to those helping runaway slaves [§16]. Israel, however, was to offer safe harbor
to foreign runaway slaves (Deut. 23:15-16)." That may be true of the CH, but
Copan does not cite Hittite law 24, which says: "If a male or female slave runs
away, he/she at whose hearth his/her owner finds him/her shall pay one month's
wages; 12 shekels of silver for a man, 6 shekels of silver for a woman."13 So
why aren't the Hittite laws characterized as a humanizing improvement? In the
Hittite law, a slave runs away, and the person harboring the slave only pays a
fine.
In fact, Hittite law systematically replaced death penalties with fines for many
offenses. Thus, law 166 demanded the death penalty for appropriating another
man's farmland (sowing seed upon previously sown land). But law 167 says:
"But now they shall substitute one sheep for the man."14 In other words, the
very symbol of the Christian substitutionary atonement had a preceding parallel
in Hittite law.
So the imposition of Lex talionis (eye-for-an-eye principle) in Pentateuchal
laws, which are usually dated after the Hittite laws, even by Copan, should be
seen as a regression. Yet Copan also says that these biblical laws: ... are not
taken literally. None of the examples illustrating an eye for an eye' calls for
bodily mutilation, but rather just (monetary) compensation" [emphasis added].
This is nothing more than mere assertion. No biblical text is offered to support
this allegation, and several biblical texts clearly state the contrary (e.g., Exodus
21:22-25, Leviticus 24:19-21, Deuteronomy 19:18-21). In fact, Jesus seems to
take this law very literally in Matthew 5:38-39: "You have heard that it was said,
`An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' But I say to you, Do not resist one
who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other
also." Or are we to suppose thatJesus was merely doing away with monetary
penalties?
Clearly, Copan must engage in special pleading to convince us that the Bible
represents an advancement in Lex talionis. If one says that Lex talionis is an
advancement, then this already had a precedent in the CH (law 196). If one says
replacing Lex talionis with fines or sacrifices was an advancement, then the
Hittites did this already. Pre-Hammurabi codes also can be found without the
Lex talionis principle.
Copan sees as a moral advancement the releasing of Hebrew slaves in the
seventh year. He remarks: "Indeed, Hebrew slaves were to be granted release in
the seventh year (Leviticus 29 [sic]:35-43)-a notable improvement over other
ancient Near Eastern law codes." Yet, this seems to contradict his own statement
in footnote 52: "The Code of Hammurabi also makes provision for
manumission." So why is the release of slaves ("manumission") in Leviticus an
improvement over CH, which also had manumission? In fact, Leviticus 25 can
be seen as worse than the CH when it comes to manumission. For example, the
CH does not restrict manumission to "Babylonians," whereas Leviticus restricts
manumission to Hebrews. Hammurabi's Code seems more open and without
regard to ethnicity here.
Long before Leviticus 25, Mesopotamian kings promulgated socalled
misharum ("equity") acts, which could include the release of whole classes of
people. As Raymond Westbrook, one of the foremost biblical legal specialists,
notes: "The proclamation of a misharum was an institution of the utmost
significance in Old Babylonian society. It was originally thought that each king
proclaimed a misharum as a once-only measure upon his accession to the throne,
but J. Finkelstein has shown that misharum enactments might occur several
times at intervals throughout a king's reign. For RimSin of Larsa there is a record
of three such enactments falling at about the twenty-sixth, thirty-fifth, and forty-
first years ... Samsuiluna in his first and eighth year." 15
These releases by RimSin and Samsuiluna (ca. eighteenth century BCE) were
in intervals of nine, six, and seven years, respectively, and so quite comparable
to the seven years of Leviticus. Therefore, there is really no advance on this
issue in the Bible. In fact, we can just as well argue that some biblical
improvements came about by imitating ancient Near Eastern institutions rather
by biblical innovation. We can find imitations of the misharum idea in Isaiah
61:1-2, which Jesus quotes in Luke 4:18-21 referring to himself.
