However, the 7th were new arrivals in the Peninsula and therefore the least experienced division in the army. It appears that Wellington thought the French were only planning a minor manoeuvre to threaten communications and induce him to weaken his centre. He believed that the main attack was likely to be concentrated against the village. The ridge running west of Fuentes de Oñoro was eminently defensible and it would have made more sense to withdraw his right flank to this position entirely instead of inadequately reinforcing it with a weak division. The troops along his eight-mile frontage were thinly stretched already, but perhaps Wellington feared a successful move cutting off his retreat, although if the enemy could not break his line, there was little to worry about in that direction. Since the defensive position he had adopted was intended to cover Almeida from possible relief, combined with the fact that the French possessed insufficient strength to bypass his position and enter into Portugal, it was unnecessary to extend his right. Even historian Michael Glover, a keen Wellington partisan, called this decision: ‘…one of the most questionable moves which Wellington ever made.’245 Yet Wellington was not completely autonomous and many of his staff approved of the redeployment, Sir Brent Spencer in particular earnestly supporting it. The morning would tell whether his line could survive the French onslaught.
Chapter 10
The Most Dangerous Hour of the War
Redeploying quietly under cover of darkness had been difficult and the French troops on Massena’s left flank had only a few hours to rest. Few slept, knowing what awaited them on the morrow. The attack would begin shortly after first light and, though a low early morning mist hung over the fields, the day promised to be bright and very hot. Parquin greeted one of his superiors as they tightened the girths on their saddles and made last minute preparations for the advance:
I noticed that Major de Verigny had had his beard trimmed. His gauntlets and his shirt were clean, his boots highly polished and his spurs gleaming. He was riding his best horse, a fine Turkish mare… His colpack was crowned with its plume and its bag fluttered in the wind. His moustache had been waxed and turned up. In short, he was immaculately turned out. I complimented him on his appearance. ‘My dear Parquin, this is how one should look when one is meeting the enemy,’ he said. ‘One is never too well dressed when the cannon roars.’246
The Allies were also settling in to their new positions. Houston had placed the 85th Regiment and the 2nd Caçadores in the village of Poço Velho and deployed the rest of the 7th Division behind the hamlet and slightly inclined towards Nave de Haver. In that village two squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons had ridden up in the night to reinforce Sanchez’s irregulars. Speaking with the famous guerrilla leader, Captain Thomas Brotherton inquired about the precautions he had made to defend the village and was assured that they were extensive. In the darkness it was difficult to confirm this, but he recalled: ‘It was a strong post, on an eminence, surrounded by stone wall enclosures, similar to those in Ireland, and no cavalry alone ought to have carried it.’247
As the morning mist began to dissipate, Brotherton spied a large body of men just before the tree line of the woods to their front. Sanchez confidently told him they were his own pickets, but, to his horror, Brotherton suddenly realised that they were a squadron of French cavalry just as they mounted their horses and began to advance. As the alarm was sounded, it became clear that a huge force of cavalry was headed for the village. Observing the odds, Sanchez made no attempt to defend Nave de Haver: ‘…but the brave Don Julian, as the Spaniards called him, took himself off immediately with his whole force to the mountains, and left me with my two squadrons to shift for myself.’248 Brotherton clearly believed that with the irregular infantry they could have at least held the French advance for a while, but Sanchez was not prepared to risk his men against a large body of regulars. The two squadrons of dragoons skirmished with the advanced French units but were forced to retreat, being massively outnumbered. Those guerrillas on foot dispersed and fled but the French sabred many of them, the horsemen eagerly riding them down, wishing to avenge scores of ambushes and raids they had suffered at their hands. Isolated groups turned to fire on their pursuers or made brief stands amongst the houses, but were rapidly surrounded and mercilessly slaughtered by the vengeful cavalry.
