environmental quality and security were not adequately provided by the MFCT. For me, it was
qualitative indices like whether our grasses and hedges were of the same height on both sides of the
road and whether the shortest cul-de-sac in Garki 1 was always clean and garbage collected daily
that indicated that the administration was working. It was quantitative indices like how long it took to
replace a broken street-light, the time patients spent in our hospitals before seeing a physician, and
the number of students that made five credits in WASC and NECO examinations that would measure
our administrative effectiveness. Did our staff regard the residents of the FCT as "customers" that
they should be responsive to politely, and not with the arrogant indifference seen in most government
departments? Were we thinking through policies to address observed problems, and seeing through
implementation? These and similar considerations guided our thought processes throughout.
We, therefore, designed our FCT public service reform programme around six activities, with some
pursued as "quick wins" to send the right signals, and others medium and longer-term in orientation.
The activities were: planning, budget and procurement reforms; structural reorganization of MFCT
and agencies; modernization of internal administrative processes, waste reduction and e-government
solutions; performance measurement, monitoring and evaluation; privatization of services and
promoting public private partnerships wherever possible, and pension reforms, training and re-
professionalization strategies. The goals of all these were to improve service delivery and make the
FCT run as a model city and territory in Nigeria.
Quick Wins ahead of Painful Reforms
We recognized that the reform programme will not have credibility until visible and sustained
improvements in service delivery and the "look and feel' of the city are demonstrated within the
shortest possible timeframe. We therefore focused our first six to nine months on six groups of
decisions and actions to send the message that there were new people in town, and they care about
delivering results quickly.
Beggars had become a huge nuisance in Abuja and even though the AEPB Act 1996 made begging and
street hawking criminal offences in the territory, they had continued unabated and become an industry
of sorts. At traffic lights and junctions, beggars and newspaper vendors struggled for space to attract
the attention of motorists. We studied several reports of previous 'beggar deportations' and
rehabilitation. We then made public our intentions, [104] and then designed a destitution management
programme with three components - rehabilitation, empowerment and enforcement. We gave all the
beggars the opportunity to attend the vocational training school in Bwari free of charge, with free
feeding and lodging for the duration of the training, and paid them a monthly stipend. On completion
of training in various trades, the FCTA gave the graduates tools and equipment, and some seed capital
to start their small businesses. The programme trained hundreds this way. Those that rejected our
offer were arrested and fined until they stopped showing up to beg. The others were repatriated to
their states of choice if neither option was acceptable to them. Those affected by leprosy had a
special settlement built for them at Yangoji in Kwali Area Council, complete with school, clinic[105]
and other essential facilities. Within nine months, there were no beggars on Abuja streets.
The quick greening of the city to take advantage of the rainy season was another quick win. We
invited construction companies that were beneficiaries of FCT's procurement contracts and other
corporate organizations, and requested them to help with city greening and in developing our parks
and recreational facilities as part of their corporate social responsibility. We made it clear that this
was all we required from them - no kickbacks, no free tickets to Europe and so on. Many
enthusiastically accepted and we developed and put into use sixteen neighbourhood, district and city
parks within the first nine months. Some of the recovered areas were also restored as parks. Among
those was Accra Street, where Obasanjo flagged off the widely-publicised demolition exercise on
30th August 2003, [106] and which became Ukpabi Asika Memorial Park. We intensified efforts to
make Abuja cleaner and greener. [107] We launched a programme to plant one million trees in Abuja
within four years, and published a tender to privatize garbage collections. We also invited tenders for
the private maintenance of our streetlights to improve response time in changing expired lamps and so
on. We completed all these processes within the first nine months as we were undertaking internal
structural and administrative changes within the Ministry of FCT and its agencies.
We also paid off a large number of contractors and suppliers who were owed relatively small sums
of money by the MFCT, as part of our “quick wins” programme. On assumption of office, I was
briefed into believing that the MFCT had total liabilities in excess of N150 billion. On digging further
and requesting for an aging analysis of the debts, I found that a substantial percentage of the debts
were small-contractor claims of less than N10 million for work done or goods supplied. These
contractors happened to constitute most of the under-capitalized, briefcase carrying, overnight
contractors that take up a lot of executive time bearing notes from ministers, senators and governors,
requesting payments for what had been due. I thought it made sense to just clear the backlog and get
everyone to focus on bigger challenges. We, therefore, set up a committee on outstanding liabilities
headed by Mr Sylva Ameh, Director Finance & Accounts, which submitted a report in October 2003.
