For the quick attack the time for preparation for the conduct of operations was necessarily reduced and commanders had to react as the situation unfolded using the resources at their disposal. This was extraordinarily stressful. With hindsight, it is easy to be critical of the performances of some commanders at some stages of the battle, but it is difficult to establish what they could have done differently or what alternatives they had under the circumstances, particularly given the ’ fog of war’. They were ordered to fulfil Monash’s intention and take their objectives, and this they did within a reasonable time-frame.
The conduct of operations in 1918 meant that the corps was in many ways a spectator, as the ‘conditions of open warfare precluded close control’.60 Peter Stanley argues that this battle was ‘not Monash’s triumph’ because ‘he moved brigades in the general direction of the battle, but did not intervene to direct them to the decisive point when needed’, leaving this to subordinate commanders who did not at first take the initiative, but then accepted the credit ‘when they finally did take charge’.61
However, the corps commander kept a close eye on operations at Mont St Quentin-Péronne, declaring that ‘the whole operation would be one of a nature in which I would have to intervene as the battle proceeded, in accordance with the varying situation from time to time, and this actually proved to be necessary’.62 Indeed it was. His message to Gellibrand at 8.35 am on 31 August that ‘casualties no longer matter’ as long as the Bouchavesnes ridge was taken, his instructions to Rosenthal on the afternoon of 31 August, his orders to Hobbs before the conference at Herbecourt on 1 September, Rosenthal’s visit to his headquarters at Méricourt at 6.00 pm on 1 September to discuss operations for 2 September and his intervention at around 11.40 am on 2 September concerning the situation on the 14th Brigade’s front all point to the fact that Monash was highly involved. On 1 September he sent a letter to Ivor Maxse, the Inspector-General of Training at GHQ, who had requested to see him, asking to postpone the meeting for ‘just today and tomorrow I am having an anxious and busy time in endeavouring to make good the somewhat precarious footing gained to-day on the bridge-head around Péronne. The enemy is counter-attacking heavily and the situation requires my constant attention.’63 This was one battle in which the corps commander could not remain a spectator for long.
It could be argued that corps headquarters was the ‘brain’ of an operation and as such this was where the corps commander could, and should, be found. However, Monash would have had a much clearer appreciation of what his troops faced had he gone forward himself at Mont St Quentin-Péronne. While known for his ability to read ground from a map, in this battlefield of difficult crossings, old trench systems, fortified strongpoints, barbed wire entanglements and determined German resistance, a map would not suffice. His policies were based on the military principle of not allowing the enemy any respite, to push and keep pushing but, as Pompey Elliott pointed out on 2 September, objectives had to be realistic, not ‘impossible’, because Australian soldiers, so keen to achieve them, did not react well to failure.64
On 6 September Monash belatedly paid a visit to the battlefield so he could see for himself what his men had accomplished. He watched the engineers at work at Brie and Eterpigny and moved ‘on to high ground at La Maisonette where we obtained very good view of country E of Canal’ and the villages burning in the distance. At Péronne and Mont St Quentin he saw Germans lying dead where they were killed, a sight also witnessed by Gellibrand who was on Mont St Quentin that day — ‘plenty dead Boche and a good many of ours’. Monash returned to his headquarters at 8.00 pm ‘after interesting afternoon’. Rosenthal was out and about as well, visiting Mont St Quentin and the north-east spur that the 7th Brigade had captured. Standing on the Mont, ‘one appreciates to the full the difficult nature of the task and the gallant work done by our infantry on the 31st August and 1st September.’ Hobbs, who visited Péronne, St Denis and Flamicourt also on 6 September, was awestruck, marvelling in his diary, ‘how our men achieved the success they did is beyond me in the face of the difficulties they had to surmount.’65
CHAPTER 11:
MY STOMACH THINKS MY THROAT’S CUT
Here lie six Boches
History has tended to judge the Great War on its appalling casualty figures, remembering battles where the intention was not achieved but the ground ran red with blood. Dealing with the issue of an ‘acceptable’ casualty rate is very difficult and often unpalatable. While the casualty figure at Mont St Quentin-Péronne — around 3600 men from 31 August–2 September — is small compared to some of the Australians’ other battles where either victory or defeat was dearly bought, it is difficult to argue, as Shelford Bidwell does, that the Mont, a well-defended ‘notable eminence’, virtually ‘went for a song’.1
One important consideration is that the men themselves would not have seen it this way. Although their perspective was limited by their particular experiences on their particular part of the battlefield, they all knew that their battalions were severely under strength and the prospects for reinforcement were slim. They all knew that casualties were high in proportion to the number of men who attacked and because of the number of men who attacked.
