by Aristotle
possible. For this reason questions of this kind are not dialectical
unless the questioner himself draws distinctions or divisions before
expressing them, e.g. 'Good means this, or this, does it not?' For
questions of this sort are easily answered by a Yes or a No. Hence one
should endeavour to formulate propositions of this kind in this
form. It is at the same time also perhaps fair to ask the other man
how many meanings of 'the good' there are, whenever you have
yourself distinguished and formulated them, and he will not admit them
at all.
Any one who keeps on asking one thing for a long time is a bad
inquirer. For if he does so though the person questioned keeps on
answering the questions, clearly he asks a large number of
questions, or else asks the same question a large number of times:
in the one case he merely babbles, in the other he fails to reason:
for reasoning always consists of a small number of premisses. If, on
the other hand, he does it because the person questioned does not
answer the questions, he is at fault in not taking him to task or
breaking off the discussion.
3
There are certain hypotheses upon which it is at once difficult to
bring, and easy to stand up to, an argument. Such (e.g.) are those
things which stand first and those which stand last in the order of
nature. For the former require definition, while the latter have to be
arrived at through many steps if one wishes to secure a continuous
proof from first principles, or else all discussion about them wears
the air of mere sophistry: for to prove anything is impossible
unless one begins with the appropriate principles, and connects
inference with inference till the last are reached. Now to define
first principles is just what answerers do not care to do, nor do they
pay any attention if the questioner makes a definition: and yet
until it is clear what it is that is proposed, it is not easy to
discuss it. This sort of thing happens particularly in the case of the
first principles: for while the other propositions are shown through
these, these cannot be shown through anything else: we are obliged
to understand every item of that sort by a definition. The inferences,
too, that lie too close to the first principle are hard to treat in
argument: for it is not possible to bring many arguments in regard
to them, because of the small number of those steps, between the
conclusion and the principle, whereby the succeeding propositions have
to be shown. The hardest, however, of all definitions to treat in
argument are those that employ terms about which, in the first
place, it is uncertain whether they are used in one sense or
several, and, further, whether they are used literally or
metaphorically by the definer. For because of their obscurity, it is
impossible to argue upon such terms; and because of the
impossibility of saying whether this obscurity is due to their being
used metaphorically, it is impossible to refute them.
In general, it is safe to suppose that, whenever any problem
proves intractable, it either needs definition or else bears either
several senses, or a metaphorical sense, or it is not far removed from
the first principles; or else the reason is that we have yet to
discover in the first place just this-in which of the aforesaid
directions the source of our difficulty lies: when we have made this
clear, then obviously our business must be either to define or to
distinguish, or to supply the intermediate premisses: for it is
through these that the final conclusions are shown.
It often happens that a difficulty is found in discussing or arguing
a given position because the definition has not been correctly
rendered: e.g. 'Has one thing one contrary or many?': here when the
term 'contraries' has been properly defined, it is easy to bring
people to see whether it is possible for the same thing to have
several contraries or not: in the same way also with other terms
requiring definition. It appears also in mathematics that the
difficulty in using a figure is sometimes due to a defect in
definition; e.g. in proving that the line which cuts the plane
parallel to one side divides similarly both the line which it cuts and
the area; whereas if the definition be given, the fact asserted
becomes immediately clear: for the areas have the same fraction
subtracted from them as have the sides: and this is the definition
of 'the same ratio'. The most primary of the elementary principles are
without exception very easy to show, if the definitions involved, e.g.
the nature of a line or of a circle, be laid down; only the
arguments that can be brought in regard to each of them are not
many, because there are not many intermediate steps. If, on the
other hand, the definition of the starting-points be not laid down, to
show them is difficult and may even prove quite impossible. The case
of the significance of verbal expressions is like that of these
mathematical conceptions.
