When Wellington realised the French were pulling out he marched after them with his field army and established his headquarters at Cartaxo. Some attempts were made to press the French retreat, but it became apparent that they had established themselves effectively, as D’Urban recalled:
Nov. 20. This morning it is evident that the Enemy is in force in Santarem – he has completed an Abbatis along the whole face of the Upper Heights… and it is now clear that if the attack yesterday had not fortunately been prevented. we should have fallen into the Trap which had been set for us and sacrificed the two attacking Divisions…(sic) 186
Massena had fought a hard campaign, only to be thwarted almost within sight of his goal. His skills, however, had not deserted him. He constructed small-scale field works of his own, hoping that he would soon receive more troops to roust the British out of Lisbon. He was securely placed in Santarem and, while desultory skirmishing took place, Wellington realised that the French were far from beaten.
Chapter 8
The Retreat
The Army of Portugal remained at Santarem for months, enduring poor food and shelter, whilst the high command debated their next move. Massena had several options to consider, the first of which was to attack the lines in force. With the inadequate numbers at his disposal this seemed madness unless he received major reinforcement. Even with the necessary men it was likely to be extremely costly and casualties would probably exceed the slaughter at Busaço. The British had always been formidable in defence and a successful assault was likely to be a bloodbath even if it succeeded. In terms of the army’s morale, this course should have been attempted as soon as they reached the lines rather than after weeks of inaction. The French had stayed relatively idle for months and the soldiers were naturally weakened by their poor diet and living conditions.
Alternatively, the army could return to the frontier region and could be resupplied around Salamanca. This would mean sacrificing everything gained during the past few months, but it would preserve the army and allow the possibility of another invasion. It was now clear that they had inadequate men for the task, and the Emperor might permit a greatly increased force for a fourth invasion. Marshal Ney favoured this course, but Massena viewed it as admitting defeat. If a fourth invasion took place it might well have a new commander-in-chief and he did not wish to end what was likely to be his final campaign in failure.
The third option was to march north and take Oporto, Portugal’s second city. This would allow the campaign to continue within the region and allow the Army to be reprovisioned in an area relatively untouched by the recent conflict. Although it had proved unfortunate for Soult years before, Oporto was on the River Douro, which provided a good defensive line and a secure base for renewed attempts on the capital. Much of Portugal was devastated and Massena knew that the British were having difficulties convincing their Allies of the need to destroy large areas of the country in order to save it. For a long-term strategy this was a good move and raised the possibility of a political solution to the war without the need to take Lisbon.
Massena’s final option was to cross the Tagus and invade southern Portugal. The obvious drawback was the difficulty of crossing such a wide river knowing that the Allies would interfere with any such attempt. However, if the British riverboats were neutralised and a significant force crossed, the Allies would have difficulty sending sufficient numbers to oppose them and still man the lines. This being the case, the French would seize the heights of Almada opposite Lisbon with little difficulty. From this point they would be able to bombard the capital from long range and interfere with river traffic in the estuary. Relatively few troops would be behind them, their main concentration being at the border fortresses of Badajoz and Elvas. From this position it would be possible to aid Soult in reducing these fortresses and thereby gain his assistance for renewed efforts on Lisbon.
The fact that Massena was desperate to find a way out of his dilemma was amply illustrated by his eagerness to believe the tales of a British officer who had deserted and offered to provide the French with detailed plans of the lines. Several staff officers had reservations about the man’s credibility but: ‘You will hardly believe that Massena and Pelet, much as they despised the fellow, put faith in his tale, and wishing to profit by his advice, spent whole days over the maps with him, taking notes of what he said.’187 When Junot met the deserter he claimed to recognise him as a spy who had tried a similar subterfuge before. This put Massena on his guard but the spy escaped that night, allegedly stealing some of his notes.
