by Amartya Sen
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c l o s e d a n d o p e n i m p a r t i a l i t y each other, since the broadening of admissible voices beyond the confines of the local territory or polity can allow more non-congruent principles to be brought into consideration in answering a wide variety of justice-related questions. There will, of course, be considerable divergence between different impartial views – from far as well as near – but for reasons already outlined in the Introduction, this would yield an incomplete social ranking, based on congruently ranked pairs, and this incomplete ranking could be seen as being shared by all.
Consideration of this shared partial ordering as well as reflection on the differences involved (related to the incomplete parts of the ranking) can very substantially enrich public reasoning on justice and injustice.*
The Smithian ‘impartial spectator’ is, of course, a device for critical scrutiny and public discussion. It need not, therefore, seek unanimity or total agreement in the way that the institutional straitjacket of Rawlsian theory of justice demands.† Any concurrence that may emerge need not go beyond a partial ordering with limited articulation, which can nevertheless make firm and useful statements. And, correspondingly, the agreements arrived at need not demand that some proposal is uniquely just, but perhaps only that it is plausibly just, or at least not manifestly unjust. Indeed, the demands of reasoned practice can, in one way or another, live with a good deal of incompleteness or unresolved conflicts. The agreement to emerge from ‘a public framework of thought’ can be of a partial but useful kind.
* However, it would also make it very difficult to expect that a perfectly just society can be unanimously identified. Agreements on particular justice-enhancing moves are material enough for public action (what was described earlier as ‘plural grounding’), and for that guidance, unanimity on the nature of the perfectly just society is not needed.
† However, as was discussed earlier, Rawls’s general reasoning goes well beyond his formal modelling. Indeed, despite the main features of his transcendental theory, based on translating the deliberations in the original position into principles that firmly establish a particular institutional structure for a just society, Rawls does allow himself the thought: ‘given the many obstacles to agreement in political judgment even among reasonable persons, we will not reach agreement all the time, or perhaps even much of the time’ ( Political Liberalism, p. 118). This seems eminently right, even though it is not absolutely clear how this recognition tallies with the Rawlsian programme of structuring the basic institutions of the society in line with unique social contracts reflecting complete agreements between the parties involved.
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t h e i d e a o f j u s t i c e o n r aw l s ’ s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
o f
s m i t h
There are substantial similarities as well as differences between the open impartiality of the impartial spectator and the closed impartiality of the social contract. The question can be asked: can the impartial spectator really be the basis of a viable approach to moral or political assessment without being, directly or indirectly, parasitic on some version of closed impartiality, such as contractarianism? In fact, this issue has been addressed by John Rawls himself in the Theory of Justice, when he comments on the general device of the impartial spectator ( A Theory of Justice, section 30, pp. 183–92).
Rawls interprets the impartial spectator conception as one particular example of the ‘ideal observer’ approach (p. 184). Seen in this way, the idea allows some freedom, as Rawls rightly notes, about how we may proceed from there to make the conception more specific. He argues that interpreted in this way, ‘there is no conflict so far between this definition and justice as fairness’ (p. 184). Indeed, it ‘may well be the case that an ideally rational and impartial spectator would approve of a social system if and only if it satisfies the principles of justice which would be adopted in the contract scheme’ (pp. 184–5).
This is certainly a possible interpretation of an ‘ideal observer’, but it is definitely not, as we have seen, Smith’s conception of the ‘impartial spectator’. It is indeed the case that the spectator can take note of what may be expected had there been an attempt to get to a Rawlsian social contract, but Smith requires the impartial spectator to go beyond that and at least see what the issues would look like with ‘the eyes of other people’, from the perspective of ‘real spectators’ – from both far and near.
Rawls, too, goes on to note that ‘while it is possible to supplement the impartial spectator definition with the contract point of view, there are other ways of giving it a deductive basis’ (p. 185). However, Rawls then proceeds, oddly enough, by looking at David Hume’s writings rather than Adam Smith’s. This, not surprisingly, leads him to consider the alternative of making the impartial spectator rely on
‘satisfactions’ generated by sympathetic consideration of the experi-136
c l o s e d a n d o p e n i m p a r t i a l i t y ences of others, interpreting that: ‘the strength of his approval is determined by the balance of satisfactions to which he had sympatheti-cally responded’ (p. 186). This, in turn, takes Rawls to the interpretation that the impartial spectator may really be a ‘classical utilitarian’
in disguise. Once that extremely odd diagnosis is made, Rawls’s response is, of course, quite predictable – and predictably forceful. He points out that even in the first chapter of the Theory of Justice he has dealt with that point of view, and found reason to dispense with that approach since ‘there is a sense in which classical utilitarianism fails to take seriously the distinction between persons’ (p. 187).
