If you establish a democracy, you must in due season reap the fruits of a democracy. You will in due season have great impatience of the public bodies combined in due season with great increase of the public expenditure. You will in due season reap the fruits of such united influence. You will in due season have wars entered into from passion, and not from reason; and you will in due season submit to peace ignominiously sought and ignominiously obtained, which will diminish your authority and perhaps endanger your independence. You will, in due season, with a democracy find that your property is less valuable and that your freedom is less complete. (quoted in Lang 1999, pp. 81-2).
Overall, the most plausible interpretation of the interparty rivalry in Britain during the 1860s and 1870s was that, whereas both parties regarded the extension of voting rights as inevitable due to mounting social pressure, they clearly saw that it could be structured in ways that were more or less advantageous to themselves. This created a complicated “end game.” Cowling (1967, p. 89) argues that the Conservative Party supported Disraeli in 1867 because if the act failed, “the Liberals might then do precisely what Derby and Disraeli had striven in 1866 to prevent their doing - carry Reform on their own lines.” In fact, Disraeli’s first move upon becoming prime minister was to introduce a less generous franchise extension, but he realized that this would not gain majority support. He then switched to the more radical proposal that he could pass by gaining the support of a heterogeneous group of Liberals. The one triumph of the 1867 reform for Disraeli was the fact that it limited the redistribution of seats away from the counties to the boroughs, which would have been even more substantial otherwise. This strategy reduced the impact of the franchise extension for the Conservative Party and its constituency. Smith (1966, p. 97) agrees and argues that “Derby and Disraeli ... in 1867, did not determine to trust the people, or put their faith in a Conservative democracy. They did what they felt they had to do, to satisfy the popular agitation and reconcile the upper strata of the working classes to the established political system.”
Other cases of nineteenth-century democratization in Europe also do not offer much support for the view that the transition to full democracy was a way for one subgroup of the elites to increase its own vote share. For example, in the German case, the threat of revolution appeared to be the main factor. With army units in revolt and the economy collapsing in Germany in 1918-19, the former political elites attempted to prevent revolution by generating a transition that would cause minimal damage to their interests.
In France, there were more distinct subsets within elites. Orleanists and Legitimists formed separate factions within the monarchist camp; the Republicans, although democratic, were basically middle class and not in favor of universal male suffrage in 1848. When the monarchy collapsed in 1848, these groups had to concede to the demands of the revolutionaries. The same is true for the period after 1870. The conflict at the time, particularly the Commune, forced democracy along the lines of 1848. Although no group within the elites was committed to universal male suffrage, they were forced to reintroduce it.
The Swedish case is perhaps the most similar to Britain. In 1906, the Liberal Party’s first-ever government fell after failing to pass a law introducing universal male suffrage. The reform measure of 1909 was then passed by the Conservative government under Lindman. As with Disraeli in 1867, “Lindman and his Conservative ministry that took office a year after the Liberals’ 1906 failure saw an opportunity to pass a political reform on its own terms” (Collier 1999, p. 84). Although male suffrage was conceded in one house, the Conservatives kept control over the other through the maintenance of multiple voting and taxpayer suffrage. As with the British case, this pattern of events was not the result of attempts by the Conservatives to gain votes but rather a damage-limitation exercise in the face of mounting social pressure for a full democracy.
4.2 The Threat of Revolution and Transition to Full Democracy
So, if the move from partial to full democracy was not the result of intra-elite competition, what was the cause? Our answer, perhaps not surprisingly, is again the threat of revolution from the disenfranchised poor. As Chapter 1 illustrates, there was significant political and social unrest during the years leading to the Second Reform Act in Britain. In Chapter 3, we discussed evidence suggesting that in many other countries political reforms were frequently driven by similar forces. We therefore believe that we need a model along the lines of those in Chapter 6 to understand transition from partial to full democracy.
Figure 8.3. From Partial to Full Democracy.
Let us now analyze how a society might transition from partial to full democracy because the poor form an effective challenge or pose a revolutionary threat. The underlying economic model is the same as our basic three-class model described previously.
How is this model different from that of Chapter 6? The main differences are that without further institutional change, we are in a world with partial democracy; the middle class is politically decisive with respect to the tax rate in partial democracy; and, given> ym, there is going to be positive taxation and therefore redistribution toward the poor, even when they are excluded from the political system. Figure 8.3 draws the game tree. The revolution threat now comes from the poor and takes the same form as in Chapter 6. After revolution, the poor share the remaining income and the middle class and the rich receive nothing. Specifically, if there is revolution, we have:
and Vm(R, µ) = Vr(R, µ) = 0.