Questionable exegesis is at the heart of some of Copan's examples of biblical
improvements. He remarks, "The overriding goal in Deuteronomy 15 is that
there be no slavery in the land atall (vv. 4, 11)" [emphasis added]. Yet, that is not
really what Deuteronomy 15:4 and 11 say. Those verses actually say: "[4] But
there will be no poor among you (for the LORD will bless you in the land which
the LORD your God gives you for an inheritance to possess) ... [11] For the poor
will never cease out of the land; therefore I com mand you, You shall open wide
your hand to your brother, to the needy and to the poor, in the land." Nothing is
said about slavery ending. In fact, if anything it's the reverse, since verse 11 says:
"For the poor will never cease out of the land." So even though Hebrew slaves
were to be released seven years after being taken into service, there is nothing to
prevent a new crop of Hebrew slaves from being taken into service all the time.
Note also how Copan places a positive spin on Exodus 21:20-21: "Another
marked improvement is in the release of injured slaves themselves (Exod. 21:20-
21). This is in contrast to their masters merely being compensated, which is
typical in the ANE codes." Yet this is what Exodus 21:20-21 says: "When a man
strikes his slave, male or female, with a rod and the slave dies under his hand, he
shall be punished. But if the slave survives a day or two, he is not to be
punished; for the slave is his money." So you can beat a slave nearly to death and
the master will not be punished at all. The reason given is that a slave is "his
money." The slave is property, not a human being.
The idea that a master has absolute control over his "money," regardless of
any injustice to workers, is endorsed by Jesus' parable of the vineyard workers in
Matthew 20:1-16. When workers complain that the master has paid those who
worked all day exactly the same as those who worked only a fraction of that day,
the master says: "Am I not allowed to do what I choose with what belongs to
me?" Treating workers like the master did is an injustice. As far as labor laws are
concerned, this is not an improvement, but rather a continuation of the idea of
Exodus 21:21 ("for the slave is his money").
It is true that Exodus 21:26-27 allows a slave to go free if a slave's tooth or
eye is damaged, but is that really better than other reasons for freeing slaves that
we can find in the ancient Near East? Consider laws 170-71 of the CH, which, in
the case of a master who has fathered children by slavewomen, grants freedom
to those slavewomen and their children if the master did not adopt them
formally. No beating is necessary to release these slaves.
If adopted, these children of slave
s are not treated as property, but as an actual
part of the master's family. Children of slavewomen could be coinheritors with
the children of the formal wife in the laws 170-71 of CH. This contrasts to the
cruel attitude expressed by Sarah concerning Ishmael, Abraham's biological son
by Hagar, a slavewoman in Genesis 21:10: "Cast out this slavewoman with her
son; for the son of this slavewoman shall not be heir with my son Isaac." God
tells Abraham to follow this injunction regardless of Abraham's sympathy for
Ishmael (Genesis 21:12). So where Abraham might represent a humanizing
tendency, God actually demands the more inhumane option. Paul repeats and
endorses Sarah's cruel actions in Galatians 4:30, which should be counted as a
regression relative to the rights of the children of slavewomen in the CH.
Copan also claims that "Later in Amos (2:6, 8:6), slavery is again repudiated."
But Amos 2:6 actually states: "Thus says the LORD: `For three transgressions of
Israel, and for four, I will not revoke the punishment; because they sell the
righteous for silver, and the needy for a pair of shoes"' (see also Amos 8:6).
Nothing is said here about the need for his people to repudiate slavery in order
for Yahweh not to punish them. And there were other sources for slaves besides
those being sold into bondage (Leviticus 25:44-45). For instance, one could still
capture slaves in war (Numbers 31:25-47, Deuteronomy 21:10, and 1 Kings
9:21). Nor is it clear that nonHebrew slaves were excluded from being sold in
this manner. Isaiah 14:1-2, which is usually dated later than Amos, envisions a
future with even more people enslaved: "But the LORD will have compassion on
Jacob and will again choose Israel, and will set them in their own land; and
aliens will join them and attach themselves to the house of Jacob. And the
peoples will take them and bring them to their place, and the house of Israel will
possess them in the LORD's land as male and female slaves; they will take
captive those who were their captors, and rule over those who oppressed them."
