Rosenthal’s aim in deploying the 6th Brigade was also now in jeopardy. He intended that once the mopping up was completed — and this was not expected to be an arduous task — the troops would pass through the 5th Brigade in its battle positions and advance to the east of Aizecourt-le-Haut, exploiting along the Mont St Quentin ridge. The 5th Brigade would then make sure the river bend was clear. He issued these instructions to the 6th Brigade at 10.45 am. He had already extended the 5th Brigade’s objectives to include St Denis Wood and the high ground in the vicinity of Cardinal Wood and, at 1.20 pm, he ordered the 6th Brigade to help the 5th accomplish this and establish the flank before pushing on. At 10.00 am he ordered the 7th Brigade to be in position to cross the river from 12.30 pm in support of his other two brigades.16
None of this bore any resemblance to what was happening on the battlefield. The 6th Brigade presumed that since Mont St Quentin had been taken its battalions would not meet much resistance as they moved up. However, Martin had ordered the 5th Brigade to go straight for the Mont without mopping up; it was only on the initiative of Captain Herbert Allan that Halle and Park Wood had been cleared. Monash seemed aware by about 9.00 am that the ground between Mont St Quentin and Péronne had not been definitely established; he was unaware of how dangerous it actually was and how strongly it was held by the Germans. An earlier deployment of the 6th Brigade may have alleviated some of the difficulties on the right flank, allowing both the 5th and the 6th to conduct their exploitation tasks. Had this been accomplished on 31 August the battle for Mont St Quentin-Péronne could have been shortened, the objectives taken sooner, and fewer casualties suffered as a result.
The 5th Brigade was clearly under the impression that the 6th Brigade would move through on the afternoon of 31 August. Repeated messages from the men told of no troops on the right flank and no troops behind, allowing the Germans to infiltrate the Australian positions. Part of the problem was that, although the men of the 19th Battalion were fighting for their lives on the right, they had undershot their objective in the morning and were not in Uber Alles or Gott Mit Uns trenches, but on a line from the top of the former trench back along Agram Alley. It was not until 12.50 pm that William Bateman, the battalion commander, realised the mistake — ‘I am not satisfied that the battalion is holding the whole of objective laid down’ — and ordered any men facing Mont St Quentin to withdraw to take up positions in the trench system, where two companies of the 18th Battalion, having cleared Anvil Wood, would join them for the push to St Denis Wood and Cardinal Wood.17 The 6th Brigade was to pass through at 2.00 pm and Bateman wanted the position defined before then.
However, just an hour later, Brigade Order BM 149 directed that, while the troops should endeavour to carry out their previous instructions, they should also hold on to the positions gained.18 The companies of the 18th could not get beyond Agram Alley because of German machine-gun fire from Anvil Wood, the aerodrome and St Denis; whether the Australians were ever in Uber Alles or Gott Mit Uns trenches remained a contentious issue well into the evening of 31 August and the morning of 1 September.
By the evening of 31 August, the 5th Brigade had formed a salient without support on either flank, as the 10th Brigade had not moved up on its left. A force of around 600 men was holding a front of 4000 yards. Had they been reinforced, they may well have been able to ‘push on’ rather than simply ‘hold on’, for ‘once they got onto the road they say they could have gone on forever had they had the men’.19 As it was, buffeted by repeated counter-attacks, the battalions had no hope of carrying out their exploitation orders and were forced to fall back from their objectives.