It is important that without further democratization, we are in partial democracy, so the relevant values are as in (8.9). This implies that the revolution constraint is now different because the existing system is redistributing at the tax rate τPD. In particular, in this case the revolution constraint would require:
which is equivalent to:
(8.16)
In addition, partial democracy can now promise to tax at a rate τPD greater than τm, in the same way that the rich promised higher redistribution in nondemocracy to stave off a revolution. The difference is that if those holding political power, the middle class and the rich, get a chance to reset the tax, they will not go down to zero taxation but rather to the most preferred tax rate of the median enfranchised voter, who is now a middle-class agent. Therefore, the values to the three social groups following a promise of future redistribution by the existing regime are as follows:
(8.17)
for i = p, m, r, where we incorporate the fact that if the middle class gets to reset the tax rate, then it chooses its preferred rate and sets τm. Following our previous analysis, we can now determine a critical level, µ*, so that at µ*, we have:
or:
(8.18)
There is an important new feature for future reference: µ* is decreasing in τm. Intuitively, when the existing regime is more redistributive, it is easier to convince the poor with promises of future redistribution because even when the existing regime gets a chance to reset the tax, there will be some redistribution. This implies that when the middle class favors more redistribution, it is easier to convince the poor not to undertake a revolution. In consequence, it is easier to avoid democratizing.
Finally, we need to check that transition to full democracy prevents a revolution. This discussion shows that when δp < ½ , full democracy also implements the most preferred tax rate of a middle-class agent. Therefore, in this case, full democracy is no different than partial democracy. The more interesting case is when δp ≥ ½ , so that the median voter in full democracy is a poor agent, and democracy leads to the most preferred tax rate of the poor, τp. In this case, the condition for full democratization to prevent revolution is Vp(R, µ) ≤ Vp(D), which is equivalent to:
(8.19)
Given this discussion, we can state:
Proposition 8.2: In the game described in Figure 8.3, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium such that:
• If (8.16) does not bind, then partial democracy sets the most preferred tax rate of the middle class
, τPD= τm.
• If (8.16) binds and (1) δp≥ ½ and (8.19) fails to hold, or (2) δp< ½ and µ < µ*, then there is revolution.
• If (8.16) binds and µ ≥ µ*, then the existing regime prevents transition to full democracy by promising to redistribute at the tax rate τPD= such that Vp (PD, τPD= ) = Vp (R, µ).
• Finally, if (8.16) binds, (8.19) holds, δp ≥ ½ , and µ < µ*, then transition to full democracy happens as a credible commitment to future redistribution toward the poor.
For the most part, the results of this proposition are similar to those of Proposition 6.1. However, there is an important new result. We know from our results that τm is higher when the middle class is relatively poor (i.e., when θm/δm is low). However, our analysis shows that a high level of τm makes partial democracy more attractive for the poor and decreases µ*. As a result, societies in which the middle class is relatively poor may be able to stave off the threat of a revolution without having to fully democratize. Here, it is the middle class that is pivotal in nondemocracy (or partial democracy) and if it reneges on any promised concession it offers the poor, it will revert to its preferred polity, τm. If the middle class is relatively poor, τm will not be too far from τp, the policy preferred by the poor. In this case, the fact that the middle class may not be able to commit to offering τp is less important, a revolution less attractive, and democracy less likely to arise. Therefore, this model suggests that full democratization is more likely not only when the poor are poor but also when the middle class is relatively rich. This result is certainly in line with scholars who have argued for the importance of the strength and affluence of the middle class in democratization.
5. Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer
In this section, we revisit the simple game analyzed in Section 3 in which both the middle class and the poor are disenfranchised but make the alternative assumption that the revolution threat is posed by the poor. In reality, both the middle class and the poor pose threats when they are excluded from political power. What matters is which group is pivotal. In the previous section, we considered the situation in which both the middle class and the poor were disenfranchised but the middle class was pivotal. Here, we investigate the alternative scenario: as in our basic model of democratization of Chapter 6, the rich have to satisfy the poor to prevent a revolution. Crucially, however, we reintroduce the possibility that the rich can use repression to prevent a revolution. The key question is: When will the rich prefer repression rather than democratization?
Figure 8.4. The Middle Class as a Buffer.
In this model, the presence of the middle class may act as a buffer between the rich and the poor and allow society to avoid repression. Therefore, repression is more likely to arise in societies in which the middle class is small or relatively poor.
