by Yael Tamir
spread of reason, and the beginning of a new enlightenment. This
vision captivated the imagination, promising endless economic
growth, expanding opportunities, and an ongoing increase in
well- being. Each generation was to be better off than its
predecessors.
Disappointingly, the twenty- first century opened with a se-
ries of social and economic crises. Many of the achievements of
the previous decades have come under threat; the young gen-
erations fear the return of the crisis of capitalism and worry
about the well- being of their parents and their children. No
wonder that liberal optimism has lost its popularity and that
those who several years ago chanted “Yes, We Can!” now suspect
“we” cannot.
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Trump’s election alongside Brexit, the growing support for
separatist movements, the rise of the new right in many Euro-
pean countries, and the phenomena of national and religious
awakenings around the world leave liberals perplexed. They were
convinced they were doing the right thing. Michael Moore
proudly summarized their achievements:
Things are better. The left has won the cultural wars. Gays and
lesbians can get married. A majority of Americans now take the
liberal position on just about every polling question posed
to them: Equal pay for women— check. Abortion should be
legal— check. Stronger environmental laws— check. More gun
control— check. Legalize marijuana— check.1
One day, on his way home, Moore was stopped by a man who
said: “Mike . . . we have to vote for Trump. We HAVE to shake
things up.” Why did he say that? The man’s words made Moore
stop and think. This is the virtue of many of the recent political
events; they force us to stop and reflect on the way we have in-
terpreted the basic social and economic developments of the
last half of a century.
Historical turning points are difficult to detect—usually they
are acknowledged in retrospect; the assassination of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo, the self- immolation of
an unknown Tunisian street merchant, and the first inflatable
boat loaded with refugees crossing the Mediterranean changed
the world, yet it took some time before the massive scope of the
change was acknowledged. We tend to analyze events in hind-
sight. Why did the people revolt? Why did the refuges start
to flee across the Mediterranean at a certain point in time? Why
didn’t the man share Moore’s view that things are so much
better? Much of this book is an answer to these questions, yet
unlike many commentators who put the blame on those who
The New Nationalism • 5
acted against their expectations, I ask a different question: why
were the accumulating warning signs that the social and politi-
cal crisis is deepening transparent to those in power? The
blindness I am interested in is that of the elites.
The present political upheaval is a necessary wake- up call, an
invitation to admit that the liberal- progressive camp has made
its mistakes and must look back on the last forty years with a
sense of self- criticism. Many would like to think that the pres-
ent state of affairs is no more than a sad coincidence; that things
could easily have gone the other way, and soon they would go
back to normal. They are wrong. Among Trump’s tweets, Le
Pen’s slogans, and the demonstrations of the extreme right,
some real concerns are hidden. It is dangerous to comfort one-
self with the fact that actually Hil ary won the popular vote, Le
Pen wasn’t elected, and Brexit supporters did not know what
the European Union was all about and now regret their vote.
Whether winning or losing, new powers entered the political
game, and they cannot be ignored.
In liberalism’s victorious years the Western world assumed it
had outgrown nationalism; now that it is back it lacks the tools
to accommodate its challenge. Why nationalism now? What pro-
voked national feelings and national ideology and made them
more relevant than ever? Is nationalism a dormant evil force wait-
ing to pop out whenever there is a crisis, a force that must be
repressed at all costs, or is it a constructive power, a worthwhile
ideology that could and should be harnessed to make the world
a better place? This book presents a case for nationalism, high-
lighting the ways it shaped public policy and made the years be-
tween the end of the world wars and the eruption of neoliberal
globalism the best years for the least well- off members of the
developed world.2 Some may say that these years were good ones
because nationalism was repressed, allowing liberal democracy
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to flourish. I, however, wish to argue the opposite— namely, that
many of the achievements of that period were dependent on an
alliance between the nation and the state.
True, neither liberals nor nationalists are eager to expose their
interdependencies— as with many odd couples, they wish to dis-
tance themselves, avoiding the embarrassment associated with
admitting they cannot do without each other. But they have been
partners for years. The vigor and anger with which liberals are
rejecting nationalism are not a sign of estrangement but a cover-
up of a too- intimate reliance.