At 3.30 pm Charles Rosenthal told James Robertson by telephone that his brigade must take over from the 5th Brigade before nightfall and establish a line well east of Feuillaucourt and Mont St Quentin so as to be in a good position to advance on the morning of 1 September. However, brigade telephone lines to the battalions were down until 4.00 pm. At 4.15 pm, Robertson issued Instructions No 1 Series ‘A’ in which his four battalions would capture the Bussu-Haut-Allaines road including both villages before moving onto a long trench system running from the Canal du Nord, east of Aizecourt-le-Haut and east of Bussu, a huge and unrealistic objective.20
However, at 4.00 pm, with the telephone lines back up, the 24th Battalion commander, William James, advised Robertson that such an attack would be impossible until the ground from which it would be launched was cleared. The brigadier then went forward to see the situation for himself — braving Rosenthal’s displeasure that he had left his headquarters to put himself in great danger — and he modified the plan as a consequence, displaying flexibility in attempting to achieve Monash’s intention. At some unspecified zero hour, the 24th Battalion would attack Mont St Quentin, which he now believed the 5th Brigade had lost, while the 23rd Battalion, line right, and the 21st Battalion, line left, would clear the ground between Mont St Quentin and Péronne. Robertson advised Rosenthal of the situation by telephone at around 7.00 pm and until that point the divisional commander appeared unaware that the 5th Brigade had been pushed off the Mont and out of Feuillaucourt. He continued to stress that the 6th and 14th brigades must push through that night and establish the line east of Feuillaucourt, Mont St Quentin and St Denis.21
Men of the 56th Battalion en route from the southern to the northern bank of the Somme, 31 August 1918. (AWM EO3201)
By mid-afternoon it must have been apparent to Rosenthal that the battle was not unfolding as he had anticipated in the morning. However, from his headquarters at Cappy he had to rely on the intelligence he received from subordinate commanders unless he went forward himself. At 2.00 pm a message from Martin indicated that the brigadier was still pleased with the situation even though Ommiécourt and Mont St Quentin were being constantly shelled. Given the nature of communications it is difficult to ascertain what time Martin sent this message. At this stage both commanders believed their troops still held the village, despite a counter-attack in the morning and a 20th Battalion report at 11.35 am that the situation on Mont St Quentin was far from satisfactory.22 Both still believed that Anvil Wood could be cleared to allow for exploitation towards St Denis. The pressure on Rosenthal was intense and, by mid-afternoon, he became far more proactive in conducting the operation, whether as a result of a directive from Monash or on his own initiative is unclear.
During the afternoon Monash clearly became concerned about the progress of the battle. Even though he moved his headquarters forward to a derelict chateau at Méricourt-sur-Somme, and was not settled there until around 4.00 pm, he continued to monitor the situation, particularly later in the afternoon when the scheme of operations began to unravel. Prior to this, there had been no need for the corps commander to intervene; he could leave his divisional and brigade commanders to implement their instructions. Now, however, his guiding hand was everywhere. At 3.40 pm Thomas Blamey issued Battle Instruction Series C No 15 which stressed the need to exploit the gains of the 5th Brigade. At 4.30 pm, Major Richard Casey, working as the liaison officer between the 2nd Division and the Australian Corps, paid Rosenthal a visit, shortly followed by a representative of the Fourth Army seeking an update on the situation. Rosenthal, now under pressure from Monash, increased the pressure on Robertson. Monash’s intention was clear; Rosenthal and Robertson simply needed to implement it. By 7.30 pm Blamey and Monash had both been informed of a conference Rosenthal had called for 9.30 pm, the latter instructing at 8.30 pm that fresh troops must attack at 5.00 am on 1 September to recapture the lost ground and extend the bridgehead.23
Thus, the early euphoria surrounding the capture of Mont St Quentin proved premature, reflecting the extent to which the commanders had underestimated the determination of the defenders. Once the Germans had regrouped, they made a determined stand against the Australians. Had the Germans been fully established in their positions on the Mont and its approaches, the Australians should never have reached them. The defenders had sufficient striking power in their
own ranks to launch counter-attack after counter-attack against their opponents and while the action disintegrated into a bloody battle for survival on both sides, the skill, discipline, firepower and training of the Australian infantry enabled them to hold on and maintain their line, demoralising the Germans. While there was much disorganisation and desperate fighting, control was never lost on the battlefield.
Company commanders — such as John McDonald and Herbert Allan — may have been directing the grass roots operations, but battalion commanders close to the action were making important decisions which would be instrumental in the outcome of the battle. Edward Martin kept in close contact with his battalion commanders by telephone until the wires were cut sometime around 8.00 am on the morning of 31 August, when he lost touch with his troops for a time. Nor did he appear to know where they were when night fell at the end of that momentous day, a consequence of ‘the fog of war’. In this situation a great deal of responsibility devolved on his battalion commanders who proved themselves more than capable of taking up the challenge.
