They went down like tenpins. From where I stood I heard the
   sickening whacks of the clubs on unprotected skulls. … At times
   the spectacle of unresisting men being methodically bashed into
   a bloody pulp sickened me so much that I had to turn away. The
   western mind finds it difficult to grasp the idea of nonresistance.
   I felt an indefinable sense of helpless rage and loathing, almost
   as much against the men who were submitting unresistingly to
   being beaten as against the police wielding the clubs, and this
   despite the fact that when I came to India I sympathized with the
   Gandhi cause. (G 250– 51)
   The marchers were not simply acquiescing. They continue to march, and
   they chanted the slogan “Long live the revolution.” And yet, as Miller
   says: there is something in the mind, and not only the Western mind, that
   resists accepting this way of reacting to brutal behavior. (Interestingly, the police treated Ms. Naidu with the utmost respect, and when she asked
   them not to lay a hand on her they did not even touch her. Would the
   men’s commitment to nonviolence have held up had they assaulted her
   as well?) What do Gandhi and King have to say to people who think
   Revolutionary Justice
   221
   anger the right response to oppressive behavior, and the only response
   consistent with self- respect?
   First, they point out that the stance they recommend is anything
   but passive. Gandhi soon rejected “passive resistance” as a misleading
   English rendering of his ideas. As Dennis Dalton documents in his impor-
   tant philosophical study, starting already in 1907 Gandhi repudiated the
   term “passive resistance,” insisting that “passive resistance” could be
   weak and inactive, whereas his idea was one of active protest; he eventu-
   ally chose satyagraha, “truth force,” as a superior term.10 Both he and King continually insist that what they recommend is a posture of thought and
   conduct that is highly active, even “dynamically aggressive” (K 7), in that
   it involves resistance to unjust conditions and protest against them. “But
   when I say we should not resent, I do not say that we should acquiesce,”
   says Gandhi (G 138). For King, similarly: “I have not said to my people
   ‘Get rid of your discontent.’ Rather, I have tried to say that this normal
   and healthy discontent can be channeled into the creative outlet of non-
   violent direct action” (K 291). Both men hold, as I do, that anger is inher-
   ently wedded to a payback mentality: Gandhi says that resenting means
   wishing some harm to the opponent (even if only through divine agency)
   (G 138); King speaks of a “strike- back” mentality (K 32). That is what they
   want to get rid of, and we shall soon see with what they replace it.
   Moreover, the new attitude is not just internally active, it issues
   in concrete actions with one’s body, actions that require considerable
   courage (K 7). King calls this “direct action”: action in which, after
   “self- purification” (i.e., rejection of anger), one’s own body is used to
   make the case (K 290– 91). This action is a forceful and uncompromising
   demand for freedom (292). The protester acts by marching, by breaking
   an unjust law in a deliberate demand for justice, by refusing to cooperate
   with unjust authority. The goal? In King’s case, to force negotiation and
   move toward legal and social change (291, 294). For Gandhi it is no less
   than to overthrow a wrongful government and to “compel its submission
   to the people’s will” (G 193, 195). The idea of acquiescence in brutality
   is presumably what revolted Webb Miller, but he misunderstood: there
   is no acquiescence, but a courageous struggle for a radical end.11 (The
   Attenborough movie, in which the Webb Miller role is played by Martin
   Sheen, depicts Miller as understanding exactly what he is seeing, and
   reporting to the world that the dignity of Indians carried the day over the
   hapless brutality of the British. Certainly, whatever the real Miller felt, his dispatches did show people what was really happening.)
   What is the new attitude with which they propose to replace anger?
   King, interestingly, allows some scope for real anger, holding that dem-
   onstrations and marches are a way of channeling repressed emotions
   that might otherwise lead to violence (297).12 He even appears to grant
   222
   Anger and Forgiveness
   that anger may play a valuable part in motivating some people to get
   involved. Nonetheless, even when there is real anger, it must soon lead to
   a focus on the future, with hope and with faith in the possibility of justice (K 52). Meanwhile, anger toward opponents is to be “purified” through
   a set of disciplined practices, and ultimately transformed into a mental
   attitude that carefully separates the deed from the doer, criticizing and
   repudiating the bad deed, but not imputing unalterable evil to people
   (K 61, GAut 242). (Notice the striking resemblance to Braithwaite’s con-
   ferences with juvenile offenders.) Deeds may be denounced: people
   always deserve respect and sympathy. After all, the ultimate goal is “to
   create a world where men and women can live together” (K 61), and that
   goal needs the participation of all.
   Above all, then, one should not wish to humiliate opponents in any
   way, or wish them ill (K 7, G 315), but instead should seek to win their
   friendship and cooperation (K 7). Gandhi remarks that early in his career
   he already felt the inappropriateness of the second stanza in “God Save
   the Queen,” which asks God to “Scatter her enemies / And make them
   fall, / Confound their politics, / Frustrate their knavish tricks” (G 152).
