I had positively forbidden the foolish affairs in which Craufurd involved his outposts… and repeated my injunction that he should not engage in affair on the right of the river… You will say, if this be the case, why not accuse Craufurd? I answer, because, if I am to be hanged for it, I cannot accuse a man who I believe has meant well, and whose error is one of judgement, and not of intention.114
This is reminiscent of his attitude towards Lieutenant-Colonel William Orrock at the battle of Assaye years before. Wellington had a fearsome temper and was implacable when faced with wilful disobedience, but honest mistakes he could tolerate. Many accounts testify to his formidable anger when fully roused against unfortunate subordinates. Luckily Craufurd was popular with the Duke since, had it been anyone else, they would probably have received the full extent of his wrath. However, this view was far from universal within the army and Craufurd’s ability to command was called into question by many officers. For example, Napier scorned his performance:
He occupied a position a mile in front of a bridge: thus voluntarily imposing on himself the most difficult operation in war, viz passing a defile in the face of a superior enemy, and in the confusion of a retreat! The result might have been destruction – it was great loss.115
As if such backbiting was not bad enough, Massena’s account of the action was damning, appearing in the French newspapers and relayed in The Times. Praising the actions of Ney, his brigade commanders and the performance of the troops he concluded:
The English sustained a considerable loss in this action. Their estafette man, or chief courier, has been taken, with all his dispatches; several of which… represent the English army as in full rout; that it is impossible to form an idea of its deplorable condition; that the English never were engaged in so brisk an affair; and, in short, that they had lost 60 Officers, 24 of whom have been interred in the field of battle; 400 rank and file killed, and 700 wounded… We have taken from them one standard of colours, 400 men, and two pieces of cannon; our loss amounted to nearly 300 killed and wounded.116
The casualty figures were almost certainly exaggerated and Oman records how papers in the Archives du Ministère de la Guerre reveal Massena caught in the very act of falsifying the records, crossing out Ney’s honest report of 500 French casualties and substituting his own figures.117 Furthermore, no colours were taken and the two guns captured were dismounted and belonged to the garrison of Almeida rather than Craufurd’s force. Yet it must be borne in mind that the French were fighting a deeply unpopular war in the depths of a very hostile country, and such propaganda had to be expected.
Angered by Massena’s claims, Craufurd wrote to The Times to refute them:
Marshal Massena, not content with the gross mis-representations which were contained in his first official account of the action of the 24th of July, near Almeida, has, in a subsequent despatch, reverted to it in a tone of boasting wholly unjustified by the circumstances; assuring the war-minister that his whole army is burning with impatience to teach the English army what they taught the division of Craufurd in the affair of the Coa.118
He went on to challenge Massena’s figures, commenting on how well his troops had performed such a difficult manoeuvre and claiming that it was: ‘…indisputable that they had the best of it.’ British reports recorded remarkably slight casualty figures for the action, claiming slightly over 330 killed, wounded or missing compared to Ney’s 500. However, these should not be accepted without question, those present testifying to the ferocity of the action and how lucky they were that losses had not been far higher considering the difficult ground they had to retreat over.
Whilst it could be claimed that Craufurd won a ‘moral victory’ during his rearguard action, the British had really sustained a defeat in a wholly unnecessary clash. Had it not been for the outstanding quality of Craufurd’s troops, many more of the 52nd would have been killed or captured in the flight to the bridge. Furthermore, if they had not contested possession of the span so fiercely, it is possible that Ney could have turned their retreat into the rout that Massena subsequently claimed. Fortescue summed up Craufurd’s performance thus:
Beyond any question he lost all control of the flight very early, and was saved from disaster only by his regimental officers. It was a pity, for while holding the line of outposts he had done superlative service; but there is no contesting the fact that Craufurd was rarely at his best in action.119
Allowing for exaggerations on both sides, the casualty figures were fairly even and Craufurd had achieved nothing by his stand. Forced into a precipitous retreat, the Light Division had narrowly averted taking serious losses, but had neither delayed the enemy significantly nor inflicted serious losses upon them. While it was true that the French had probably suffered greater casualties, their larger army meant they could afford to lose them, while the loss of even a hundred men was a serious matter for Wellington if nothing were gained by the sacrifice.
