by Yael Tamir
book Populism: A Very Short Introduction, Cristóbal Rovira Kalt-
wasser and Cas Mudde define populism as an ideology that
considers society to be separated into two homogenous and
antagonistic groups: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,”
arguing that politics should be an expression of the volonté
générale (general wil ) of the people.8
The common ground of populist claims is the complaint that
the ruling political elites fail to represent the “real” interests of
the “real” people. Such claims could be used to discredit perfectly
decent regimes, but they could also point to the actual failures
of a political system. In most cases, populist criticism embodies
a bit of both: a grain of truth enveloped in zealous terminology.
The most interesting definition of populism is offered by the
Dutch social scientist Jan- Werner Müller, who describes popu-
lism as an “il iberal democratic response to undemocratic lib-
eralism.”9 According to Müller, “populism is seen as a threat but
also as a potential corrective for a politics that has somehow be-
come too distant from ‘the people.’ ”10 Needless to say, concern
about the development of a democratic deficit or mounting
inequalities has little to do with populism. The mere fact that the
masses share a critical view may be disconcerting for the elites,
yet it certainly does not make it illegitimate. This is particularly
true in an age characterized by liberal elites concerned with
their own wel - being rather than with their democratic duties.
Liberal elites, Müller argues, are worried about “what they see
as il iberal masses falling prey to populism, nationalism, and even
outright xenophobia.”11 In one sentence, he adequately captures
the patronizing ways in which the masses are perceived: an
amalgam of individuals who have no personal autonomy, are un-
able to make decisions, swayed by passing moods, and are fall-
ing prey to notoriously dangerous political movements, of
The Two Faces of Janus • 31
which nationalism is but one example. These claims express dis-
respect for the personal autonomy of one’s opponents. People
who are wrong should be corrected; people who are swayed
should be stopped. The conclusion is clear, populists should not
be given the power to change things; hence their claims are
stripped of corrective powers. The accusation of populism is
used to restructure the perception of the debate, transform it
into a conflict between the rational and the ridiculous, the
open and the racist mind, a conflict that calls for victory rather
than for a compromise that would lay the basis of a new social
agreement.12
Nationalism could indeed be reactionary and populist, but the
new nationalism we are witnessing is much more than that—it
is an expression of a distinct anti- elitist voice that reflects the
widening rift between the people and the privileged few, as wel
as the anger inspired by the growing inequalities and the emer-
gence of “two nations” where there used to be just one. This
anger should not be shelved and repressed; it should be given a
voice, considered in an attempt to revise the present world
order and make it work for the benefit of the many.
In seeking to build a more decent social and political regime,
one that provides all citizens better protection and better life
chances, it is important to remember that no institution did it
better than the nation- state. International organizations are play-
ing a growing role in a wide range of spheres— they determine
educational standards, banking and auditing regulations,
medical directives, and trade agreements— yet none is able
to replace the state in its most important social and democratic
roles: allowing individuals to be self- governing, meeting the
political challenge of “no taxation without representation,” and
developing distributive tools and a social support system for
those who need it.
32 • Chapter
4
Hence, the nation- state should be our primary unit of analy-
sis, argues the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum, “on
account of its pivotal importance in setting life conditions for all
on a basis of equal respect, and as the largest unit we know until
now that is decently accountable to peoples’ voices and capable
of expressing their desires to give themselves laws of their own
choosing.”13 The Harvard economist Dani Rodrik concurs. The
nation- state, he argues, is still the best tool for administrating
social and economic issues.14
In a hypothetical world, globalism may be the answer, but in
our fractured reality the few international agencies that exist did
not prove themselves to be more independent and less influ-
enced by the powerful, or more efficient in protecting individu-
als and their rights, than the nation- state. Assuming our goal is
to secure the democratic representation of the people and rebuild
political trust, the nation- state, rather than some form of global-
ism, should be our choice.
5
Nutopia
In what may have been one of the most symbolic moments of
the last half of the twentieth century, John Lennon and Yoko Ono
declared the establishment of Nutopia, a borderless state anyone
can voluntarily join. “Imagine” became Nutopia’s semiofficial
hymn:
Imagine there’s no countries
It isn’t hard to do
Nothing to kill or die for
And no religion too
Imagine all the people living life in peace . . .