The underlying model is the same as our basic three-class model. Agents again value posttax income but, in addition, there are the potential costs of repression if the rich choose the repression strategy. More specifically, the utility of an agent of class i now takes the form given in (6.8).
Figure 8.4 draws the game tree. The rich have two democratization options: partial and full. Also, the key revolution decision is now by the poor (they can undertake revolution even without help from the middle class). In addition, we still have the feature that the promise to redistribute by the rich is imperfect because they can get to reset the tax after the threat of revolution has subsided with probability 1 - p, which implies that any tax set initially will stay with probability p.
We assume that the returns from revolution are similar to before but because the poor are the main revolutionary element, we assume for the sake of simplicity that they share the returns only among themselves. So, the return to the poor from undertaking a revolution is:
(8.20)
The middle class and the rich obtain nothing after a revolution, so Vm (R, µ) = Vr (R, µ) = 0.
The revolution constraint is binding if the poor prefer revolution to no redistribution under the existing system or if Vp (R, µ) = (1 - µ)/δp > yp. The revolution constraint can be written as:
(8.21)
As before, the rich may meet the revolution threat by promising redistribution, which is only a partially credible promise because they have a chance to reset the tax with probability p once the threat has subsided. The values to the three different groups, when the rich keep political power and promise redistribution at the tax rate, are given by (8.8) evaluated at τN =.
If the rich choose partial democracy, P D, only the middle class is enfranchised and by the assumption that δp > δm > δr, in this partial democracy the rich are a minority and the most preferred tax rate of the middle class is implemented. By assumption, this tax rate, τm, is strictly positive. Therefore, we have the values Vi (P D) given by (8.9).
Finally, the values in democracy depend on whether the median voter is a poor or a middle-class agent. Recall that this depends on whether δp is less than or greater than ½ . These values are given by (8.10) with the tax rate determined by (8.11). As before, if δp < ½ , then Vr (P D) = Vr (D), but when δp ≥ ½ , we have Vr (P D) > Vr(D).
As in the Chapter 6 analysis and in Section 3, the crucial issue is whether the promise of redistribution can prevent revolution. But now, in contrast to when the middle class was the politically pivotal group, it is the poor that need to be placated to avoid revolution. Thus, for revolution to be prevented, we need that:
(8.22)
Because the highest value that the rich can offer to the poor is clearly when they set the tax rate most preferred by the poor, τp, this is equivalent to:
Define µ* such that this condition holds as an equality or, in other words:
(8.23)
The rich can now also try to prevent revolution by undertaking a partial democratization. Following partial democratization, the median voter is a middle-class agent and chooses a tax rate of τ PD = τm. This strategy prevents revolution if:
or if:
(8.24)
Finally, we need to look at payoffs from repression, which are:
(8.25)
The analysis is similar to before and, in particular, we need to determine threshold values for the cost of repression such that the rich are indifferent between repression and their other alternatives. Denote these threshold values byand(τ) such that the rich are indifferent between their various options at these threshold levels. The second threshold is conditioned on the tax rate that will result in either democracy, τD, or partial democracy, τPD. More specifically, we have:
whereis such that VP(N, τN =) = VP(R, µ). In other words:
(8.26)
Therefore, at, the rich are indifferent between redistribution and repression. As a result, for all K <, they prefer repression to promising redistribution. This implies that one set of parameter configurations in which repression emerges is when µ ≥ µ* and K <.
Next, define the threshold for the elites to be indifferent between democratization and repression by(τ) as a function of the tax rate in democracy:
(8.27)
or:
(8.28)
These two conditions both imply the same formula:
(8.29)
where τ = τD if the value of repression is equated to the value of full democracy (i.e., (8.27)) or τ = τPD if the value of partial democracy is relevant (i.e., (8.28)).
At(τ), the rich are indifferent between repression and either partial or full democratization, which leads to the tax rate τ ∈ {τD, τPD}. As a result, for all K <(τ), they prefer repression to democratization. Therefore, another set of parameter values in which repression is an equilibrium outcome is when µ < µ* and K <(τ):
Proposition 8.3: Assume that (8.19) holds. In the game described in Figure 8.4, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Let µ*,(τ), and be as defined above. Then:
• If (8.21) does not bind, the rich set their preferred tax rate, τN= τr.
• It (8.2
1) binds. Then:
(1) If µ < µ* and (8.24) holds, δP≥ ½ , and K ≥ (τPD), the rich undertake a partial democratization.
(2) If µ < µ*, (8.24) does not hold, K > (τD), and δp≥ 1/2, the rich fully democratize.
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Page 39