by Propaganda
He ties it to an old adage in law, that one should hear the other side to a dispute:
“Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition
which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms
can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right” (JSM
24). This is a centrally important observation not just for individual expressions of
isolated doctrine but for a whole philosophy of democratic government. Mill’s argu-
ment has staying power, but an immediate reply can be made along the following
lines: if the problem is that government leaders need to legitimize their judgments by
hearing the other side, why can they not satisfy the requirement by hearing the views
they desire to suppress expressed behind closed doors? If the leaders give these views
full consideration and win the argument in debate with the person whose ideas are to
be suppressed, then the legitimacy problem has been solved for some, at least. Mill is
aware of this type of argument and notes the practice of the Roman Catholic Church
of allowing members of the hierarchy to read books forbidden to most of the faithful
for the purpose of being better able to refute them.
In reply, Mill notes that, without dissemination, a doctrine will not get a full and
effective hearing. Yet, such a hearing is necessary so that other highly intelligent people
may be convinced and become involved in its defence. Without dissemination, these
other potential defenders will be kept out of action. Mill’s defence of his infallibil-
ity argument thus mutates into a legitimacy question, but as such it carries weight.
Secondly, he argues that it is all very well for a select group of officials to satisfy them-
selves that the dissenting doctrines are without merit, but does that justify them in
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preventing others from hearing those doctrines and deciding for themselves? No! This is Mill’s point in using the word “infallibility.” As he says, “it is not the feeling sure
of a doctrine (be it what it may) which I call an assumption of infallibility. It is the
undertaking to decide that question for others, without allowing them to hear what
can be said on the contrary side” (JSM 29). Mill bolsters his arguments against the
assumption of infallibility by reflecting on historical cases—those of Socrates, Jesus,
and Christianity under Emperor Marcus Aurelius—where, from a later perspective,
the persecutors of a new doctrine were wrong. As Mill notes, any of the arguments that
might be used to suppress atheism could have been used, suitably modified, to support
Aurelius’s action against Christianity.
Mill also takes note of the value of continual self-correction. Progress comes from
recognition of the corrigibility of what we believe, and the development of a habit
of openness to correction will improve the process of learning. We need people who
listen to what others have to say, not people who put blinkers around cherished ideas
for fear of losing them. Stifling unpopular opinion discourages development of this
beneficial character trait of openness.
Partial Truth
As a second general line of argument, Mill observes that even if the doctrine, taken as a
whole, is in error, a vigorous defence of it may lead us to discover new truths or to recover aspects of older truths that have been forgotten. By not allowing its expression, we cut
ourselves off from access to some aspects of truth that may be enlightening. We need to
encourage bold thinkers, who are not afraid to follow reason where it may take them,
instead of aborting an inquiry when it threatens to end in some heretical conclusion. The
harm of suppression is not only done to the suppressed thinkers. “The greatest harm,”
Mill claims, “is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is
cramped and their reason cowed by the fear of heresy” (JSM 41). No great thinker can
subordinate the pursuit of truth to predetermined conclusions, he claims. “Truth gains
more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself
than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer them-
selves to think” (JSM 41).12 Not silencing expression of a doctrine permits us to benefit
from such part-truths as may be contained in the doctrine we wish to suppress. When
there are conflicting doctrines, it is unlikely that one is wholly true and the other wholly
false. More likely they share some part of the truth between them (JSM 56). The real
problem comes from taking an incomplete set of truths for a complete set. Opposition
helps those with open minds to realize what is missing from their own set. This can be so
even though the challenged view may start with the greater amount of truth.
Vitality of Belief and Comprehension of the Doctrine
Quite apart from the possible truth of all or part of a heretical doctrine, Mill rec-
ognizes the great benefit provided by challenges to received opinion, namely, the
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stimulus to holding those views with vitality. Without any challenges, a view may become simply “dead dogma.” The result of avoiding all critical reflection about a
doctrine one subscribes to is that one becomes unable to defend the view against
the most superficial objections. Apart from that, the holding even of true opinion
through prejudice is unworthy of a rational being and does not constitute knowledge
(JSM 43). We do not fully understand the justification for our believing in our own
doctrines if we do not understand what arguments are brought against them. How
can we say that some contrary view is wrong, when we don’t even know what that
view is? To experience a proper challenge to received opinion, it is not enough, Mill
thinks, to get a secondhand statement of heretical opinions. It is important to hear
from people who actually believe these statements and who can present their case in
the strongest form.