Some battalions, such as the 33rd and the 17th, suffered a 50% casualty rate — and this may be a conservative figure — and in the 56th Battalion, 56% of the men became casualties. The casualty figures for the 11th Brigade were running at 50%, and it was estimated that 40% of those men would not return to their units within three months.2 Personal accounts tend to put the casualty rates higher than the official records, but even here there are plenty of examples of company strengths down to between 25 and 35 men by the end of the ‘stunt’, when those companies went in with at most 70 to 80 men, still a long way below the normal establishment. In some cases platoons were reduced to an average of five to eight men. This would present a devastating picture if the analysis were to end here.
However, casualties suffered must be measured against what the intention was and whether it was achieved. This significant victory was not cheaply bought, but the price was acceptable in terms of the tactical value of the positions won. Throughout the operation Monash was focused on his intention and he achieved his aim and his purpose; Mont St Quentin-Péronne was one of a number of engagements which helped to shorten the war and therefore ultimately saved lives.
The battle was much more expensive for the Germans, who suffered ‘extraordinarily heavy’ losses from 31 August to 2 September.3 The Australians alone captured at least 3500 prisoners and casualties were far higher. Corporal Alfred Edwards of the 17th Battalion believed that there were some 500 enemy dead on Mont St Quentin at 9.00 am on 31 August and the 53rd took no prisoners in Florina Trench on the morning of 1 September.4 The Germans were very crowded in Péronne on the morning of 2 September and suffered severely under the artillery barrage.
Already weak formations were decimated. The 94th Infantry Regiment, which watched the fighting strength of its exhausted companies ebb day by day, was reduced to 150 men, while battalions of the 96th averaged 100 men each by the end of the ‘stunt’. The Franz Regiment of the 2nd Guard Division, fighting on the Bouchavesnes ridge, was reduced to 216 men, its 1st Battalion numbering 80 men and its 3rd Battalion 14. The Augusta Regiment, also fighting to the north of Mont St Quentin, was just as weak and suffered heavy losses, its 1st Battalion down to 100 men, while the Alexander Regiment opposing the 2nd Division was reduced to 465.5 By the afternoon of 2 September, the Germans opposite the 11th Brigade and the 74th Division on the Bouchavesnes ridge ‘were exhausted beyond their usual power of resistance’.6 The once-proud 14th Bavarian Division was dissolved shortly after the battle for Péronne.
More significantly, the already fragile morale of the German divisions was further undermined by the relentlessness of the Australian attack. As the battle was drawing to a close, even Guardsmen, so disciplined in training and tradition, wanted to be captured and ‘had no more fighting spirit’. Some
were caught ‘making off’ and behaving in a drunk and disorderly manner behind the lines. It seemed that no amount of suffering or sacrifice would bring victory, a sad lesson learnt by men who had done everything in their power to hold their positions and who believed they had fought ‘heroically’ but to no purpose.7 By contrast, their opponents were up-beat, an epitaph on a rough cross on the Mont St Quentin battlefield perhaps summing this up:
Here lie six Boches.
