But it has to be said, painful and humiliating as the remembrance may be, that when victory was secure… when the men, elated in the highest degree… asked for nothing more than to come to close quarters… French generals refused to fight. As a result of that incredible disobedience, which Massena had no longer the energy required to punish by blowing out the brains of one of the generals who were defying his authority… our troops stood still with success before them and recoiled from victory…284
Thiebault also complained that Wellington had benefited from great good fortune which, considering his right wing was obliged to retire a full three miles, is a well founded observation. As for the poor performance of Massena’s commanders, many historians agree with Thiebault’s assessment. Fortescue claims that the French suspected that Wellington may have brought Beresford’s army back along the frontier and that more troops lay concealed behind the crest than was actually the case. This could have been one reason for their hesitancy to assail the slope to the south of Fuentes and Fortescue believed that they should have pushed their advantage on the flank. The British cavalry should have been entirely destroyed in that sector considering how badly outnumbered they were and they were lucky not to have taken greater losses.285 Napier agrees that Massena’s initial success on 5 May should have brought greater benefits and that gross insubordination lay at the root of his failure. Junot had been inactive as his second-in-command, Reynier had dithered ineffectually in the north and several generals had refused to commit their troops to the fight. In summary he commented that for Massena: ‘…the machinery of battle would not work.’286
From the British point of view they had successfully blocked the French path to Almeida, stood firm during three days of fighting and obliged the enemy to retire into Spain. The escape of the garrison was an annoying factor but strategically irrelevant to the campaign. However, the battle had been very close and Ensign Mills wrote:
I have learnt one thing since I came to this country, and that is to know how easily England is duped; how completely ignorant she is of the truth of what is going on here… At Fuentes the French completely turned our right; Lord Wellington in his dispatch slightly notices it, and would lead you to think that the troops on the right were withdrawn rather than, as was the case, driven in; and then they give him what he himself never dreamt of claiming, a victory.287
Publicly, Wellington had indeed announced that Fuentes was an Allied victory, but could hardly have done otherwise during wartime. However, his private view differed and in later years he admitted that: ‘.he committed a fault by extending his right too much at Poco Velha; and that, if the French had taken advantage of it, there might have been bad consequences, but that they permitted him to recover himself and change his front before their face.’288 Clearly he considered himself fortunate that the attack there had not been pressed home with more conviction, though it must be said that, when he became aware of his error, he retrieved the situation admirably.
If Wellington’s right wing had disintegrated during its long retreat, the consequences for the army could have been catastrophic. In Thiebault’s opinion, the Allies could then have been trapped with near impassable rivers on each side and the entire army captured or destroyed. This is backed by Wallace’s comment before mounting a bayonet charge in Fuentes as being the lesser of two evils. Generally, Wellington’s handling of his army at Fuentes de Oñoro had been masterful, but this one key error nearly cost him the battle. During his momentous career he rarely misjudged a situation, but this must stand as one of his worst mistakes. He owed his deliverance to his own self-confidence, well-trained officers, disciplined troops and the French failure to exploit their advantage.