You may say I’m a dreamer
But I’m not the only one
I hope someday you’ll join us
And the world will be as one.
If you are over fifty, I am sure you can hum along. Maybe you
sang it out loud at a sit- in or a demonstration of the peace move-
ment; Lennon’s song plays in the background, while people
hold hands and light candles, hoping for an open and peaceful
world. The influence of “Imagine” on a whole generation and its
perception of an ideal world cannot be overestimated. Yet, like
all utopian fantasies, this too was a dangerous one. A borderless
world is far from ideal; it can be neither democratic nor just. For
34 • Chapter
5
a democracy to work, individuals need to form an ongoing union,
allowing members to test and trust one another’s intentions
over a considerable span of time.
Game theory teaches us that multiple games played by the
same players increase the probability of playing by the rules. If
people can leave the game after a certain round they might be
tempted to exploit the maximum benefit from that round, ignor-
ing future risks and benefits. In other words, a social contract
that does not last for an unknown period of time induces inse-
curity and raises the chances of social egoism and unfairness. It
also erodes the rationality of transgenerational commit
ments, as
the children of those who now invest in structuring some insti-
tution or another will grow up, be educated, mature, and age in
another social context.
Moreover, when individuals move freely and frequently in and
out of a democratic system, it will become unclear who is enti-
tled to vote and who is entitled to be elected. As those who
chose the present leadership may have already moved on and
newcomers have different and unpredictable interests, whose
interests should the elected representatives defend? Who is
entitled to make pledges for the future and fulfill political prom-
ises? And who should make decisions regarding membership,
those who are already members or those who would like to be
members?
While writing “Imagine,” Lennon aspired to get an American
visa; for him the idea that his request could be rejected was in-
conceivable. Like other members of the elite who have the
means to move from one place to another, he believed he had
the right to travel freely around the world and live wherever he
chose. Indeed, Nutopia is an attractive vision for those who do
not depend on the existence of a social network for either their
security or their livelihood. In his song “The Other Side of the
Nutopia • 35
Summer” Elvis Costello captured the class bias of the “Imagine”
dream, asking sarcastically: “Was it a mil ionaire who said: imag-
ine no possessions?” Castello was right! The “Imagine” vision
served a certain class better than others, and it was these benefi-
ciaries who promoted it as a universal vision.
For globalists, borders are an unnecessary interruption, a hur-
dle blocking the free flow of capital, skil s, and wealth. Hence,
they preach free trade and open borders, but the concept of an
“open border” is an oxymoron; borders are meant to be closed,
to draw a distinction between what is in and what is out; cross-
ing the border must be the exception and not the rule.
Borders are by no means a nationalist idea. No social contract
and no system of distribution can function as an open political
framework. This is especially true in a democracy. The legitimacy
of kings and tyrants does not derive from the boundaries of the
exact territory they govern or the population found under their
sovereignty. The legitimacy of a democratic regime depends on
the support it gathers among its citizens. The question of who
is a member thus gains special importance.
Empires moved people around: send them to exile or bring
them back home. The will of the ruler and his interests were
good enough reasons to include or exclude individuals from a
political unit. In a democracy the people choose their leader;
the concept of “the people” must therefore precede that of the
sovereign. Granting sovereignty to the people and recognizing
members of the various social strata as political equals are basic
tenets of both nationalism and democracy.
Unlike other identities, nationalism “connects a group of
people to a particular geographical place. . . . It is this territorial
element that has forged the connection between nations and
states, since as we have already noted a state is precisely a body
that claims legitimate authority over a geographical area.”1 This
36 • Chapter
5
sense of connectedness turns a place into a home, and this
homely feeling makes people care about the state and wish to
participate in its making. Democratic activism is geographically
situated— as virtuous individuals we can join others in a struggle
to defend their democracy— but it is our democracy that we
have an obligation to shape.
