by Helen Fry
In the safety of Trent Park, the generals and senior German officers privately discussed how the war could not carry on:
HENNECKE: It can’t go on like this. Just imagine it, in three days there have been three thousand bombers over Munich and so on, just imagine the damage that is being done and how it is increasing the chaos that will come later.
KRUG: That’s what I say too. What did the Führer say? ‘And if they smash up the whole of Germany, then we shall live underground!’
ROHRBACH: I heard that too!
HENNECKE: It’s madness!
ROHRBACH: It certainly is!12
Hennecke spoke about how he had been forced to retreat permanently to his concrete bunker at Cherbourg once the attack began.13 British and American intelligence began to piece together German military strategy and order of battle from the bugged conversations, as well as vital information on U-boats and E-boats. Hennecke gave away that St Malo had become the new base for German E-boats instead of Cherbourg.14 Von Schlieben talked about his friendship with Schmettow, the commander of the Channel Islands, and how the British could easily take them because Schmettow only had one battalion stationed there.
ANXIETY OF THE GENERALS
The D-Day landings and aftermath gave the generals plenty to discuss, especially with those who had been captured in 1943 and isolated at Trent Park for over a year. They were eager for news from the newly-arrived officers and to analyse amongst themselves the military disasters on the battlefields of France. Crüwell was anxious that the Allies were being allowed (by German forces) to land too much material at the bridgehead.15 Neuffer replied that, comparing it with Germany’s plans to invade England in 1940 in Operation Sealion, it would take at least three weeks for them to land sufficient material for an advance to continue.16 Von Arnim declared that the German handling of the situation had been very clumsy, and it would have been wiser for them to have given up a few kilometres of ground during the initial (invasion) landings to enable more mobility for a German counter-offensive.
In a different conversation, von Liebenstein said that, in typical style, Field Marshal Rommel was ‘throwing in the Panzer divisions piecemeal’.17 Sponeck agreed that it was El Alamein all over again and that troops should have been held ready in a body further to the rear. The generals debated that this month (June 1944) would decide whether Germany continued to fight. Glasow believed the British and Americans might still be persuaded to come to peace terms rather than fight for every kilometre of Berlin. He told von Arnim, in true anti-Semitic Nazi style, that the Jews were at the helm of Russia and America and if they had their way, they would stamp out Nazi ideas.18 He doubted they would achieve it, however.
Meanwhile, Neuffer and Bassenge concentrated their discussions on speculations about where the Allies would next land, which they believed would be around Le Havre or as far north as Holland.19 They agreed that the war was as good as lost and would be over by the end of the year.20
General Bassenge had just returned from a mission with Lord Aberfeldy to negotiate the surrender of the Channel Islands.21 The result is not discussed in CSDIC files. However, after the war, A.R. Rawlinson (head of MI19) wrote a three-part play for the BBC based on the intelligence operation at Trent Park, entitled Lord Glenaldy (to disguise the original use of Lord Aberfeldy).22 Lord Glenaldy is cast as a fake aristocrat, working at a bugging site that holds German generals in a stately house.23 In one scene in the play, Glenaldy and the German general (given the name von Hussen) do not succeed in achieving the surrender of the Channel Islands. They decide to stop off in Paris for the weekend without telling British intelligence.24 By Sunday, they still had not returned to Trent Park. There was panic within British military circles until Kendrick (known as ‘Tommy’ in the play) received a phone call from Paris to say that Lord Glenaldy was partying in the capital with the general in tow.25 The irony was that the general trusted him so completely that he did not attempt an escape.
At the time of its broadcast, the play was described in the press as ‘factional’26 as some of the scenes are remarkably close to the facts and antics that actually surrounded the real wartime intelligence operation and behaviour of the generals in captivity.
