On March 29, Biddle cabled the Secretary of State and told him about his talk with Beck and Poland’s resolve not to acquiesce to Germany’s requests. Perhaps, the Poles figured that Germany would invade Poland as they had Czechoslovakia. Therefore, they decided to militarily oppose Hitler, especially since they had, according to Bullitt, the support of the United States. 986
On that same day, even before Britain gave its guarantee, the Polish escalated their rearmament program and declared that they were going to double the Territorial Army in size from 170,000 to 340,000. In April, officials revealed its intentions to initiate obligatory military service. On June 6, the Swedish executive Axel Wenner-Gren, owner of Electrolux, with close connections to British financial circles, met with Chamberlain to deliver a message from Göring who said Germany did not want war. The Reichsmarshall offered a twenty-five year peace pact, approval of all German claims, especially regarding Danzig and the Polish Corridor, followed by disarmament talks. Göring also requested the restoration of international commerce. 987
Beck did not acknowledge Hitler’s offer regarding the Corridor, Posen and Upper Silesia in exchange for Danzig, actions that many NSDAP members opposed. Hitler also wanted Poland to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. While Hitler referred to an attack against the USSR in Mein Kampf, he abandoned that idea after the Bolsheviks totally established their control in Russia. Diplomats serving in Berlin felt that Hitler was absolutely justified and reasonable in his offers to Poland. Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador to Germany, thought that his offer was very fair and generous. On April 3, Hitler asked the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) to draw up provisional plans for an attack on Poland. 988
On March 31, based on FDR’s support, Chamberlain, along with the French pledged their aid to Poland in the event of a war. Chamberlain told the House of Commons that Britain would support Poland in the event of a military assault. However, they were both incapable of preventing an invasion of Poland if diplomatic talks between Warsaw and Berlin failed. If the Soviets invaded Poland, they would be the only victors in the situation. Polish officials, to whom they gave the pledge, were not the real power in Poland, but merely a camouflage, for a group of unscrupulous men, many of whom were army officers. 989
From 1919 until 1926, at least 990,000 ethnic Germans relocated from Poland to Germany. On April 6, 1939, according to the Polish census, there were 741,000 ethnic Germans residing in Poland, who, along with the Jews, suffered from official restrictions. 990 The German Austrians and the Sudeten Germans exercised an adaptation of the right of return; even before officials codified it in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 10, 1948). Usually people just apply this “right of return” to the Jew’s insistence on returning to Palestine even if they have never previously set foot in the area. Clearly, people selectively and habitually manipulate and exploit such legislation to their benefit. 991
Beck, who claimed that Danzig had belonged to Poland for centuries, went to London to finalize a British/Polish alliance, which they did on April 3, 1939. 992 On April 11, the Warsaw Parliament began preparing and gathering support for national defense and mobilization. FDR sent Hitler a telegram on April 15, accusing him of aggression. On that day, Britain and France vowed to protect the independence of Romania and Greece, as well as fight with Poland. The British claimed that they wanted to prevent Germany from making Eastern Europe into a colony or from developing her maximum capacity. Otherwise, Britain could do nothing, which would permit Germany to become as strong as she was which might reduce Britain to a second-rate country. Whatever actions she took, neither Chamberlain nor Halifax wanted any kind of an alliance with the Soviet Union. 993
On April 23, without a hint of a German threat, Warsaw officials activated another 334,000 army reservists. 994 On April 25, the Polish media promoted the developing connection between Moscow and Warsaw and applauded the Soviet Union’s interest in Polish concerns. There was a definite easing of tensions between the Soviet Union and Poland, potentially an encircled country, which German officials should have noticed. 995 On April 26, encouraged by Britain, Poland issued two laws, one to enable them to assemble the military reserves and auxiliaries and the other to introduce conscription, both in effect for three years, indicative of the length of time they expected to be engaged in warfare. Hitler, in response, and perceiving the source of the change in Poland’s foreign policy, delivered a speech to the Reichstag. He rescinded the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement and the 1934 German-Polish treaty. 996
