by Amartya Sen
17. The formal characteristics of ‘intersection partial orderings’ are discussed in my On Economic Inequality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973; enlarged edition, with an addendum written jointly with James Foster, 1997).
18. See also my Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1970).
19. See Herbert Simon, Models of Man (New York: Wiley, 1957), and Models of Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).
20. This is part of the typology of social choice problems discussed in my essay, ‘Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination’, Econometrica, 45 (1977), republished in Choice, Welfare and Measurement (1982; 1997).
21. The issue of membership entitlement is the principal focus of the important analysis of judgement aggregation presented by Christian List and Philip 426
n o t e s t o p p . 108 – 111
Pettit, ‘Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result’, Economics and Philosophy, 18 (2002).
22. See the references cited in note 9 of this chapter.
23. The result was included in my Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1970), Chapter 6, and also in ‘The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’, Journal of Political Economy, 78 (1970). It will be briefly discussed in Chapter 14, ‘Equality and Liberty’.
24. The contributions include, among many others, Allan Gibbard, ‘A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim’, Journal of Economic Theory, 7 (1974); Peter Bernholz, ‘Is a Paretian Liberal Really Impossible?’ Public Choice, 20 (1974); Christian Seidl, ‘On Liberal Values’, Zeitschrift fu¨r Nationalo¨konomie, 35
(1975); Julian Blau, ‘Liberal Values and Independence’, Reviewof Economic Studies, 42 (1975); Donald E. Campbell, ‘Democratic Preference Functions’, Journal of Economic Theory, 12 (1976); Jerry S. Kelly, ‘Rights-Exercising and a Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim’, Journal of Economic Theory, 13
(1976); Michael J. Farrell, ‘Liberalism in the Theory of Social Choice’, Review of Economic Studies, 43 (1976); John A. Ferejohn, ‘The Distribution of Rights in Society’, in Hans W. Gottinger and Werner Leinfellner (eds), Decision Theory and Social Ethics (Boston: Reidel, 1978); Jonathan Barnes,
‘Freedom, Rationality and Paradox’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10
(1980); Peter Hammond, ‘Liberalism, Independent Rights and the Pareto Principle’, in L. J. Cohen, H. Pfeiffer and K. Podewski (eds), Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Sciences, II (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982); Kotaro Suzumura, ‘On the Consistency of Libertarian Claims’, Reviewof Economic Studies, 45 (1978); Wulf Gaertner and L. Kru¨ger, ‘Self-supporting Preferences and Individual Rights: The Possibility of Paretian Libertarianism’, Economica, 48 (1981); Kotaro Suzumura, Rational Choice, Collective Decisions and Social Welfare (1983); Kaushik Basu, ‘The Right to Give up Rights’, Economica, 51 (1984); John L. Wriglesworth, Libertarian Conflicts in Social Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Jonathan M. Riley, Liberal Utilitarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Dennis Mueller, Public Choice II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). See also the special issue on ‘the liberal paradox’ of Analyse & Kritik, 18 (1996), with contributions from a large number of authors interested in the subject, and also a response from me.
25. I have tried to discuss this connection in ‘Minimal Liberty’, Economica 59 (1992), and in ‘Rationality and Social Choice’, Presidential Address to the American Economic Association, published in American Economic Review, 85 (1995), reprinted in my Rationality and Freedom (2002). See also Seidl,
‘On Liberal Values’ (1975).
427
n o t e s t o p p . 111 – 122
26. See Philippe Mongin, ‘Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics’, Economica, 73 (2006); Marc Fleurbaey, Maurice Salles and John Weymark (eds), Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
27. On this, see my ‘Fertility and Coercion’, University of Chicago Law Review, 63 (Summer 1996); also Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999).
5
i m p a r t i a l i t y a n d o b j e c t i v i t y 1. Wollstonecraft, in Sylvana Tomaselli (ed.), A Vindication of the Rights of Men and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 13.
2. Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects (1792); included in the volume edited by Sylvana Tomaselli, 1995.
3. Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, translated by T. K. Abbott, 3rd edn (London: Longmans, 1907), p. 66.
4. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1907; New York: Dover, 1966), Preface to the 6th edition, p. xvii.
5. Vivian Walsh, ‘Sen after Putnam’, Reviewof Political Economy, 15 (2003), p. 331.
6. Antonio Gramsci, Letters from Prison, translated and edited by Lynne Lawner (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975), p. 324. See also Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds), Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).
7. Amartya Sen, ‘Sraffa, Wittgenstein, and Gramsci’, Journal of Economic Literature, 41 (2003).
8. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953, 2nd edn, 1958).