The British cavalrymen were bloodied but had not suffered serious casualties as they thundered up to the village of Pogo Velho, glad of the sight of the red-coated infantry drawn up there. Yet Brotherton was puzzled at their nonchalant attitude:
…but as they did not commence firing on the French cavalry that were closely pursuing me, I rode up to the first officer I could approach, and asked him why he did not fire and stop the progress of the enemy. He replied with astonishment, ‘Are those French?’249
This was a battalion of the 85th Regiment who had never seen action before. Brotherton swiftly confirmed the identity of his pursuers and the infantry began to open a brisk fire on the horsemen. Numerous horses and men fell in the leading ranks, but the cavalry only retired a brief distance and more squadrons rode up to their support, reforming and obviously preparing for a major attack.
Private Wheeler of the 51st Foot also recalled that his battalion, drawn up on the plain to the right of the village, was casually cooking rice for breakfast when round shot began to fall amongst them from horse artillery that had unlimbered to their front. An immense body of cavalry was observed spreading out in squadrons on the plain before them. These were the brigades of generals Fournier and Lepic, and to their rear the leading elements of Marchand’s infantry could be seen marching in a column of double companies from Nave de Haver.
From his vantage point above Fuentes de Oñoro Wellington could now see the danger. Once again Reynier was attacking on his left, but without much conviction, and it was likely to be a mere distraction attack. He judged that Erskine and Campbell’s Divisions could hold their own there and in any case his main concern was the right flank and they would have to fend for themselves. The 7th Division could not possibly stand against the huge attack that was being concentrated against them and he decided to commit the Light Division to their support. He ordered Craufurd to march to the threatened flank, attempt to extricate Houston’s Division and cover their withdrawal.
Around Poço Velho matters were becoming serious for the Allies. The skirmishers had been pushed back into the village and French infantry were beginning to form for an assault. On the plain, Wheeler recalled that they only had two Portuguese cannon supporting them to the right and that one of them was rapidly dismounted and put out of action by French artillery fire.250 The gun teams then swiftly retired with their other piece and the French gunners began to fire upon the infantry standing in line. Their exposed position made them an easy target and as they were softened up, the cavalry began to make repeated charges against them: ‘The C.B. Regt now opened a fire, as did the Portugueses over our heads. It was a dangerous but necessary expedient, for our fire was not sufficient to stop the cavalry, so we were obliged to lay down and load.’251
The French infantry assault soon drove the 85th and the 2nd Cagadores out of the small village with some loss and they retreated in disorder. The 7th Division was forced to adopt square formations as the cavalry menaced them, reducing their firepower and slowing their rearward movement. The compact mass of bayonet-tipped muskets presented an near insurmountable anti-cavalry defence, but was also an inviting target for enemy artillery and the infantry who were approaching. Once weakened by their fire, the horsemen would charge in and destroy the squares. Luckily for the Allies, the leading elements of the Light Division were now approaching and Rifleman Costello recalled how he entered woods to the left of the village to help cover the withdrawal:
…where the 85th regiment were very roughly handled by the enemy. This was the first time since their arrival in the country that they had been engaged. Opposed, with their conspicuous red dresses, to the old trained French tirailleurs, it is no wonder that the gallant 85th
should have suffered so severely. When we came up, however, our practiced fellows, in their dark clothing, from the murderous nature of their arms, soon turned back the advancing French.252
Craufurd conveyed orders to Houston that he was to withdraw to the higher ground between Fuentes de Oñoro and the village of Freneda. He would cover the 7th Division as they retired across the plain, but it was a fearsome prospect since the rocky slope lay three miles to their rear. Seeing the scale of the French manoeuvre, Wellington had decided to pull in his right flank and yield the road to Castello Bom. Once this had been accomplished there was no prospect of using the fords and the bridge behind them if he had to retreat. The single bridge near Almeida was a dubious escape route for the entire army and Wellington now placed his hopes on holding the line to avoid such an eventuality.
