Why Faith Fails The Christian Delusion

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by John W. Loftus

discomforting to someone as saying that a potentially abusive authority figure

  did the same. If God is perpetually monitoring us, knowing what we are thinking

  at every moment, objectivity certainly gives way to anxiety.

  People who were never indoctrinated with religious beliefs often fail to

  appreciate the consequences of this dilemma. I'm afraid that I don't have much

  advice to give to those who are battling with intellectual selfhonesty-other than

  to point out the inherent unfairness of a system in which an allpowerful being

  mistreats anyone who has the intellectual curiosity to arrive at its existence

  through reason rather than through faith. Perhaps you can tell God that you are

  going to set his existence aside for a moment in order to see what evidence

  would be most convincing to a nonbeliever. Or perhaps you can tell God that

  you want to make your faith stronger than ever by passing Loftus's Outsider Test

  for Faith (see chapter 4). Ask for forgiveness in advance if you feel you must,

  but if the evidence for God is as strong as the religious experts would have you

  believe, should it not find you rather easily?

  NOTES

  1. Michael Sheriner, Why People Believe Weird Things. Pseudoscience,

  Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time (New York: Henry Holt, 2002),

  p. 258.

  2. Richard Petty and John Cacioppo, Attitudes and Persuasion: Classic and

  Contemporary Approaches (Dubuque, IA: William C. Brown, 1981): pp. 72-73.

  3. See Matthew 13:47-50, Mark 9:42-49, and Revelation 14:9-12.

  4. See Matthew 13:41-50, 25:31-46; and Revelation 20:11-15.

  5. See John 3:16.

  6. Petty and Cacioppo, Attitudes and Persuasion, p. 80.

  7. Robert Cialdini, Influence.- The Psychology of Persuasion (New York:

  William Morrow, 1993), p. 57.

  8. Shermer, Why People Believe, p. 296.

  9. Petty and Cacioppo, Attitudes and Persuasion, p. 72.

  10. Ibid., p. 85.

  11. Ibid., pp. 259-60.

  12. Johanna Olexy and Lee Herring, "Atheists Are Distrusted: Atheists

  Identified as America's Most Distrusted Minority, According to Sociological

  Study," American Sociological Association News, May 3, 2006,

  http://www.asanet.org/page.ww ?section =Press&name=Atheists

  +Are+Distrusted.

  13. Petty and Cacioppo, Attitudes and Persuasion, pp. 228-29.

  14. Ibid., p. 257.

  15. Gallup poll, June 8, 2001, accessed from http://classes.skepdic.com/

  gallup2001.pdf on July 18, 2009.

  16. Shermer, Why People Believe, p. 26.

  17. Cialdini, Influence, pp. 188-90.

  18. Ibid., pp. 1, 4, 7, 29, 40, 172.

  19. The three most definitive investigations are STEP from American Heart

  journal 151, no. 4 (April 2006): 934-42; MANTRA from Lancet 366, no. 9499

  (November 2005): 1769-70; and the 2001 Mayo Clinic coronary care unit trial in

  Mayo Clinic Proceedings 76, no. 12 (December 2001): 1192-98.

  20. Festinger et al., When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study

  of a Modern Group That Predicted the Destruction of the World (Minneapolis:

  University of Minnesota Press, 1956).

  21. Petty and Cacioppo, Attitudes and Persuasion, pp. 141-42.

  22. Ibid., p. 137.

  23. J. A. Hardyck and M. Braden, "Prophecy Fails Again: A Report of a

  Failure to Replicate," journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 65, no. 2

  (August 1962): 136-41.

  24. Festinger et al., When Prophecy Fails.

  25. Petty and Cacioppo, Attitudes and Persuasion, p. 152.

  26. Ibid., p. 155.

  27. Ibid., pp. 159-60.

  28. Firearms, alcohol, pornography, speech, religion, and so on.

  29. Sheriner, Why People Believe, p. 59.

  30. Ibid., pp. 299-300.

  31. Muzafer Sherif and Carl Hovland, Social judgment: Assimilation and

  Con-trastEffects in Communication and Attitude Change (New Haven, CT: Yale

  University Press, 1961).