Wellington never sent a victory dispatch to London, which traditionally entailed a promotion for the aide de camp chosen to bear it. He did not count the battle among his victories, though it could hardly be said that he lost the action. Four years later he would comment on how close a victory Waterloo had been, but in comparison his monumental struggle against Napoleon never witnessed the near collapse of his army’s flank. He was honest enough to concede how near he had come to defeat, writing two weeks after the battle:
Lord Liverpool was quite right not to move thanks for the battle of Fuentes, though it was the most difficult one I was ever concerned in, and against the greatest odds… If Boney had been there, we should have been beaten.289
Chapter 11
The End of the Old Fox
On 10 May in Ciudad Rodrigo, General Foy delivered two letters to Massena from Marshal Berthier conveying the Emperor’s displeasure. The first contained a tirade of criticism for his conduct during the campaign. Considering the old enmity that existed between them, writing these reprimands on the Emperor’s behalf must have been satisfying for the resentful Berthier. A great deal of the dispatch was unfair and took no account of the incredible difficulties Massena had faced. For example:
Old soldiers are grieved to see such a fine army fleeing from 25,000 British, and manoeuvring to evacuate the country without the honour of a battle. Prince, the Emperor charges me to inform you that he expected more from your energy, and from the opinion he had formed of you as the result of the glorious episodes in which you have so frequently taken part.290
Of course, Massena had brought the Allies to battle while this dispatch was in transit, but it would not be enough to save him from disgrace. Just as he had claimed with Pelet, Napoleon refused to consider the Portuguese soldiers and irregulars in his calculations, in complete ignorance of how effective they had become. The second letter informed Massena of his dismissal and replacement with Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa. It was a blunt and unnecessary rebuke and, to add insult to injury, he was ordered to hand over the majority of his staff to his successor and return to Paris immediately.
Massena did not linger in Ciudad Rodrigo but, after a stormy encounter with Foy, whom he accused of turning the Emperor against him, left for France the next day. Napoleon was furious over the failures in Portugal and the ambiguous results of Fuentes de Oñoro failed to placate him. After his arrival in Paris, Massena was kept waiting for weeks before an audience with the Emperor was granted, only to be greeted with the taunt: ’Eh bien! Prince d’Essling, vous n’êtes donc plus Massena!’291 He was then subjected to one of Napoleon’s tantrums, which included a string of accusations and taunts about missed opportunities in the Peninsula. Under similar circumstances, many French officers had been reduced to tears when confronted by the engraged Corsican after letting him down, but Massena dispassionately stood his ground in near silence. Occasionally he would challenge the wild charges made against him, but Napoleon rarely paused for breath on such occasions and he would take no excuse. In the final analysis Massena had failed.
Massena’s involvement in the Peninsular War had led to shame and disgrace; in contrast Wellington’s fortunes would go on from strength to strength during the conflict. However, in the immediate aftermath of Fuentes he received bad news from the south. Marshal Soult had attempted to relieve Badajoz and Beresford had, according to instructions, opposed his march towards the city. The resulting battle at Albuera on 16 May had been extremely bloody with Beresford coming close to seeing his right flank destroyed in an error that bore an eerie similarity to Wellington’s mistake at Fuentes. Beresford was on the verge of ordering a retreat, but was saved by his subordinates when, without orders, generals Lowry Cole and Sir Henry Hardinge brought up 4,000 men of the 4th Division to support the threatened flank. The battle had been a slaughterhouse, with 6,000 Allied casualties compared to 8,000 French. Only Soult’s decision to retire gave the British the opportunity to claim a victory in this controversial action.
Reading Beresford’s honest and gloomy report on Albuera, Wellington snapped to the staff officer who brought it: ‘This won’t do. Write me down a victory.’292 News of a near defeat would make dismal reading in London and, since the Government was struggling to ensure that Parliament persevered with the long and unpop
ular war, its effect could be devastating. Though Wellington did not doctor the dispatch as much as his French counterparts would have done, he nevertheless played down Allied losses and how close Beresford had come to defeat. It may have been unethical, but the fate of the Peninsula and Europe still lay in the balance and he justified his actions by saying: ‘they would have written a whining report upon it, which would have driven the people in England mad. However, I prevented that.’293 Harking back over that year’s events, The Annual Register gave a fairer summary:
That the action of Albuera was really a victory on the part of the allies, the result rendered undeniable, for the French general was completely foiled in his attempt, and was obliged to quit the purpose he had in view. It was, however, so dearly purchased, that in a sober estimate the day will perhaps be reckoned (more) among the disastrous than the triumphant ones, for the loss incurred seems to have exerted a serious influence on subsequent transactions.294
While 1811 also saw the British fail to take Badajoz and retire across the border, it proved a watershed for the entire conflict. Never again would Wellington be compelled to retreat as far as Lisbon, and Massena’s invasion was the last major French offensive to come so close to success. Early the following year Wellington took Ciudad Rodrigo and, turning south, invested and captured Badajoz by April. The fall of the Spanish frontier fortresses secured Portugal and on 22 July Wellington won a remarkable victory at Salamanca. Prior to this the French had formed the inaccurate view that Wellington was dangerous only as a defensive general and his attack and the conclusive defeat of Marmont’s army came as an unpleasant surprise. Both the Marshal and his second in command General Bonet were seriously wounded in a battle that saw the French lose 14,000 casualties. Only a staunch rearguard action by General Foy allowed the French to retreat without suffering greater losses and the defeat broke their hold over northern and central Spain.