Frederick Forbes, commanding the 20th Battalion, had not slept since the night of 29 August, when he had taken a short nap while waiting for his company commanders to arrive at his ‘watery dugout’.24 On 30 August he took precautions as the 20th moved close to Cléry, astutely and correctly refusing to believe that it was clear of Germans, and was largely responsible for the 20th’s part in the clearing of the village. At 1.30 am on 31 August he personally took the orders for the attack on Mont St Quentin up to Bluey McDonald’s ‘hole’ in the bank. As well as controlling his battalion skilfully, Forbes took command of the whole line on 31 August, cleverly deploying companies of the 18th Battalion to prevent the line from being broken and to support the 17th and 19th battalions in particular. Already much decorated, he was now mentioned in despatches and was later awarded the CMG, partly for his work at Mont St Quentin. Leslie Fussell was awarded the DSO for his ‘clever’ handling of the 17th Battalion under difficult and trying circumstances.25
Likewise, the battalion commanders of 6th Brigade read the ground well and it illustrates something of the command structure in the Australian Corps that Robertson listened to them, advised Rosenthal of the position on both the 5th and 6th Brigade fronts and perhaps influenced the divisional commander to change the plan of attack for 1 September, realising that ‘it was far more than a one battalion show to take Mont St Quentin’.26 During that attack Robertson went forward again on the urging of his battalion commanders, who all shared the same headquarters by direct order from the brigadier, resulting in the artillery barrage at 1.00 pm that finally allowed the 6th Brigade to retake the Mont. The initiative of subordinate commanders such as Robertson, James, Forbes and Fussell was clearly critical to the success of this battle.
Far too great for exhausted men
But the man who can most truly be accounted brave
is he who best knows the meaning of what is sweet in life
and of what is terrible, and then goes out undeterred
to meet what is to come.
Pericles’ Funeral Oration,
Thucydides II.40
On 30 August the 14th Brigade was resting west of Barleux in support of the 15th Brigade which was to relieve the 7th Brigade in the line that night and try to force a crossing of the Somme south of Péronne to take the high ground between Doingt and Le Mesnil. At 5.20 pm patrols from the 14th were reconnoitring areas for occupation and defence on the western bank. James Stewart had given strict instructions that battalions were not to move without orders. Shortly after, Hobbs told the 15th Brigade that while maximum objectives were not to be attempted, fighting patrols should work south of Péronne towards Flamicourt and along the east bank. Both Evan Wisdom and Pompey Elliott had advised him that a passage could not be found south of Péronne; Hobbs consulted Monash, who said he preferred to turn the position from the north in an attempt to reduce casualties.27 The 5th Brigade’s progress in crossing the river to the northern bank and moving into a position from which to attack Mont St Quentin from the north-west was a determining factor. The whole complexion of the operation had now changed but, while rumours abounded all day that the 14th might be ordered to cross to the northern bank, no such orders came through. The brigade was expectant and ready to move immediately, keen to prove its mettle in this fight.
Much depended on the outcome of the 5th Brigade’s attack on the morning of 31 August. With the seemingly easy capture of Mont St Quentin, at 8.00 am Monash wired Hobbs to direct the 14th Brigade to cross the river at Ommiécourt ‘at once’ and exploit the 5th Brigade’s success, a new task which would see it following behind the 6th Brigade until it could swing south to capture the high ground originally stipulated for the 15th Brigade’s attack on 30 August.28 Rosenthal similarly redirected the 7th Brigade to the north, while Pompey Elliott’s brigade was left holding the 5th Divisional front south of Péronne with instructions to force a passage if possible.