Political ideologies would like to be self- sufficient; they trem-
ble at the thought of their shortcomings being exposed. I wish
to do exactly that— expose the ideological interdependencies
that shape our world, arguing that the modern democratic state
cannot have survived without the supportive hand of both lib-
eral and national ideologies. My argument highlights areas where
liberal democratic theory draws on national criteria to counter
the pressures of globalism, and where nationalism relies on
liberal- democratic principles to strengthen its claims for
self- determination.
The nation- state has been an ideal meeting point between the
two, and hence it is here to stay. Democratic regimes require a
pre- political partnership that turns citizens into a collective
entity that has a common past and a common future. In the
absence of a political we, states disintegrate, and the political
structure that allows them to turn into democratic and decent
entities dissolves.
A political we had never been a natural phenomenon; it must
be created, and then constantly nurtured, supported, and re-
invented. This is an old truth that is easily forgotten. States are
manmade entities that need to be cherished and maintained.
Enchanted with what seemed to be their conclusive victory,
The New Nationalism • 7
liberal democracies felt secure and ignored the ongoing work
of state building. Confident that they would last forever, they
neglected the need for ideological and political maintenance.
They withdrew from the public sphere, became reluctant to
nur-
ture a unifying cultural and political narrative that acculturates
citizens to confront the evolving social and economic condi-
tions. Invisible hands were expected to solve social problems
and merge the different identities gathered under the wings of
the Rainbow Coalition into a new social identity strong enough
to carry the burden of the state. No wonder states are now facing
an existential crisis.
While liberal democrats were paralyzed by their assumed vic-
tory, nationalists felt defeated and obsolete. In most of the de-
veloped world they were taken to be outdated, carrying the voice
of political immaturity, raising the kind of ideas civilized people
don’t mention around a dinner table. They have therefore lost
the ability to offer the state a supportive hand.
With no one working to preserve its unique structure, the
modern nation- state started crumbling down. Should we lament
its disintegration? Many argue that nowadays it is more of a bur-
den than an asset; that it fitted the needs of modernization but
that it cannot meet the needs of a postindustrial world, that we
should let it be torn apart by global and local forces and opt for
a better alternative— yet none has so far emerged.
The present social and political chaos exposes the damaging
outcomes of the theoretical and political void caused by the
demise of the nation- state. When states step aside they leave
behind a social, political, economic, and cultural vacuum. The
public sphere is emptied of ideological and motivational
forces that could promote social solidarity and encourage the
erection of mechanisms necessary to combat growing social
alienation.
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Even when state intervention is indispensable, the language
used to justify it has been delegalized; national planning is as-
sumed to be breeding inefficiency and corruption, undermining
the productive spirit kindled by personal freedom. In time, re-
sentment of the state crossed party lines, joining liberals and
conservatives in a struggle for personal freedom. This led to the
shrinking of the state and the erosion of its regulatory powers.
Checks and balances were removed, allowing markets to shape
public life. The weakness of the state alongside the prominence
of the markets opened unprecedented opportunities for a new
kind globalism that is individualistic rather than state governed.
Each person was encouraged to compete on his/her own. In an
age marked by competitiveness, people are ready to do “what-
ever it takes” to have the upper hand. They compete internally
and internationally without ever thinking of the larger social ef-
fects of their actions. As a result, social and economic gaps grow,
and the social contract held by a combination of democratic and
national beliefs loses its power. With the spreading of social dis-
array, some political players try to capture the opportunity and
draft a new contract that would serve their interests. Seeking to
justify their claims they turn to nationalism— which in modern
times was, and still is, the greatest legitimizing political power.
Present- day nationalism appears in two different forms, both
grounded in the weakness of the state: the first, the more classic
one, is to be found in Catalonia, Lombardy, and Vento as well
as in Flanders, Transylvania, Scotland, Kurdistan, and lately
Brazil. It represents the desire of national groups, concentrated
in distinct territories, to capture the opportunity and demand
self- rule. As this claim is voiced in the name of the people, such
national movements try to recruit as many fellow nationals as
possible. Consequently, they are inwardly inclusive, bringing on
board each and every member of the nation regardless of age,
The New Nationalism • 9
gender, or class, nurturing a partnership among the elites, the
middle classes, and the working classes to back the national
agenda.
