage, consisting mostly of ‘heavy high explosive shells which burst immediately on contact with the ground’, continued in its violence for over two hours and ‘how men could live through such a rain of shells’ was ‘past all understanding’.16 For Private Bert Bishop of the 55th Battalion it was like entering a ‘cauldron straight from hell’, and he also felt that the men ‘had never gone into battle like this before’; they ‘switched off’ as they walked ‘into the valley of death’.17
The 56th Battalion struggled to its start line and the attack commenced at 6.00 am, only to be met by hurricane machine-gun fire from the ramparts, clearly not subdued by the Australian bombardment, from St Denis, from the sugar factory where machine-gunners were firing from the top windows, and from the left flank. There was havoc in the 56th, reduced from 360 men to only 180, and by 7.00 am the position was critical. However, Sergeant Alexander O’Connor, a 29-year-old carrier from West Wyalong in New South Wales, took control of the remnants of three companies and led them forward in rushes in a truly gallant action that succeeded in making around 800 yards before the men were forced to dig in south of the sugar factory, the companies at most only 35 strong.
From the nearby railway embankment, a target that the German machine-gunners ‘dreamt of’ and where the Australians suffered many casualties, O’Connor watched the advance of the 58th Battalion in Péronne and turned his riflemen — all his Lewis guns had been knocked out — on the Germans who were opposing it from the eastern ramparts, prompting them to flee or surrender and causing much amusement among the Australians who were sniping at them.18 He then made contact with two companies of the 55th Battalion which, recognising the desperate situation of the 56th, ‘charged’ forward on the left, having been instructed to ‘fix bayonets, and get into them’.19 They reached the sugar factory which at last fell to the Australians. As well as providing good cover, this strongpoint had dominated the flank.
Private Ernie Corey MM and three bars, 55th Battalion. (AWM AO5109)
Private Bert Bishop, 55th Battalion.
From here the Australian snipers went to work, forcing the Germans from the broken buildings across the road all the way down to St Denis. A company of the 55th attempted to take this strongpoint but suffered heavy casualties after unexpectedly running into German machine-gun nests, and was forced to withdraw, having lost all but two officers and 25 men. It was not until 4.30 pm that St Denis was finally captured. The defenders were forced to withdraw behind the Aizecourt-le-Haut road to Darmstadt Trench and the wooded hills beyond.
O’Connor now set about forming a defensive line by gathering guns, ammunition and as many men as he could find. He placed them in outposts in a line from the sugar factory to the moat at Péronne where they remained until 11.00 pm. All the time he and his men were strafed by enemy planes and shelled by all calibres as well as gas with only shell holes for cover. The 56th was reinforced in the afternoon by the 59th Battalion coming in on the right after also being held up by withering machine-gun fire from the brickworks and aerodrome near Anvil Wood; the clearing of Péronne finally made the position more secure.
However, the Australians needed to take St Denis Wood for the whole line to advance and undertake its flanking movement. The attack was planned for that night, only to be cancelled when orders were received that the 14th Brigade, ‘who had only remnants left in the line’, was to be relieved by the 15th, which would form a brigade front.20 Pompey Elliott firmly believed that, had this attack gone in, the troops launching it ‘would have be
en utterly annihilated’ because the hills surrounding and overlooking the position bristled with machine-guns.21 The remaining two officers and 80 other ranks of the 56th Battalion moved back and were given a hot meal. In this battalion alone, over 200 men had been wounded and 26 killed over two days of fighting.
In the midst of the fighting, the stretcher-bearers were hard at work. The 26-year-old Ernest Corey of the 55th Battalion was a legend to the men of the 14th Brigade. He was the only man in the Great War to win the MM with three bars — at Bullecourt, Polygon Wood, Péronne and Bellicourt. At Polygon Wood and Péronne he was recommended for the DCM but, on both occasions, was awarded a bar to his MM instead. With his knowledge of first aid, he was able to dress the wounded before carrying them from the battlefield, often under heavy fire and with no thought for his own safety. He saved the lives of many men, working continuously and cheerfully. Bert Bishop wrote that there were times when a man was so badly wounded that it was thought he could not possibly survive, but Ernie would work on him, move him out and the men would learn later that he had lived.
Bert Bishop reading his book, The Hell, the Humour and the Heartbreak, published in 1991 just before his death at age 93.