Both divisions began to retreat across the plain as large numbers of French cavalry milled about them at the edge of musket and rifle range. Craufurd had brought up some horse artillery and the batteries of Bull and Ramsay fired upon the French cavalry, hoping to arrest their progress. With practised skill, Craufurd formed the men into close columns of companies moving in pairs – one formation remaining in square while the other withdrew. Riflemen were sent into the scrub and outcrops of rock around them to snipe at the cavalry and check the advance of French infantry, whose skirmishers were beginning to approach and fire upon them. A slow and painful shuffle across the plain began as French artillery fire ripped into the squares, often knocking down many men with one shot as the projectiles bounced over the plain wreaking havoc.
Despite the remarkable orderliness of the withdrawal, the French cavalry had a rare chance to attack infantry who were barely supported by other arms. Their officers knew it, and as the 20th Chasseurs formed up for a charge they tried to urge their men on to greater feats. Major de Vérigny tried to inspire Parquin’s squadron:
’Parquin,’ he said, pointing to a chasseur who was under fire for the first time and whose pale face betrayed the apprehension he felt, ‘Parquin, I can see by this fellow’s face that he is going to make good use of his sabre when we charge.’ The chasseur, who immediately recovered his determination at these words, brandished his sabre and declared: ‘You may count on that, sir.’253
The trooper kept his word and in the charge that followed rode right into the British ranks, hacking down wildly at the men around him with his sword, but he was swiftly shot down and killed. Parquin was also struck in the face by a bullet fired up at him at point-blank range and was forced to leave the field.
Every charge on the squares was fiercely resisted. The first rank knelt, holding their muskets at the slope, presenting a hedge of bayonets to the horsemen as their fellows levelled their firelocks and fired over them at the approaching cavalry. Wheeler recalled: ‘One of our men shot a horse, the dragoon made an attack on him with his sword, but Maxwell, for that is his name, ran him through the body with such force that he could not extricate his bayonet without placing his foot on the fellow’s ribs.’254 The rush of the horsemen was intimidating but without more artillery support or infantry to weaken the formations, they stood little chance of breaking their formation.
Meanwhile, the vastly outnumbered British cavalry charged continually against their French counterparts. Some Frenchmen were said to be drunk and wheeled about haphazardly,255 yet they outnumbered the dragoons and their brave attempts to hold them back from the infantry were near suicidal:
…a squadron of the 1st Royal and of the 14th Light Dragoons gallantly dashed in amongst the enemy and performed wonders, but they were soon obliged to fall back – for the enemy outnumbered them twenty to one or more; we now sorely felt the want of artillery and cavalry.256
Brotherton was involved in the brief and violent cavalry clashes as the horsemen whirled back and forth across the plain. Each time they retired to reform their ranks, French artillery would target them, knocking down horses and riders in a flurry of blood and dust. It was brutal, close-range fighting with sword and pistol: ‘I had my charger shot under me, and got on a troop horse which was also shot under me, through the head, by the pistol of a French officer, so closely that my own face was singed.’257
With combined arms the French should have been able to decimate the stricken Divisions, but Mermet’s infantry had paused inexplicably around Poço Velho and the Allies were beginning to lengthen the distance between them. A trail of casualties lay stretched over the plain, but they would have been even greater if the men had not kept their order. The cavalry persistently harried the retreat and tried to dislodge the riflemen operating in the scrubland. Costello was forced to run to the cover of the 51st’s square on several occasions.258 Wheeler recalls his somewhat eccentric Colonel’s outbursts during the retreat:
’That fellow is out of step, keep step and they cannot hurt us.’ Another time he would observe such a one, calling him by name, ‘cannot march, mark him for drill, Serjeant Major. I tell you again they cannot hurt us if you are steady, if you get out of time, you will be knocked down.’ He was leading his horse and a shot passed under the horses belley (sic) which made him rear up. ‘You are a coward’ he said ‘I will stop your corn three days.’259