Adding to this confusion, in discussing the history of classical utilitarianism, Rawls lists Adam Smith among its early proponents, along with Hume.11 This is a hugely incorrect diagnosis, since Smith had firmly rejected the utilitarian proposal of basing ideas of the good and the right on pleasure and pain, and had also spurned the view that the reasoning needed for complex moral judgements can be reduced simply to counting pleasure and pain, or more generally, to reducing different relevant considerations into ‘one species of propriety’.12
Thus, the Rawlsian interpretation of Adam Smith and of his use of the ‘impartial spectator’ is altogether mistaken.* More importantly, the impartial spectator approach need not in fact be based either on Rawlsian contractarianism or on Benthamite classical utilitarianism –
the only two options that Rawls considers. Rather, the kind of diverse moral and political concerns that Rawls himself discusses so illuminatingly are precisely the ones that the impartial spectator has to grapple with, but without the additional (and in the Smithian perspective, inescapably arbitrary) insistence on closed impartiality. In the
* Given Rawls’s command over the history of ideas and his extraordinary generosity in presenting the views of others, it is uncharacteristic that he pays so little attention to the writings of Smith, especially to The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In Rawls’s far-reaching Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy edited by Barbara Herman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), Smith does get five mentions, but these passing references are confined to his being (1) a Protestant, (2) a friend of Hume, (3) an amusing user of words, (4) a successful economist, and (5) the author of the Wealth of Nations published in the same year (1776) in which David Hume died. In general, it is rather amazing how little attention the Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, so influential in philosophical thinking of his time (including Kant’s), gets from moral philosophers of our time.
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t h e i d e a o f j u s t i c e approach of the impartial spectator, the need for the discipline of ethical and political reasoning firmly remains, and the requirement of impartiality stays paramount: it is only the ‘closing’ of that impartiality that is absent. The impartial spectator can work and enlighten without being either a social contractor, or a utilitarian in camouflage.
l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e
‘ o r i g i n a l
The original position as a device for generating principles of justice through the use of a particular interpretation of fairness can be subjected to scrutiny from several distinct perspectives. There is a question of motivational adequacy, in particular the possibility that Rawlsian reasoning is too confined to reasons of ‘extended prudence’, and restricts the reflections of ‘reasonable persons’ to thinking ultimately about how they can benefit from ‘cooperating with others’.* This can be seen as something of a general limitation on the reach of impartial thinking modelled within the specific approach of a ‘social contract’, since a contract of this kind, as Thomas Hobbes had noted, is basically a device for mutually gainful cooperation. Impartiality need not always take the form of being linked with mutually gainful cooperation, and can also accommodate unilateral obligations that we may acknowledge because of our power to achieve social results that we have reason to value (without necessarily benefiting from those results).†
In what follows, I shall concentrate on some specific issues that are firmly related to the closed form of the impartiality pursued through the original position.13 The possible limitations can be placed under three rather general headings.
(1) Exclusionary neglect: Closed impartiality can exclude the voice of people who do not belong to the focal group, but whose lives are
* See Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993). An immediate contrast can be found in Thomas Scanlon’s more general criterion that does not draw on extended prudence ( What We Owe to Each Other, 1998).
† This issue will be examined in Chapters 8, ‘Rationality and Other People’, and 9,
‘Plurality of Impartial Reasons’.
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c l o s e d a n d o p e n i m p a r t i a l i t y affected by the decisions of that group. The problem is not adequately resolved by multi-staged formulations of closed impartiality, as in Rawls’s ‘the law of peoples’.
This problem will not arise if decisions taken by the focal group (for example, in the original position) do not have any effect on anyone outside the focal group, though that would be quite extraordinary unless the people lived in a world of completely separated communities. This issue can be particularly problematic for ‘justice as fairness’ in dealing with justice across borders, since the basic social structure chosen for a society can have an influence on the lives not only of members of that society, but also those of others (who are not accommodated in the original position for that society). There can be much vexation without representation.
(2) Inclusionary incoherence: Inconsistencies can potentially arise in the exercise of ‘closing’ the group when the decisions to be taken by any focal group can influence the size or composition of the group itself.
For example, when the size or composition of the population of a country (or a polity) is itself influenced – directly or indirectly – by the decisions taken in the original position (in particular, the choice of the basic social structure), the membership of the focal group would vary with decisions that are meant to be taken by the focal group itself.
Structural arrangements, such as the Rawlsian ‘Difference Principle’, cannot but influence the pattern of social – and biological – intercourse and thus generate populations of different size and composition.14
(3) Procedural parochialism: Closed impartiality is devised to eliminate partiality towards the vested interests or personal objectives of individuals in the focal group, but it is not designed to address the limitations of partiality towards the shared prejudices or biases of the focal group itself.