On 13 August 1813 Wellington entered Madrid for the first time, but was forced to relinquish the city when the French renewed the offensive. However, the tide had irretrievably turned in the Peninsula; Napoleon’s disastrous invasion of Russia crippled the French Army and reduced the chance of sufficient reinforcements being made available for Spain. On 12 June 1813 Wellington inflicted a crushing defeat on the French at Vitoria, where King Joseph was nearly taken in the rout that followed and a vast amount of loot, acquired from all quarters of the Peninsula, was captured in the French baggage. French military power was broken in the region after Vitoria and the fall of San Sebastian on 27 June was the last major obstacle to ousting the French from Spain.
From 25 July to 2 August Marshal Soult mounted a desperate offensive over the Pyrenees to try to restore the situation, but this was swiftly forced back. France itself was now under threat and, having driven the invaders from the Peninsula, Wellington invaded France in 1813 as the combined might of Europe converged on Napoleon’s capital. His offensive culminated in the Battle of Toulouse on 10 April, when the French capitulated after Napoleon’s first abdication.
During this time Massena had languished in semi-retirement as Napoleon mounted one of the greatest invasions the world had yet seen against Russia. Portugal’s resistance to his Continental System was insignificant compared to the increasing reluctance of Tsar Alexander to conform to demands that were so damaging to the Russian economy. Determined to bring the Russians to a decisive battle, Napoleon pursued them further and further into the hinterland in a campaign that surpassed even the Peninsula for its horrific conditions and the ferocious manner in which it was fought.
Massena was deliberately overlooked when the high command was picked for the Russian venture. Beset by ill health and premature old age, he was likely to have turned down any command offered. The years had given him ample reason to dislike Bonaparte and, remembering his revolutionary ideals, he loathed his increasingly autocratic style. When walking with a friend in the grounds of his house he pointed out that the stream running over his land flowed down towards Malmaison, one of Napoleon’s favourite retreats. ‘I piss on him when I want to,’295 he casually remarked. Yet, with Wellington’s increasing success in Spain, France required his services and he was offered command of the Army of Portugal once again by the Regency Council governing in Napoleon’s absence. However, during the journey southwards he fell ill at Bayonne on 26 August. Massena had never fully recovered his health after years of hard campaigning and, with a chronic stomach inflammation, was forced to relinquish the command.296
Napoleon had lost thousands of men in his disastrous invasion of Russia. Even the incredible slaughter at the Battle of Borodino and the fall of Moscow failed to force the Tsar to negotiate and the retreat that followed witnessed the virtual destruction of Napoleon’s Grande Armée. Though his political and military positions were desperate, the Emperor still denied Massena a corps command but appointed him Military Governor of the 8th Military District at Toulon. This was an important position, as Toulon was crucial to France as the main naval base for the Mediterranean. Massena was responsible for the protection of a long stretch of coastline and commanded the Garde Nationale.
The years 1813–1814 proved to be the swansong of the French Empire. Massive armies were concentrated against the French and, one by one, Napoleon’s allies began to desert him. For years he had led France to victory, humbling some of the greatest powers in Europe, but now everyone urged him to make peace. His marshals, with an average age of forty-nine, were tired of war and wished to enjoy the estates and privileges that Napoleon had bestowed upon them rather than risk them in further conflict. The Allies were offering generous terms, allowing Napoleon to retain power if he conceded that France would return to its former borders, but the Emperor was intractable. Despite the odds, he set out in pursuit of a great victory that he hoped would restore France’s position as the greatest power in Europe. He had humbled the Continental armies before and believed he could do so again.