The French remained largely inactive during the winter, almost wholly preoccupied by the necessity of finding provisions. Nevertheless, Massena did make some attempt to prepare for crossing the Tagus, ordering General Eblé to mount a bridging operation. The centre of operations was at the small town of Punhete at the confluence of the Tagus and the Zezere (a tributary of the Tagus). Eblé managed to work wonders with tools he was largely obliged to improvise. Due to lack of transportation he was forced to take beams from houses in Punhete and Santarem to provide wood, but he produced a large number of boats and materials to construct a pontoon bridge. The work kept the men occupied and the possibility of spanning the Tagus was therefore an option. However, the British soon became aware of the move and Wellington ordered batteries set up opposite Punhete that began to harass French operations with long-range fire. It seemed a crossing would be unlikely to succeed without help from Marshal Soult’s army. It was even more frustrating that the French could occasionally hear distant cannon fire from the direction of Badajoz, now under siege by Soult. Napoleon had ordered Soult to send 10,000 men to bolster Massena’s army, but he ignored the command. When Badajoz eventually fell the Emperor caustically remarked: ‘He captured me a town, and lost me a kingdom.’188 There would be no help from Soult.
Napoleon had mused over how to proceed but failed to produce any definite plan other than to send General D’Erlon with IX Corps to reinforce Massena. The trouble was that the conflict was so far away that his dispatches took weeks to reach the region, meaning circumstances could well have changed by the time of their arrival. However, the Emperor knew that every day that the Army of Portugal remained before Lisbon increased the likelihood of a political split between the Allies and weakened the resolve of the British Parliament. Pursuing the war was expensive and though the British troops were safely placed behind the Lines of Torres Vedras, defensive actions alone would not bring victory. However, they were pleased to hear that the French were suffering and were unlikely to sit before the lines much longer:
The deserters who have arrived these last few days affirm, that the privations and miseries of the French are excessive; they are reduced to one-fourth part of a ration of bread, have no wine, brandy, or medicines of any kind; the greater part of the army is without shoes and without clothing; the cavalry have no forage and are again dying in great numbers…189
When D’Erlon’s IX Corps arrived at Almeida on 14 December, Silveira’s levies abandoned their blockade and retreated, being outnumbered and faced by regular troops. D’Erlon had a difficult mission to perform for the Emperor. He was obliged to reinforce Massena and at the same time maintain communications between Spain and the Army of Portugal. His attempts to fulfil both objectives were naturally doomed to failure. Generals Gardanne and Claparède were sent in pursuit of the various militia formations under Silveira, Wilson and Trant. The devastated state of the land made this no easy task:
With all the Emperor’s persipacity it was impossible for him at Paris to judge of the numerous difficulties which would hamper Gardanne in carrying out his orders. Napoleon could never believe that the flight of the Portuguese occupants at the approach of the French corps had been so universal that it was impossible to come across an inhabitant from whom one could receive the slightest information.190
These problems dogged the French campaigns in the Peninsula and,despite his brief sojourn into the war, Napoleon was far more used to the relati
vely genteel conditions prevailing in central Europe, where supplies were easily obtained along with intelligence. Nevertheless, the French drove the militia forces before them, winning a string of small victories and pushing them north and west. However, these triumphs had little strategic effect and the roads became no safer, couriers requiring large escorts in order to get through.
The news that IX Corps was marching to reinforce them cheered the Army of Portugal, but they were dismayed when D’Erlon arrived with a mere 6,000 men having left significant forces behind to bolster the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo and fight the irregulars. Initially D’Erlon visited Ney at Thomar instead of travelling to Massena’s headquarters at Torres Novas. This was not only against regulations, but was disrespectful of Massena’s authority as commander-in-chief. When Marbot was sent to protest, he discovered that Ney, being convinced that no attempt on the lines would succeed, had suggested that D’Erlon march his men straight back to the border and that he was preparing to do so. Amazingly, D’Erlon had not been officially placed under Massena’s command and considered himself subject only to the Emperor. Though the aide managed to convince him to report to Massena, the addition of 6,000 men was not going to make much difference.