  32. Drew Westen et al., "The Neural Basis of Motivated Reasoning: An IMRI

  Study of Emotional Constraints on Political judgment during the US Presidential

  Election of 2004," journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18 (2006): 1947-58. See

  also Drew Westen, The Political Brain. The Role of Emotion in Deciding the

  Fate of the Nation (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007).

  33. William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics,

  3rd ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2008), p. 48.

  34. Answers in Genesis, "The AiG Statement of Faith," section 4, article 6,

  http://www.answersingenesis.org/hoine/area/about/faith.asp.

  35. Petty and Cacioppo, Attitudes and Persuasion, p. 82.

  36. See Matthew 10:37-39; Luke 18:9-14; Romans 3:9-28; and so on. See also

  Craig, Reasonable Faith, pp. 46-47, 65-86.

  37. Paul Bell, "Would You Believe It?" Mensa Magazine (February 2002): 12-

  13.

  38. Sheriner, Why People Believe, p. 292.

  39. Ibid., p. 297.

  hat I intend to do in this chapter is to further argue for and defend

  my Outsider Test for Faith (OTF) from initial feedback I received about it. This

  is just one of several arguments I use in my book Why I Became An Atheist

  (WIBA) to demonstrate that the predisposition of skepticism is warranted when

  examining the evidence for a religious faith. This feedback came from several

  sources including the Midwest regional meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical

  Society, where I presented a paper on this topic in March 2009 at Ashland

  Theological Seminary.

  The most important question of all when it comes to assessing the truth claims of

  Christian theism (or religion in general) is whether we should approach the

  available evidence through the eyes of faith or with skepticism. Complete

  neutrality as sort of a blank-slate type of condition, while desirable, is practically

  impossible, since the cultural worldview we use to evaluate the available

  evidence is already there prior to looking at the evidence. With the OTF I'll

  argue that we should adopt a skeptical predisposition as best as possible prior to

  examining the evidence, if we adopt any predisposition at all.

  My argument is as follows:

  1) Rational people in distinct geographical locations around the globe

  overwhelmingly adopt and defend a wide diversity of religious faiths due to

  their upbringing and cultural heritage. This is the religious diversity thesis.

  2) Consequently, it seems very likely that adopting one's religious faith is

  not merely a matter of independent rational judgment but is causally

  dependent on cultural conditions to an overwhelming degree.1 This is the

  religious dependency thesis.

  3) Hence the odds are highly likely that any given adopted religious faith is

  false.

  4) So the best way to test one's adopted religious faith is from the

  perspective of an outsider with the same level of skepticism used to

  evaluate other religious faiths. This expresses the OTE

  The OTF is primarily a test to examine religious faiths. When I refer to

  religious faith here, I'm primarily referring to beliefs that are essential for a

  member t
o be accepted in a particular religious community of faith who worship

  together and/or accept the same divinely inspired prophetic revelations whereby

  one's position in the afterlife depends. The OTF is no different than the prince in

  the Cinderella story who must question forry-five thousand people to see which

  girl lost the glass slipper at the ball the previous night. They all claim to have

  done so. Therefore, skepticism is definitely warranted. This is especially true

  when an empirical foot-match cannot solve the religious questions we're asking.

