The entire countryside was rocky and mountainous; there were no roads, merely narrow, dangerous and stony pathways where the artillery avoided accidents only with enormous difficulty… I had to send gunners, armed with pickaxes and mattocks, ahead of me to clear the way.140
The two sieges had proved a trial, but Massena’s corps commanders were beginning to accept his authority now that success seemed to lie within their grasp. But the appearance of his mistress, still attired as a dragoon, provoked them once again. Sitting down to an informal lunch on the march under some lemon trees, Massena invited Ney, Reynier, Montbrun and Junot to join him. An awkward pause in their conversation occurred when Madam Leberton arrived to join them and it was taken as an affront. Ney found her presence particularly offensive. Amused at the generals’ discomfort, Marbot later spoke to Junot, asking why he felt so aggrieved and hinting that their attitude was slightly hypocritical. He replied:
Because an old hussar like me has his games sometimes, that is no reason for Massena to imitate them. Besides I must stand by my colleagues.’ From that day forward the four generals were on the worst of terms with Massena, who, on his side, bore them no goodwill.141
It does seem remarkable that hardened campaigners, used to the occcasional squalor and immorality of army life, found the presence of a mistress quite so offensive, especially in an informal atmosphere. This slight affront was doubtless exaggerated by jealously and a wish to find fault.
Marbot even suggests that the six-day halt at the city of Viseu, which proved almost entirely deserted, was largely motivated by the need to find adequate quarters for the marshal’s lady and his need to spend time in her company. This was probably malice on Marbot’s part, but the charms of a young woman on a man twice her age certainly proved distracting. Previously she had travelled by coach, but owing to the poor roads had been obliged to ride and was consequently fatigued. Nevertheless, it is more likely that Massena halted the advance to enable the supply convoys and artillery to catch up with the army. This was the excuse that Massena later gave to Napoleon, and the fact that the guns and wagons were slowed by the appalling state of the roads gives it credibility.
Wellington had believed that Massena intended to take the road running south-west from Celorico to Coimbra, and had selected the ridge of Serra da Atalhada to fight a delaying action along that route. To this purpose he had constructed a line of earth redoubts along its crest and these were now useless. As the French struggled over the hills on poorly made tracks Wellington exulted over the fact that Massena had made such an error in marching to the north. He had surveyed the country extensively over the previous few months and found that much of the ground was suited to defence. He had made secondary plans for this eventuality. Accordingly he had selected a long ridge close to Coimbra as a highly defensible site. He felt confident that he could inflict losses on the French and significantly delay their march on Lisbon if he could concentrate enough troops to meet them there.
Chapter 6
Busaço Ridge
As the French advanced further into the hinterland Ordenanza and Portuguese guerrillas closed in behind them, killing stragglers, attacking foragers and cutting off their communications with Spain. Massena felt obliged to take everything with him on the march, including large numbers of wounded and sick who suffered appallingly in their ambulance carts as they scraped and bumped over the deeply rutted tracks. He was now committed to a march on Coimbra, partially because he hoped to find food supplies there. The two weeks’ rations for the army, though husbanded carefully by the French commissariat, were dwindling rapidly. The countryside yielded little in the way of forage and parties sent out to gather it had to be given large escorts due to the hostility of the locals.
It was a frustrating war of ambush and murder that the French encountered in the hills and forests. Though better disciplined than their guerrilla counterparts, often fighting in regular fashion, the Ordenanza occasionally approached French troops masquerading as peasants, only to fall upon them treacherously. This, along with frequent acts of brigandage, shooting from cover or cutting the throats of sentries in the night, soon exhausted Massena’s patience and he ordered all those taken in arms and out of uniform to be hanged or shot. Although the guerrillas were acting outside the rules of war, Wellington wrote to Massena imploring restraint in regard to the Ordenanza. He reminded the marshal that his own troops of 1792–1797 had been equipped in similar fashion and that such a policy would only perpetuate the bitter cycle of atrocity and reprisal. In reality Massena had little power to stop his troops shooting irregulars when they captured them and when the Ordenanza responded by torturing as well as killing those they captured, Wellington proved equally powerless to prevent such savagery.142
Wellington had decided to bar Massena’s path at the Serra de Busago about eight miles north east of Coimbra. Mindful of Portuguese opinions, he felt obliged to contest the enemy’s advance and, having ridden over the area personally in the previous months, he knew the ridge was easily defended and that the French would have great difficulty dislodging a determined opponent stationed on the heights. It was a long, uninterrupted ridge extending about nine miles in length, dotted with rocky outcrops and sloping down steeply on its eastern side where the French were likely to approach. Several ravines ran down from the summit, which rose 1,800 feet above sea level in places. Though covered with heavy forestry today, the slopes were only partially wooded in 1810, along with patches of gorse and rocky outcrops in many places. The reverse slope was shallower in comparison and the summit quite broad and flat, in places extending to a width of between 300–400 yards.