Indeed, if we proceed to the New Testament (NT), slavery may have gotten
even worse, not better, compared to Amos. In 1 Peter 2:18-20, we read:
"Servants, be submissive to your masters with all respect, not only to the kind
and gentle but also to the overbearing. For one is approved if, mindful of God,
he endures pain while suffering unjustly. For what credit is it, if when you do
wrong and are beaten for it you take it patiently? But if when you do right and
suffer for it you take it patiently, you have God's approval." The word
"overbearing" here is much too kind because the passage indicates that beatings
might be part of being "overbearing." Thus, the word "cruel" or "brutal" would
not be too far off the mark.
In any case, slaves are supposed to be in utter subjection to masters even if the
masters beat them. It is deemed good to suffer pain and injustice. Moreover, the
laws limiting service for Hebrew slaves were no longer applicable, since Christ
is viewed as "abolishing in his flesh the law of commandments and ordinances"
(Ephesians 2:15). So, if Copan sees a "humanizing" trajectory in the Old
Testament (OT), it seems to have gone backward in the NT, which usually
assumes slavery is acceptable, and where it is again deemed good to be treated in
a dehumanizing way.
If harboring slaves was supposed to be an advance, in the NT we see Paul
returning the slave named Onesimus, who has run away from Philemon, his
master. In fact, Paul accepts that it is entirely Philemon's prerogative to retain
Onesimus in slavery: "but I preferred to do nothing without your consent in
order that your goodness might not be by compulsion but of your own free will"
(Philemon 14).16 There is no reprimand of Philemon for having a slave. Slavery
is not included in the list of sins, which includes drunkenness, that prevent entry
into the kingdom of heaven (1 Corinthians 6:9-10). So why is drunkenness
judged to be more sinful than slave owning? Are those really more advanced and
humanizing values?
It was only after the secularization of the West, and after the erosion of
biblical authority, that we moved away from slavery and toward greater civil
rights for women.17 If we followed Ephesians 6:5 or 1 Peter 2:18, we might still
have slavery.
WHAT COUNTS AS CENTRAL BIBLICAL MORAL PRINCIPLES?
Copan unfortunately falls into the common trap that always besets biblical
theologians. Historically, biblical theology has been preoccupied with finding
"the central message" or the major principles of the Bible. This endeavor
evaporates when we realize that the biblical materials have contradictory and
complex principles that usually cannot be unified. Such tensions and
contradictions are acknowledged by Copan himself when he recommends the
approach of Christopher Wright in explaining contradictory slavery laws: "
[Wright] goes so far as to say that while Exodus 21 emphasizes the humanness
of slaves, even the ancient Israelite would recognize that Deuteronomy 15 was in
tension with earlier legislation. So, to obey Deuteronomy `necessarily meant no
longer complying with Exodus."'
Yet how are we to know that Deuteronomy should reverse anything in
Exodus? This is a faith claim. Even if we disregard the chronological problems,
contradictory texts usually mean that the interpreter ends up privileging one text
over another and declaring that one "central." Yet an advocate of the Exodus
slave legislation might declare Deuteronomy to be a corruption or deviation.
Because it is hard to erase all of the injustices found in biblical law, another
favorite technique is the "trajectory" argument. Thus, apologists can argue that,
while things may look bad, they are heading in the right direction. Of course,
this already prejudges what the right direction is, and also plays pick-and-choose
with what counts as a trajectory (e.g., why not say the trajectory is enslaving the
entire world to Yahweh?).
