131 using a good lawyer to help you negotiate deals: Good lawyers can actually create value in negotiations. Bad ones usually prolong the process and add costs. See Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, “Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 94 (1994), pp. 509-578.
132 longer when they are selling yours: Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), pp. 120-131.
133 ease the negotiation over many hurdles: For a good summary of various communication methods and their effect on negotiation, see Kathleen L. McGinn and Rachel Croson, “What Do Communication Media Mean for Negotiations? A Question of Social Awareness,” in Michele J. Gelfand and Jeanne M. Brett, eds., The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 334-349.
133 use the narrowest communication pipeline (e-mail) the most: I have written more extensively on the general issues of electronic negotiations. See G. Richard Shell, “Electronic Bargaining: The Perils of E-Mail and the Promise of Computer-Assisted Negotiations,” in Stephen J. Hoch and Howard C. Kunreuther, Wharton on Making Decisions (New York : Wiley, 2001), pp. 201-221.
133 benefits of using e-mail . . . to negotiate our home sale: For a general discussion of the benefits of electronic negotiation, see Leigh Thompson and Janice Nadler, “Negotiating Via Information Technology: Theory and Application,” Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 109-124.
134 studies of e-mail negotiations have confirmed this problem: The study described in the text can be found in Michael Morris, Janice Nadler, Terri Kurtzberg, and Leigh Thompson, “Schmooze or Lose: Social Friction and Lubrication in E-mail Negotiations,” Group Dynamics, Theory, Research & Practice, Vol. 6, No. 1 (May 2002), pp. 89-100. A similar study was done involving law students at different universities, with similar results. Negotiators who shared a getting-to-know-you telephone call before initiating e-mail negotiations were more successful avoiding impasse than those who did not. Janice Nadler, “Legal Negotiation and Communication Technology: How Small Talk Can Facilitate E-mail Dealmaking,” Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol. 9 (2004), pp. 223-245. See also Nicholas Epley and Justin Kruger, “When What You Type Isn’t What They Read: The Perseverance of Stereotypes and Expectancies Over E-Mail,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 41 (2005), pp. 414-422. For further research regarding the pitfalls of using e-mail to negotiate, see Raymond A. Fried-man and Steven C. Currall, “Conflict Escalation: Dispute Exacerbating Elements of E-mail Communications,” Human Relations, Vol. 56, No. 11 (2003), pp. 1325-1347; Charles E. Naquin and Gaylen D. Paulson, “Online Bargaining and Trust,” Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 88, No. 1 (2003), pp. 113-120 (e-mail negotiators had less trust and had less desire for a repeated transaction than did face-to-face negotiators).
135 an advantage when using IM: Research on IM negotiating is just getting started. See Jeffrey Loewenstein, Michael W. Morris, Angnish Chakravarti, Leigh Thompson, and Shirli Kopelman, “At a loss for words: Dominating the conversation and the outcome in negotiation as a function of intricate arguments and communication media,” Vol. 98 (2005), pp. 28-38.
CHAPTER 8: Step 2: Exchanging Information
138 Sir Francis Bacon (1597): Michael Kiernan, ed., Sir Francis Bacon, The Essays of Counsels, Civill and Morall (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 145-147. The essay from which this quote is taken is called “Of Negotiating” and first appeared in 1597.
138 Fulfulde folk saying: R.G.H. Siu, Folk Wisdom and Management 3,333 Proverbs (Washington, D.C.: Manuscript, 1994), p. 24. The Fulfulde people live in Africa, mainly within Nigeria.
139 discussed in Chapter 4: As discussed in Chapter 4, fairness and reciprocity are basic building blocks to successful relationships. Paul C. Cozby, “Self-disclosure, Reciprocity, and Liking,” Sociometry, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1972), pp. 151-160.
140 “task-oriented” in negotiation: Camille P. Schuster and Michael J. Copeland, Global Business: Planning for Sales and Negotiations (Fort Worth, Tex.: The Dryden Press, Harcourt Brace, 1996), pp. 27-28 (discussing the prevalence outside North America of prenegotiation discussion of nonbusiness matters ranging from personal concerns to social conversation).