One may be sure then, whenever a position is hard to discuss, that
one or other of the aforesaid things has happened to it. Whenever,
on the other hand, it is a harder task to argue to the point
claimed, i.e. the premiss, than to the resulting position, a doubt may
arise whether such claims should be admitted or not: for if a man is
going to refuse to admit it and claim that you shall argue to it as
well, he will be giving the signal for a harder undertaking than was
originally proposed: if, on the other hand, he grants it, he will be
giving the original thesis credence on the strength of what is less
credible than itself. If, then, it is essential not to enhance the
difficulty of the problem, he had better grant it; if, on the other
hand, it be essential to reason through premisses that are better
assured, he had better refuse. In other words, in serious inquiry he
ought not to grant it, unless he be more sure about it than about
the conclusion; whereas in a dialectical exercise he may do so if he
is merely satisfied of its truth. Clearly, then, the circumstances
under which such admissions should be claimed are different for a mere
questioner and for a serious teacher.
4
As to the formulation, then, and arrangement of one's questions,
about enough has been said.
With regard to the giving of answers, we must first define what is
the business of a good answerer, as of a good questioner. The business
of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to make the
answerer utter the most extrvagant paradoxes that necessarily follow
because of his position: while that of the answerer is to make it
appear that it is not he who is responsible for the absurdity or
paradox, but only his position: for one may, perhaps, distinguish
between the mistake of taking up a wrong position to start with, and
that of not maintaining it properly, when once taken up.
5
Inasmuch as no rules are laid down for those who argue for the
sake of trai
ning and of examination:-and the aim of those engaged in
teaching or learning is quite different from that of those engaged
in a competition; as is the latter from that of those who discuss
things together in the spirit of inquiry: for a learner should
always state what he thinks: for no one is even trying to teach him
what is false; whereas in a competition the business of the questioner
is to appear by all means to produce an effect upon the other, while
that of the answerer is to appear unaffected by him; on the other
hand, in an assembly of disputants discussing in the spirit not of a
competition but of an examination and inquiry, there are as yet no
articulate rules about what the answerer should aim at, and what
kind of things he should and should not grant for the correct or
incorrect defence of his position:-inasmuch, then, as we have no
tradition bequeathed to us by others, let us try to say something upon
the matter for ourselves.
The thesis laid down by the answerer before facing the
questioner's argument is bound of necessity to be one that is either
generally accepted or generally rejected or else is neither: and
moreover is so accepted or rejected either absolutely or else with a
restriction, e.g. by some given person, by the speaker or by some
one else. The manner, however, of its acceptance or rejection,
whatever it be, makes no difference: for the right way to answer, i.e.
to admit or to refuse to admit what has been asked, will be the same
in either case. If, then, the statement laid down by the answerer be
generally rejected, the conclusion aimed at by the questioner is bound
to be one generally accepted, whereas if the former be generally
accepted, the latter is generally rejected: for the conclusion which
the questioner tries to draw is always the opposite of the statement
laid down. If, on the other hand, what is laid down is generally
neither rejected nor accepted, the conclusion will be of the same type
as well. Now since a man who reasons correctly demonstrates his
proposed conclusion from premisses that are more generally accepted,
and more familiar, it is clear that (1) where the view laid down by
him is one that generally is absolutely rejected, the answerer ought
not to grant either what is thus absolutely not accepted at all, or
what is accepted indeed, but accepted less generally than the
questioner's conclusion. For if the statement laid down by the
answerer be generally rejected, the conclusion aimed at by the
questioner will be one that is generally accepted, so that the
premisses secured by the questioner should all be views generally
accepted, and more generally accepted than his proposed conclusion, if
the less familiar is to be inferred through the more familiar.