Separatist national movements challenge the boundaries of
existing states for both national and economic reasons. Often
they represent the desire of the more affluent regions to be freed
from the obligation to share their wealth with members of poorer
regions they now take to be outsiders. The affluent attempt to
rewrite the political contract in ways that will secure them bet-
ter life chances, offering new political and cultural opportunities
to their elites and a larger share of the national wealth to the
people.
The second kind of nationalism is the nationalism of the less
wel - off, those left defenseless by the process of hyperglobaliza-
tion.3 The vulnerable revoke national feelings in order to con-
vince the elites to come back home from their global voyage and
put their nation first. Because the vulnerable do not inhabit a
defined territory or have a distinct identity, they define them-
selves in opposition to others. From here, the distance to an
aggressive, xenophobic type of nationalism is short. Yet, despite
their brutal language and their association with hateful right-
wing movements, many of the claims the vulnerable make are
not without moral value. The demand to rewrite the social con-
tract in ways that will answer their needs is a legitimate one.
Their request to be included and fairly treated is as justified
as their xenophobia is morally unwarranted.
The nationalism of the vulnerable is a revolt against the
betrayal of the global elites. The vulnerable rightly feel it is un-
just that those who exploit cheap labor and natural resources
overseas are al owed to portray themselves as moral universal-
ists, while those trying to defend their jobs and their future
back home are labeled as narrow- minded bigots. They would like
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their claims to be taken seriously rather than rejected offhand,
dismissed as populists or reactionaries.
Liberals would like us to believe that nationalists are morally
inferior to globalists. They conveniently ignore the strong cor-
relation between social class and political preferences. Some
suggest that this correlation attests to the fact that moral and
political competence varies among members of the different
social classes, or to put it bluntly, that the more educated and
affluent exercise better judgment than the rest. My theory travels
between the two types of nationalism, making it harder to pin
nationalism on the hil bil ies, the rednecks, or European right-
wing extremists. The savvy people of Catalan and northern Italy
force us to think harder about the origins of nationalism and its
role in the contemporary political reality.
It is easier to be a globalist if you are likely to enjoy the ben-
efits of an open market, or to support free immigration if you
feel secure in your social status and do not fear that newcomers
are going to take your job, or reduce the value of your property
by r
enting the next- door apartment, forcing your neighborhood
schools to face new challenges. Likewise, it is logical to be against
separatism if you think you might be on the losing side and sup-
port it if you expect to enjoy its benefits. This means that moral
and social luck plays an important role in determining the scope
of values and behaviors individuals are likely to consider and
are able to endorse.4 If one’s position in the national- global de-
bate strongly correlates to one’s actual interests and expecta-
tions, there is no reason to describe one side as being more
rational, moral, or open- minded than the other. Exposing the
rational aspects hidden in national choices, and contrary to
most commentators, I suggest that the reemergence of national
feelings is a sensible response to the present social, political, and
The New Nationalism • 11
economic circumstances rather than an uncontrolled outburst
of destructive human qualities.
Nationalism has always been part of the modern political
world, at times occupying the back seat, at others the front row.
The persistence of nationalism attests to its inherent value. This
book aims to enumerate the assets that nationalism brings to the
political discourse and examine a variety of national claims with-
out falling into the ad hominem trap of rebutting ideas by at-
tacking the people making the argument or those associated with
them. The present political discourse deals far too often with the
(problematic) personalities of the deliverers rather than with
the issues themselves. It is therefore important to emphasize
that what follows is not an argument in support of any particu-
lar leader or political movement but an examination of the
accuracy of theoretical claims judged on their own merit.
The text tries to keep a calm tone, avoiding the hysteria or mel-
ancholia characteristic of present- day political exchanges; it
takes a step back in order to get some perspective and encour-
age intellectual modesty so desperately needed these days. In
this spirit it shuns inflated declarations and false promises and
tries to adjust expectations to the social and political conditions
of our time. Much of the present- day sense of disappointment
is grounded in the inability of both theorists and political lead-
ers to break away from the illusion that all problems can be