  There are at least three legs supportive of the first three premises of my

  argument: anthropological studies, psychological studies, and sociological (or

  demographic) data. The first two legs have been sufficiently argued for by David

  Eller, Valerie Tarico, and Jason Long in their earlier chapters. Daniel Dennett

  sums up the psychological data in these words: "One of the surprising

  discoveries of modern psychology is how easy it is to be ignorant of your own

  ignorance."2 Cultural anthropology shows us that we don't see culture so much

  as we see with culture. We swim in a Christian culture. It's hard to argue

  Christians out of their faith because they were never argued into it in the first

  place. Elsewhere, Eller has argued that "nothing is more destructive to religion

  than other religions; it is like meeting one's own anti-matter twin ... other

  religions represent alternatives to one's own religion: other people believe in

  them just as fervently as we do, and they live their lives just as successfully as

  we do ... the diversity of religions forces us to see religion as a culturally relative

  phenomenon; different groups have different religions that appear adapted to

  their unique social and even environmental conditions. But if their religion is

  relative, then why is ours not?"3

  The third leg of sociological data is easy to come by. For instance, 95 percent

  of people born and raised in Saudi Arabia are Muslim, while 95 percent of the

  people born and raised in Thailand are Buddhist. If you were born in India, you'd

  likely be a Hindu. If you were born in Mexico, you'd likely be a Catholic. In fact,

  we were all raised as believers, to a large extent. We were taught to believe

  whatever our parents told us. If they said there is a Santa Claus, then he existed

  until they said otherwise. If we were told there was a god named Zeus, we

  would've believed it. The sociological data is vast, and I've already documented

  some of it in WIBA.4 All three legs converge to provide overwhelming,

  undeniable, and noncontroversial support for the OTF by showing that when it

  comes to religious faith, an overwhelming number of believers adopt and defend

  what they were raised to believe by their parents in their respective cultures.'

  Religious faiths are not chosen by us. They are given to us. We inherit them.

  They are caught-not taught. In most cases we rarely stray far from what we were

  raised in but merely move around among versions of the same general religion,

  and even when we make a more radical change, we rarely do so after conducting

  a thorough study of the comparative evidence. So the question the OTF

  addresses is how we should test the faith given to us, or any new faith we may be

  considering instead. The problem is that social conditions provide us with the

  initial control beliefs we use from that moment onward to incorporate all known

  facts and experiences. That's why they're called control beliefs. They are like

  blinders. From the moment they are put on, we pretty much see only what our

  blinders will let us see. What else can best explain why there is still a Mormon

  church even though DNA evidence now shows us that Native Americans did not

  come from the Middle East, as the Mormon Bible claims?6

  Valerie Tarico describes the process of adopting and following blinding-

  beliefs that are subsequently defended by intelligent people. She claims, "It

  doesn't take very many false assumptions to send us on a long goose chase." To

  illustrate this, in The Dark Side-How Evangelical Teachings Corrupt Love and

  Truth she tells us about the mental world of a paranoid schizophrenic. To such a

  person the perceived persecution by the CIA sounds real:

  You can sit, as a psychiatrist, with a diagnostic manual next to you, and

  think: as bizarre as it sounds, the CIA really is bugging this guy. The

  arguments are tight, the logic persuasive, the evidence organized into neat

  files. All that is needed to build such an impressive house of illusion is a

  clear, well-organized mind and a few false assumptions. Paranoid

  individuals can be very credible.?

  Given these facts, the central thesis of the OTF is a challenge to believers to

  test or examine their own religious faith as if they were outsiders with the same

  presumption of skepticism they use to test or examine other religious faiths. Its

  presumption is that when examining one's own religious faith, skepticism is

  warranted, since the odds are good that it is false. Remember, brainwashed

  people do not know that they have been brainwashed. We know that billions of

  people have been brainwashed to believe, if you grant that they have been misled

  by their parents and culture. So you must take seriously the real possibility that

  you are one of them. If you really want know if you've been brainwashed to

  believe, then taking the OTF is the best and probably the only way to know the

  truth about your own religious faith, since there seems to be no reasonable

  alternative.

  If believers refuse to take the OTF, then they must justify having such a

  double standard. Why are they more critical of other religious beliefs than they

  are their own? For believers to object that what I'm asking is unfair, they have

  the burden of proof to show why their inconsistent approach to religious faith is

  justified in the first place.