   How can we assume that these opponents are “knavish”? he asks. Surely
   the believer in non- anger should not encourage such attitudes. The oppo-
   nent is a person who has made a mistake, but we hope he can be won
   over by friendship and generosity.13 This attitude can be called love, so
   long as we understand that Gandhi and King refer to an attitude that is
   not soft and sentimental, but tough and uncompromising in its demand
   for justice. It is an attitude of respect and active concern, one that seeks a common good in which all are included.14
   An important insight of Gandhi (present in Paton’s novel) is that
   anger is frequently rooted in fear. In Nehru’s shrewd diagnosis, Gandhi’s
   greatest gift to his followers was a new freedom from the “all- pervading
   fear” that British rule had inspired in Indians. That “black pall of fear
   was lifted from the people’s shoulders”— how? Nehru suggests that this
   massive “psychological change” (which he compares to a successful psy-
   choanalysis) had its source in Gandhi’s ability to show an exit route from
   the reign of terror, and to inspire people, simultaneously, with a sense
   of their own worth and the worth of their actions. This made possible a
   form of protest that was calm, dignified, and strategic, rather than fur-
   tive, desperate, and prone to retributive violence.15
   The ultimate goal of the protester must be a beautiful future in
   which all have a share: “the creation of the beloved community” (K 7).
   King’s famous “Dream” speech, which I have discussed as an exam-
   ple of the Transition, is also a sentiment map that turns the critical
   and once- angry protester toward a future of enormous beauty, and
   one that is shown as possible and shortly available, by being rooted
   Revolutionary Justice
   223
   in concrete features of the real American landscape, all of which are
   now seen as sites of freedom.16 Belief in the possibility of such a future
   plays no small part in the Transition. King was really outstanding here,
   and Gandhi somewhat less so: because of his asceticism he kept por-
   traying the future as one of impoverished rural simplicity, which was
   not very inspiring to most people, and was quite unrealistic in thinking
   about how to build a successful nation. King’s prophetic description of
   the future, furthermore, repositions opponents as potential partners in
   building the beautiful future: so then the question naturally becomes,
   how can we secure their cooperation? How can we get them on our
   side, joining with us? King doesn’t just tell people they ought to try to
   cooperate, he encourages a cooperative frame of mind by depicting a
   compelling goal that needs the cooperation of all. Gandhi’s strategy is
   a little different, in that he wants the British simply to leave India, not
   to help build it. They had tried to “build” long enough, and not well.
   But he encourages the thought that a free nation can be constructed, not
   through hatred and bloodshed, but by negotiation. The British don’t
   have to be seen as fellow citizens, but they do have to be seen as reason-
   able people who will ultimately do the right thing and depart, remain-
   ing peaceful Commonwealth partners.
   I have linked some anger to excessive preoccupation with status.
   One very significant aspect of Gandhi’s movement was its renunciation
   of artificial distinctions of status through a detailed and comprehensive
   sympathy. The powerful must live the simple lifestyle of the powerless,
   thus beginning to forge a nation in which all can see their fate in the
   lives of all. Lawyers washed pots, upper- caste people cleaned latrines,
   breaking down lines of both caste and gender. As so often in our inqui-
   ries, non- anger is in this way linked to practices that support empathetic
   participation in the lives of others. This was also a prominent feature
   of King’s movement, in which blacks and whites associated together in
   defiance of law, and in which white supporters were constantly urged to
   imagine the indignities and hardships of a black person’s life.
   In trying to respond to likely criticisms of the Gandhi/ King idea, we
   must confront the objection that it imposes on people an inhuman set of
   demands. We have begun to reply by showing that, and how, they made it
   possible for people to accept and internalize non- angry practices. But this
   worry is certainly heightened by Gandhi’s views about emotional and
   sexual detachment. Gandhi was close to being a thoroughgoing Stoic. He
   repeatedly asserted that one cannot pursue satyagraha or non- angry resistance adequately without conducting a struggle against all the passions,
   prominently including erotic desire and emotion. Nor did he cultivate
   the type of personal love and friendship that would naturally give rise
   to deep grief and fear. If he is correct in insisting that Stoic detachment is
   224
   Anger and Forgiveness
   necessary for non- anger, that would give us reason to think it an unwork-
   able and also an unattractive goal.