British officials, cognizant of the Pole’s long-standing animosity towards the Germans, knew that violence, now sanctioned by the state, would lead to genocide. Since the Versailles Treaty, the Polish press had engaged in anti-German rhetoric. Now, that propaganda was even more pronounced and aggressive against Germany and the German minorities. Poland’s national hatred, backed by Britain, spread like an epidemic which resulted in unbelievable savagery. The British, because they were aware of the historical prejudices, were just as responsible for the appalling consequences, the atrocities, and the bloodshed. Britain’s guarantee was Poland’s blank check to vent their rage. The Polish rejected Hitler’s compromises and assistance which he made public during his Reichstag speech on April 28 but chose to exterminate the German minority who they had long deprived of all its rights. 997
As early as April 1939, Stalin and Churchill, who led the War Party thought it beneficial to cooperate in a multi-front war against Germany. In July, they agreed, probably through Stalin’s agent in London, Ivan Maisky, who was close to Churchill, that Britain would only declare war against Germany, although both nations, Germany and the Soviet Union, would attack Poland. On October 15, Stalin and Churchill would sign the agreement to economically and militarily obliterate Germany. 998 On April 28, in his speech, Hitler said that he would welcome the opportunity to negotiate a new treaty relative to Polish-German relations. Newspapers, anti-German and anti-Hitler, reported on the Polish-British Pact implying that war was imminent because of Germany’s alleged hostility. German farmers in Danzig, fearful of the Polish authorities, hid their valuables and often spent their nights away from their farms. In April, Bromberg’s mayor said that if Germany invaded his town, they would be stepping over the corpses of Bromberg’s Germans. 999
On May 5, Beck delivered a speech at the Warsaw Chamber of Deputies announcing agreements with England and France. 1000 On that day, after Britain’s guarantee of support, the Polish government refused Ribbentrop’s proposals. Germany’s goal was legitimate and reasonable. Poland’s actions were “the spark” that started World War II. 1001 Author Hamilton Fish wrote, “There was no valid reason for Poland not to realize that Germany had a justifiable claim to get back a German city that was lost by the Versailles Treaty.” Two years before the crisis, Lord Lothian said, “Now if the principle of self-determination were applied on behalf of Germany in the way in which it was applied against them, it would mean the reentry of Austria into Germany, the Union of the Sudeten Deutsch, Danzig, and probably Memel with Germany, and certain adjustments with Poland in Silesia and the Corridor.” 1002
The Polish government abandoned its German citizens to “the lowest class of Polish degenerates,” terrorists who had such a lust for murder. Irresponsible rulers put themselves into an irreparable situation and did not consider the dire consequences of an armed conflict with Germany to their citizens. They made their decisions based on outside influences, the biggest factor in their abandonment of the ethnic Germans. Britain guaranteed that they would rescue Polish citizens from the effects of warfare if Germany invaded. Britain exploited Poland, just a pawn to intensify Britain’s encirclement policy to provoke a long-planned war. Britain used Poland as a battering ram against Germany, over the Danzig Corridor issue. 1003
On May 21, 1939 in Danzig, a Polish citizen, claiming self-defense, shot a German, probably a staged event. Two days later, a representative from Britain, France and Sweden sided
with Poland and opted not to alter the status of the Free City of Danzig. On May 24, the Polish Commissioner-General in Danzig and the Danzig NS government argued about the accountability of the incident. On May 31, Molotov said that the Soviet Union supported Poland while condemning Germany’s Czechoslovakian policy, which may have temporarily affected the possibility of a German-Russian compromise. On May 25, Laurence Steinhardt, soon to become the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, while visiting Moscow, explained the details to the German Chief of Mission, Graf Schulenburg, saying that the Germans and the Soviets could maintain contact. 1004
On June 12, Biddle, after a conversation with the Polish Foreign Ministry, Jan Wszelaki, reported to Cordell Hull that the Poles, unlike the Czechs, were prepared to resist “oppression” and fight and die for their country, especially against the Germans. Apparently, Joseph Goebbels did not understand the serious implications, because on June 17, in Danzig, he said that “agitators” had created the issue. He reported Poland’s goals to annex Silesia and East Prussia and said that the Poles did not worry about the number of Germans that they slaughtered. On June 29, President Moscicki claimed that Poland was arming to “maintain peace in the Polish shore of the Baltic Sea.”