Over the summer of 1944, some generals were due to be transferred from Trent Park to camps in America. General Crüwell expressed considerable surprise and displeasure that his name was on the list.27 He met with the new commandant and Lord Aberfeldy and insisted that he was a prisoner of war of the British.28 His protestations led nowhere. His frustration was still running high when he conversed with Egersdorf later that day and told him that he was being shipped to America to make room for what he termed ‘the Free German Movement’ in the camp under von Thoma’s leadership.29 For the duration of his time at Trent Park, Crüwell had been the pillar and leader of the pro-Nazis.30 He expressed disappointment to Egersdorf that all his efforts to feign illness had been in vain.
Von Arnim and Bassenge joined the conversation. ‘It is contrary to the Geneva Convention to send me to America,’ Crüwell complained to them. ‘I’m not an American prisoner.’31 Von Arnim did not seem bothered by Crüwell’s imminent transfer and said to him: ‘Well, I have no objection to the arrangement. It will be a change for you. The English have no say in the matter. They have to dance to the American tune.’
Bassenge added his contribution, saying, ‘There’s no point in protesting. Prisoners of war taken by Germany’s allies are handed over to the Germans.’ It was certainly rich of Crüwell to invoke the Geneva Convention when the Nazi regime, including its military commanders and generals, had committed so many atrocities and genocide.
With the departure of Crüwell, his worst fears were confirmed when anti-Nazi von Thoma was announced as the new camp leader. Von Thoma seemed quite amused by the turn of events and told the other generals that he did not plan to change anything. He told Bassenge, ‘I’m rather surprised still to be here. But then, it must be a matter of prestige.’32
OPERATION VALKYRIE
At 1800 hours on 20 July 1944, a British army officer sent for Sponeck and gave him the news that an attempt had been made on Hitler’s life, but he had survived with minor injuries. The assassination attempt ‘caused a stir at No.11 Camp,’ the intelligence report said.33 MI19 prepared a special report on the generals’ reactions to the news.34 The failed putsch came as a shock to Sponeck who told the British officer that it was a put-up job by the Nazis as an excuse for a purge of the anti-Nazi generals.35
The bungled plot, led by German army officer Claus von Stauffenberg, an aristocrat, became widely known as Operation Valkyrie. He had smuggled a small bomb in a briefcase into a meeting room with the Führer at his Wolf’s Lair field headquarters in East Prussia. Von Stauffenberg placed the briefcase between Hitler’s legs, then made an excuse to leave.36 Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the German army, had called out ‘Stay here!’, but von Stauffenberg simply made an excuse that he had an urgent phone call to make and hadn’t had breakfast. Outside the room, von Stauffenberg waited about 300 metres away and on hearing the bomb blast decided that no one could have survived. He boarded an aircraft to Berlin where he declared the attempt had been successful, without checking if, indeed, it had been, for at the crucial moment, Hitler had moved away from the briefcase and was only slightly wounded when the device went off.
Staff at MI9/MI19 were amongst the first to hear about the attempted assassination before it became public knowledge.37 Commenting on those events, Catherine Townshend said: ‘A camp bed was made up next to the scrambler telephone that had to be manned around the clock; a clerk and despatch rider were on hand in case of need. Most dramatic of all the news that arrived by scrambler telephone was the attempted assassination of Hitler … We knew that retribution would be swift and merciless.’38
Hitler ordered von Stauffenberg’s execution by firing squad the following day. His death caused consternation among the generals at Trent Park.39 Weeks later, the failed assassination of H
itler was still a frequent topic amongst the prisoners, especially those who had been captured on the battlefields of France. The frustration of Bassenge was recorded in a transcript from the M Room: ‘For God’s sake, where is all this leading us?’40
Admiral Hennecke declared: ‘This is the beginning of the end. There will be a blood-bath in Germany.’41
Von Broich quietly admitted to Sponeck that he had known von Stauffenberg because he had been on his staff at one time. He was ‘a first-class man’ and could not understand why he only used a small bomb. He deplored the fact that von Stauffenberg had failed in his attempt and now envisaged that a concentration camp would be set up for generals.42 Reimann believed there would be another attempt on Hitler’s life soon.43
The generals also questioned the levels of security around Hitler.44 How was it possible to get the bomb into his headquarters so easily? The problem was that those closest to Hitler had been trusted completely. Von Choltitz told von Thoma and Sponeck that he was never searched when going into the headquarters: ‘I could easily have had a pistol or a small egg-hand-grenade hidden away,’ he said.45
Sponeck commented that ‘nobody was really wounded. That seems suspicious to me. I mean, if it had been a real attempt on Hitler’s life, none of them would still be alive.’ In a separate conversation, Sponeck told Broich, ‘I can only say I think it a great pity that Stauffenberg didn’t succeed.’46
The generals deplored the fact that some of the perpetrators of the plot had been hanged as traitors and not shot according to the honour due to military men.47 Eberbach told Schramm:
These people were not traitors. They first started to hang people in concentration camps. But those were mostly hardened criminals. Certainly officers who indulge in swindling might perhaps be put on the same level. But those officers – that should not have been done. And the worst of all is that the whole families of those officers have also been slaughtered.48
Schramm expressed disbelief that the families of the officers involved in the plot had been murdered. Eberbach added: ‘They have disappeared. Whether they’ve been executed or gassed or what I don’t know. Graf von Stauffenberg’s family, consisting of his wife and four children and a fifth expected is no more. I know about them because he lived in Bamberg where I live.’
