by Aristotle
with that of desire and spirit, in that the former commands, while the
latter obeys: for the reasoning faculty does not always command, but
sometimes also is under command, nor is that of desire and spirit
always under command, but also on occasion assumes the command,
whenever the soul of a man is vicious.
Of 'properties' the most 'arguable' are the essential and
permanent and the relative. For a relative property gives rise, as
we said before, to several questions: for of necessity the questions
arising are either two or four, or that arguments in regard to these
are several. An essential and a permanent property you can discuss
in relation to many things, or can observe in relation to many periods
of time: if essential', discuss it in comparison with many things: for
the property ought to belong to its subject in comparison with every
single thing that is, so that if the subject be not distinguished by
it in comparison with everything else, the property could not have
been rendered correctly. So a permanent property you should observe in
relation to many periods of time; for if it does not or did not, or is
not going to, belong, it will not be a property. On the other hand,
about a temporary property we do not inquire further than in regard to
the time called 'the present'; and so arguments in regard to it are
not many; whereas an arguable' question is one in regard to which it
is possible for arguments both numerous and good to arise.
The so-called 'relative' property, then, should be examined by means
of the commonplace arguments relating to Accident, to see whether it
belongs to the one thing and not to the other: on the other hand,
permanent and essential properties should be considered by the
following methods.
2
First, see whether the property has or has not been rendered
correctly. Of a rendering being incorrect or correct, one test is to
see whether the terms in which the property is stated are not or are
more intelligible-for destructive purposes, whether they are not so,
and for constructive purposes, whether they are so. Of the terms not
being more intelligible, one test is to see whether the property which
he renders is altogether more unintelligible than the subject whose
property he has stated: for, if so, the property will not have been
stated correctly. For the object of getting a property constituted
is to be intelligible: the terms therefore in which it is rendered
should be more intelligible: for in that case it will be possible to
conceive it more adequately, e.g. any one who has stated that it is
a property of 'fire' to 'bear a very close resemblance to the soul',
uses the term 'soul', which is less intelligible than 'fire'-for we
know better what fire is than what soul is-, and therefore a 'very
close resemblance to the soul' could not be correctly stated to be a
property of fire. Another test is to see whether the attribution of
A (property) to B (subject) fails to be more intelligible. For not
only should the property be more intelligible than its subject, but
also it should be something whose attribution to the particular
subject is a more intelligible attribution. For he who does not know
whether it is an attribute of the particular subject at all, will
not know either whether it belongs to it alone, so that whichever of
these results happens, its character as a property becomes obscure.
Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of fire to be
'the primary element wherein the soul is naturally found', has
introduced a subject which is less intelligible than 'fire', viz.
whether the soul is found in it, and whether it is found there
primarily; and therefore to be 'the primary element in which the
soul is naturally found' could not be correctly stated to be a
property of 'fire'. On the other hand, for constructive purposes,
see whether the terms in which the property is stated are more
intelligible, and if they are more intelligible in each of the
aforesaid ways. For then the property will have been correctly
stated in this respect: for of constructive arguments, showing the
correctness of a rendering, some will show the correctness merely in
this respect, while others will show it without qualification. Thus
(e.g.) a man who has said that the 'possession of sensation' is a
property of 'animal' has both used more intelligible terms and has
rendered the property more intelligible in each of the aforesaid
senses; so that to 'possess sensation' would in this respect have been
correctly rendered as a property of 'animal'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether any of the terms
rendered in the property is used in more than one sense, or whether
the whole expression too signifies more than one thing. For then the
property will not have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) seeing
that to 'being natural sentient' signifies more than one thing, viz.
(1) to possess sensation, (2) to use one's sensation, being
naturally sentient' could not be a correct statement of a property
of 'animal'. The reason why the term you use, or the whole
expression signifying the property, should not bear more than one
meaning is this, that an expression bearing more than one meaning
makes the object described obscure, because the man who is about to
attempt an argument is in doubt which of the various senses the
expression bears: and this will not do, for the object of rendering
the property is that he may understand. Moreover, in addition to this,
it is inevitable that those who render a property after this fashion
should be somehow refuted whenever any one addresses his syllogism
to that one of the term's several meanings which does not agree. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether both all the
terms and also the expression as a whole avoid bearing more than one
sense: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this
respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that 'body' does not bear several
meanings, nor quickest to move upwards in space', nor yet the whole
expression made by putting them together, it would be correct in
this respect to say that it is a property of fire to be the 'body
quickest to move upwards in space'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the term of which he
renders the property is used in more than one sense, and no
distinction has been drawn as to which of them it is whose property he
is stating: for then the property will not have been correctly
rendered. The reasons why this is so are quite clear from what has
been said above: for the same results are bound to follow. Thus (e.g.)
seeing that 'the knowledge of this' signifies many things for it means
(1) the possession of knowledge by it, (2) the use of its knowledge by
it, (3) the existence of knowledge about it, (4) the use of
knowledge about it-no property of the 'knowledge of this' could be
rendered correctly unless he draw a distinction as to which of these
it is whose property he is rendering. For constructive purposes, a
man
should see if the term of which he is rendering the property avoids
bearing many senses and is one and simple: for then the property
will have been correctly stated in this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing
that 'man' is used in a single sense, 'naturally civilized animal'
would be correctly stated as a property of man.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether the same term has been
repeated in the property. For people often do this undetected in
rendering 'properties' also, just as they do in their 'definitions' as
well: but a property to which this has happened will not have been
correctly stated: for the repetition of it confuses the hearer; thus
inevitably the meaning becomes obscure, and further, such people are
thought to babble. Repetition of the same term is likely to happen
in two ways; one is, when a man repeatedly uses the same word, as
would happen if any one were to render, as a property of fire, 'the
body which is the most rarefied of bodies' (for he has repeated the
word 'body'); the second is, if a man replaces words by their
definitions, as would happen if any one were to render, as a
property of earth, 'the substance which is by its nature most easily
of all bodies borne downwards in space', and were then to substitute
'substances of such and such a kind' for the word 'bodies': for 'body'
and 'a substance of such and such a kind' mean one and the same thing.
