http://www.skepdic.com/ selfdeception.html.
4. For this and many more examples, see V. S. Ramachandran and Sandra
Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain (New York: William Morrow, 1998); and hear
V. S. Ramachandran, "A Journey to the Center of Your Mind," Ted.com, October
2007, http://www.ted.com/talks/vilayanur_rainachandran_onyouur_mind.htinl.
5. Robert Burton, On Being Certain: Believing You Are Right Even When
You're Not (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008), p. xi.
6. Robert Jay Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).
7. See Richard Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith (Raleigh, NC: Lulu, 2009),
pp. 17-20; and Samuel Noah Kramer, "The First Tale of Resurrection," History
Begins at Sumer, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981),
pp. 154-67; a connection between the two stories is even clearer in the ancient
Christian redaction of the The Ascension of Isaiah, of which there is an English
edition by R. H. Charles (New York: Macmillan, 1919).
8. Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 3, 4.
9. For more on this science of religious thought, see the video presentation of
Dr. Andy Thomson, "Why We Believe in Gods," 2009 American Atheists
Convention (Atlanta, Georgia),
http://www.reasonproject.org/archive/item/why_we believein_gods=
drandy_thomson.
10. Flo Conway and Jim Siegelman, Snapping; Americaii Epidemic of Sudden
Personality Change, 2nd ed. (New York: Stillpoint Press, 2005), p. 24.
11. Ibid., p. 32.
12. Ibid., p. 12.
13. Ibid., p. 31.
14. Karen Armstrong, The Spiral Staircase (New York: Anchor Books, 2004).
15. luris, "Visual Snow and Kundalini," Migraine Aura.org, February 21,
2007, http://www.migraine-aura.org/content/e27891/e27265/e42285/e42419/
e43344/index_en.html.
16. For more on this point, see Sharon Begley, "Your Brain on Religion:
Mystic Visions or Brain Circuits at Work?" Newsweek, May 7, 2001, http://
www.cognitiveliberty.org/neuro/neuronewswk.htin.
t is a curious thing that most of us ardently believe that we solved the
ultimate question of the universe before we even learned how to tie our
shoelaces. If philosophers, theologians, and scientists have struggled with the
concept of existence for millennia without arriving at a definite solution, our
naive assessment from childhood that a divine entity simply wished it were so
certainly requires a reevaluation. It is nothing short of an incomprehensible
tragedy that anyone in this age of reason would have to write a book debunking
a collection of ridiculous fantasies from an era of rampant superstition.*I
Why do a majority of Americans believe in the ability to predict specific
details in the distant future, the existence of winged messengers living in the sky,
the worldwide Flood as told in Genesis, and the resurrection of a man who had
been dead for over a day? How can these people believe they are enlightened
enough to insist upon the veracity of these outlandish beliefs when studies show
they know so little about them? They believe simply because they want to
believe, they believe because they have always believed, and they believe
because others around them believe. The vast majority of those who believe such
things will stick to those beliefs throughout life despite overwhelming evidence
to the contrary, as Dr. Eller and Dr. Tarico explained in the first two chapters of
this collection.
While ideas from other religions might seem ridiculous to Christians, most of
them believe in an omnipotent deity that will torture his underlings forever if we
do not worship him. While God could choose any absurd method of interaction
he wanted, people rarely stop to consider if God would manifest himself in that
way. Sound reflection on this problem is not a matter of accepting that one
method must be true and deciding that our hastily chosen belief sounds the least
superstitious (or perhaps just as good as the next), but rather of determining if
any suggestion can stand on its own as a sensible avenue for a god to take. The
reasons given for belief are driven not by rational thought and reasoned
argumentation, but by psychological factors that maintain what society has given
the religious believer through indoctrination.
Some Muslims taught themselves it's normal to believe that Allah would
provide a paradise for suicide bombers, and they are constantly able to recruit
them. The Mormons taught themselves it's normal to believe in a prehistoric
Jewish kingdom in America, and they are constantly able to find scholars who
will attest to its existence. Christians taught themselves it's normal to pray to an
earthly savior who miraculously rose from the dead, and they are constantly able
to find "evidence" of his benevolence. Members of each group have their faiths
because they are lifelong members of a society that has continually reinforced
the "special" nature of their beliefs. What one society perceives as normal,
another perceives as a collective delusion.
Explaining the various thought processes that place people in a certain
religion is not intended to serve as proof that the belief system is wrong, but
rather to demonstrate that devout observation of the system is typically void of
rational and independent thought. In other words, the religion was offered,
accepted, practiced, justified, and passed on; but it was not seriously questioned.
This is hardly a coincidence.
