I would like to thank my colleagues Christopher Poole and Matt Coote for their advice on computer programmes when I designed the maps to accompany this work. Though I possess a fair knowledge of computers, their suggestions and comments were very useful during a long and occasionally frustrating task.
No thanks can be enough for Stuart Hadaway, a fellow historian whose views and opinions I have always valued and respected. We made a good team during our trip to the Peninsula and without his assistance I could never have found and visited as many sites as I did in what is still a remote and difficult region. His knowledge of the Napoleonic era has been invaluable during our many discussions, and he allowed me access to his personal collection of Peninsular War volumes.
I would like to thank Pauline Buttery for reading through the manuscript and picking up all those little typographical errors that hound every aspiring writer. Having worked in a provincial newspaper for many years, I appreciate the value of good proofreading and still consider such ‘quality control’ to be the most important job in the publishing industry. Even in the days of computerised spelling and grammar checks, no writer can do without a second pair of eyes that might catch embarrassing errors he has overlooked. I would also like to thank her for helping me with French translation, as her grasp of the language is considerably superior to my own.
Finally I would like to thank Rupert Harding and Pen and Sword Books for allowing me the chance to bring my work to a wider readership. After picking up a taste for writing at university it has been my dream to write a book and I am extremely grateful for the opportunity. I hope that all those I have mentioned will look over this work and consider it worthwhile.
David Buttery
June 2006
Chapter 1
The Peninsular War
In 1807 Napoleon Bonaparte had reached the zenith of his power in Europe. Born in relative obscurity on the isle of Corsica, the French Revolution enabled him to rise with stunning rapidity through military talent, political opportunism and unwavering ambition. During the Revolutionary Wars, France fought to maintain her borders and preserve the new republic and, as one of her foremost generals, Bonaparte’s influence increased until he overthrew the Directorate in the coup d’ état of 18 Brumaire 1799. Though initially sharing power, as First Consul he rapidly began to assume the status of a dictator. As his popularity grew, many Frenchmen were persuaded to accept a strong leader, fearing the old monarchies of Europe who despised the young republic and wishing to avoid the terror and corruption that typified the Revolution’s seedy aftermath. By 1804 Napoleon felt confident enough to crown himself Emperor and his coronation took place at N ôtre Dame on 2 December.
France had been in a state of almost continual warfare since 1792, but the wars now took on a different character. Defending French interests alone was no longer enough for the ambitious new Emperor, who wished to make France the dominant European power. He believed that maintaining supremacy was closely inter-linked with imperialism and military success:
My power depends on my glory and my glory on the victories I have won. My power will fall if I do not feed it on new glories and new victories. Conquest has made me what I am and only conquest can enable me to hold my position.1
With much of Europe opposed to France, Bonaparte had ample opportunity to put this theory to the test. Britain remained an implacable foe of French expansionism, so the invasion and subjugation of England became his first objective. However, the catastrophic defeat of the combined French and Spanish fleets at the battle of Trafalgar in 1805 saw this operation postponed indefinitely.
Over the next three years Napoleon demonstrated his military genius by inflicting a series of crushing defeats on the foremost land powers in Europe. In 1805 the French Grande Armée marched from their base at Boulogne, where they were massed for the abortive invasion of England, and brought a new kind of warfare to Europe. Napoleon had restructured the army, dividing it into independent corps capable of rapid movement and yet strong enough to hold their own against considerable numbers until reinforced. His theories of war relied on swift marches and lightning strikes, intended to bring the enemy to a decisive battle as quickly as possible. The Austrians were caught off guard by the speed of French manoeuvres and General Mack was surrounded and forced to surrender with around 27,000 men in a relatively bloodless victory at Ulm in Bavaria.