While Napoleon fought for the survival of the Empire, Massena quietly pursued the demands of his governorship. Toulon was a great port but the English still dominated the oceans and with news of the loss of French ships in the region, Massena wrote to the Emperor, fearful of an attempt on the city.297 Napoleon replied that a British landing was more likely at Genoa but in fact the Allies saw little need to open another front in the war since the French were being forced out of the German states and Wellington was manoeuvring to cross the Pyrenees.
The Battle of Leipzig shattered Napoleon’s attempt to confine the fighting to Germany. Renowned as ‘The Battle of the Nations,’ it was the largest battle of the era. Between 177,000 and 195,000 French troops and their allies were ranged against as many as 365,000 Allied troops by the end of the confrontation. Bernadotte, a one time Marshal of the Empire and now Crown Prince of Sweden, changed sides, bringing Swedish forces against Napoleon to combine with the might of Russia and Prussia. Hemmed in, the French lost 73,000 casualties during a three-day battle while the Allies lost 54,000. Though coming close to victory, Napoleon was eventually forced to retreat over the River Elster. He lost 20,000 men in the city of Leipzig when a bridge was destroyed prematurely and the rearguard was stranded. Prince Poniatowski, a recently appointed Marshal, was drowned trying to swim the river and Generals Lauriston and Reynier were captured along with many others.
As the Allies invaded France, Napoleon still refused to negotiate and, though he conducted a brilliant campaign, winning a string of minor victories, defeat became inevitable. Many troops had been left in Germany garrisoning fortresses and cities now under siege, which he sorely needed, and he could no longer rely on his marshals. Following the battle of Laon on 9 March, Marmont opened independent negotiations with the Allies that eventually led to the surrender of Paris, in which Joseph Bonaparte played a part. Marshal Murat tried and failed to make a secret deal to retain his kingdom of Naples in return for deserting the Emperor. On 4 April the marshals rebelled en masse. Further slaughter was futile, they argued, and on 6 April 1814
Napoleon was persuaded to yield to the inevitable at Fontainebleau.
The Emperor abdicated in favour of his infant son, but a secret agreement had been reached between Tsar Alexander and Talleyrand for the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. On 26 April the Comte de Provence landed at Calais and was proclaimed Louis XVIII. Napoleon travelled into exile on the Isle of Elba in the Mediterranean. Massena reluctantly gave his allegiance to the king. As a republican he hated the idea of a return to the monarchy, although he had always entertained misgivings regarding Napoleon’s autocratic form of government. He was not alone in this – nearly all of the marshals followed suit. Their political views varied enormously but in the end the wish to retain money, status and power overcame any reservations they entertained. Louis was glad to receive Massena’s fealty and awarded him the Grand Cross of the Order of Saint Louis. He also wished to make him a peer, but now the borders of France had been redrawn once more he was unable to do so, for Massena had lost his French citizenship. His native Piedmont had been returned to the Kingdom of Sardinia. The problem was resolved by an Act of Naturalisation on 20 January 1815, which saw Massena become a Peer of France.298
Massena retained his position as a Military Governor under the Bourbons as the country adjusted to a short period of peace after over twenty years of almost continuous war. Wellington had been recalled to London after the fall of Toulouse and received the congratulations of the Regent and the Government. In the House of Lords he was granted the unique privilege of having five plaudits of nobility read out for him in a single day, conferring the titles between Baron and Duke. He was then sent to Paris as the British Ambassador to the Court of the Tuileries. Following the political maelstrom in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, the Congress of Vienna was to be convened with the intention of planning Europe’s future and he was to play a role. There he encountered an old adversary:
Wellington Against Massena Page 24