The army had shown amazing tenacity but, even with the careful husbandry of resources, Massena knew that time was running out. Only a commander of his skill and experience could have stayed so long in such a hostile region and, as Wellington wrote:
It is wonderful that they have been able to remain in the country so long, and it is scarcely possible that they can remain much longer. If they go, and when they go, their losses will be very great, and mine nothing. If they stay, they must continue to lose men daily, as they do now…191
The hardship and trials he endured during the siege of Genoa had provided Massena with valuable experience of operations of this kind, and he knew when to admit defeat. His army could only take so much without disintegrating or becoming totally ineffective. Hundreds had already succumbed through lack of food or disease and many were too sick to move unassisted. Soult was clearly not coming and attempts to bridge the Tagus and move southwards were too much of a risk in his absence. He decided to retreat northwards, but keep his options open regarding his eventual objective. The occupation of central Portugal was his preferred strategy but, should this prove impractical, a withdrawal to the frontier was still possible. His corps commanders had been of little assistance over the preceding months, constantly bickering and offering conflicting advice. Even the course of the retreat was questioned, and when Massena instructed D’Erlon to prepare his corps to move out he was answered with the lofty reply that he was only obliged to follow the Emperor’s orders. This final disobedience was enough for Massena, who angrily retorted that he could take IX Corps his own way and damned him for his impertinence.192
The French retreat began on 5 March 1811. They withdrew slowly and quietly at first and efforts were made to mask their intentions, with straw-stuffed dummies set up in place of sentries along with the placement of false cannons in their earthworks. There was no room for surplus equipment and hundreds of ammunition caissons and baggage wagons were burnt, their horses being used to drag the guns. Retreating in three columns, the French were accompanied by hundreds of sick, who trudged dismally along or rode painfully in the wagons along the deeply rutted tracks. The troops had already tolerated months of hardship and a long siege, but their trials were only just beginning.
Though the move had been expected, the British were caught slightly off guard by the French subterfuge and the enemy managed to steal a day’s march upon the Allies. Wellington immediately broke camp and followed the French. He had no intention of forcing a heavy engagement, but earnestly desired to prevent Massena from marching on Oporto. He had already sent word to the levies to prevent the enemy crossing the Mondego if possible and Trant’s brigade had occupied Coimbra. The Army of Portugal was still a formidable force, but Wellington intended to snap at its heels and inflict some losses before they left the lands they had ravaged.
Embittered and angry, the French soldiers vented their frustrations on the towns through which they passed, looting and burning as they went. Those occupants who had remained were subjected to rape, torture and murder, whilst many French officers either participated or looked on apathetically. Private Wheeler recalled seeing numerous bodies in the streets of the towns and villages he passed through, the houses often being set alight to impede the Allied advance, as at Leiria:
The town had been on fire in several places, the houses were completely glutted (sic), doors, windows, shutters, and in many places the floors were ripped to pieces for fuel… the churches did not escape, the graves were opened, and the dead dragged out.193
The British saw many terrible sights marching in the wake of the French. Grattan recalled how beautiful towns such as Leiria and Pombal were wantonly destroyed and their inhabitants mistreated or murdered. The magnificent convent at Alcobaça was set afire in an orgy of destruction as the soldiers took a dreadful revenge on the people who had harried and ambushed them along the march. Grattan mused that: ‘…a century will be insufficient to repair the evils which a few months inflicted on this unfortunate country.’194 Yet the sight of those villagers who had survived the French occupation was even more horrific. The French had starved over the preceding months, but those peasants who had remained were completely famished and suffering from exposure:
…we saw several women and children coming from their hiding places. Their appearance was frightful, scarcely able to crawl for the want of food, their deathlike countenances and their hollow sepulchral voices would excite pity from savages.195
The Allies continued their pursuit, the path of their enemies being easily traced by the smoke on the horizon. Ney’s VI Corps acted as the rearguard and conducted many skilful holding actions south of Pombal to delay their pursuers. Though an indifferent strategist, Ney was an accomplished tactician and made the Allies’ task far harder than anticipated. He was fortunate in gaining such experience, as he would be forced to repeat this service for the Emperor on the famous retreat from Moscow the following year. Without orders, Ney decided to resist the Allied advance at Pombal on 11 March. British light troops drove the French back into the town and seized the bridge before the engineers could detonate their charges underneath it. Following this success they made an attempt on Pombal Castle, but were driven back by a counter-attack led by Ney in person with four battalions. As more British troops began to arrive, Ney relinquished the town and ordered parts of it fired to impede the enemy advance.