On 2 December 1805, Napoleon won his greatest victory at Austerlitz, defeating the combined armies of Russia and Austria, who quickly sued for peace. In a tactical triumph, Napoleon lured the Allies into attacking him by abandoning the key strategic position of the Pratzen Heights. His carefully planned counter-attack enabled him to cut off his assailants’ overextended assaults and inflict crippling losses, driving his enemies into headlong retreat. The political will to oppose Bonaparte crumbled, leaving the Third Coalition in tatters. The effect of the French victory was aptly summed up by British Prime Minister William Pitt’s prophetic remark upon seeing a map of Europe: ‘Roll up that map; it will not be wanted these ten years.’2 Ten hours of bloodletting at Austerlitz had dashed his hopes of stopping the French and the terrible news reputedly hastened the great statesman’s death.
The following year Napoleon shocked the Continent when he defeated the Prussians at Jena, since their army was thought to be amongst the finest in Europe after Frederick the Great’s reforms. Frederick William III was eventually forced to concede humiliating terms to the French, with the Prussian army virtually destroyed. Russia had once again declared war against France and the costly battle of Eylau, fought in severe winter conditions, proved indecisive. However, the French won a conclusive victory at Friedland in 1807 and Tsar Alexander I made peace at Tilsit between 7–9 July 1807. Meeting on a raft in the middle of the River Niemen, the two monarchs agreed terms that saw France become the dominant power on the Continent. Prussia lost considerable territory and various states were divided between France and her allies. Most importantly, Alexander agreed to reverse his old allegiances and join France in a trade agreement against Britain, known as the Continental System. Britain’s overwhelming naval superiority made a sea-borne invasion unlikely to succeed, so Napoleon hoped to close Continental ports to the British in an attempt to damage their economy.
However, Russia and France were still divided over several important issues and some clauses in the treaty were left deliberately vague. For example, although Napoleon promised some assistance against the Turkish Sultan, he would never allow Russia to seize Constantinople, thereby gaining strategic access to the Mediterranean. From the Russian point of view, French enthusiasm for an independent Poland was anathema to the Tsar, who wished to keep the recalcitrant Poles firmly under Russian control and feared a French client state so far to the east. Thus, despite some common interest, Russia was always a reluctant ally, brought to the negotiating table by force of arms. The longevity of the alliance was very much dependent upon future events. Nevertheless, this treaty made France the foremost state in Europe and only one significant foe remained – Great Britain.
Britain refused to make peace with France until the balance of power had been restored in Europe. Austria, Prussia and Russia had been subdued by the seemingly unstoppable French army and many small countries had become mere vassal states of France, Napoleon’s influence being so great that he could impose members of his family as kings and queens over them.3 Politically it was dangerous for the old order to allow upstarts like the Bonaparte clan to create a new royal dynasty, as it set an alarming precedent. Furthermore, allowing Napoleon to remain as the virtual master of Europe was unthinkable for the British.
In 1807 the two nations had reached a strategic stalemate. With the breadth of the English Channel and the dominance of the Royal Navy at sea, Britain was virtually impregnable. Yet her navy was incapable of defeating a land-based, largely self-sustaining empire by blockade, and the defeat of the formidable French army, totalling nearly a quarter of a million men, could only be achieved through dire
ct military intervention on the Continent. Though the new Continental System would need time to take effect, many countries were hostile or at least ambivalent towards Britain, and her mercantile interests could be severely damaged if the war became a lengthy struggle. Although the French had suffered a crushing defeat at Trafalgar, given time Napoleon could rebuild the fleet and potentially cross the Channel. Prime Minister William Portland realised that the need for a swift conclusion was imperative and the current policy of conducting small sea-borne raids was proving ineffective. Lord Melville’s reminiscences in 1814 are revealing in this regard, when he acknowledged that given sufficient time Napoleon would:
… have sent forth such powerful fleets that our navy must eventually have been destroyed since we could never have kept pace with him in building ships or in equipping numbers sufficient to cope with the tremendous power he could have brought against us.’ 4
This fact was well known to Napoleon, despite his general ignorance of naval warfare. Though committed to economic warfare against Great Britain, he never entirely relinquished the idea of crossing the twenty miles of strait between France and England and inflicting a military defeat on his oldest enemy. The British fleet possessed about 104 ships of the line, but many of these were needed on the far side of the Atlantic or in the Indian Ocean, protecting British colonies and interests. If the French possessed odds of three to one, the Royal Navy could be destroyed or at least kept occupied while troops were ferried across the Channel. The combined French and Dutch fleet had around seventy-five battleships in 1807. Allied Spain could contribute a further thirty and Russia potentially had twenty-four to lend. Admittedly, a further 129 warships would be required for total superiority, but, in addition to building further vessels, the Danish possessed seventeen battleships and the Portuguese had ten. One of the secret clauses agreed in the treaty in Tilsit permitted Napoleon to acquire these fleets from their rightful owners.5 Britain’s bombardment of neutral Copenhagen in August 1807 and the forcible seizure of the Danish fleet revealed that the British were aware of the threat and made Portugal’s navy even more important.