It should not be a shocking discovery that parents pass on their religious
beliefs through their children. Muslim parents tend to have Muslim children,
Christian parents tend to have Christian children, Hindu parents tend to have
Hindu children. Such consistent traditions simply cannot be maintained by
chance alone. A child's environment must affect his religious affiliation to an
extensive degree. In fact, all children are born without specific religious ideas
and remain in a state of impressionability until influenced by the religious
convictions of their parents or other similarly motivated individuals. Likewise,
the parents are probably members of their religion because their parents were
also members. How far back does this blind tradition continue? How do we
know that the first person converted for an intellectually justifiable reason?
Instead of initiating an honest and impartial analysis of the new evidence that
science and enlightened thinking have provided, people simply bury their heads
in the sand and continue to believe whatever religion their ancestors thought they
needed, or were perhaps conquered with, centuries ago. They were instilled with
the beliefs as children, and they will maintain them as adults.
Psychologists Richard Petty and John Cacioppo have explained how high-fear
messages, such as the indoctrinated idea of a god who is always watching
everyone's actions so as to later separate the righteous from the wicked, can be
so upsetting that the audience engages in defensive avoidance and refuses to
think
critically about them.' The effectiveness of the message depends on three
factors: the unfavorableness of the consequences that will occur if the
recommended actions are not adopted, which is absolute because hell is
complete (and often asserted to be eternal) agony;3 the likelihood that
unfavorable consequences will occur if the recommended actions are not
adopted, which is absolute because the perfect Bible says so;4 and the likelihood
that unfavorable consequences will not occur if the recommended actions are
adopted, which is absolute because, again, the perfect Bible says so.'
Hardly any conceivable message could be more motivating than the threat of
hell, and we have good reason to conclude that such a message can be upsetting
enough to deter critical thinking, especially when the message often begins at an
age when the audience is too young to have developed a discipline that can
challenge the validity of such assertions. Just the opposite, children habitually
give benefit of the doubt to their parents and other role models. Religious
indoctrination is firmly in place well before persuasability begins an established
decline at the age of eight, making any subsequent attempts to remove the
indoctrination extremely difficult.6 Since parents tend to be correct on just about
every other testable matter of importance, extending this pattern into the realm
of the unfalsifiable seems unfortunately reasonable to a young child. And we
must not forget about the ultimate reward for accepting Christianity: an eternal
stay in heaven with infinite happiness. How can the young and impressionable
refuse?
Psychologist Robert Cialdini has shown that people become more confident
about their decisions as time progresses, even despite a complete lack of
evidence to support the veracity of their choices.? As humans, we simply are not
comfortable considering the notion that we might be wrong. We enjoy being
right. Rather than entertaining the possibility that we might be wrong, we strive
to convince ourselves that we have followed proper avenues of thought. This
process is highly illogical, intellectually dishonest, and potentially dangerous.
With enough exposure, people of deep religious faith become conditioned to
avoid questioning their core beliefs.
While many think they have arrived at their Christian beliefs through logical
deduction and not childhood indoctrination, prominent skeptic Michael Shermer
demonstrates the existence of an intellectual attribution bias that helps dispel the
claims of believers who think they are an exception to the indoctrination process.
He shows that an individual is nearly nine times more likely to think he arrived
at his religious position using reason than he is to think any other Christian did
the same.8 People are able to accept the fact that many religious believers have
adopted their faiths because of societal influence, but they refuse to consider that
the same might be true of themselves. Finding the gullibility of others is an easy
task; finding it within ourselves can be a difficult and discomforting one.
Once indoctrination is firmly in place, and the children have become adults, we
find that there are a number of factors in the very nature of skepticism that
prevent it from winning a victory over thoughtless optimism. The first is that
skeptics will explore many types of arguments, including both strong and
moderate ones, that would debunk Christian preconceived notions. But the
inclusion of the moderate arguments weakens the perceived credibility of the
person presenting them. Petty and Cacioppo have found that providing a person
with a few strong arguments provokes more attitude change than providing these
arguments along with a number of moderate arguments.° People are prone to
believing that if they think they can defeat a moderate argument, they would
probably be able to spot the fallacies of the stronger arguments if they
considered them long enough. This is an unfortunate mistake. The addition of
moderate arguments onto a pile of already strong arguments should add
credibility to the position, not diminish it.
Messages favoring the veracity of Christianity arrive through more convincing
channels than those that support a nonreligious viewpoint. Petty and Cacioppo
report that face-to-face appeals repeatedly have a greater impact than appeals
through mass media.10 If the doubter wants to hear arguments from those with
contrasting beliefs, where does he turn? To his atheist family members? To his
atheist friends? To an atheist church group? These probably don't exist. Instead,
he will likely rely on mass media, typically in the form of a book like this one.
Thus the freethought literature must be superior enough to overcome not only
the indoctrinated Christian message itself, but also the difference from the
perceived level of superiority that's attributed to face-to-face communication.