9. In his insightful analysis of the influence of Sraffa, along with that of Freud, on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, Brian McGuinness points out the impact on Wittgenstein of ‘the ethnological or anthropological way of looking at things that came to him from the economist Sraffa’. See Brian McGuinness (ed.), Wittgenstein and His Times (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), pp. 36–9.
10. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 119. Even though Rawls’s language seems to partition people into reasonable and unreasonable people, this does not restrict the reach of his criterion to cover all persons to the extent that 428
n o t e s t o p p . 122 – 139
they are willing to engage in public discussion, examine arguments and evidences offered, and reason about them in an open-minded way (on this see Chapter 1).
11. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; revised edn, 1790; republished, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).
6
c l o s e d a n d o p e n i m p a r t i a l i t y 1. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: T. Cadell, extended version, 1790; republished, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), III, i, 2; the extended version occurs in the sixth edition. On the points of emphasis see the discussion in D. D. Raphael, ‘The Impartial Spectator’, in Andrew S.
Skinner and Thomas Wilson (eds), Essays on Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 88–90. On the centrality of these issues in the Enlightenment perspectives, particularly in the works of Smith and Condorcet, see Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
2. See Raphael and Macfie, ‘Introduction’, in Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (republished 1976), p. 31.
3. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, III, 1, 2, in the 1975
reprint, p. 110.
4. A Theory of Justice (1971), pp. 516–17.
5. Ibid., p. 517.
6. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, III, 1, 2, p. 110.
7. On this, see my Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., and London: Penguin, 2006).
8. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 23.
9. Rawls, ‘Reply to Alexander and Musgrave’, in John Rawls: Collected Papers, p. 249. See also Tony Laden, ‘Games, Fairness and Rawls’s A Theory of Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20 (1991).
10. A Theory of Justice (1971), pp. 516–17; more extensively, see section 78 in A Theory of Justice, pp. 513–20, and Political Liberalism (1993).
pp. 110–16.
11. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 22–3, footnote 9.
12. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, VII, ii, 2, 14, p. 299.
13. In the argument that follows I
draw on an earlier analysis I presented in
‘Open and Closed Impartiality’, Journal of Philosophy, 99 (September 2002).
14. This is not to deny the possible existence of what topologists would call a ‘fixed point’ (with suitable assumptions regarding continuity) such that the 429
n o t e s t o p p . 139 – 148
decisions of a given focal group lead exactly back to the same focal group (however unlikely that congruence might be). But the problem of possible inconsistency cannot be ruled out, to say the least, in general when decisions to be taken by a focal group influence the composition of the focal group itself.
15. I have tried to identify these issues in ‘Global Justice: Beyond International Equity’, in Inga Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. A. Stern (eds), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), and also in ‘Justice across Borders’, in Pablo De Greiff and Ciaran Cronin (eds) Global Justice and Transnational Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), originally presented as a lecture for the Centennial Year Celebrations of the De Paul University in Chicago in September 1998.
16. John Rawls, ‘The Law of Peoples’, in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (eds), On Human Rights (New York: Basic Books, 1993), and The Lawof Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
17. See Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Brian Barry, Theories of Justice, vol. 1 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989); Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Thomas Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001); Deen Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Thomas Pogge and Sanjay Reddy, HowNot to Count the Poor (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
18. See Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen and Kotaro Suzumura (eds), Social Choice Re-examined (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1997). See also Isaac Levi, Hard Choices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
19. On this, see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Parfit’s general point has a bearing on ‘inclusionary incoherence’, though he does not discuss it specifically.
20. See David Hume, ‘On the Original Contract’, republished in David Hume, Selected Essays, edited by Stephen Copley and Andrew Edgar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 279.
21. Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’, Collected Papers, p. 401.
22. Rawls, ‘Reply to Alexander and Musgrave’, Collected Papers, p. 249.
430
n o t e s t o p p . 155 – 177
7
p o s i t i o n , r e l e va n c e a n d i l l u s i o n 1. William Shakespeare, King Lear, IV.6.150–54.
2. Thomas Nagel, The Viewfrom Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 5.
3. See Alberuni’s India, edited by A. T. Embree (New York: W. W. Norton
& Co., 1971), p. 111.
4. G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 328–9.
5. I have discussed these issues in my ‘Gender and Cooperative Conflict’, in Irene Tinker (ed.), Persistent Inequalities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). See also my ‘Many Faces of Gender Inequality’, NewRepublic (2001) and Frontline (2001).
6. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1777; republished, La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1966), p. 25.
8
r a t i o n a l i t y a n d o t h e r p e o p l e 1. Jon Elster, Reason and Rationality (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 2. In this small book Jon Elster provides a remarkably engaging account of the connection between reasoning and rationality, a subject in which Elster has himself made outstanding contributions. He also critically surveys the literature on this subject.
2. Bounded rationality has been particularly studied by Herbert Simon,
‘A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 (1955), and Models of Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).
3. See Daniel Kahneman, P. Slovik, and A. Tversky, Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
See also B. P. Stigum and F. Wenstøp (eds), Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory with Applications (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983); Isaac Levi, Hard Choices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); L. Daboni, A. Montesano and M. Lines, Recent Developments in the Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986); Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991); Daniel McFadden,
‘Rationality for Economists’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19 (1999).
4. See Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759, 1790); republished and edited by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976); Thomas Schelling, Choice and Consequence (Cambridge, MA: 431
n o t e s t o p p . 177 – 186
Harvard University Press, 1984), Chapters 3 (‘The Intimate Contest of Self-Command’) and 4 (‘Ethics, Law and the Exercise of Self-Command’).
5. Many of these departures can be made to fit into a general pattern of behaviour that Richard Thaler calls ‘quasi-rational’ (see his Quasi-Rational Economics (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991).
6. See Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1953).
7. Amartya Sen, ‘The Discipline of Economics’, Economica, 75 (November 2008).
8. On this and related issues, see Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2001).
9. The demands of rationality as well as departures from rationality can take many different forms, which I have tried to address in several essays included in Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
10. Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
11. See John Broome, ‘Choice and Value in Economics’, Oxford Economic Papers, 30 (1978); Amartya Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
12. F. Y. Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences (London: C. K. Paul, 1881), pp. 16, 104.
13. The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1770, 1790), p. 191 (in the 1976
edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford).
14. Ibid., pp. 190–92.
15. Ibid., p. 189.
16. See George Stigler, ‘Smith’s Travel on the Ship of State’, in A. S. Skinner and T. Wilson (eds), Essays on Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), particularly p. 237, and ‘Economics or Ethics?’, in S. McMurrin (ed.), Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), particularly p. 176.
17. See, however, Geoffrey Brennan and Loran Lomasky, ‘The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Towards a Smithian Model of Electoral Politics’, Economics and Philosophy, vol. 1 (1985); Patricia H. Werhane, Adam Smith and His Legacy for Modern Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Emma Rothschild, ‘Adam Smith and Conservative Economics’, Economic History Review, vol. 45 (February 1992); Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
432
n o t e s t o p p . 186 – 205
18. Stephen Leacock, Hellements of Hickonomics (New York: Dodd, Mead
& Co, 1936), p. 75; see also my On Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), Chapter 1.
19. This issue of misinterpretation is more fully discussed in my ‘Adam Smith’s Prudence’, in S. Lal and F. Stewart (eds), Theory and Reality in Development (London: Macmillan, 1986); On Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
20. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (in the 1976 reprint, pp. 26–7).
21. The Theory of Moral Sentiment
s, p. 192.
22. Ibid., p. 162.
23. Choice, Welfare and Measurement (1982), pp. 7–8.
24. Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 14; and Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
9
p l u r a l i t y o f i m p a r t i a l r e a s o n s 1. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, edited by Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 5–8.
2. Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (1998), p. 5; see also his
‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
3. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 6.
4. See, for example, M. Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Bruno S. Frey, ‘Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty’, Economic Inquiry, 31 (1993); David M. Gordon, ‘Bosses of Different Stripes: A Cross-Sectional Perspective on Monitoring and Super-vision’, American Economic Review, 84 (1994); Elinor Ostrom, ‘Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14
(Summer 2000); Andrew Dobson, Citizenship and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Barry Holden, Democracy and Global Warming (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002).
5. See, for example, Elinor Ostrom, ‘Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms’ (2000).
6. The classic English translation of Sutta-Nipata can be found in F. Max Muller (ed.), The Sacred Books of the East, vol. X, Part II, The Sutta-Nipata: 433
n o t e s t o p p . 205 – 226
A Collection of Discourses, translated by V. Fausboll (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881). A later translation is The Sutta-Nipata, translated by H. Saddhatissa (London: Curzon Press, 1985).
7. See also my essays, ‘Elements of a Theory of Human Rights’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 32 (2004), and ‘Human Rights and the Limits of Law’, Cardozo LawJournal, 27 (April 2006).