At Péronne, Bishop recalled holding his platoon sergeant’s arm — attached to his body by one sinew — straight out from the shoulder while Corey, with a blade razor he always carried, cut through the sinew to free the arm which was bleeding badly, leaving Bert holding the severed arm while Ernie attempted to stop the bleeding. Bert felt there was no hope for the sergeant, but the man made a full recovery.22
Ernie’s citation for the Péronne ‘stunt’ described him as courageous, cool, determined and devoted.23 To Bert Bishop, he ‘was like a foundation stone to our platoon’ and ‘fear was unknown to him’. Ernie was a character who had no respect for rank, saluting a Chinese labourer, but refusing to salute an officer.24 Badly wounded near Bellicourt in late September 1918, he nonetheless survived the war and served again during World War II. In 1979 a memorial was dedicated to him in his home town of Cooma in New South Wales, from where he had marched in 1916 as one of the ‘men from Snowy River’.
For 21-year-old Private Bert Bishop from Milton on the south coast of New South Wales, the Great War was the central experience of his life, causing him intense physical and emotional stress over a long period of time.25 His book, The Hell, the Humour and the Heartbreak, contains a graphic account of the 14th Brigade’s struggle for Péronne. Bert, who enlisted in 1915 at the age of 18, died in 1991, just three months after the book’s publication, aged 93. This daring and courageous soldier was awarded the MM for his actions at Péronne, where he used his Lewis gun to help advance the line, showing complete disregard for his own safety.
Of all the brigades involved in the battle for Mont St Quentin and Péronne, the 14th suffered the heaviest casualties — 44 officers and 797 other ranks. Brigadier General Stewart attributed most of them to machine-gun wounds, with 50–75 gas cases and others wounded by large calibre shells. In percentage terms, the brigade suffered 63% officer casualties and 49% other ranks. Stewart praised his men’s resourcefulness and initiative under very difficult conditions, in what, at times, seemed a hopeless task.
Hobbs and Stewart recommended Alexander O’Connor for the VC and, had justice been done, he would have been the ninth recipient of the award for this battle. Instead, he received the DCM. In 1919, however, he was awarded the Romanian Medaille Barbatie Si Credinta (Medal for Bravery and Loyalty), 2nd Class, for his actions on 2 September, his citation stating that he displayed ‘an utter contempt for danger’, ‘faultless’ tactics and ‘excellent judgement and the greatest valour’.26
On his return to Australia, O’Connor was prominent at battalion reunions and Anzac Day functions. He married, had three children and worked as an electrician in Sydney. At 11.00 am on 11 November 1929, Remembrance Day, he came down from the overhead wires on which he was working to observe the two minutes silence. As he climbed back up, he touched a live wire and was killed instantly.27
The most brilliant of all its successes
The forgotten brigade in the struggle for Mont St Quentin and Péronne is the 7th Brigade from the 2nd Division. Other brigades saw it as the ‘moppingup’ formation once the 5th and 6th had captured the Mont, but this is an unjust oversimplification and certainly no reflection of the way the 7th itself regarded its actions in this fight. It was tasked with exploiting the capture of Mont St Quentin and Feuillaucourt by advancing along the ridge from the Mont towards Aizecourt-le-Haut and conforming with the actions of the British 74th Division on its left and the 14th Brigade on its right by swinging a flank to face south-east along the ridge.
The 7th’s orders were based on reports that the Germans on this front were retreating. In reality, the brigade was set an extremely difficult task and its commander, the highly competent Brigadier General Evan Wisdom, felt ‘it would appear an impossibility for any troops, even Australians, to storm such a position, held as it was, with such a small force, and for most of the way with practically no close artillery support. No words can describe the bravery, determination and skill of the infantry’. In the aftermath of the fighting, Wisdom commented: ‘I consider that the job was one of the toughest the Brigade has ever been up against, and was the most brilliant of all its successes.’28
The 7th Brigade went into action at 5.30 am on 2 September with some crucial elements stacked against it. Originally it was not meant to attack until 3 September, so the change of orders at 9.50 pm on the night of 1 September came as a surprise. Godley was keen to exploit British successes on the left of the Australian operation while the Germans were shaken and the newly arrived British 74th Division was fresh. Thus, it had not been possible for the 7th to reconnoitre the ground or adequately brief junior officers or NCOs and its task was made more difficult because the 6th Brigade had not reached its objectives along the ridge. Company commanders did not receive their verbal instructions until 2.00 am, when they woke the men for a breakfast of dry bread, cold beef and cold tea with no milk or sugar and marched them to their start line from Uber Alles to Elsa trenches and then along the Mont St Quentin–Feuillaucourt road to the Canal du Nord with no time to spare.