Yet the situation was desperate for the Allies and as Napier wrote in his account of the war: ‘…there was not during the whole war a more perilous hour.’260 If Montbrun’s cavalry could delay the retreat until their infantry came up the entire Allied right wing might collapse. The situation was grave indeed, and at one point during the retreat Colonel Mainwaring of the 51st apparently took the drastic step of burning his regimental colours, fearing that they would fall into enemy hands. These were symbols of the Regiment’s pride, which they were supposed to defend to the last, and this virtually unprecedented act reveals how desperate the situation had become. Mainwaring would later suffer for this ‘defeatism’ when Wellington heard of it.261
It seemed that the French were on the verge of victory, as Thiebault later recorded:
…having by a magnificent movement turned the enemy’s right flank, it became master of the fairly accessible ground lying between Nave de Aver and Pozo Velho, and was in a position to take Wellington in flank and rear, and throw him back into the cul-de-sac formed by the Coa, the Agueda and the Douro. In this situation, among the crags with which the banks of those torrents bristle, the English army would have been certainly lost…262
The troops placed before Fuentes de Oñoro had remained inactive until mid-morning. Observing that his flank attack was succeeding, Massena ordered an assault on the village. Once again Ferey’s Brigade splashed through the Dos Casas and Claparede’s Brigade from IX Corps attacked the village to his left. French artillery began to pound the village in a heavy bombardment to cover the attack, bringing walls and roofs down upon the defenders as dust and smoke rose above Fuentes. Commissary Schaumann, posted in the rear at the bridge of Castello Bom, had ridden to observe the action from the ridge and observed the fearsome struggle below:
The French attack, particularly their gun fire (they usually fired salvos of six), was terrible, and the carnage in the streets was, if anything, worse than on the day before. The whole place rang with the clash of bayonets, the cheers of the men, and the chatter of muskets. Death flew forth from the churchyard wall and from the village church, which had been crenelated like a fortress by our men, and pierced with embrasures.263
The French pressed upwards through the narrow streets, rousting the defenders out of the houses and heading up towards the church. The 71st and 79th fell back before them, fighting house-to-house but gradually being overrun. Wellington ordered the 24th Regiment and the 6th Cagadores to support them, but General Drouet now committed ten more battalions to the attack, including grenadiers of the Imperial Guard. He hoped these elite shock troops would force the Allies out of the village and smash through Wellington’s centre. The attack was even supported by some dragoons on the right of the village, and some of them clattered their way into the winding streets
where a series of savage fights was in progress:
A French dragoon, who was dealing death around, forced his way up to near where I stood. Every moment I expected to be cut down. My piece was empty; there was not a moment to lose. I got a stab at him, beneath the ribs, upwards; he gave a back stroke, before he fell, and cut the stock of my musket in two.264
Brunton also encountered cavalry on the edge of the village. His Cagadore battalion was to the right of Fuentes de Onoro, defending series of walls and broken ground. The dragoons charged a weak point in their position where the ground was flatter and marshy, riding down many of the Portuguese as they tried to flee. Brunton’s company was cut off from the rest of the battalion when the horsemen got in between them and: ‘We lost many men and the other wing was partly dispersed, but I maintained my ground and after dark rejoined the Brigade with what remained to their surprise, as they had imagined we were all taken.’265
Being forced out of the lower part of the village, the Highlanders were pushed back into its upper reaches. A fierce fight took place around the churchyard as the Highlanders fought among the tombstones with the French, but the enemy soon had possession of the church and its environs. The village was theirs and they began to re-form into line around the churchyard. One last effort would see them crown the ridge and if they could carry it and were reinforced with enough men, the Anglo-Portuguese Army would be cut in two.
Meanwhile, Houston and Craufurd’s Divisions had nearly reached their new position. They had performed the incredible feat of retreating nearly three miles, harried all the while by the enemy. It justified Wellington’s faith in Craufurd, since without careful handling and rigid discipline the troops would have broken and routed during such a long retreat. It was a crucial point in the battle and Massena recalled:
Wellington Against Massena Page 22