Added to the question of vitality is the matter of comprehension. Mill argues
that absence of challenge does not lead only to diminishing intellectual enthusiasm
for a set of beliefs. It also results in atrophy of understanding: the beliefs become more
and more imperfectly understood. Eventually only the “shell or husk” of an idea is
retained, while the “finer essence” is lost (JSM 48). In fact, this was the state for many
of Mill’s contemporaries regarding their belief in Christianity. This situation was very
different from that of the early Christians, who had to struggle to defend and spread
their beliefs.
Finally, Mill notes how easy it is for upholders of the received view to denounce
challengers as being immoral people and to demand that they be less strident in their
expression. This polemical debating weapon introduces unfairness into the debate,
since the challenger cannot so easily attack the character of a defender of the status
quo. If anything deserves protection, Mill argues, it is the view that challenges ortho-
doxy. Better still is a moral judgmen
t by the community to disapprove of attacks on
character and to encourage disputants to stick to the matters under debate.
Mill’s Exceptions and the Matter of Consistency
If we try to apply Mill’s theory to some of the specific issues concerning us today, we
find some problems. Take, for example, the question of whether it is legitimate to
suppress tobacco advertising. It is clear that Mill had in mind the propagation of doc-
trines, whether scientific, religious, or political. Modern advertising does not express
doctrine, although it may hint at certain unstated claims. The same is true with regard
to hate propaganda, some of which can be a matter of doctrine. However, most use
insulting epithets or a deliberately falsified version of history. Mill’s argument depends
to some extent on the merit of hearing a passionate defender of some heterodox opin-
ion. He has not envisaged for us, other than in passing,13 the cynical disseminator of
falsehoods who knows them to be false. Can we be confident that what is thus dis-
seminated will still contain some partial truth?
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When Mill considers specific free speech problems in his own time, he takes into account cases where the model is not that of a doctrinal dissenter but of someone
much more practically oriented or whose expressions have immediate practical conse-
quences. We need to examine the matter of consistency between the exceptions and
his stated principles.
Children
Mill specifically excepted children from the ambit of his remarks. Some general read-
ers take this to mean “children should be seen and not heard”; in other words, it is
all right to silence them. Certainly, there are circumstances in which children are
rightly silenced by parents or guardians, although it would be ludicrous to claim that
they should not be allowed to express their thoughts about God, morality, music,
what’s wrong with school, parents, etc. This is not Mill’s point. He is concerned with
what law and morality have to say about curtailing expression, and the argument that
adults should not have to be protected from corruption by communications from
others clearly is not applicable to children. Children do not have the experience and
knowledge to evaluate critically what they are told. Parents have the right and the
duty to protect their children from evil influences. Once we understand curtailment
of free speech in this way, Mill’s exception becomes acceptable. That children should
be protected in some respects against the free expression of others is uncontroversial
today, although there are disagreements concerning specific matters, such as whether
a parent or the state should prevail on the matter of exposing young children to sex
education, the teaching of evolution in schools, etc.
Infirm Adults and People “In Their Nonage”
Mill also made exceptions for adults suffering from some relevant kind of infirmity
that affects, for example, their reasoning or judgmental powers (although he does not
spell this out). Once again, we must object to Mill, if we think this means measures
such as gagging or sedating mental patients. However, if we think of the predations of
unscrupulous marketers who exploit the deteriorating judgment of elderly persons, the
picture changes (for an explanation of what I have in mind, see Chapter 7, page 258f ).
