Epicureanism

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Epicureanism Page 21

by Tim O'Keefe


  10. The canon

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 37–8, 49–51, 76–80 (IG I-2 37–8, 49–51, 76–80; LS 17C, 15A); Ep. Pyth. 85–8, 92–115 (IG I-3 85–8, 92–155; LS 18C, 13B); KD 23, 24 (IG I-5 23, 24; LS 16D); Epicurus On Nature XXV 26–30 (IG I-34; LS 20C); DL X 30–34 (IG I-7; LS 17A, 19I, 16B, 15F, 17E, 18B, 19J); DRN IV 379–499 (LS 16A, 16H), V 509–33 (LS 18D), V 592–770, VI 703–11 (LS 18E); Sext. Emp. Math. VII 203–16 (IG I-68; LS 18A), XIII 63–4 (IG I-70; LS 16F); Plut. Adv. Col. 1120d–e, 1121c–e (IG I-29).

  Elizabeth Asmis’s Epicurus’ Scientific Method (1984) is the most detailed and comprehensive treatment of Epicurean epistemology available. Gisela Striker’s “Epicurus on the Truth of Sense-impressions” in her Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (1996) argues that sensations are alēthēs in the sense of all being true, not merely real, and concludes that the theory is an interesting (if ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to find an infallible ground for knowledge.

  11. Pleasure, the highest good

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Men. 129–30 (IG I-4 129–30; LS 21B); Cic. Fin. I 29–33 (IG I-21; LS 21A).

  Jacques Brunschwig’s “The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism” (1986) is, as the title says, a detailed examination of how examining infant behaviour is supposed to establish what the highest good is. A different analysis of the functioning of the cradle argument can be found in Sedley’s “The Inferential Foundations of Epicurean Ethics” (1998), as part of a larger (and quite fruitful) discussion of the foundations of Epicurean ethics. John Cooper’s “Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus”, in his Reason and Emotion (1998), argues that Epicurus is only an ethical hedonist, not both an ethical and psychological hedonist. Reading this essay paired with Raphael Woolf’s rebuttal “What Kind of Hedonist is Epicurus?” (2004) would be a nice introduction to the issues and texts regarding Epicurean hedonism.

  12. Varieties of pleasure, varieties of desire

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Men. 127–8, 130–31 (IG I-4127–8, 130–31; LS 21B); KD 3, 9, 18, 19, 29, 30 (IG I-5 3, 9, 18, 19, 29, 30; LS 21C, 21D, 23E1, 24C, 21E3); SV 33, 59, 69, 71 (IG I-6 33, 59, 69, 71; LS 21G1, 21G4, 21H2); DL X 22 (IG I-41; LS 24D), X 136–7 (IG I-9; LS 21R); DRN II 963–6, III 28–30, IV 858–76; Cic. Fin. I 37–9 (IG I-22; LS 21A), 55–7 (IG I-23; LS 21U), II 28–35; Porph. Abst. 1.51.6–52.1 (LS 21J).

  In J. Gosling and C. Taylors The Greeks on Pleasure (1982), chs 18–20 concentrate on Epicurus and make the controversial argument that Epicurus himself does not sharply distinguish between kinetic and katastematic pleasures. But the whole book is well worth reading. Jeffrey Purinton’s “Epicurus on the Telos” (1993) argues that the state of being free from pain is not itself a pleasure, but instead is the intentional object in which we take pleasure.

  13. The virtues and philosophy

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Men. 122, 132 (IG I-4 122, 132; LS 25A, 21B); KD 5, 10–13 (IG I-5 5, 10–13; LS 21D, 25B); SV27, 54 (IG I-6 27, 54; LS 25I1, 25D2); DL X 120 (IG I-8; LS 22Q); DRN I 62–79, III 1–30; Cic. Fin. I 34–6, 42–9; Stob. Anthology 3.17.33 (IG I-59); Ath. Deipnosophists 12, 547a (IG I-151); Porph. To Marcella 31 (IG I-124).

  Martha Nussbaum’s “Therapeutic Arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle” (1986) argues (from a broadly Aristotelian perspective) that the Epicureans take a strictly instrumental view of the value of arguments, and that this view has troubling implications. Pierre Hadot’s What is Ancient Philosophy? (2002) contends that ancient philosophy is primarily a way of life instead of a system of theories. It includes extensive consideration of the Epicurean communities in chapter 7.