The attack was based on the misconception that the enemy was retreating and would not offer much resistance. Counter-battery work was ineffective due to lack of time and the brigade was in a situation where it was difficult to coordinate the artillery as the rate of fire for the British 74th Division on its left was different to that of the Australian artillery. On its right, the 14th Brigade’s zero hour was 6.00 am — some 30 minutes later than that of the 7th Brigade. There was no creeping barrage and the thin artillery barrage that was laid down very quickly outpaced the infantry. When the Australian barrage opened, the 7th, like the other formations around it, noted that the Germans responded with ‘one of the heaviest barrages our troops have experienced’, mixing their shells of all calibres up to 5.9-inch with high quantities of blue cross and lachrymatory gases.29 Machine-gun fire raked the advancing troops who also had to negotiate uncut barbed wire entanglements in the trenches and on the northern and southern slopes of the ridge.
Contrary to expectations, the Germans facing the 7th Brigade ‘stuck to their guns with unusual tenacity, causing serious casualties to our troops’.30 Their trenches were lined with deep shafts in which they sheltered during the bombardment, to surface with machine-guns blazing when the barrage ceased. Wisdom estimated that the defenders had twice as many machine-guns as the Australians and were firing from trenches at close quarters. Artillery from many different directions swept Mont St Quentin and the area west and south of the village. Germans from the relatively sound 38th and 243rd Divisions were interspersed with troops from all three regiments of the effective 2nd Guard Division and their attitude was stubborn and aggressive. The 7th Brigade war diary commented that ‘the fight developed into an infantry attack against numerous and well sited machine gun positions, garrison
ed by determined troops.’31 It was remarkable that any troops attacking under these conditions could escape annihilation. There was very little cover and every yard gained was vigorously contested, the Australians dislodging the defenders from their trenches.32 This was no easy ‘mopping up’ for the 7th Brigade which had to push the Germans back and clear the ridge.
Because of the extent of the ground to be covered, the 7th Brigade attacked on a three-battalion front. The precise objective was a line from the south of Mont St Quentin village, along Koros Alley into Rupprecht Trench to the St Denis– Aizecourt road and to Aizecourt-le-Haut itself. In addition, the brigade was to mop up all the ground from the north of Allaines and Haut-Allaines to the 14th Brigade boundary in the south.
I only trust he is yet alive, but I fear not
On the right, the 26th Battalion, just over 300 strong, had the unenviable task of providing a flank for the 14th Brigade whose advance was proving extremely difficult. The right company of the 26th encountered destructive machine-gun fire from St Denis and a quarry where ten machine-gun positions had an open field of fire to the west across a triangle bounded by the Péronne–Bapaume road, the St Denis–Aizecourt road and Koros Alley, forcing the company back to Koros. Bean wrote that it was ‘machine gun fire such as the 7th Brigade had not experienced even at Pozieres’ — that bloody operation in August 1916 — and many casualties resulted.33 For a time the men also had to wear gas masks. One company was ‘cut to pieces in the open’ by the deadly fire in the triangle, one officer suffering a thigh wound and bleeding to death.34
Brigadier General Evan Wisdom, 7th Brigade. (AWM ART02999)
Second Lieutenant Oscar Lawson, 26th Battalion, c. 1915.
The left company of the 26th Battalion, also severely diminished in numbers, ‘disappeared in smoke and shells’, facing at least 30 machine-guns manned by determined Germans along Koros and Kurilo alleys, stretching along the ridge for 1000 yards.35 The clearing of these trenches, according to the 26th Battalion war diary, was ‘a feat which should almost rank amongst the finest achievements of the war.’36 The troops, split into two parties, ‘went on crossfiring at the Germans from one trench to the other up the alley’.37 Although it took its objective in the morning, it was dusk before contact with the 14th Brigade was established and the 26th‘s line was consolidated about 1500 yards east from its start line, with posts north of St Denis and as far east as Darmstadt Trench.
Beaten Down By Blood Page 14