140 single transaction at issue: Ibid., p. 28 (discussing the importance of relationship formation in negotiations outside North America).
140 get to meaningful bargaining: Ibid., pp. 107-112. (“Because relationships are paramount [in Latin America] and getting to the task is not the highest priority, more time is spent at the early part of the process getting to know the other person and deciding on the parameters of the negotiation process.”)
140 rapport between the negotiators: Bruce Barry and Richard L. Oliver, “Affect in Dyadic Negotiation: A Model and Propositions,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 67, No. 2 (1996), pp. 127-143.
141 also won the contract: Carl Blumay, The Dark Side of Power: The Real Armand Hammer (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), pp. 96-97.
141 the funeral home business: Connie Bruck, Master of the Game: Steve Ross and the Creation of Time Warner (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 27.
142 “we know and like”: Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: William Morrow, 1993), pp. 167-207.
142 reflect well on them: Two early works that helped identify this phenomenon are T. M. Newcomb, The Acquaintance Process (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), and D. Byrne, The Attraction Paradigm (New York : Academic Press, 1971). For a more recent survey and study on how similarity of mood affects liking, see Kenneth D. Locke and Leonard M. Horowitz, “Satisfaction in Interpersonal Interactions as a Foundation of Similarity in Level of Dysphoria,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 58, No. 5 (1990), pp. 823-831.
142 of relatedness and similarity: M. B. Brewer, “In-Group Bias in the Minimal Group Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 86 (1979), pp. 307-324; A. H. Ryen and A. Kahn, “Effects of Intergroup Orientation on Group Attitudes and Proximic Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 31 (1975), pp. 302-310.
143 in terms of credibility: See Edward E. Jones and C. Wortman, Ingratiation: An Attributional Approach (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973); Edward E. Jones, “Flattery Will Get You Somewhere,” Transaction, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1965), pp. 20-23; David Drachman, Andre DeCarufel, and Chester A. Insko, “The Extra Credit Effect in Interpersonal Attraction,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 14 (1978), pp. 458-465.
143 partners were not amused: Dean Takahashi, “It’s Dog Eat Dog, So Executives with Loose Lips Get the Muzzle,” The Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1997, p. B1.
145 copy and replay TV programs: This story originally comes from a series that ran in The New Yorker magazine. See “Annals of the Law: The Betamax Case I,” The New Yorker, April 6, 1987. It is retold in Robert M. March, The Japanese Negotiator: Subtlety and Strategy Beyond Western Logic (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1989), pp. 119-123.
148 engaged in actual transactions: N. Rackham and J. Carlisle, “The Effective Negotiator—Part 1: The Behavior of Successful Negotiators,” Journal of European Industrial Training, Vol. 2, No. 6 (1978), pp. 6-11; N. Rackham and J. Carlisle, “The Effective Negotiator—Part 2: Planning for Negotiations,” Journal of European Industrial Training, Vol. 2, No. 7 (1978), pp. 2-5.
149 activities by average negotiators: N. Rackham and J. Carlisle, “The Effective Negotiator—Part I: The Behavior of Successful Negotiators,” Journal of European Industrial Training, Vol. 2, No. 6 (1978), pp. 6-11.
149 “probe an opponent’s position”: Williams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1983), pp. 15-46. Williams’s research studied practicing lawyers in two major U.S. cities. In addition to discovering the traits of effective negotiators, Williams found th
at least effective negotiators are either too “trustful” and “obliging” (for cooperative negotiators) or “irritating,” “headstrong,” and “arrogant” (for competitive negotiators). Ibid.
149 negotiators in that industry: Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 120-121.
149 skill after “verbal clarity”: Chester Karrass, The Negotiating Game, rev. ed. (New York: HarperBusiness, 1992), pp. 241-244.
150 provide them with leverage: For a formal economic model that expresses this same thought, see Vincent P. Crawford and Joel Sobel, “Strategic Information Transmission,” Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 6 (1982), pp. 1431-1451.
151 50 percent of the time: Leigh Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1998), p. 49.