The failed assassination was discussed between General Eberbach and his son, a naval officer, both being held at Trent Park:
SON: You’ve no idea how adversely this Stauffenberg business affected the Officer Corps. The fact that the individual soldier at the front was being killed, and that the officers at home were breaking their oath, infuriated the people. The fact that Lindemann, for example, through his own swinishness, let about 100,000 soldiers on the Eastern Front go to the devil – he let his whole front go to hell and went over to the other side with half his staff.
EBERBACH: It hasn’t yet been established that Lindemann went over to the other side. Nothing is known about him.49
MI19 files noted the lengthy conversations on the von Stauffenberg affair: ‘The possibility of a military coup d’état in Germany has been discussed among the senior officer POW for some time.’50 How did the secret listeners react to the news of the attempt on Hitler’s life? Fritz Lustig recalled:
We heard on the radio that same evening and that the plot had failed. By all accounts, Hitler was still alive and well. It may seem a strange reaction, but I was pleased that the plot had not succeeded because most of the names of the conspirators indicated that they belonged to the Prussian aristocracy and were high-ranking army officers. I figured that not much would change for the better in Germany if that particular class were to make peace with the Allies and then rule the country. No doubt millions of lives would have been saved if the war had ended in July 1944 rather than in May 1945, but how would the political situation in Germany have developed, and would it have led to democracy?51
POST D-DAY
After D-Day, as the Allies advanced through France, Germany’s senior military commanders continued to be brought to Trent Park for the same softening-up treatment as those generals who had been captured in 1942 and 1943. General Dietrich von Choltitz, the commander of Paris who was captured on 25 August 1944, soon figures prominently in the bugged conversations at Trent Park. John Sinclair, then director of Military Intelligence, wrote to colleagues on 7 September 1944:
You may care to glance through the latest CSDIC report on captured generals’ conversations. The recent arrival of von Choltitz has unloosed their tongues, and gave this general an opportunity to put them wise about the latest situation in Germany . . . it shows the incredible state of mind of Hitler. The impression expressed by the generals is that Germany is now a mad house.52
During 1943, von Choltitz had commanded five German divisions in the Crimea. In July 1944, he was transferred to France and then posted as commandant of Paris. This monocled general, described by British intelligence as ‘overweight, coarse, with an inflated sense of his own self-importance’,53 was captured when American forces entered Paris. Negotiations for an armistice had broken down and von Choltitz was arrested.
On 27 August, he was brought to Latimer House, then two days later transferred to Trent Park. His egotistic character played right into the hands of MI19 because he was boastful and spoke too freely in the presence of the other generals. They were only too eager to hear the latest news from the battlefields and about events in Germany from von Choltitz.54 This updated information about Germany was extremely helpful for the secret listeners to record for British intelligence. Von Choltitz tried to ingratiate himself with his minders to appear in the best possible light. It was noted that he ‘adopted the attitude that he had foreseen the outcome of the war because of his insight into historical necessities’.55 He spoke about how Hitler had ordered him to defend Paris at all costs and to round up members of the underground resistance and execute them.56 In a meeting with Hitler, von Choltitz had told him that he had inadequate supplies for a successful defence of Paris but the Führer did not listen.