Petty and Cacioppo also report that the likeability of the source of the message
conveyed plays a major role in whether that message is capable of being
persuasive.11 The disparity in the amount of attitude change from identical
messages provided by a likable source and an unlikable source is comparable to
the disparity in the amount of change resultant from identical messages provided
by an expert source and a nonexpert source. In short, you can obtain the same
amount of perceived credibility by being likable as you can by becoming an
expert! Unfortunately, society has painted a nasty picture of atheism and
skepticism. People who do not believe in God are the least trusted minority in
America.12
People are motivated to defend their beliefs from attacks, particularly when
they are forewarned of a speaker's intent, and even more so when the belief is
closely linked with identity.13 Not only are religious beliefs synonymous with
identity for a number of people, religious followers have been inoculated from
skeptical arguments because they have been forewarned that skeptics are not
trustworthy people. This "poisoning of the well" modifies individuals to be more
resistant to attitude changes toward the position that they already believe to be
fundamentally weak.
So there is no pressure from society to understand or defend itself against the
true position of skeptics. This is unfortunate because Petty and Cacioppo report
that subjects are often motivated to understand an issue when they are led to
believe that they would have to later discuss the issue with someone who took a
contrasting position.14 Without this pressure, subjects are less likely to consider
the position of the opponent. Since people do not have a real interest in
evaluating their innermost beliefs, those who have been conditioned to believe in
a book with a talking donkey will never actively seek out someone to challenge
this position.
Human beings are surprisingly gullible creatures. The ability to think
skeptically is not innate; it requires practice. One-half of America believes that a
person can use extrasensory perception to read another person's mind.1' Nearly
the same amount believes we can communicate with the dead.16 Otherwise sane
individuals have been known to send death threats to meteorologists, not for
inaccurate predictions, but for the actual weather conditions. 17 Among other
feats of incredible sheepishness, Cialdini reports that people are more likely to
buy unusual items when they are priced higher, buy items with coupons despite
no price advantage, respond to requests when empty reasons are given, agree to
absurd requests if they are preceded by ones of greater absurdity, and consider
people intelligent and persuasive if they are attractive.ls If people are so prone to
following foolish patterns under such poor assumptions in order to help guide
them through this complex world, we should not be at all surprised when people
hypothesize the existence of a personal god in order to explain intelligent life,
distant galaxies, childbirth, starvation, natural disasters, and suicide bombers.
The realization that rational skepticism is not as interesting, promising, or
comforting as optimistic romanticism is perhaps more formidable than any other
obstacle. It's only human to believe in things that make us happier. If you have
admired a book since childhood because it says that your lost loved ones are
waiting for you in heaven when you die, it's going to take an extraordinary
amount of work to convince you that the talking donkey also found in the book
might mean that the book is not proper evidence for such an optimistic idea.
Skepticism does not appeal to most people because humans have an innate
tendency to search for patterns and simple explanations in order to make sense
of the world. Such a practice results in an incorporation of elements that fit into
an understandable answer and a neglect of elements that do not. Psychologists
often use this phenomenon to explain the reason people believe in clairvoyance,
horoscopes, prayer, and other such foolishness. Individuals remember when
these methods "work" and forget when they do not. With respect to religion,
people will often remember "answered" prayers but forget or rationalize the
unanswered ones. Have you ever noticed how people will trumpet abundances of
miracles when there are a few survivors of a catastrophe yet say nothing about
the many people who died? It is also very easy to claim that prayer healed a
person dying of a terrible disease, but quite another to prove it. Study after study
demonstrates that prayer has no effect on patients when they are unaware that
they are being prayed for.19 Christians will avoid the rational conclusion that
prayers are only "answered" by a placebo effect. They will avoid admitting that
tragic events or unbelievable coincidences are the result of complex natural
factors. They will avoid admitting that prayers have answers just as often as
problems have solutions.
In addition to childhood indoctrination and the nature of skepticism itself, a
specific psychological phenomenon prevents individuals from properly weighing
the evidence on important decisions. Psychologist Leon Festinger established the
presence of an innate tendency to rid oneself of uneasy feelings. He compared
the psychological drive, later termed cognitive dissonance, to physiological
hunger. Just as hunger is a motivation to eat and rid oneself of the hunger,
dissonance is a motivation to explain inconsistency and rid oneself of the
dissonance. Explanations, therefore, work toward satisfying dissonance just as
nutrients work toward satisfying hunger. He suggested three modes that we use
to rid ourselves of cognitive dissonance: altering the importance of the original
belief or the new information, changing the original belief, or seeking evidence
that is critical of the new information. Since religious people do not want to
trivialize or change their beliefs, finding information that supports the original
Why Faith Fails The Christian Delusion Page 8