The last two problems (viz. ‘procedural parochialism’ and ‘inclusionary incoherence’) have not received any systematic attention at all in the general literature, and have hardly even been identified. The first problem, ‘exclusionary neglect’, in contrast, has received much attention already, in one way or another. I begin with an examination of this relatively better recognized problem of the Rawlsian model of fairness, namely exclusionary neglect.
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t h e i d e a o f j u s t i c e e x c l u s i o n a r y n e g l e c t a n d
g l o b a l j u s t i c e
There is clearly an important issue in the neglect of the interests and perspectives of those who are not parties to the social contract of a polity but who bear some of the consequences of decisions taken in that particular polity. I would also argue that, in this context, we have to see clearly why the demands of ‘global justice’ may differ substantially from those of ‘international justice’.15 Open impartiality, through such devices as the Smithian impartial spectator, has insights to offer on this difficult subject. Relations between different countries or polities are omnipresent in an interdependent world, and operate in interactive ways. John Rawls himself, among others, has addressed this question specifically in the context of justice across borders through his proposal of ‘the law of peoples’, which invokes a second original position between representatives of different polities (or
‘peoples’).16 Others too, including Charles Beitz, Brian Barry, Thomas Pogge, have also investigated this problem and suggested ways and means of dealing with it.17
Rawls’s way of addressing the problem involves invoking another
‘original position’, this time involving representatives of different
‘peoples’. With some oversimplification – not central in the present context – the two ‘original positions’ can be seen as being respectively intra national (between individuals in a nation) and inter national (between representatives of different nations). Each exercise is one of closed impartiality, but the two together cover the entire world population.
This procedure does not, of course, eliminate the asymmetry between different groups of affected people, since the different polities are diversely endowed in assets and opportunities, and there would be a clear contrast between covering the world population through a sequence of prioritized impartialities (as in Rawls’s method), and covering it through one comprehensive exercise of impartiality (as in the ‘cosmopolitan’ version of the Rawlsian original position, presented by Thomas Pogge and others). However, the idea of one global exercise of social contract for the entire world population would 140
c l o s e d a n d o p e n i m p a r t i a l i t y appear to be deeply unrealistic – now or in the foreseeable future.
Certainly, there is an institutional lacuna here.*
What has to be borne in mind, however, is that the recognition of this forceful practical point nevertheless need not rule out the possibility of invoking the insights and instructions generated by a cross-border ‘public framework of thought’, as Smith (among many others) have tried to do. The relevance and influence of global discussions are not conditional on the existence of a global state, or even of a well-organized planetary forum for gigantic institutional agreements.
More immediately, even in the politically divisive world in which we live, we have to give fuller recognition to the fact that different persons across borders need not operate only through international (or ‘inter-people’) relations. The world is certainly divisive, but it is diversely divisive, and the partitioning of the global population into distinct ‘nations’ or ‘peoples’ is not the only line of division.† Nor does the national partitioning have any pre-eminent priority over other categorizations (as implicitly presumed in ‘the law of peoples’).
Interpersonal relations across country borders go far beyond international interactions in many different ways. The ‘original position’
of nations or ‘peoples’ would be peculiarly restricted in dealing with many of the cross-border effects of human action. If the effects of
* Thomas Nagel’s scepticism of global justice, in ‘The Problem of Global Justice’
( Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33 (2005)), discussed in the Introduction, would seem to have much greater relevance to the search for a cosmopolitan social contract than for global justice through the less demanding Smithian route of
open impartiality. The cosmopolitan social contract is more heavily dependent on global institutions than the
‘looser’ Smithian approach is.
† It is interesting that the priority of exactly one specific partitioning of the global population has been proposed in many different political discussions, giving the pride of place, respectively, to a variety of disparate single categorizations. The categorization underlying the so-called ‘clash of civilizations’ is an example of a rival partitioning (see Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996)), since national or polity-based categories do not coincide with categories of culture or civilization. The coexistence of these rival claims in itself illustrates why none of these putatively foundational partitions – allegedly foundational for ethics and politics – can easily drown the competing relevance of other partitions, and related to that, the need to consider other identities of human beings across the world. This question is further discussed in my Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., and London and Delhi: Penguin, 2006).
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t h e i d e a o f j u s t i c e the operation of transnational corporations are to be assessed or scrutinized, they have to be seen for what they are, namely corporations that operate without borders, that take business decisions about legal registration, tax homes and similar contingent matters according to the convenience of business. They can hardly be fitted into the model of one ‘people’ (or ‘nation’) impacting on another.