Democracy was thus
born with the sense of nationality, the two are inherently linked, and
neither can be ful y understood apart from this connection. Nation-
alism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world,
contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon.2
In order for citizens to participate in the democratic process, they
must show interest, act, and assume responsibility. The likeli-
hood that they will do so depends on their ability to see the
political framework as their own. Only then can social trust be
created and a motivation for long- term investments kindled.
Here again, there is nothing specifically nationalistic in this
way of thinking; political institutions crave to form long- term
political bonding, and for that matter they must create a com-
munity that is neither momentary nor meaningless. Open bor-
ders and unrestricted immigration are therefore a democratic
challenge as much as they are a national one. The major differ-
ence between the liberal- democratic and the national concep-
tions of bordered political communities lies in the ethos of their
formation. While liberal conceptions of membership are
grounded in voluntarism, national conceptions of membership
rely on history and fate. Individuals are assumed to be born into
a nation rather than choose to belong to it. This is not a minor
difference. Yet, true voluntarism is enjoyed by only a fortunate
few. The thousands of refugees who sail the seas in wobbly boats
fleeing their demolished homelands and searching for shelter
Nutopia • 37
Economic Class as percentage of
total immigration: historical averages and 2016-2017 levels
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1991-1995
42%
94,600
37,100
1996-2000
58%
59,000
26,000
2001-2005
59%
64,000
29,500
2006-2010
60%
65,600
26,000
2011-2015
62%
67,100
25,900
2016 levels
54%
80,000
55,800
2017 levels
58%
84,000
40,000
Economic
Family
Refugees
Other
Figure 1. Economic class as percentage of total immigration.
soon find out that free movement is not for everyone. The movers
who are welcome in the new homeland are mostly those who can,
due to exceptional talent or wealth, choose to leave their place of
birth and make a new one their home. Even liberal states like
Canada and Australia choose their immigrants to fit their needs.
A brief look at Figure 1 wil make things clearer. In Canada,
one of the most liberal countries from the point of view of im-
migration policy, more than 50 percent of those allowed to enter
have required skil s or enough wealth to be seen as productive
additions to the social structure, and less than 20 percent (about
60,000 out of 300,000 immigrants, less than 1 percent of the
Canadian population) are refugees.3
> In fact, movement across borders, as such, is much less com-
mon than we think. Only 3.3 percent of the world’s population
lives outside their country of birth. It is therefore fair to con-
clude that political reality (even in the most liberal of states)
does not encourage or allow open movement. In reality, concep-
tions of membership lean much more in the direction of destiny
than choice.
38 • Chapter
5
Immigration policies, even generous ones, do not offer
principles of demarcation; they take closure as a given and
determine a set of exceptions to the rule, nor do they challenge
existing borders or the rights of members to determine mem-
bership rights; on the contrary, they are grounded in the right
of political entities to determine who and how many can join in.
Refuges and asylum seekers are an exception to the rule. In such
cases the obligation to save lives and prevent harm overrides the
right of members to determine the nature of their communion.
Yet even in these cases, defining the rules, determining who is
to be considered as a refugee, is the prerogative of members.
How can such a decision be made, by whom? What are the
principles that would make it fair, and when would it be unac-
ceptable? The scope of this text does not allow me to dwell on
these important questions but only to argue that all solutions
presuppose closure and some restricted degree of free
movement— hence no society is a voluntary association of
people gathering together out of their own free wil . The liberal
and the national ways of thinking converge in real life.
Closure would have been morally and politically less trou-
bling if political units were constructed in a logical way, their
borders drawn on the basis of some democratic practice or
principles of justice. Unfortunately, no such principle has been
found. Questions of demarcation have no democratic answer;
one could indeed vote or hold a referendum, yet the outcomes
depend on the identity of those who answer the question (as
well as on the phrasing of the question itself); we are then
caught in a vicious circle.
For example, a referendum regarding the political future of
Catalonia will have a different result if it allows the participation
of all Spanish citizens or only the Catalonians. As the group de-
fines the result as much as the result defines the group, the
Nutopia • 39
legitimacy question cannot find a proper answer in procedure