Therefore, Napoleon had several motives for sending a military expedition to the Peninsula. Portugal openly flouted the commercial agreements France wished to impose on Europe, continuing a thriving trade with Great Britain, and Napoleon coveted her navy. Furthermore, as one of Britain’s oldest Continental allies, the Portuguese might let the English land troops on her shores, enabling them to secure a foothold in Europe. Significantly, the country was already used as a stopping-off point and unofficial base for British naval operations in the Mediterranean. In political and strategic terms, Napoleon viewed Portugal as a British colony in all but name and an invasion would be a direct attack on British interests.
Prince Regent John of Portugal was soon made aware of French designs on his country through the French and Spanish ambassadors, and desperately tried to avert the forthcoming war. The Portuguese royal house of Braganza was in an unenviable position when faced with the threat of French expansionism. The Portuguese army was in a deplorable state and certainly incapable of withstanding an invasion by the foremost army of Europe. However, Portugal relied heavily on trade by sea and could not afford to lose the revenue from British merchants or risk a blockade of her ports by the Royal Navy. Desperately trying to placate both sides, the Prince Regent offered to declare war on Britain, whilst assuring the English that this was in name only and that trade would continue despite any agreements he made with the French. However, neither side could be appeased and a British fleet appeared off the Portuguese coast to establish a blockade whilst Napoleon’s threats, conveyed through French envoys, became increasingly vocal.
Meanwhile, France had entered into negotiations with Spain. King Charles IV was persuaded, largely through the efforts of his Prime Minister Manuel de Godoy, to allow a French army to march across Spain and invade Portugal. This was ratified at the treaty of Fontainebleau of 27 October 1807, in which the French agreed to divide Portugal into three sections. The north would fall under the Queen of Etruria’s rule, central Portugal including Lisbon under France, and the duplicitous Godoy, who was deeply unpopular amongst his own people, would receive the south as a principality. The Emperor had made his decision to force Portugal to conform to his vision of Europe or be swallowed up by the growing French Empire. This was the first war since the Revolution to be fought without the pretext of a coalition of royalist states united against France. It would cost the blood of hundreds of thousands, inflict horrific damage in Iberia and eventually contribute to Napoleon’s downfall.
Accordingly, General Andoche Junot, a particular favourite of the Emperor, marched into Iberia at the head of 28,000 men bound for Portugal. On the march the army was greeted by an exuberant Spanish population, excited at the prospect of war with their old enemy. However, the Spanish troops promised to assist Junot’s invasion were ill prepared and he crossed the border without them. Having planned the campaign largely by map, Napoleon was aware of his lack of knowledge regarding Portugal’s geography and had ordered Junot to make reports on the nature of the countryside, its population, fortifications and towns.6 In future campaigns the lack of French knowledge about the Peninsula would prove crucial for the outcome of the war.