151 due to bluffs that backfired: Leigh Thompson, “An Examination of Naive and Experienced Negotiators,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 59, No. 1 (1990), pp. 82-90.
153 “they want the deal”: I got this quote from Harvey Mackay. See Harvey Mackay, Swim with the Sharks (New York: Ivy Books, 1988), p. 107.
153 proceed on that basis: Research suggests that personalizing the negotiation encounter is especially good advice when you lack leverage. Ian Morley and Geoffrey Stephenson, The Social Psychology of Bargaining (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), pp. 138-182. See also James K. Esser, Michael J. Calvillo, Michael R. Scheel, and James L. Walker, “Oligopoly Bargaining: Effects of Agreement Pressure and Opponent Strategies,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 20 (1990), pp. 1256-1271; Dean Tjosvold and Ted L. Houston, “Social Face and Resistance to Compromise in Bargaining,” Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 104 (1978), pp. 57-68.
CHAPTER 9: Step 3: Opening and Making Concessions
156 Samuel Johnson: Roget’s International Thesaurus (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1946), p. 530.
158 ready to negotiate: This story comes from Mark McCormack. See Mark McCormack, On Negotiating (Los Angeles: Dove Books, 1995), p. 129.
158 Beatles considerably more money: Bob Woolf, Friendly Persuasion: How to Negotiate and Win (New York: Berkley Books, 1990), pp. 180-181.
159 to rethink its goals: Bruce K. MacMurray and Edward J. Lawler, “Level-of-Aspiration Theory and Initial Stance in Bargaining,” Representative Research in Social Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1986), pp. 35-44.
159 we anchor and adjust: Max H. Bazerman, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making, 4th ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990), pp. 27-30.
159 could offset this effect: James K. Esser, “Agreement Pressure and Opponent Strategies in Oligopoly Bargaining,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1989), pp. 596-603.
160 should open optimistically: Jerome M. Shertkoff and Melinda Conley, “Opening Offer and Frequency of Concession as Bargaining Strategies,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1967), pp. 181-185; Gary Yukl, “Effects of the Opponent’s Initial Offer, Concession Magnitude, and Concession Frequency on Bargaining Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1974), pp. 323-335. This research finding, while confirmed repeatedly, could be the product of its experimental setting. Typically, the subjects in these investigations (usually inexperienced undergraduates in psychology classes) sit in cubicles and, thinking they are negotiating against another subject, make written or computerized offers and counteroffers for commodities such as used cars or appliances, sending and receiving bare price terms. The experimenters confront subjects with a set of “programmed” openings and concession-making strategies by the “other party” and record the subjects’ responses and final deals. Starting very high (or low), conceding slowly, and diminishing the size of concessions as bargaining proceeds is the best way to bargain in this artificial setting. Whether it is therefore the best way to handle real people with real things to buy and sell is a more complicated question.
160 mediated by a broker: Mike Allen, William Donohue, and Becky Stewart, “Comparing Hardline and Softline Bargaining Strategies in Zero-Sum Situations Using Meta-Analysis,” in M. Afzalur Rahim, ed., Theory and Research in Conflict Management (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 86-103.
161 examine the contrast principle: Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: William Morrow, 1984), pp. 11-14, 42-45.
161 or even to say “yes”: Robert B. Cialdini, Joyce E. Vincent, Stephen K. Lewis, Jose Catalan, Diane Wheeler, and Betty Lee Darby, “Reciprocal Concessions Procedure for Inducing Compliance: The Door-in-the-Face Technique,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1975), pp. 206-215. See also Robert Vincent Joule, “Tobacco deprivation: The foot-in-the-door technique versus the low-ball technique,” European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 17 (1987), pp. 361-365.
162 scare the employer away: Esser, “Agreement Pressure and Opponent Strategies in Oligopoly Bargaining.”
163 “‘what I really deserved’”: Gail DeGeorge, The Making of Blockbuster (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), pp. 38-39.
163 (see Chapter 2) is still appropriate: Dean G. Pruitt and Steven A. Lewis, “Development of Integrative Solutions in Bilateral Negotiation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1975), pp. 621-633.