They met a Digger.8
Absolutely fresh and rested troops
The corps commander regarded it ‘as a fundamental principle to employ whenever possible absolutely fresh and rested troops for an operation of any magnitude or importance.’9 Monash had the option of resting the corps when Haig directed the Fourth Army to ‘mark time’ on 25 August. Instead, he ordered that the progress of the 3rd Division continue north of the Somme and the 2nd and 5th divisions, which had enjoyed a short rest, relieve the 1st and 4th on the night of 26/27 August and continue the advance on the southern bank. He believed that each brigade in the line should be pushed to the limit of its endurance before being relieved. Thus, although fighting had not been particularly strenuous in the approach to the Somme bend, his troops were continuously moving or engaged in action against determined German rearguards. The weather was unfavourable and the men had little shelter. They ‘reached the Somme in a very tired condition’.10 For the quick attacks on Mont St Quentin-Péronne, Monash did not have any ‘absolutely fresh and rested troops’ — the 14thBrigade was the closest to the ideal that he had. After its seven-mile approach march on 31 August, however, this brigade too was fatigued.
What is significant is that by the time each brigade launched its major attacks, the men were not just weary, but exhausted. With so few men — the line strength of most brigades was around 1000–1200 men — mopping up, that systematic procedure to ensure that ground taken was clear of the enemy, and one of Monash’s key policies, became extremely difficult. This meant that the troops in the field often had to fight their way to their respective start lines — the 17th and 20th battalions in the Eleu trench system on 30 August and the 53rd Battalion in Florina Trench on 1 September are just two examples. This also made them more vulnerable to counter-attacks. Deploying ‘fresh and rested troops’ was a means of reducing risk in battle that was not in play at Mont St Quentin-Péronne.
James Marshall of the 53rd Battalion recorded the level of his exhaustion. He fought all day on 1 September and then acted as a runner in the early morning of 2 September. He found some maps, code books, drawings, four revolvers and other souvenirs in a dugout and took them back to headquarters only to be told that headquarters was moving forward, so he had to move again with no time for a meal. By now he had been 14 hours without even a drink of water, no sleep, under fire and ‘fit to collapse’. Then a signaller asked him to help lay a cable, after which he had to move back again as the battalion was being relieved.11
No place for the kitchens here
Tired men can often find new strength if they are well fed. Another of Monash’s key principles was to ensure that the troops were well supplied with the basics — food, water, forage for the horses, ammunition — in order to perform their tasks and keep their morale high.12 The logistical organisation within the Australian Corps was such that even in the quick attacks of Mont St Quentin-Péronne these needs could largely be met and maintained. This was a key ingredient for success in this battle.
However, there were times when the men went into battle without a hot meal, perhaps because they had to move at short notice or because the rations could not get forward. These tended to occur at crucial points such as the attack by the 9th and 10th brigades on 30 August and, noticeably, the attack by the 17th, 19th and 20th battalions on Mont St Quentin on 31 August. The 54th Battalion had not had breakfast before its attack on Péronne on 1 September and was pleased that the Germans had coffee waiting. Bert Bishop recorded that his company went for hours and hours without food at various stages of the 55th’s attack, one man commenting that ‘my stomach thinks my throat’s cut’.13 In this case it would appear that Monash’s basic principle broke down and tired men were launched against key objectives without the benefit of hot food and fortified only with rum.