In contrast, the French were very pleased with the outcome of the clash. The Allies had been forced to withdraw following a well-fought engagement, and they were now free to set about the reduction of Almeida. It was true that Ney’s attempts to take the bridge had incurred losses, but his attempts to cross the defile could have seen the total destruction of the enemy and was thwarted only by the famous tenacity of the British infantry and their Allies. The numbers of the troops actually engaged had also been similar, bolstering morale in the army and making the affair an inspiring start to the invasion. However, privately the Prince of Essling was once again exasperated with Ney’s conduct, his instructions having been merely to reconnoitre the area around Almeida. At his next meeting with his commander-in-chief, Ney proudly boasted of his achievement, but was embarrassed when Pelet tactfully reminded him that he had exceeded his orders, advancing with his entire corps without warning the Prince.120 Unusually, both Wellington and Massena had good reason to criticise their subordinates over the same incident.
Chapter 5
The Third Invasion
With Almeida isolated, Ney set about securing both banks of the Côa, guarding bridges and fords in its vicinity. The bulk of the Allied army was based at Guarda and Celorico and Massena knew that the river was his best line of defence should the Allies march against them. General Ferey was placed in command of the advanced guard, with orders to retire across the Côa and hold the bridge near Almeida if hard pressed. Ferey mounted regular cavalry patrols to keep an eye on the British and was surprised at the extent of resistance they encountered from the peasantry. The French soon discovered that this was part of Wellington’s plan to deny them the least refuge or assistance. They faced not only guerrilla bands but also Ordenanza militiamen who shot at them from the hills and forests and attempted to hinder them whenever possible.
When the Marquis d’Alorna, a Portuguese renegade in French service, returned to Pinhel in search of supporters, he was appalled by what he found. Not only were the French extremely unpopular after previous invasions, but the countryside was also virtually barren. In accordance with Wellington’s ‘Proclamation to the People’ livestock had been driven off, farmsteads laid waste and shelter destroyed. The people had been instructed to flee to the hills or seek refuge either in Lisbon or to the south. Those who refused to leave, destroy their property or join the Ordenanza were deemed traitors and treated as such. D’Alorna recorded that the English: ‘… have committed horrors…’121 to enforce this. Though British and Portuguese actions had alienated the peasantry, he found little sympathy for the French cause. The peasantry was in a terrible position, facing the destruction of their lands and liable to persecution by either side if they protested.
Massena was eager to win Portuguese support and was heartened to hear, from Ney and d’Alorna, that the British placed little confidence in the regular Portuguese troops and that the depredations of the Ordenanza were a hindrance rather than a real threat. It was true that they interfered with foraging parties and sprang ambushes on small units, but the
y were inexperienced, poorly armed and not yet effective. Massena wrote that the British:
… employ a means of defence that results in the greatest misfortune to the nation. They have ordered the inhabitants to leave their homes; the women, the children, and the old are to put themselves behind the army; the men, between seventeen and fifty years of age, are to arm themselves with guns, pikes, axes, fire etc, in order to act as partisans.122
Many were pressed unwillingly into the new militia and the devastation of the countryside denied them their only means of livelihood. Few of the Ordenanza possessed uniforms and were likely to be treated as guerrillas if captured and dealt with summarily under the rules of war. It is quite possible that the Allies hoped to provoke French reprisals by their strategy in order to alienate the people even further. Massena believed that it was still possible to win support and issued a proclamation claiming: ‘We enter your territory not as conquerors. We do not come to make war on you, but to fight those who force you to make it.’123 However, the actions of his troops, hardened by the resistance they had encountered in Spain, belied this. He constantly received reports of looting, murder and rape and, despite making examples and threatening to hold officers accountable, he failed to prevent such outrages.