Consequently, if any of the questions put to him be not of this
character, the answerer should not grant them. (2) If, on the other
hand, the statement laid down by the answerer be generally accepted
without qualification, clearly the conclusion sought by the questioner
will be one generally rejected without qualification. Accordingly, the
answerer should admit all views that are generally accepted and, of
those that are not generally accepted, all that are less generally
rejected than the conclusion sought by the questioner. For then he
will probably be thought to have argued sufficiently well. (3)
Likewise, too, if the statement laid down by the answerer be neither
rejected generally nor generally accepted; for then, too, anything
that appears to be true should be granted, and, of the views not
generally accepted, any that are more generally accepted than the
questioner's conclusion; for in that case the result will be that
the arguments will be more generally accepted. If, then, the view laid
down by the answerer be one that is generally accepted or rejected
without qualification, then the views that are accepted absolutely
must be taken as the standard of comparison: whereas if the view
laid down be one that is not generally accepted or rejected, but
only by the answerer, then the standard whereby the latter must
judge what is generally accepted or not, and must grant or refuse to
grant the point asked, is himself. If, again, the answerer be
defending some one else's opinion, then clearly it will be the
latter's judgement to which he must have regard in granting or denying
the various points. This is why those, too, who introduce other's
opinions, e.g. that 'good and evil are the same thing, as Heraclitus
says,' refuse to admit the impossibility of contraries belonging at
the same time to the same thing; not because they do not themselves
believe this, but because on Heraclitus' principles one has to say so.
The same thing is done also by those who take on the defence of one
another's positions; their aim being to speak as would the man who
stated the position.
6
It is clear, then, what the aims of the answerer should be,
whether the position he lays down be a view generally accepted without
qualification or accepted by some definite person. Now every
question asked is bound to involve some view that is either
generally held or generally rejected or neither, and is also bound
to be either relevant to the argument or irrelevant: if then it be a
view generally accepted and irrelevant, the answerer should grant it
and remark that it is the accepted view: if it be a view not generally
accepted and irrelevant, he should grant it but add a comment that
it is not generally accepted, in order to avoid the appearance of
being a simpleton. If it be relevant and also be generally accepted,
he should admit that it is the view generally accepted but say that it
lies too close to the original proposition, and that if it be
granted the problem proposed collapses. If what is claimed by the
questioner be relevant but too generally rejected, the answerer, while
admitting that if it be granted the conclusion sought follows,
should yet protest that the proposition is too absurd to be
admitted. Suppose, again, it be a view that is neither rejected
generally nor generally accepted, then, if it be irrelevant to the
argument, it may be granted without restriction; if, however, it be
relevant, the answerer should add the comment that, if it be
granted, the original problem collapses. For then the answerer will
not be held to be personally accountable for what happens to him, if
he grants the several points with his eyes open, and also the
questioner will be able to draw his inference, seeing that all the
premisses that are more generally accepted than the conclusion are
granted him. Those who try to draw an inference from premisses more
generally rejected than the conclusion clearly do not reason
correctly: hence, when men ask these things, they ought not to be
granted.
7
The questioner should be met in a like manner also in the case of
terms used obscurely, i.e. in several senses. For the answerer, if
he does not understand, is always permi
tted to say 'I do not
understand': he is not compelled to reply 'Yes' or 'No' to a
question which may mean different things. Clearly, then, in the
first place, if what is said be not clear, he ought not to hesitate to
say that he does not understand it; for often people encounter some
difficulty from assenting to questions that are not clearly put. If he
understands the question and yet it covers many senses, then supposing
what it says to be universally true or false, he should give it an
unqualified assent or denial: if, on the other hand, it be partly true
and partly false, he should add a comment that it bears different
senses, and also that in one it is true, in the other false: for if he
leave this distinction till later, it becomes uncertain whether
originally as well he perceived the ambiguity or not. If he does not
foresee the ambiguity, but assents to the question having in view
the one sense of the words, then, if the questioner takes it in the
other sense, he should say, 'That was not what I had in view when I
admitted it; I meant the other sense': for if a term or expression
covers more than one thing, it is easy to disagree. If, however, the
question is both clear and simple, he should answer either 'Yes' or
'No'.
8
A premiss in reasoning always either is one of the constituent
elements in the reasoning, or else goes to establish one of these:
(and you can always tell when it is secured in order to establish
something else by the fact of a number of similar questions being put:
for as a rule people secure their universal by means either of
induction or of likeness):-accordingly the particular propositions
should all be admitted, if they are true and generally held. On the
other hand, against the universal one should try to bring some
negative instance; for to bring the argument to a standstill without a
negative instance, either real or apparent, shows ill-temper. If,
then, a man refuses to grant the universal when supported by many
instances, although he has no negative instance to show, he
obviously shows ill-temper. If, moreover, he cannot even attempt a