   First of all, we must ask whether Gandhi was making an instru-
   mental claim (emotional and passional detachment is instrumentally
   necessary for successful satyagraha) or offering a stipulative definition ( satyagraha consists in nonviolent and non- angry resistance carried
   out with a commitment to emotional and passional detachment). The
   answer is unclear. For himself, Gandhi most likely meant the latter,
   given the evidence of his systematic self- discipline. For his movement,
   however, he does not appear to endorse even the limited instrumen-
   tal claims, since he made no attempt to convince Nehru and other key
   leaders to renounce particular love and other forms of strong passion.17
   Perhaps his idea was simply that the leader of a successful nonviolent resistance movement must (whether instrumentally or conceptually)
   pursue Stoic detachment. Even this, however, might worry a modern
   reader: if the path of non- anger demands an implausible and in some
   ways unappealing detachment of its leaders, how attractive can it be,
   as a path to justice?
   We can begin by looking at history, where the examples of King and
   Mandela (indeed also Nehru) seem to refute Gandhi’s theory. All three
   had lives of passionate devotion to individuals, and none renounced
   sexuality. Certainly King’s love affairs compromised the success of his
   movement by putting him into the power of J. Edgar Hoover. But that
   just shows that leaders had better obey social norms, or conceal their
   actions well if they don’t.
   The case of Mandela tells us something further and different, which
   he repeatedly discusses: that the leader of a movement may encounter
   great obstacles to the successful pursuit of love and family life. The long
   hours away from home in the early days and the long years of impris-
   onment later on made successful marriage impossible and successful
   fatherhood problematic. But the evidence (his prison letters to Winnie,
   for example) suggests that love was still an energizing force in his politi-
   cal life, nor does anything in his writings indicate that he would have
   been a better leader had he pursued detachment rather than love and
   family care. One can say much the same of Nehru.
   Moreover, if people sometimes like to be inspired by a leader like
   Gandhi, who seems to be apart from the common human lot, they also,
   and probably more often where politics is concerned, respond to a leader
   who is demonstrably human in need and vulnerability, albeit more self-
   controlled than many other leaders. Nehru, like Mandela, took great
   care in his Autobiography to emphasize his own vulnerable human side, including his passionate love of his wife and his grief at her death.18
   George Orwell speaks for many people when he concludes that “Saints
   Revolutionary Justice
   225
   should always be judged guilty until they are proved innocent”— a judg-
   ment that he applies to Gandhi with complicated results.19
   Psychologist Erik Erikson goes one step further, in his insightful book
   on Gandhi: he treats Gandhi’s attitude to human love in general, sexual-
   ity in particular, as one of self- anger, indeed of violence. Addressing the
   dead leader directly, he says, “You should stop terrorizing yourself, and
   approach your own body with nonviolence.”20 He then contrasts psycho-
   analysis, a nonviolent art of self- change through truth, with Gandhi’s
   punitive attitudes. There is much in Gandhi’s biography to recommend
   Erikson’s view that self- anger is continually expressed in his attitude to
   his own body. The genesis of his idea that all
 sexual desire is destructive
   was, by his own account, a very specific experience. As a young married
   teenager, he was making love with his wife at the very moment when his
   father died. His father had long been ill, and he felt it was his duty to sit with him. Nonetheless, he allowed himself to be distracted by the lure
   of desire, and went to his wife even though his father’s state appeared
   dire. As a result he was not there at the moment of death. “It is a blot
   I have never been able to efface or forget… . It took me long to get free
   from the shackles of lust, and I had to pass through many ordeals before
   I could overcome it” (GAut 27). Erikson’s idea that self- anger is exacting
   a payback is extremely cogent, and of course even Gandhi’s retrospective
   narrative portrays his behavior in the most pejorative light. If we accept
   Erikson’s claim, we have a further reason not to hold that non- anger
   entails Gandhian renunciation: renunciation in this case, and perhaps
   in others, is itself an expression of anger. George Orwell agrees, saying
   of Gandhi: “If one could follow it to its psychological roots, one would,
   I believe, find that the main motive for ‘non- attachment’ is a desire to
   escape from the pain of living, and above all from love, which, sexual or
   non- sexual, is hard work.”21
   So, non- anger not only does not demand an inhuman sort of renun-
   ciation, it is incompatible with (at least this form of) it. In that important respect, King, Nehru, and Mandela were more successful practitioners
   of non- anger than Gandhi, though all of them found it difficult to be
   adequate partners and parents, given the all- consuming demands of a
   political vocation.22 One may grieve and love intensely while avoiding
   anger’s specific errors.
   We now have a picture of non- angry revolutionary action, and we
   have some persuasive answers to some of the most powerful objec-
   tions that have been raised against it. We also have an appealing pic-
   ture of the non- angry revolutionary: dignified, courageous, and proud,
   but not emotionless or inhumanly detached. But perhaps we do not yet
   have enough to answer the normative question with which we began. If
   we have shown that non- anger is acceptable, we have not conclusively
   
 
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