  14. Justice

  Ancient sources  KD 6–7, 14, 31–40 (IG I-5 6–7, 14, 31–40; LS 22C1, 22a, 22B1–2, 22C2); SV 51, 58 (IG I-6 58; LS 21G3, 22D1); DIX 117–20 (IG I-8; LS 22Q); DRN V 925–1135 (LS 22K, 19B, 22L); Cic. Fin. I 50–53; Porp. Abst. I.44.2–I.55.4, I.7.1–12.7 (LS 22M-N); Stob. Anthology 4.143 (IG I-154).

  Paul Vander Waerdt’s “Hermarchus and the Epicurean Genealogy of Morals” (1988) is a good introduction to Hermarchus’ account of the origin of justice (as preserved in Porphyry), an understudied text. Vander Waerdt argues that Hermarchus adapts the Stoic doctrine of oikeiosis, a natural kinship between members of the same species, to help explain the origin of justice and the exclusion of animals from the justice contract, and that in so doing Hermarchus enriches the basic Epicurean doctrine. John Armstrong’s “Epicurean Justice” (1997) contains a nice discussion of how justice as a virtue relates to justice as a property of social institutions.

  15. Friendship

  Ancient sources  KD 27, 40 (IG I-5 27, 40; LS 22E, 22C2); SV34, 39, 52, 56–7, 66, 78 (IG I-6 34, 39, 52, 56–57, 66, 78; LS 22F3, 22F4, 22F5, 22F6, 22F7); DIX 120–21 (IG I-8; LS 22Q); Cic. Fin. I 65–70 (IG I-26; LS 220), II 78–85; Sen. Ep. 9.8 (IG I-54).

  Matt Evans’s “Can Epicureans Be Friends?” (2004) answers “yes” to the title’s question, and provides an extended and convincing argument that the Epicurean position on friendship can be reconciled with their hedonism. Voula Tsouna’s The Ethics of Philodemus (2007) is a wide-ranging reconstruction of the ethics of this later Epicurean, who was an important source of information for Cicero. Among many other topics, such as Philodemus on property management, Tsouna argues that Philodemus was most probably the source for the “timid” revisionist account of friendship that Torquatus lays out in On Ends, so that Philodemus was the source of one of the most important modifications of Epicurean orthodoxy.

  16. The gods

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Men. 123–4 (IG I-4 123–4; LS 23B), 135 (IG I-4 135; LS 23J); KD 1 (IG I-5 1; LS 23E4); DRN II 600–660, III 1–30, V 146–55 (LS 23L), VI 68–79 (LS 23D); Cic. Nat. D. I 43–56 (IG I-16; LS 23E), 69–76 (IG I-17); Sext. Emp. Math. IX43–7 (LS 23F); Phld. On piety 105 (IG I-56), 112.5–12 (LS 23H).

  M. Erler’s “Epicurus as dues mortalis: Homoiosis theoi and Epicurean Self-cultivation” (2002) examines Epicurus himself as an instantiation of the Epicurean ideal of “becoming godlike”, as Lucretius describes him, and argues that this Epicurean doctrine is rooted in similar ideas put forward in Plato’s Timaeus. André-Jean Festugière’s short book Epicurus and his Gods (1955) does not much engage with the questions that have dominated most of this chapter, about the exact ontological status of the gods. Instead, it places Epicurean religious practices within the contexts of religious practices of the day and the ways in which members of Epicurean communities embody the Epicurean ideals of friendship.

  17. Death

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Men. 124–5 (IG I-4 124–5; LS 24A); KD 19–21 (IG I-5 19–21; LS 24C); SV 14 (IG I-6 14); DRN III 630–1094 (LS 14G, 14H, 24E, 24F, 24G); Plut. Non posse 1101a–b (IG I-40); Phld. On Death XXV 2–10.

  Warren’s Facing Death (2004) is an excellent book that tries to bridge the gap between the modern discussions of the harmfulness of death and the Epicurean texts that inspire those discussions. It is hard to overestimate the impact that Thomas Nagels admirably short, clear and provocative article “Death” (1979) has had on subsequent discussions of the Epicurean arguments concerning death. Nagels article is also included in John Fischer’s The Metaphysics of Death (1993), an outstanding compilation of articles dealing with death, most inspired by the Epicurean arguments.

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