We tasked another committee headed by Yusuf Tsaiyabu, Head of Internal Audit, with making the
payments, but there was one hurdle - there was no money voted for that purpose in the 2003 budget
that I inherited.120 We reviewed the spending priorities, cut down on purchases of tea and coffee,
domestic and international travel, and so on. We then approached the national assembly to approve
the virement - transfer of funds from one budget head to another. We effected payments in two batches
in the total sum of N1.8 billion, in addition to some N700 million in normal liability payments by 31st
December 2003, and succeeded in getting hundreds of companies off our backs.
I have gone into these details to demonstrate the link between sequencing the implementation of
public service reforms, the organizational context and the outcomes. Pursuing public service reform
as a standalone activity without visible improvements in other areas will be interpreted as simply
laying off large numbers of people, and no more.
With regard to the core reforms in the MFCT, we first reviewed the nominal roll from the HR
departments and compared them with the payroll of the Finance & Accounts Department. We ordered
that a pay parade be undertaken for the months of August to October 2003 requiring every employee
to collect his pay in person with staff ID card and letter of first employment. This was then followed
by cheque-only payments to designated bank accounts, and then biometrics - about 3,000 staff failed
to show up. We saved about N756 million in 2004 from these steps taken in 2003. For instance, the
ministry's nominal roll showed 13,855 staff, but only 11,722 cheques were cashed. [108] Other
parastatals and agencies accounted for the balance. By the time we concluded the restructuring and
reforms within the FCT Administration, our nominal and pay rolls were capped at about 18,000
employees. We then undertook detailed process reviews, looking at our budget and spending
priorities, and reversed the structure in favour of capital spending. [109]
The Ministry of the FCT was then dissolved by Executive Order and about 1,500 staff of the Federal
Civil Service were given the option to convert to the FCT Public Service or return to the office of the
Head of Civil Service for posting. Most of them chose to leave the FCT Administration. We then
restructured the entire FCT Administration and right-sized the workforce, disengaging redundant staff
and those engaged in corruption, land racketeering and declining performance.
Intensive training and pay reform followed, enabling our teachers to be better paid than any in the
Federal Government. We collaborated with computer vendors to introduce government-assisted
purchase of computers and motorcycles for FCT staff, with flexible payment terms. On the whole, our
pilot was deemed successful and similar templates were followed by the other pilot MDAs - the State
House, the Federal Ministries of Finance and Information, National Planning Commission and the
Federal Inland Revenue Service.
Creating the Public Service Reform Team
In the course of implementation of reforms in the pilot MDAs, we learnt a few lessons. Obvious ones
included the resistance to change and issues of trust in the reformers. The public servants considered
us hostile outsiders intent on messing up their lives, work and careers. Only continuous interactions
and evidence of good faith can change that perception. The rigid civil service rules and systems did
not help matters, and we realized the need to rewrite and update the rules for the twenty-first century.
Issues of federal character, regional and religious balance in staff disposition constrained decision-
making sometimes, amidst shortage of skills and inadequate resources within the public service.
These all needed to be taken into account when mainstreaming the reform processes to cover the
entire public service.
On 8th August 2005, I submitted a fourteen-page memorandum[110] to the President reporting the
status of the reforms in the FCT and other pilot MDAs, and recommending changes in the
implementation arrangements for the public service reforms. The proposal to change the reporting
relationship such that the Bureau of Public Service Reform reported to the Economic Team through
me was approved. Thereafter, the head of the civil service, in a September 27, 2005 letter to the
president, reluctantly gave his status report. This was transmitted to me and the Secretary to the
Government a week later. By then I had already taken charge of supervising the Bureau of Public
Service Reform, and instituted the reform team.
Like most citizens, I considered myself a victim of the corruption and inefficiency of the public
service. I, therefore, approached the PSRT assignment with single-minded focus to effect reforms in
the service. In this role, I received the support and assistance of many wonderful and capable people.
Segun Peters of the World Bank combined passion for Nigeria, uncommon dedication and intellect
that enabled him break down complicated policies into measurable, implementable strategies. Dr.