Von Choltitz discussed secret weapons with comrades, with speculation from Neuffer about why these were not being used against the Allied invasion front.57 Von Liebenstein supposed it was because the weapon was not yet ready and von Broich agreed, saying to von Choltitz and Elfeldt that the launch sites had been delayed because of bombing by the Allies.58
Other ‘guests’ at the hospitality of British intelligence included Colonel Andreas von Aulock, who surrendered at St Malo on 17 August 1944. Known as the ‘mad Colonel of St Malo’ by MI19, he was deemed to be ‘an untrustworthy type who trims his sails to the wind and only thinks of himself and his well-being’.59 The officer who escorted him to Trent Park described him as ‘another typical, monocled, aristocratic German officer found to be pro-British and violently anti-Russian … with a high opinion of himself and his attraction to women’.60 General von Thoma told Aulock that he had been very sensible to surrender the fortress. To which, Aulock replied, ‘Well, there was nothing else to be done’.61
Heinrich Eberbach, general of a Panzer Division, 7th Army, had been forced to surrender on 31 August 1944 after failing to withdraw in time from Amiens where his division encountered Allied tanks. Three years earlier, he had seen action in the German advance on Russia and the capture of Roslavl (Smolensk Oblast, western Russia). That winter of 1941, he had contracted an illness related to the bladder and been forced to return to Germany. In November 1942, he was ordered to Stalingrad, wounded and returned to Germany again. In the autumn of 1943, he took over command of the XL Panzer Korps in Nicopol (Russia). By May 1944, he was back in Germany as an inspector of Panzer troops until being appointed commander of Panzer Gruppe West (France) on 10 July.
The day after his capture at the end of July, Eberbach was brought first to Wilton Park, then five days later to Trent Park. Eberbach proved to be another strong character with clear-cut views. He decided to join the ‘generals’ revolt’ as an anti-Nazi. Although he had supported the Nazis
for a number of years, he had never been a Party member. He came to recognise the Nazi regime as a criminal body to whom he no longer felt bound by his oath of allegiance.62 His son, naval Lieutenant Colonel Eberbach, was captured and also taken prisoner. MI19 allowed him to visit his father at Trent Park and noted the son to have ‘a fanatical trust in Hitler, although he admitted that he was not a 100% Nazi’.63
Fifty-two-year-old General Lieutenant Kurt Badinsky was captured in France on 20 August 1944. A professional soldier and anti-Nazi, he was careful not to display his open objection to the regime. He confessed a loathing of Himmler, called Hitler an ape and condemned Hitler’s policy as disastrous.64 He criticised the senior army command and expected Germany’s complete defeat and total collapse. He was held at Trent Park until 23 September 1944.
General von Choltitz captivated the other generals with his tale of the famous Bayeux Tapestry which was being stored in the cellars of the Louvre in Paris. He told them how it was not to leave Europe but, on Hitler’s orders, was to be secured for Germany.65 Von Choltitz painted himself as a hero for saving it from being carried off. He had told his military colleagues, ‘The tapestry won’t leave Paris as long as I’m there! I’m not going to be party to that under any circumstances.’66 Even when an SS delegation turned up to take the tapestry, he hid the keys to the cellars and successfully prevented its removal from the capital. Paris was liberated a short time after this incident.
Captured too were 48-year-old Colonel Hans Jay, commander of the Paris defence forces, and 53-year-old Colonel von Unger, Chief of Staff at von Choltitz’s headquarters. Von Unger was, according to MI19, ‘inclined to throw security to the winds’.67 Jay was described as ‘a very keen horseman who appears to have spent most of his time in Paris in contacting French racehorse owners’; he was relieved to be in Allied hands and had aided the arrests of prominent SS during the liberation of the city.68