French attempts to besiege Almeida proceeded slowly, with food in short supply throughout Spain and transportation hard to find. The countryside had been stripped of oxen, mules and wagons, with the result that those who had them guarded them jealously. Lambert, now Quartermaster-General, encountered great difficulties in acquiring provisions for the Army of Portugal, exacerbated by corruption and intransigence. For example, General Kellerman claimed to have sole authority over the districts of Zamora and León, initially refusing Lambert’s requests. Massena had to intervene personally before Kellerman would submit to his orders and even then with a poor grace. Napoleon had established a bad precedent by allowing military governors in parts of Spain virtual autonomy over their regions and precious time was squandered in persuading them.
Salamanca was the region’s main centre for food production but was too distant for the easy supply of Almeida, guerrilla raids on supply columns between the city and Ciudad Rodrigo magnifying this problem. Massena knew that a good commissariat was vital for the invasion to succeed and decided that Ciudad Rodrigo must start baking bread en masse, ordering the repair or construction of sixteen large ovens for the purpose. This was an additional burden to the garrison, who already had the mammoth task of filling in the siege trenches, repairing the town and restoring its defences. Though food was brought in ‘on the hoof’ in the form of sheep and cattle, the best rations for the campaign were bread and biscuit, due to their longevity. However, grain supplies were minimal and the local corn had not yet ripened. Shortages, profiteering and logistical problems all conspired against the French, making the swift fall of Almeida a priority. Yet by 27 July the lack of French activity around the town had almost convinced Wellington that they intended to mask the town and march against his army.
For months Colonel William Cox, the military governor of Almeida, had been improving his defences and putting his Portuguese troops through intensive training. He had one complete Portuguese regiment in the form of the 24th Line and elements of the 23rd to support him. He had continually requested reinforcements but had been denied British regulars or artillerymen. His gunners were Portuguese regulars of the 4th artillery and he was eventually sent some companies of the 11th Cavalry to supplement a garrison mainly comprised of militia. In all, he had just under 4,000 men under arms. Cox felt that the policy of devastation was doing enormous damage to the region and had great difficulty in restraining his militia from returning to their farms, suffering constant desertions. Placing little faith in his militia, he discounted the Ordenanza knowing that their arms were even poorer than his own militia’s, most having fowling pieces rather than muskets. Since the guns of the fortress could not cover the bridge on the Côa he knew that any relief attempt from Wellington’s army would be difficult. In common with many British officers familiar with the region, he lamented the fact that Almeida had not been built a few miles to the west across the river, which would have increased its effectiveness. When light troops from Simon’s brigade established a presence around the town they offered terms that Cox rejected contemptuously, seeing their lack of artillery. In letters to General Beresford, commander in chief of the Portuguese Army, he speculated that the slow pace of French operations indicated an intention to blockade the town rather than besiege it.124
However, French troops continued to arrive around the town and General Jean-Baptiste Eblé was ordered to make a thorough reconnaissance of the fortress. Almeida was smaller than Ciudad Rodrigo, but this was a benefit in defensive terms since troops could be concentrated with greater ease to reinforce threatened sectors. Unlike its Spanish counterpart, the town had no suburbs outside the walls that could potentially shield approaching troops. The fortress presented a low silhouette and there were no nearby hills or features that could dominate it. Eblé submitted an eleven-page report describing it as a formidable work, superior to its neighbour yet far from impregnable. It had six bastions supported by ravelins, though Eblé considered four of these inadequate to protect the bastions fully. The ditch was wide, being over a hundred feet across in many places, and the walls were all dressed with faced stone in a good state of repair. The glacis was effective but so steep in places that it would conceal attackers from view for some of their approach if the fortress were stormed. The British had improved the structure, building and repairing several bombproof casemates and enlarging the barracks. A large medieval castle lay in the centre of the town, which was used as the powder magazine.