For he will have repeated the word 'substance', and accordingly
neither of the properties would be correctly stated. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids ever
repeating the same term; for then the property will in this respect
have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) seeing that he who has
stated 'animal capable of acquiring knowledge' as a property of man
has avoided repeating the same term several times, the property
would in this respect have been correctly rendered of man.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered in the
property any such term as is a universal attribute. For one which does
not distinguish its subject from other things is useless, and it is
the business of the language Of 'properties', as also of the
language of definitions, to distinguish. In the case contemplated,
therefore, the property will not have been correctly rendered. Thus
(e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be a
'conception incontrovertible by argument, because of its unity', has
used in the property a term of that kind, viz. 'unity', which is a
universal attribute; and therefore the property of knowledge could not
have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other
hand, see whether he has avoided all terms that are common to
everything and used a term that distinguishes the subject from
something: for then the property will in this respect have been
correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has said that it is a
property of a 'living creature' to 'have a soul' has used no term that
is common to everything, it would in this respect have been
correctly stated to be a property of a 'living creature' to 'have a
soul'.
Next, for destructive purposes see whether he renders more than
one property of the same thing, without a definite proviso that he
is stating more than one: for then the property will not have been
correctly stated. For just as in the case of definitions too there
should be no further addition beside the expression which shows the
essence, so too in the case of properties nothing further should be
rendered beside the expression that constitutes the property
mentioned: for such an addition is made to no purpose. Thus (e.g.) a
man who has said that it is a property of fire to be 'the most
rarefied and lightest body' has rendered more than one property (for
each term is a true predicate of fire alone); and so it could not be a
correctly stated property of fire to be 'the most rarefied and
lightest body'. On the other hand, for constructive purposes, see
whether he has avoided rendering more than one property of the same
thing, and has rendered one only: for then the property will in this
respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said
that it is a property of a liquid to be a 'body adaptable to every
shape' has rendered as its property a single character and not
several, and so the property of 'liquid' would in this respect have
been correctly stated.
3
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed either
the actual subject whose property he is rendering, or any of its
species: for then the property will not have been correctly stated.
For the object of rendering the property is that people may
understand: now the subject itself is just as unintelligible as it was
to start with, while any one of its species is posterior to it, and so
is no more intelligible. Accordingly it is impossible to understand
anything further by the use of these terms. Thus (e.g.) any one who
has said that it is property of 'animal' to be 'the substance to which
"man" belongs as a species' has employed one of its species, and
therefore the property could not have been correctly stated. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids
introducing either the subject itself or any of its species: for
then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated.
Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a living
creature to be 'compounded of soul and body' has avoided introducing
among the rest either the subject itself or any of its species, and
therefore in this respect the property of a 'living creature' would
have been correctly rendered.
You should inquire in the same way also in the case of other terms
that do or do not make the subject more intelligible: thus, for
destructive purposes, see whether he has employed anything either
opposite to the subject or, in general, anything simultaneous by
nature with it or posterior to it: for then the property will not have
been correctly stated. For an opposite is simultaneous by nature
with its opposite, and what is simultaneous by nature or is
posterior to it does not make its subject more intelligible. Thus
(e.g.) any one who has said that it is a property of good to be 'the
most direct opposite of evil', has employed the opposite of good,
and so the property of good could not have been correctly rendered.
For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has
avoided employing anything either opposite to, or, in general,
simultaneous by nature with the subject, or posterior to it: for
then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered.
Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to
be 'the most convincing conception' has avoided employing anything
either opposite to, or simultaneous by nature with, or posterior to,
the subject; and so the property of knowledge would in this respect
have been correctly stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered as
property something that does not always follow the subject but
sometimes ceases to be its property: for then the property will not
have been correctly described. For there is no necessity either that
the name of the subject must also be true of anything to which we find
such an attribute belonging; nor yet that the name of the subject will
be untrue of anything to which such an attribute is found not to
belong. Moreover, in addition to this, even after he has rendered
the property it will not be clear whether it belongs, seeing that it
is the kind of attribute that may fall: and so the property will not
be clear. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of
animal 'sometimes to move and sometimes to stand still' rendered the
kind of property which sometimes is not a property, and so the
property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has rendered something
that of necessity must always be a property: for then the property
will have been in this respect correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who
has stated that it is a property of virtue to be 'what makes its
possessor good' has rendered as property something that always
follows, and so the property of virtue would in this respect have been
correctly rendered.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether in rendering the
property of the present time he has omitted to make a definite proviso
that it is the property of the present time which he is rendering: for
else the property will not have been correctly stated. For in the
first place, any unusual procedure always needs a definite proviso:
and it is the usual procedure for everybody to render as property some
attribute that always follows. In the second place, a man who omits to
provide definitely whether it was the property of the present time
which he intended to state, is obscure: and one should not give any
occasion for adverse criticism. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated it as
the property of a particular man 'to be sitting with a particular