Goke Adegoroye, [111] an academic scientist turned civil servant, brought commitment, integrity and
competence, in addition to emotional intelligence, in navigating the minefields and traps of the civil
service establishment, represented by Yayale Ahmed, the intuitively obstructive head of the civil
service. It is my humble opinion that the imperative to reform the public service for effectiveness is
still very much on the table. I will therefore go into some details about what we did, lessons learnt,
and what is left to be done.
In a State of Denial
One major problem with public service reform is the belief held by most public servants that they are
not to blame for the sorry state of affairs. The bulk of the public servants continue to be in denial and
have refused to take responsibility for their ineffectiveness, blaming their political masters for the
dysfunction in the public service. They blame the collapse of merit and excellence in the public
service on the Murtala-Obasanjo retirements "with immediate effect" that occurred in the mid-1970s.
Others attribute the current situation to the Civil Service Reform Decree No. 43 of 1988 of the
Babangida administration. The deterioration of pay and fringe benefits relative to the cost of living as
a result of the Structural Adjustment Programme in the late 1980s has also been identified as
contributory to the de-motivation, deskilling and dispiriting of the public service.
The truth may be a combination of all three and more, compounded by the inability of the public
service to update its methods, skills and technology. The public service has been short-term in its
vision, self-centred in policy formulation and corrupt in programme implementation. Instead, its
leadership (the permanent secretaries and successive heads of civil service) have consistently
focused on taking care of themselves and their narrow interests to the detriment of the nation, the
public service and the governance system which sustains it.
The public service failed to reform itself between 2001 and 2005 when two successive heads of the
civil service were tasked to do so by President Obasanjo. It was therefore inevitable that driving the
public service reforms of 2005-2007 had to be transferred to the economic team, with President
Obasanjo leading the charge himself. I, as an ‘outsider,’ was needed to administer the required
medicine. But even that needed the cooperation of the patient, which was not forthcoming.
Public Service Reforms in Summary
It was incontestable that the public service became dysfunctional following years of neglect and
failure to reform. The public service was both large and unwieldy, accountability was weak and
professional standards low. The federal bureaucracy had also sprawled, with considerable overlap
of functions between agencies, and between tiers and arms of government. There was an urgent need
for both civil service and parastatals reforms, and in spite of all efforts, little progress was made in
that regard.
The need to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the public service had been
recognized from pre-independence days, and over time there were several attempts at reform. The
first of these was the Tudor Davis Commission of 1945-46. The Morgan Commission of 1963 not
only revised salaries and wages of junior staff of the federal government, but introduced for the first
time a minimum wage for each region of the country. The more recent ones include the commissions
headed by Simeon Adebo (1971), Jerome Udoji (1972), Dotun Philips (1986) and the Allison Ayida
Panel (1995). The Dotun Philips reforms properly and correctly aligned the civil service structure
with the constitution and presidential system of government, designating permanent secretaries as
directors-general and deputy ministers. Unfortunately, the reforms devolved human resource functions
with res
pect to employment, promotion and discipline of the junior cadres to ministries with
disastrous consequences which needed dealing with by 2005.
The Bureau of Public Service Reforms (BPSR) was established in September 2003 as an independent
agency in the Presidency to ensure the reform of all ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) of
all arms and branches of the federal government, and submitted quarterly reports to the President. The
Public Service Reform Team (PSRT) had the BPSR as its secretariat and met weekly every Tuesday
to deliver on its mandate. Some of the achievements of that round of reforms include:
Restructuring of Pilot Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs): The PSRT produced two
generic guidelines approved by cabinet in March 2006 for the reform and restructuring of MDAs and
parastatals. Initially five pilot MDAs volunteered for restructuring and this was expanded to 14. This
entailed cleaning up the staff headcount and payroll, and redesigning the MDA structure to have
between four and eight departments and two to four divisions per department. These were approved
by the cabinet on May 16th, 2007 and became applicable to all government departments immediately.
Cleaning up of Civil Service and Parastatals Nominal Rolls: A committee of the reform team,
headed by Steve Oronsaye,[112] developed eight criteria for the retirement of public servants to
enable the clean-up of the headcount and reducing the negative impact of the devolution of human
resource management functions to MDAs in 1988, and the failures of the FCSC and OHCSF to
discharge their central management functions. An appeals process was put in place to minimize
victimization and errors. For the civil service, about 45,000 names were prepared by MDAs and
forwarded to BPSR for consideration and approval by PSRT, and then forwarded to the FCSC for
removal from the service. An initial batch of 36,843 officers were put through pre-retirement
The Accidental Public Servant Page 48