Eblé considered the bastion of São Pedro near the main gatehouse of São Francisco to be the best point to attack as it was more vulnerable to artillery than its counterparts due to the positioning of its supporting ravelins. A slight depression in the land to the south would provide some protection for the early stages of digging at this point. In addition the ground here appeared more favourable than elsewhere, which was the main strength of the fortress. The whole town lay upon a granite plateau and the soil was exceedingly stony, with rocky outcrops jutting out of the ground in places. Even worse from the attackers’ point of view was the presence of hard rock lying under only two feet of topsoil in many places. This meant that the trenches would have to be bolstered with hundreds of wicker gabions and fascines to raise the trench to a practical defensive height.125 Not only would this be dangerous and time consuming, but the materials for their construction would also have to be carted in along with the huge amount of material that the siege already required. Eblé expressed concern about the rocky terrain and the questionable safety that wicker defences would provide for their trench workers, but following his experiences at Genoa, Gaeta and Ciudad, Massena felt capable of handling these difficulties.
Trench works were started on 14 August by 2,500 volunteers of the 6th Léger, who were promised full rations in return for their labour. Distraction attacks were made against the São João de Deos Bastion to cover the workers who began digging the first parallel trench less than 1,500 feet from the fortress. An unexpectedly accurate and well-sustained bombardment was mounted by the Portuguese gunners for three hours. This night’s work revealed the ground was harder than feared and in some areas the workers dug down only a foot before reaching solid rock. The following morning the engineers brought canvas bags filled with gunpowder and took the unusual step of blasting several outcrops of rock getting in the way of the excavations.
The engineers suggested eleven batteries to fire on Almeida using sixty-four guns, but there was some disagreement over their placement based on the nature of the ground and the strength of the granite walls. As former Lieutenant-General in the Portuguese Army, d’Alorna had not only been based at Almeida but had also worked on improving its defences. However, though he was eager to be helpful his information proved inaccurate compared to
Eblé’s studies and Pelet disregarded his counsel. The hard work the siege was entailing, along with the logistical nightmare encountered in bringing up materials from Spain, demoralised the French engineers. The operation had only just begun but an exasperated Pelet felt compelled to remind them that: ‘…we were dealing only with a rather poor fortress and a Portuguese garrison, commanded by a foreign general.’126 By 15 August the town was closely invested as the heavy cannon began to arrive. Guns of high calibre were needed to penetrate the granite walls and the siege train was comprised mainly of twenty-four and twelve-pound cannons with a few ten-inch mortars for use against personnel.
Massena and his staff were now based at Fort La Concepción. Though rendered almost indefensible by Craufurd’s engineers, the structure still possessed adequate living quarters and three companies of Taupin’s brigade were delegated as guards for the Prince. In an effort to make the place more congenial, amusements were provided for the staff there including horse racing, gambling and even a café. However, Massena was pessimistic about meeting his timetable for reducing Almeida with the daunting amount of work required and the mammoth logistical tasks. His letters to Berthier revealed that he was hard pressed to meet the demands of his office and had little chance to avail himself of the distractions he had set up for his officers.
Work on the trenches progressed slowly due to the strenuous nature of the task, but when the first parallel trench was completed, approach trenches were dug, zig-zagging towards Almeida. Portuguese gunnery was proving far more accurate than anticipated and inflicted numerous casualties among the trench workers, despite the marksmen set to protect them. Major Fortunato José Barreiros commanded the artillery and under his direction the gunners pounded the trenches on the night of 19 August, inflicting six dead and thirty-five wounded in a heavy bombardment. The stony soil magnified the effect of Portuguese round shot as it ploughed into the ground, often showering the trenches with chips of stone. However, the sappers had already established batteries and French counter-fire was beginning to take effect. The earth-filled gabions, sandbags and fascines were providing better protection than the French had hoped and every night the trenches crept closer.
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