Two roads crossed the ridge, the most important of which was the paved road between Mortagoa and Coimbra, which took advantage of a spur jutting out below the village of Sula on the slopes and surmounted the crest around the convent of Busaço. This consisted of a small chapel surrounded by a large ten-foot wall. Wellington took the convent as his headquarters and ordered the wall to be loop-holed for defence. Another country track climbed the ridge running from San Antonio de Cantaro to Palheiros along with two paths connecting small villages. Wellington suspected these four roads and pathways were the likely points for French assaults should they decide to attack him there.
By 25 September, Wellington had concentrated three divisions on the Serra de Busaço and hoped that two more would join him before the French arrived in strength. The Light Division were placed before the village of Sula on the lower slopes and Craufurd encountered the first elements of Reynier’s II Corps when he marched them down on to the plain. Angry and humiliated after the affair on the Côa, Craufurd wished to restore his reputation by coming to grips with the enemy. Some skirmishing took place and Wellington was obliged to order Craufurd to retire to his initial position as the French began to deploy in force. It was only by rapid manoeuvre that a major engagement was avoided at this point, requiring considerable skill on Wellington’s part.143 Commissary August Schaumann recorded his impression of the great commander in the days leading up to the battle:
His orders were communicated in a loud voice, and were short and precise. In him there is nothing of the bombastic pomp of the Commander-in-Chief surrounded by his glittering staff. He wears no befeathered hat, no gold lace, no stars, no orders – simply a plain low hat, a white collar, a grey overcoat, and a light sword.144
As the troops from both armies began to concentrate, Wellington deployed his men in an extensive line along the ridge, taking advantage of the reverse slope to shield them from enemy view. Though the Allies had around 50,000 men by 27 September, these were not enough to hold the entire ridge, although Wellington intended to make up for this deficiency by concentrating his defence on the tracks dissecting the hillside. He also ordered the construction of a military road along the crest line, knowing this would aid redeployment if he was outmatched at any point. He distributed his 60 guns in field batteries along the line and later received criticism for doing so on the basis that one or two
large batteries would have been able to concentrate a heavier fire upon the French assaults. However, he was unsure at what points the enemy would attack and felt obliged to cover his entire frontage if possible, which was a wise course to adopt. After all, the military road would allow him to redeploy his guns should it prove necessary. Where the summit was flat enough, he even stationed two squadrons of dragoons. He knew that this was likely to be an infantry and artillery battle, but should the French carry the slopes he believed that a counter-attack by cavalry would be totally unexpected in such an area and might prove devastating.
Marshal Ney arrived on 25 September and ordered what appears to have been a rather haphazard reconnaissance of the Allied position. He determined that the area around the convent and the village of Sula was held in some strength and located the position of a battery of twelve cannon nearby, which most sources agree to have been Ross’s battery. However, even from the highest point available to him he could only observe the position from 400 feet below the level of the summit, and therefore the bulk of Wellington’s deployment would have been masked from view.145 In addition, scores of light troops were stationed on the slopes, preventing close reconnaissance by his light cavalry. He believed that despite the steep gradient that would obviously hinder the infantry, the position was far less daunting than it appeared. By most accounts he was very confident of carrying the ridge and wrote to Reynier claiming: ‘If I were in command I would attack without a moment’s hesitation.’146 However, this was on 25 September, when Ney assumed the force in front of him constituted little more than a rearguard. The next day, hearing that the Allies were bringing up more troops, he modified his view and became slightly more cautious.
Initially, Massena was delighted that Wellington had finally decided to offer battle. Many in the French army scorned the constant retreats that the Allies relied upon and shared their commander’s wish that they would stand and decide the issue by force of arms instead of hiding behind fortifications. The chance of inflicting a serious defeat on the British could not be ignored and in any case the Allies lay between them and Coimbra and the need for supplies was becoming urgent. Yet many officers who trained their telescopes on the ridge quailed at the prospect of attacking such a position. In the valley they were exposed and the enemy could observe their moves and deployment. The only way to avoid their scrutiny was to assemble their formations at night, but an assault would have to wait until dawn. The difficulties of marching up the wooded, rock strewn hillside in darkness made a successful night attack unlikely and in daylight they would be exposed to artillery and musketry during a long climb up a precipitous slope.
Most of the senior commanders agreed with Ney’s optimistic assessment and favoured a frontal attack on the ridge. With 65,000 men the French enjoyed good odds against the Allies, who possessed only 25,000 reliable British troops. Though aware of the presence of Portuguese forces, these were largely discounted as ineffective in ignorance of the extensive training that they had recently received. After all, the Portuguese had barely contested the occupation of their country under Junot, having so little faith in their army. Marbot was shocked when Massena accepted what he considered highly inadequate reconnaissance reports and, after announcing his intention to assail the ridge the next day, retired to Mortagoa without ordering further investigation. Having found and interrogated one of the local inhabitants, he claimed to know of the existence of a road between Mortagoa and Boialva, which might allow an outflanking move upon the Serra.