  If after having investigated one's own religious faith with the presumption of

  skepticism it passes intellectual muster, then the believer can have his or her

  religious faith. It's that simple. If not, abandon it. I suspect that if believers are

  willing to take the challenge of the OTF, they will find that their faith fails the

  test; consequently they will abandon it, along with all other religious faiths, like

  I did. Any loving god who requires us to believe correctly, when instead we have

  this extremely strong tendency to accept what we were raised to believe,

  especially if he'll punish us if we end up being wrong, should surely make the

  correct religious faith pass the OTF If God exists and he doesn't care which

  religion we accept, that kind of god might survive the OTF, but then we would

  end up believing in a nebulous god with no definable characteristics, perhaps a

  deistic god or the "god of the philosophers." But this god is much too different

  from the God of any full-blown Christianity or any specific revealed religion

  though, and can be safely ignored.

  In a way, adopting the OTF is like following the Golden Rule, or so argues Dr.

  James McGrath, associate professor of religion at Butler University,

  Indianapolis, IN. He claims this is the way to assess the likelihoo
d of Christian

  miracles in history:

  One doesn't have to be committed in advance to history's inability to deal

  with miracles in order to begin to realize that one cannot claim Christianity

  is grounded purely in history while other traditions are at best shrouded in

  myth. One simply has to apply the most basic Christian principle to one's

  investigation of the competing claims: The Golden Rule. And so what does

  it mean to do history from a Christian perspective? It means doing to the

  claims of others what you would want done to your claims. And perhaps

  also the reverse: doing to your own claims, views and presuppositions that

  which you have been willing to do to the claims, views and presuppositions

  of others. Once one begins to attempt to examine the evidence not in an

  unbiased way, but simply fairly, one cannot but acknowledge that there are

  elements of the Christian tradition which, if they were in your opponent's

  tradition, you would reject, debunk, discount, and otherwise find

  unpersuasive or at least not decisive or compelling.8

  I've investigated my faith as an insider with the presumption that it was true.

  Even from an insider's perspective with the Christian set of control beliefs, I

  couldn't continue to believe.9 Now, from the outside, it makes no sense at all.

  Christians are on the inside. I am now on the outside. Christians see things from

  the inside. I see things from the outside. From the inside, it seems true. From the

  outside, it seems bizarre. As Stephen Roberts quipped: "When you understand

  why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss

  yours."10

  WHAT DOES THE OTF REQUIRE OF BELIEVERS?

  Believers should approach all religious faiths equally with the same level of

  skepticism. Look closely at how evangelical Christians, for instance, dismiss the

  distinctive beliefs of Muslims or Mormons and with it their religious

  worldviews. They use two different methods. One faulty method is to argue that

  since what they believe is true the other religious faiths are false. Other faiths

  either don't address the right questions or the questions they do address are not

  answered satisfactorily when compared to their own answers. Such a method is

  faulty. It first presumes what they believe based on what they were raised to

  believe, so it begs the question.

  The other method Christians use is on much firmer ground. They use David

  Hume's evidentiary standards for examining miraculous claims to the faiths they

  reject. They also deconstruct these other religious texts by assuming human

  rather than divine authors. They adopt a methodological naturalist viewpoint to

  test these other extraordinary claims and find them wanting. That best represents

  the skepticism from the outside using tests that are very well defended as not

  being sociologically dependent but rather scientifically dependent. I'm arguing

  that Christians should transfer that same skepticism toward Trinitarian,

  incarnational, resurrection faith and see what they get. I argue they won't get

  much.

  To the Christian theist the challenge of the OTF means there would be no

  more quoting the Bible to defend the claim that Jesus' death on the cross saves

  them from sins. As an outsider you wouldn't believe such a claim just because

  you read it in some ancient text. The Christian theist must now try to rationally

  explain it. No more quoting the Bible to show how it's possible for Jesus to be

  100 percent God and 100 percent man with nothing left over. The Christian

  theist must now try to make sense of this claim, coming as it does from an

 

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