Incitement
Mill makes an exception to his principle in the case of incitement, where the damage is
immediate. Since his philosophy is based on the advantages of hearing different sides
to a disputed doctrine, the benefits only arise under circumstances where time permits
formation of a balanced judgment. However, he recognizes that there are situations in
which provocative remarks can trigger harmful actions, and he makes an exception for
such cases. He illustrates his point by a story about corn-dealers who support tariffs, thus
raising the price of grain for the British people:
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An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may
justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before
the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form
of a placard. Acts of whatever kind, which without justifiable cause do harm to others
may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the
unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of mankind.
(JSM 67–68)
This is an important restriction on his principle, and it immediately raises ques-
tions of the following sort: just how immediate must the threat be to the life of the
corn-dealer? Does it matter if the effect of the incitement is felt right away or instead
results a few days later in death by stealth? Does it make any difference whether what
is said is true or false? In US jurisprudence, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. intro-
duced the “clear and present danger” test for deciding whether or not a speech act
was seditious (and therefore punishable by law). It can be argued that false accusa-
tions over time, in a situation where the communicatees are not able to find out the
truth, can lead to systematic harms against a person or group. Why should the time
lapse make this situation different from the case of the corn-dealer, where Mill allows
an exception to his principle? Another important question is whether deliberately
deceptive propaganda should be treated differently from honest expression of opinion.
Commercial Speech
Mill thinks that commercial speech is on a very different footing from the expression
of beliefs concerning doctrines in science, religion, or politics. He says, “Whoever
undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the inter-
ests of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle,
comes within the jurisdiction of society” (JSM 115). At first one may question the
distinction. Someone who gives a political speech also affects people. The words of
Karl Marx, Jesus, and Socrates, for example, affected many people. However, consider
a situation in which a person is selling poison. If the poison is not properly labelled,
people’s lives are put at risk right away. The effect of such mislabelling is much less
under anyone’s control than the case of political speech. Mill favours free trade, but
he feels that controls to enhance safety are permissible as long as they are restricted to
what is necessary to reduce involuntary harms from the sales. If the poison has some
legitimate use, the legitimate users should not be barred access to it simply because
others might want to use it for murder. Thus, the state can properly require labelling
of the poison. The buyer “cannot wish not to know that the thing he possesses has poi-
sonous qualities,” Mill writes (JSM 117). Where articles are regularly used for criminal
purposes, the state legitimately may require the seller to register the
name and address
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of the buyer, quantities sold, etc. Mill’s suggestion has been acted on in many jurisdictions, including Canada, with regard to firearms.
Mill recognizes the duty of public authority to prevent accidents, and he defends
this duty in the case where a man is about to cross an unsafe bridge not knowing of
its hazardous condition. If there is no time to warn him, the police have the right to
physically prevent him from crossing without any real infringement on his liberty. If
there is time to explain all the dangers and a person decides to enter upon risky activity
anyway, Mill thinks he should not be prevented from taking the risk, because only that
person knows his motives well enough to judge whether the risk is worth taking or
not. We are speaking, of course, of adult persons who are not in some condition ren-
dering their judgment unfit (see above). Few people will quarrel with Mill’s judgment
that it would be right to stop the person who does not know of the risk, but getting
people to appreciate the nature of a given risk may not be such a simple matter, and
an authority may decide to exercise restraining power on the basis that a person has
not had sufficient time and explanation to get a realistic sense of a given risk. From
that point, it is possible for a misguided authority (departing from Mill and common
sense) to reason that no one with full comprehension of risks would choose to smoke
or drink to excess so that it would not be an infringement of liberty to restrain people
from such activities. Once we link freedom to what people would choose if they were
fully informed instead of first informing them and seeing what they do choose, we are
on the road to endorsing Rousseau’s notion of “forcing people to be free.” Freedom
on Rousseau’s account implies a distinction between a person’s higher self and his or
her lower self, and a totalitarian state could pass all kinds of restrictive legislation in
the name of such a higher self. Perhaps it is worth repeating that Mill himself was not
advocating Rousseau’s approach.
Mill supports the right of mature individuals to purchase drugs such as opium,