The Poles also claimed that the German Freikorps in Danzig intensified the crisis. On July 2, the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet stated that France and Britain planned to fulfill their assurances to the Poles because rumor had it that Hitler intended to declare Anschluss for Danzig. On July 10, Chamberlain reaffirmed Britain’s guarantee. On July 13, foreign newspapers reported that the Danzig Germans wanted to nominate Hitler their president. On July 24, the Polish government rejected any supposed attempts of Germany to incorporate Danzig into the Reich. 1005
On August 3, Hitler told 2,000 officers on the General Staff that this big “secret” meeting they were having was a pretense intended for Britain, as a show of force. Despite the fact that “they” had already decided on war, he hoped that Britain understood that peace was the best option. He gave a four-hour address, for the benefit of the British, in which he stated, “Do not think, gentlemen, that I am an idiot and will let myself be forced into war because of the question of the Polish Corridor.” 1006 British historian, Russell Grenfell, said, “First of all, was there anything essentially wicked in Hitler’s desire to retake the Polish Corridor? 1007
As early as the Military Conference of August 6, Germany’s senior military personnel knew that war was imminent. On August 7, Johan Dahlerus, a Swede, a close acquaintance of Göring, arranged a meeting at his house between Göring and seven British executives who tried to convince Göring that Britain would abide by its treaty promises to Poland. At the Nuremberg trials, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, a British prosecutor, told Dahlerus that the Germans misled him, which they had not.
On August 24, someone in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow sent a telegram notifying the U.S. Government, within hours, of the signing of the “Secret Additional Protocol.” The Polish government kept American officials in Warsaw up to date on every development. On August 25, British officials signed the Anglo-Polish mutual assistance agreement. On the same day, almost on cue, Prime Minister Daladier echoed the same sentiments. Also on that day, as if they had synchronized schedules, FDR sent a message to Hitler suggesting that he would intercede in finding a resolution to the German-Polish conflict. On August 25, Hitler had already contemplated having the Wehrmacht march into Poland and had given the order but rescinded it on August 26. 1008
Right up until the end of August 1939, some French and British officials, reconsidering Bullitt’s promises of military support, tried to persuade Polish officials in Warsaw to negotiate with Hitler who contacted Beck in an effort to resume communications for a peaceful resolution. Beck, instead of responding to his peace-seeking neighbor, flew to London to confer with the British military. Hitler learned of Beck’s trip in the newspapers. Beck returned to Poland and immediately mobilized troops at the German border. Within a day, French and Scandinavian newspapers reported that Poland had placed their airspace at the disposal of the Soviet Union, an invitation to Stalin that he was not ready to accept. Clearly revealing Poland’s intentions, the nation’s main newspaper, Kurier Polski proclaimed in its headlines—Germany must be destroyed. 1009
On August 25, British and Polish officials altered Britain’s declaration of support into a mutual assistance pact. Simultaneously, Benito Mussolini told Hitler that he was unable to declare war on the Western Powers. Dahlerus, an intermediary between Göring and Lord Halifax, went to London to inform the British that Germany wanted to negotiate with Britain. Halifax told him that they were always willing to talk, without the assistance of a mediator. On August 26, Dahlerus again talked with Halifax who wrote to Hitler that the British only wanted peace and wanted some time to accomplish that objective. On August 27, Dahlerus flew to London, and met with Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Sir Horace Wilson and Sir Alexander Cadogan. Dahlerus presented Hitler’s modest sixteen-point proposal to Britain regarding Danzig and the Polish Corridor, something Poland had already determined as unacceptable in preference of a war. Dahlerus returned to Berlin to obtain Hitler’s response. Dahlerus advised the British to retain Henderson in London to handle Hitler’s response.