Nonetheless, Copan believes that there is a "moral heart" to the OT in the
following statement: "While acknowledging the drastically different mindset
between ANE and modern societies, we can overcome a good deal of the force
of the New Atheists' objections and discern the moral heart of the OT, which is a
marked contrast to the New Atheists' portrayal." But Copan never establishes
criteria for what constitutes "the moral heart" of the Bible. Is it a statistical
criterion? That is to say, is it the number of times a specific concept or term is
repeated? Or is it qualitative? That is to say, is it something believed to be the
most important concept, regardless of how many times others are repeated?
Statistically, as we have already noted, cultic laws are an overwhelming
majority of the laws. So shall we say that the moral heart is really about good
cultic practices? Why should we accept that being good to one's neighbor is "the
moral heart" when we also can find many instances of people destroying their
Canaanite neighbors? Empirically and historically, what is identified as "the
moral heart" differs sometimes by religious group or by scholar.
Orthodox Jews
obviously will not have a Christocentric approach to the Bible, and so a moral
center must include maintaining food laws, which are intimately related to God's
holiness, which does not change (see Leviticus 11:44). Jews chose death rather
than violate food laws (1 Maccabees 1:62-63; Daniel 1:8). The food laws are just
as much a part of the moral system for orthodox Jews as Jesus' injunctions are
for Christians.
UNCLEAR CRITERIA FOR MORAL
COMPARISONS
The religiocentric and ethnocentric biases of Copan play a fundamental role in
how he evaluates other religions. Copan preselects the standards of his religion,
and then just simply judges other religions by that standard. He is actually
relying on a moral relativism that could be used to establish the superiority of
any standard. For example, if we, as Americans, value freedom of religion, then
it is clear that biblical law is inferior to that of other Near Eastern systems. One
could easily argue that the denial of religious freedom is at the "moral heart" of
the OT. It is the very first of the Ten Commandments in Exodus 20:3: "You shall
have no other gods before me."
The intolerance of other religions is found in every single biblical book. This
includes:
1. commands to destroy the temples and property of other religions (e.g.,
Deuteronomy 7; 2 Kings 23),
2. destruction of the "clergy" of other religions (e.g., 1 Kings 18:40),
3. consistent commands not to worship other gods (e.g., Exodus 20:3), and
4. laws requiring the outright murder of any Hebrew exercising religious
freedom (e.g., Deuteronomy 13:1-16, 17:2-5; Exodus 22:18).
Copan acknowledges this intolerance as well: "Yes, God prohibits the worship of
other gods and the fashioning of graven images, but the ultimate desire is that
Yahweh's people love him wholeheartedly."
In contrast, most Near Eastern religions valued religious diversity and allowed
the worship of almost any god people chose. This freedom to worship would
actually be more consistent with American ideals than with anything in the
Bible. By the standard that attempts to maximize freedom of religion, the Bible
is a setback for humanity, not an advance.
Moreover, Copan completely misunderstands the idea of "loving God." As has
been pointed out by W L. Moran, the "love of God" is simply another part of the
slave-master rhetoric in the ancient Near East.18 The slave was compelled to
"love" the master or he would be punished (cf. Deuteronomy 28:15-68). Serving
other slave masters could be a capital offense, and we see that Yahweh is simply
envisioned as the ultimate slave master. "Love" (or even Christian agape) in the
Bible is not necessarily the benign and mutual-respect idea that we value in the
twenty-first century.
FAITH-BASED SPECIAL PLEADING
Copan's essay is thoroughly permeated with special pleading based on the faith
claims of his religion. He uses faith claims that:
1. could easily be used by competing religions, and
2. are no more verifiable than the claims of competing religions.
CHRISTOCENTRIC BIASES
Let us begin with Copan's Christocentric theology. He excuses a lot of the
violence and inequality in the OT because, "The Law-a temporary rather than
permanent fixture-would give way to a new covenant under Christ." But a
Muslim could just as well argue that anything Christ did was superseded by
Muhammad's revelation. Both the Muslim and Christians faith claims are
equally unverifiable.
Moreover, Copan's statement about the temporary nature of the law
contradicts Deuteronomy 4:2: "You shall not add to the word which I command
Why Faith Fails The Christian Delusion Page 28