Marbot claimed that General Fririon and one of his fellow aides agreed that the prospects for a successful assault were poor and that something had to be done. Since only Pelet was permitted to submit suggestions directly to the marshal, they adopted the subterfuge of discussing his discovery within Massena’s hearing. They spoke loudly and casually of their conversations with Ney’s aides, bemoaning the fact that no attempt had been made to scout the area to the extreme left of the Allied position. Massena was intrigued and approached them to ask what they meant. What they told him gave him the notion of ordering another reconnaissance. However, Pelet refused to believe that Ney would submit such an inaccurate report and the plan was aborted despite Fririon’s urgent entreaties. Infuriated by the constant bickering Massena allegedly snapped at him: ‘You come from the old Army of the Rhine, you like manoeuvring; but it is the first time that Wellington seems ready to give battle, and I want to profit by the opportunity.’147 In the early hours of the morning when the assault was about to begin, Massena murmured sadly to Fririon: ‘Your suggestion of yesterday was worth considering.’148
Among the high command it is unclear exactly who supported and who opposed the battle plan and no doubt many who approved of the frontal assault remembered their objections only after the event was decided. However, some certainly voiced reservations and Pelet believed that it was one of Ney’s outbursts that finally made up the commander-in-chief’s mind:
…the interview between the Prince and the Marshal had been rather sharp. In front of everyone the Marshal loudly expressed his desire to attack and conquer all. He spoke in the same way to the Prince, who at first did not want to listen to him and was in rather a bad mood.149
Therefore it is quite possible that Massena felt obliged to attack in order to avoid losing face in front of his staff in the face of Ney’s aggressive display of confidence. They were barely on speaking terms by this time and he did not wish to give Ney further reasons to question his competence or courage.
The essence of Massena’s plan was to attack in two places using both Reynier’s and Ney’s corps whilst Junot’s was held in reserve. Reynier was to attack up the San Antonio Pass, making use of the forest track leading up to the ridge’s summit. This position had been incorrectly identified as the Allied right and Massena hoped that once the crest was carried this attack could turn to its right, attack along the summit and roll up the Allied flank towards the convent. In reality the centre of the Allied position lay at this point. When this attack was seen to be making headway, Ney was to send in his own columns up the paved roadway, assailing the village of Sula and fighting upwards towards the convent. He has been reproached for not timing his assault in concert with II Corp’s attack, but this would have been contrary to his orders which still exist in the Archives du Ministère de la Guerre in Paris. Once Ney’s forces had carried the ridge, they were to adapt their movements according to the progress of II Corps:
Marshal Ney will send his two columns of attack in the manner indicated when General Reynier is master of the heights, and when he marches on the convent of Bussaco. It will be for Marshal Ney to press the attack if he sees the enemy advance in a movement against General Reynier or a movement of retreat.150
The attack began at 5.45 am on 27 September in heavy mist. Two large columns of divisional strength began to toil up the slope, preceded by a large wave of tirailleurs and voltigeurs. These were under the leadership of generals Merle and Heudelet, and their advance was announced by a heavy French cannonade. Proceeding on either side of the forest track, their objective was the Pass of San Antonio, at the right of which Picton’s Division was concentrated. The French gunners could fire on the slopes with relative ease but the summit, where the bulk of the Allied forces were deployed, was at the limit of their effective range and their bombardment did little damage. Colonel Noël recalled how his artillery could offer little support for the attacks:
The English occupied all the defensible points, and most importantly, a hamlet on the slopes. This was almost completely sheltered from our artillery… My division was sent to support the 2nd Corps… but in such an attack our artillery could not be of much help.151
A bitter struggle ensued as the French light troops skirmished with Portuguese Caçadores and British redcoats on the lower slopes. Ensign William Grattan of the 88th Foot recalled that the British light troops were so hard pressed that men of the regiment began to be shot down where they stood in line as their own skirmishers backed towards them.
The situation became serious enough for his Colonel to take a file of men from each company and send them to reinforce the light infantry. With drums beating, the French columns struggled upwards, their officers hurrying them forward shouting ‘En Avant!’ Allied artillery was sending round shot skittering down the slopes, but the early morning mist was hampering their aim. However, the effort of marching upward was tiring the troops and the French were losing formation as they neared the ridgeline.
As the mist started to clear, the right-hand column suffered greater losses as Arentschildt’s KGL battery began to find the range. As the men of the 31st Léger heading the column advanced into the face of this punishment they were met by close-range musket fire from the British 74th and Portuguese 21st Regiments, who were placed either side of the artillery. Standing in a line two men deep they could bring every musket to bear on the advancing column which, with its narrower frontage, could not match their firepower unless they formed into line themselves. As they attempted this, the Allied infantry calmly reloaded and fired into them. Methodically the infantrymen rammed down cartridges with their ramrods, their exhaustive training making them some of the fastest firing soldiers in Europe. The British India pattern musket, known familiarly as the ‘Brown Bess,’ was slightly less accurate than its French Charleville counterpart, since musket balls rarely fitted snugly into its wide bore. However, this also made it quicker to load. At such close range there was little need for pinpoint accuracy and, with men falling by the dozen, confusion and disorder set in under the withering fire and Heudelet’s column retreated down the hillside.
Wellington Against Massena Page 14