Napoleon had anticipated no opposition from the Portuguese forces and officially this proved to be the case. Nonetheless, Junot encountered great difficulties in traversing the mountainous terrain. Roads drawn on his maps proved to be mere tracks or occasionally non-existent, and the acquisition of sufficient food and shelter became a huge problem for his staff in a sparsely populated and inhospitable region. Although no military resistance was encountered, local peasants proved extremely hostile, fleeing at the sight of the French troops only to return in the night to cut the throats of sentries and stragglers, with banditry becoming commonplace. The fact that the invasion took place in winter added to the misery of the journey and when Junot’s ragged army eventually reached Lisbon it was starving and much of his force was strung out along the route of the march. With his artillery more than a week behind his vanguard, he was lucky that the Portuguese had decided not to oppose him when he entered Lisbon on 30 November 1807.
Trying to forestall the invasion up until the end, the Prince Regent had declared war on Britain in an attempt to appease the French on 20 October, but decided to flee the capital five days prior to Junot’s arrival. Napoleon thought so little of the Portuguese military that he had prematurely declared in Le Moniteur that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign. When the British gleefully showed the Regent the newspaper’s claims, Prince Regent John fled into exile in Brazil, escorted by a British squadron, along with his court, the royal treasury and his fleet. As Junot’s tired army marched into the capital they saw the massed sails on the horizon and realised that Napoleon’s orders to seize the Portuguese navy at all costs were now impossible to obey.
General Junot now set about securing the country, as the rest of his army gradually limped into the capital, but he was forced to await the arrival of Spanish reinforcements before he could consider the nation under sufficient control. Most of the Portuguese sullenly accepted French rule, although there was some rioting and protests. Junot did his best to install a liberal regime but Napoleon, furious at the fleet’s escape, ordered him to rule with a firm hand. The Regent, in his rush to set sail, abandoned fourteen cartloads of gold and silver on the quayside, but this was insufficient to placate the vengeful Emperor. An extraordinary tax of 100,000,000 francs was imposed on the Portuguese, Napoleon arguing that the war should pay for itself.
Napoleon had good reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the first invasion, despite the loss of the Portuguese fleet. Whilst it was true that Portugal was not wholly subjugated, it could now be forced to comply with the Continental System, which might eventually force Britain to capitulate. Britain now had to rely increasingly on Gibraltar to intervene in the Mediterranean and was denied a potential base in Euro
pe. Nevertheless, Bonaparte’s boundless ambition was both a blessing and a curse in his desire to achieve greatness. While his determination had driven him on to achieve great things, his success had blinded him to the limits of what was realistically possible.
Spain had always been a dubious ally for the French, partly because the ruling Bourbon family was related to the French royal family toppled by the Revolution. Once considered the foremost state in Europe, Spain’s fortunes had dwindled, along with her crumbling empire. Her people were poor and discontent and the Spanish army was unreliable. The church and nobility possessed incredible power, oppressing the people while displaying little real loyalty to the state. The Government itself was corrupt and inefficient. There was political division, with many wishing to see Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, supplant his father Charles IV. The Spanish system was an ineffective relic of the past and Napoleon believed that the Spaniards would welcome its replacement with a more modern form of government.
In April 1808 Napoleon summoned the members of the Spanish royal family to a conference in Bayonne. He offered to mediate between the feuding factions in the royal family and, alternating between threats and bribery, the Emperor eventually persuaded Charles IV to abdicate in favour of Ferdinand, although Charles later reneged on this promise. The French had large numbers of troops stationed in Spain to support Junot’s invasion, which would now be used to enforce the change in regime. Napoleon could have chosen to keep Ferdinand as a puppet ruler, especially as he felt grateful for French assistance in gaining his throne. It would have been easy for the French to influence the suggestible new monarch, who enjoyed considerable support from his people. However, even this was insufficient for Napoleon’s grandiose schemes and he subsequently bullied Ferdinand into resigning his right to the throne and accepting exile in Valençay. A new ruler had to be imposed on Spain and Napoleon offered the throne to his brothers Louis and Lucien Bonaparte. Both had the sense to refuse, knowing that the difficulties encountered in any change of regime would be magnified by the unstable political situation in Iberia. Joseph Bonaparte reluctantly accepted the crown at his brother’s insistence, relinquishing the throne of Naples in order to do so.
Wellington Against Massena Page 2