On August 29, Ribbentrop and Henderson discussed the sixteen points which Germany requested of Poland. Henderson complained that they failed to give him a copy. The next day, Göring gave Dahlerus a copy of the document which he then delivered to Henderson who in turn dispatched it to Lipski. On August 30, Hitler officially issued his sixteen-point solution for the management of the Danzig-Corridor and the resolution of the German-Polish minority question. Although Hitler wanted to return Danzig to the Reich, he would not have gone to war over the issue. Poland mobilized for war on August 30. On August 31, at 12:40, Hitler instructed the Wehrmacht to begin warfare against Poland on September 1, 1939 at 4:45 clock. 1010
On August 31, Lipski and Ribbentrop met. However, Lipski had no negotiation authority. Dahlerus made one final effort when he suggested that Göring meet with Henderson again, along with Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes. On August 31, at 9 pm all of the radio stations in Germany interrupted their schedules to broadcast Hitler’s sixteen-point plan, which included provisions for Germany’s annexation of Danzig, a corridor across the Danzig Corridor, the holding of a plebiscite in the Corridor area in twelve months’ time, and the exchange of populations at a later time. He agreed to recognize the port of Gdynia as Polish, which gave Poland access to the sea. Officials delivered the plan to the Polish ambassador on September 1.
The Poles blew up the Dirschau (Tczew) bridge over the Vistula River on August 31. The eastern portion of the bridge was on German territory. The Poles in the Danzig vicinity attacked hundreds of ethnic Germans. Despite all of these events, Hitler did not insist on a total Polish defeat but preferred to end all hostilities and negotiate. He had seen war firsthand and did not want another European war. Dahlerus, a friend of Göring offered to talk with certain British officials who might be able to terminate the Polish aggression. 1011
Germany Finally Responds
On the evening of August 31, 1939, the Poles attacked Gleiwitz, a mile from Poland’s western border. Göring told Henderson about the incendiary incidents perpetrated by the Poles and he believed that Hitler and Göring were sincere about peace. The German press covered the details of the Gleiwitz incident. During the Nuremberg Trials, the prosecution claimed that Germans dressed as Polish soldiers staged the incident. Gleiwitz was home to a branch of the Polish Bank Ludowy (People’s Bank). The bank’s employees tried to organize an uprising among the Polish minority in West Upper Silesia with the assumption that the Polish military would be arriving shortly. They left for Poland just before the incident. The town’s residents assumed that those employees had seized the radio station. 1012 Poland had also launched thirty-five sorties into eastern Germany. Despite what the textbooks claim, Poland declared war on Ger
many at midnight, on August 31, 1939. 1013
The Third Reich started land operations in Poland on September 1, at dawn, 04:45 am when German forces marched into Poland to rescue the ethnic Germans. Hitler announced in the Reichstag, “Since dawn today we are shooting back.” Maurice Bardeche, a French journalist wrote, “We will, of course, be told tomorrow morning that Hitler has attacked Poland. Certain people have been waiting and longing for this moment. They were expecting this attack, having been hankering and praying for it. These men are called Mandel, Churchill, Hore-Belisha and Paul Reynaud. The great league of Jewish reaction was determined to have its own war. This was its holy war. They knew very well that only such an attack could give them a chance to capture public opinion. It will not be very difficult to find the necessary proofs in the German archives that certain gentlemen in cold blood prepared the conditions which made this attack inevitable. Woe betides them should the true history of the war ever be written.” 1014
About three hours later, Göring told Dahlerus that the Poles had attacked Germany at Dirschau. Dahlerus, in his Nuremberg testimony, stated that “the Poles are sabotaging everything” and claimed that the Poles never intended to negotiate with Germany. At about mid-day, Cadogan told Dahlerus that they would negotiate if Germany withdrew its forces. In 1938, Cadogan had replaced Robert Vansittart in the Foreign Office. On September 3, the British and French governments issued an ultimatum to the German government. Dahlerus notified the British Foreign Office just minutes before the ultimatum expired, suggesting that Göring should leave immediately for London to negotiate. The British rejected Göring’s proposals. London officials rebuffed Dahlerus so he contacted Cadogan at 12:20 pm on September 1 and urged Dahlerus to discontinue his mediation attempts. However, Dahlerus was obstinate and insisted on addressing the dynamics which generated the war. Cadogan seemed rather indignant because Dahlerus implied that the Poles had initiated the hostilities, not Germany. Cadogan naturally argued with that proposition. 1015
The Ruling Elite Page 36