163 automobile dealers of America: Keith Bradsher, “Sticker Shock: Car Buyers Miss Haggling Ritual,” The New York Times, June 13, 1996, p. D1.
164 “deal is through negotiation”: Ibid., p. D23.
164 to the moderate point: P. L. Benson, H. H. Kelly, and B. Liebling, “Effects of Extremity of Offers and Concession Rate on the Outcomes of Bargaining,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 24 (1983), pp. 73-83. Similar results have been reported elsewhere. See S. S. Komorita and Arline R. Brenner, “Bargaining and Concession Making Under Bilateral Monopoly,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1968), pp. 15-20.
164 who refused to move: As psychologist W. C. Hamner has expressed it, “Negotiators expect something more than just a mutually rewarding payoff. They also seem to expect a rewarding social exchange, trial by trial. That is, they define bargaining as a give-and-take process and therefore expect it to consist of a series of exchanges, not just one large concession.” See W. C. Hamner, “Effects of Bargaining Strategy and Pressure to Reach Agreement in a Stalemated Negotiation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 30 (1974), pp. 458-467; Hamner’s sentiments are echoed in a more recent study that highlights the importance of “procedural justice” norms in allocation decisions of all kinds. See Tom R. Tyler and Eugene Griffin, “The Influence of Decision Makers’ Goals on Their Concerns About Procedural Justice,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 21 (1991), pp. 1629-1658.
166 concession strategy works best: Seungwoo Kwon and Laurie R. Weingart, “Unilateral Concessions from the Other Party: Concession Behavior, Attributions, and Negotiator Judgment,” Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 89, No. 2 (2004), pp. 263-278. Mara Olekalns, Philip L. Smith, and Therese Walsh, “The Process of Negotiating: Strategy and Timing as Predictors of Outcomes,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 68, No. 1 (1996), pp. 68-77; Gary Yukl, “Effects of Situational Variables and Opponent Concessions on a Bargainer’s Perception, Aspirations, and Concessions,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1974), pp. 227-236.
166 play it in competitive situations: Martin Patchen, “Strategies for Eliciting Cooperating from an Adversary,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1987), pp. 164-185.
168 this phenomenon “concession devaluation”: Negotiation scholars also call this “reactive devaluation.” Margaret Neale and Max Bazerman, Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 75; Robert Mnookin, “Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict,” Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 8 (1993), pp. 235, 238-247.
168 “we esteem
too lightly”: This saying is attributed to Thomas Paine. Roget’s International Thesaurus (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1946), p. 555.
168 interests, priorities, and differences: Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 126-182.
169 “big” (most important) issues: Lewis A. Froman, Jr., and Michael D. Cohen, “Compromise and Logroll: Comparing the Efficiency of Two Bargaining Processes,” Behavioral Science, Vol. 15 (1970), pp. 180-183.
169 proceeds through “package bargaining”: Pruitt and Lewis, “Development of Integrative Solutions in Bilateral Negotiation”; Elizabeth A. Mannix, Leigh Thompson, and Max H. Bazerman, “Negotiation in Small Groups,” Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 74, No. 3 (1989), pp. 508-517; Gary A. Yukl, Michael P. Malone, Bert Hayslip, and Thomas A. Pamin, “The Effects of Time Pressure and Issue Settlement Order on Integrative Bargaining,” Sociometry, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1976), pp. 277-281.
169 on issues X and Y: Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, and John McMillian, Managing Negotiations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), pp. 88-98.
172 than a simple compromise: Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991). These authors advocate brainstorming as a technique to help in problem-solving situations. Also see Thomas J. D’Zurilla and Arthur Nezu, “A Study of the Generation-of-Alternatives Process in Social Problem Solving,” Cognitive Therapy and Research, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1980), pp. 67-72 (showing that the best way to find quality solutions is simply to generate as many options as possible).
172 “good guy/bad guy” routine: Good examples can be found in several “war story” books about mergers and acquisitions. See Bryan Burrough and John Hellyar, Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), pp. 266-269; DeGeorge, The Making of Blockbuster, pp. 141-143.
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