Monash had expected more of the 6th and 14th Brigades on 31 August than they were able to deliver. But, while he let Rosenthal off lightly, at the time he was very critical of Hobbs and Stewart. Perhaps this was because the 5th Brigade had exceeded his expectations and he was now concerned about the exploitation and maintaining the momentum of the advance. He felt that both 5th Division commanders could have pushed their men harder and taken greater risks given what was at stake. He accused Hobbs of lacking ‘the drive necessary for an operation of this sort’.29 Part of his criticism stemmed from the fact that it had taken the 14th Brigade ten hours to reach its assembly positions, not unrealistic for Pompey Elliott, however, who felt that the 14th could not be in position to attack before dawn on 1 September owing to the difficulty of traversing the old battlefield and the distance it had to cover.30
The Ommiécourt crossing itself was problematic. Reports on the accessibility of the crossing changed constantly on 31 August, but when the 19th Battalion crossed there at around 3.00 am its men did so in single file under conditions which were adverse and hazardous in the extreme, the success of the operation depending ‘mainly on boldness and trust’.31 When the 53rd Battalion arrived on the southern bank at around 12.30 pm, the engineers were trying to repair the bridge, a task that had been constant all day. The 53rd began to cross, but was forced to withdraw, considering it ‘impracticable’ to continue despite the fact that a 5th Brigade report at 12 noon had declared the bridge intact.32 The 27th Battalion of the 7th Brigade crossed the bridge at around 2.30 or 3.00 pm that afternoon.
Stewart instead opted for the Buscourt crossing which considerably lengthened his approach march. Interestingly, Rosenthal had advised part of the 14th Brigade to cross at Buscourt as early as 9.15 am.33 On 31 August all the crossings were being shelled by heavy artillery; crossing the Somme at any point was a precarious business but remarkably completed with very few casualties. Private Bert Bishop described the 55th Battalion’s experience at Buscourt: the ‘German artillery on Mont St Quentin was firing over open sights straight down on the stricken structure. Planks connecting the piers were allowing groups of infantry to run the gauntlet … slipping on mud and blood, holding with one arm to anything in reach, we forced ourselves across.’34
The 53rd Battalion, in the lead, was on the northern bank by about 3.30 pm, with the rest of the brigade across around 5.30 pm or a little later. The 54th was camped under a big white chalk cutting and was aware that it was late. Stewart’s communications were down, he complained that he had no artillery support and for a time no-one was sure where the brigade was. It soon became obvious that ‘things were pretty confused in front of us’ and the situation was not as he had been led to believe.35 When the battalions attempted to move into their assembly positions east of Cléry they found them still occupied by the 6th Brigade, which had not gone over, and alternative arrangements had to be made. The area was extremely crowded and subject to shellfire. All of these factors were beyond Stewart’s control and it is difficult to understand how
Monash could criticise the 5th Division commanders for failing to form the flank for the 5th Brigade.
Stewart issued Brigade Order 175, the corresponding order to the 6th Brigade’s Instructions 1 Series ‘A’, issued at 4.15 pm. It was the plan of attack for the 14th Brigade at an unspecified zero hour. Its actions were entirely contingent on the movement of the 6th, which it would follow until the 56th Battalion cleared Péronne and the attack could be developed southwards. It was not known whether the Germans still held Péronne or whether the waterways into the town were passable.36 Both brigadiers issued these instructions believing that the 5th Brigade still held Mont St Quentin. When Robertson’s reconnaissance proved otherwise and Rosenthal called the conference for 9.30 pm, the plans of attack had to be amended. The 2nd Division was too weak to cover the whole front, so the 14th Brigade was to be brought into the attack on the right.
This conference did not break up until midnight and zero hour, at Stewart’s insistence, was set for 6.00 am, an hour too late for the 2nd Division’s liking. Hobbs made it quite clear in his after action report just how much work Stewart now had to do to get his men to the jumping-off line on time. He had to formulate a detailed plan for this new task and relay it to his battalion commanders who in turn had to ensure that it filtered down through the levels of command to the NCOs and men. Perhaps the most difficult aspect was to move the brigade from its support position into its attack position, a distance of some 2500 yards without taped tracks on an exceedingly dark night.37 The 53rd Battalion found its start line still occupied by the Germans and had to fight for it. While every commander in every unit faced tight time constraints and often difficult manoeuvres in this battle — such was the nature of the quick attack — Stewart’s situation was particularly unenviable. His troops were, however, in position to attack on time, quite an achievement given the circumstances.
Beaten Down By Blood Page 25