However, these cases were the exception rather than the rule. The commanders certainly regarded feeding their men as a priority and it is remarkable under the circumstances that they were fed so well. Edward Martin and James Robertson were both pleased with the supply of water and rations to the men, the former making the point that extra water in water carts was sent forward on 31 August, to be carried to the front line in petrol tins by carrying parties.14 In the evening, while holding on in Gottlieb Trench, the 20th Battalion ate rissoles and drank hot tea, while curry and rum was on the menu for the 17th.15 The field cookers were mobile and placed well forward; rations were sent to them and then bagged by the company quartermaster and sent up in limbers which moved them close to the front line posts, from where ration parties only had to carry them a short distance. Brigade snipers were used to carry the rations for the 21st Battalion on 1 September and hot food for the 23rd Battalion was moved up on trucks on the light railways to within easy carrying distance of the companies.16
The 18th Battalion war diary described the challenge of getting food forward and suggests that every effort was made to do this. On the night of 29 August the 18th had dry rations and hot tea because it was ‘impossible to get stew forward tonight’. The men appreciated the hot breakfast on 30 August, particularly as they were very tired. At 6.30 pm, as the battalion was standing by to move at a moment’s notice, the men had hot tea, but there was ‘no place for the kitchens here’. At 4.00 am on 31 August a hot breakfast was again organised for them as they waited in reserve. At 12.30 pm, in the middle of the battle for Mont St Quentin, the 18th was thinking about its dinner and how a ‘hot meal must be sent up tonight’. Rations, tea and rum did arrive at 6.10 pm but, at some point after the Germans had infiltrated the rear trenches, there was great distress because the rations and tea got lost.17 Apparently the ration party had walked into the German lines, where the food, especially the white bread, was stolen and eaten and men of the 24th Battalion, including Percy Smythe, had to go and rescue the ration party.18
Soldiers filling a water cart for 2nd Division troops fighting on Mont St Quentin, 31 August 1918. (AWM EO3093)
The 59th Battalion was also fed under trying circumstances. On 1 September, in trying to move rations to the front line, the wagons came under shellfire near Barleux. One horse was killed and one wounded, afterwards shot. Three drivers were wounded, two of whom were later evacuated. The rations eventually reached the men, but they were an hour late. There were more problems on 2 September when one driver was wounded by shellfire and later died. The others were badly shaken and shell-shocked. Dinner was taken up by the company storemen and the men feasted on steaks, curry, biscuit pudding and tea, remarkably all kept hot in hot boxes.19
Every attempt was made to provide the men with reasonably nutritious and varied food whenever possible. The diet sheets for the companies of the 58th Battalion in September 1918 show that meals were carefully planned. Tea was a staple, served with every ‘meal’ but, as it was often brought up in old petrol tins, it smelt and tasted like petrol. In addition, the men had bacon, stew, rissoles, curry and rice, boiled meat with cabbage, beans or potatoes, cold ham, porridge, curried mince, something suspiciously called ‘dry hash’, biscuit pudding, rice pudding and, for members of D Company, date pudding — all, of course, depending on the time of day and the situation on the battlefield.20
Men of the 27th and 28th battalions having tea in the shelter of a railway cutting 600 yards south-east of Clery, before participating in the Mont St Quentin fighting. This position was occupied by the 2nd Division cookers for the operation at Mont St Quentin. Photo taken 1 September 1918. (AWM EO3148)
When the remnants of 12 Platoon of the 55th Battalion came out of the line on
the night of 2 September they found ‘a big rectangular dixie full of steaming stew’ waiting for them. There was enough to feed a full-strength platoon of 60 men. Bert Bishop and his three remaining mates sat around it and ate and ate ‘and still we ate’. The quartermaster then brought a smaller dixie containing tea and rum. ‘Unable to eat more stew we did all we could with the drinking department. Then we just flopped over asleep.’21
An ammunition reserve
Maintaining ammunition supplies to the men was also a challenge during the battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne. James Robertson described the difficulties faced by the 6th Brigade’s ammunition limbers in crossing the Somme. They were held up on the southern bank until late afternoon on 31 August because the only forward transport bridge — at Feuillères — was under heavy shellfire and then damaged. The brigade bombing officer, realising how urgent it was to have an ammunition reserve across the river, managed to negotiate some of his limbers over the bridge, but the process took 14 hours. On the morning of 1 September the rest of the ammunition moved across and the supply was well maintained throughout the operation.22
Eight limbered wagons transported the 5th Brigade’s ammunition supply. Edward Martin observed that the good condition of the roads made it possible to move the limbers to within 800 yards of the front line. Considerable quantities were supplied because of the close nature of the fighting and on 31 August, 160,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and 2400 grenades were carried forward to the line. Each man went into the line carrying 220 rounds of small arms ammunition and two grenades.23
Beaten Down By Blood Page 27