Meanwhile, Montbrun’s cavalry were reconnoitring in the vanguard of the army and had reached the Mondego. They determined that militia were present in large numbers on the far bank and that the town of Coimbra was held by levies under Trant and Silveira. Montbrun conducted a poor reconnaissance, taking three days to find a suitable crossing point where a bridge could be thrown across three islets to allow a potential attack on Coimbra. In common with many officers he felt the campaign had foundered irretrievably and considered abandoning Portugal the best course. Therefore, his efforts during the execution of this task were somewhat lacking.196
The next Allied clash with Ney’s rearguard occurred at Redhina on 12 March. The country was very hilly and covered with pine forests, making it ideal for rearguard actions, and Ney had chosen a strong position on a high plateau between the confluence of the Redhina and the Soure. He had his back to the bridge before the town, but had taken the precaution of covering the crossing with artillery in preparation for the inevitable withdrawal. The Light Division threw out a skirmish line and drove the French tirailleurs back after a sharp skirmish in the woods, but when they began to emerge onto the plateau they were met with a withering fire. Mermet’s and Marchand’s Divisions stood there to oppose them, supported by three cavalry regiments. The French infantry resisted stubbornly, supported by the fire of fourteen guns. Combined with a skilfully executed cavalry charge, the British ad
vance was checked. As Pack’s and Picton’s Divisions arrived, Wellington decided to delay a serious attack until reinforced by the 4th Division due to the scale of resistance. However, Ney felt he had performed his task and, commanding his artillery to fire a sustained fusilade at the British, began to retire over the bridge. There was some confusion during the crossing, but Ney had achieved his objective, both sides losing just over 200 men. Wellington could have taken the opportunity to press the French retreat at this point, but considered it inadvisable to risk losing substantial numbers of men for little gain.
Arriving at Condeixa with the main body, Massena was forced to make a crucial decision. If he wished to force the Mondego and take Coimbra it must be now. If he were permitted thirty-six hours he could bridge the river and continue northwards. Asking Ney to hold his position at Condeixa as long as possible, he sent the wounded and baggage forward to Miranda de Corvo and reviewed his options. As the British vanguard approached they discovered Ney had thrown up abbatis to strengthen his position and was present in force. Wellington ordered the the 4th Division and the Light Division to occupy the French front, while the 6th and 3rd Divisions marched around both flanks to try to turn Ney’s defence. After some resistance, Ney abandoned Condeixa, fearing that he would be outflanked, and withdrew to the east. In the distance Wellington could see elements of the main French body marching in the direction of Ponte de Murcella and realised that Massena had abandoned his designs on Coimbra.
After receiving further reconnaissance reports, Massena had been deceived into thinking Coimbra was held by between 20,000–25,000 men. In fact Trant had as few as 5,000, and was under orders to relinquish the city upon the first serious attack, Wellington deeming it unnecessary to sacrifice the Portuguese levies in the face of overwhelming numbers. However, as Ney withdrew he either forgot or deliberately failed to inform his commander-in-chief and British hussars came upon him and his staff. Both sides were surprised, but Massena’s grenadiers stood firm and an aggressive display by his dragoon escort persuaded the cavalrymen to withdraw. Marbot recalled:
Wellington Against Massena Page 18