Why Nationalism

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Why Nationalism Page 5

by Yael Tamir


  book Populism: A Very Short Introduction, Cristóbal Rovira Kalt-

  wasser and Cas Mudde define populism as an ideology that

  considers society to be separated into two homogenous and

  antagonistic groups: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,”

  arguing that politics should be an expression of the volonté

  générale (general wil ) of the people.8

  The common ground of populist claims is the complaint that

  the ruling political elites fail to represent the “real” interests of

  the “real” people. Such claims could be used to discredit perfectly

  decent regimes, but they could also point to the actual failures

  of a political system. In most cases, populist criticism embodies

  a bit of both: a grain of truth enveloped in zealous terminology.

  The most interesting definition of populism is offered by the

  Dutch social scientist Jan- Werner Müller, who describes popu-

  lism as an “il iberal democratic response to undemocratic lib-

  eralism.”9 According to Müller, “populism is seen as a threat but

  also as a potential corrective for a politics that has somehow be-

  come too distant from ‘the people.’ ”10 Needless to say, concern

  about the development of a democratic deficit or mounting

  inequalities has little to do with populism. The mere fact that the

  masses share a critical view may be disconcerting for the elites,

  yet it certainly does not make it illegitimate. This is particularly

  true in an age characterized by liberal elites concerned with

  their own wel - being rather than with their democratic duties.

  Liberal elites, Müller argues, are worried about “what they see

  as il iberal masses falling prey to populism, nationalism, and even

  outright xenophobia.”11 In one sentence, he adequately captures

  the patronizing ways in which the masses are perceived: an

  amalgam of individuals who have no personal autonomy, are un-

  able to make decisions, swayed by passing moods, and are fall-

  ing prey to notoriously dangerous political movements, of

  The Two Faces of Janus • 31

  which nationalism is but one example. These claims express dis-

  respect for the personal autonomy of one’s opponents. People

  who are wrong should be corrected; people who are swayed

  should be stopped. The conclusion is clear, populists should not

  be given the power to change things; hence their claims are

  stripped of corrective powers. The accusation of populism is

  used to restructure the perception of the debate, transform it

  into a conflict between the rational and the ridiculous, the

  open and the racist mind, a conflict that calls for victory rather

  than for a compromise that would lay the basis of a new social

  agreement.12

  Nationalism could indeed be reactionary and populist, but the

  new nationalism we are witnessing is much more than that—it

  is an expression of a distinct anti- elitist voice that reflects the

  widening rift between the people and the privileged few, as wel

  as the anger inspired by the growing inequalities and the emer-

  gence of “two nations” where there used to be just one. This

  anger should not be shelved and repressed; it should be given a

  voice, considered in an attempt to revise the present world

  order and make it work for the benefit of the many.

  In seeking to build a more decent social and political regime,

  one that provides all citizens better protection and better life

  chances, it is important to remember that no institution did it

  better than the nation- state. International organizations are play-

  ing a growing role in a wide range of spheres— they determine

  educational standards, banking and auditing regulations,

  medical directives, and trade agreements— yet none is able

  to replace the state in its most important social and democratic

  roles: allowing individuals to be self- governing, meeting the

  political challenge of “no taxation without representation,” and

  developing distributive tools and a social support system for

  those who need it.

  32 • Chapter

  4

  Hence, the nation- state should be our primary unit of analy-

  sis, argues the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum, “on

  account of its pivotal importance in setting life conditions for all

  on a basis of equal respect, and as the largest unit we know until

  now that is decently accountable to peoples’ voices and capable

  of expressing their desires to give themselves laws of their own

  choosing.”13 The Harvard economist Dani Rodrik concurs. The

  nation- state, he argues, is still the best tool for administrating

  social and economic issues.14

  In a hypothetical world, globalism may be the answer, but in

  our fractured reality the few international agencies that exist did

  not prove themselves to be more independent and less influ-

  enced by the powerful, or more efficient in protecting individu-

  als and their rights, than the nation- state. Assuming our goal is

  to secure the democratic representation of the people and rebuild

  political trust, the nation- state, rather than some form of global-

  ism, should be our choice.

  5

  Nutopia

  In what may have been one of the most symbolic moments of

  the last half of the twentieth century, John Lennon and Yoko Ono

  declared the establishment of Nutopia, a borderless state anyone

  can voluntarily join. “Imagine” became Nutopia’s semiofficial

  hymn:

  Imagine there’s no countries

  It isn’t hard to do

  Nothing to kill or die for

  And no religion too

  Imagine all the people living life in peace . . .

  You may say I’m a dreamer

  But I’m not the only one

  I hope someday you’ll join us

  And the world will be as one.

  If you are over fifty, I am sure you can hum along. Maybe you

  sang it out loud at a sit- in or a demonstration of the peace move-

  ment; Lennon’s song plays in the background, while people

  hold hands and light candles, hoping for an open and peaceful

  world. The influence of “Imagine” on a whole generation and its

  perception of an ideal world cannot be overestimated. Yet, like

  all utopian fantasies, this too was a dangerous one. A borderless

  world is far from ideal; it can be neither democratic nor just. For

  34 • Chapter

  5

  a democracy to work, individuals need to form an ongoing union,

  allowing members to test and trust one another’s intentions

  over a considerable span of time.

  Game theory teaches us that multiple games played by the

  same players increase the probability of playing by the rules. If

  people can leave the game after a certain round they might be

  tempted to exploit the maximum benefit from that round, ignor-

  ing future risks and benefits. In other words, a social contract

  that does not last for an unknown period of time induces inse-

  curity and raises the chances of social egoism and unfairness. It

  also erodes the rationality of transgenerational commit
ments, as

  the children of those who now invest in structuring some insti-

  tution or another will grow up, be educated, mature, and age in

  another social context.

  Moreover, when individuals move freely and frequently in and

  out of a democratic system, it will become unclear who is enti-

  tled to vote and who is entitled to be elected. As those who

  chose the present leadership may have already moved on and

  newcomers have different and unpredictable interests, whose

  interests should the elected representatives defend? Who is

  entitled to make pledges for the future and fulfill political prom-

  ises? And who should make decisions regarding membership,

  those who are already members or those who would like to be

  members?

  While writing “Imagine,” Lennon aspired to get an American

  visa; for him the idea that his request could be rejected was in-

  conceivable. Like other members of the elite who have the

  means to move from one place to another, he believed he had

  the right to travel freely around the world and live wherever he

  chose. Indeed, Nutopia is an attractive vision for those who do

  not depend on the existence of a social network for either their

  security or their livelihood. In his song “The Other Side of the

  Nutopia • 35

  Summer” Elvis Costello captured the class bias of the “Imagine”

  dream, asking sarcastically: “Was it a mil ionaire who said: imag-

  ine no possessions?” Castello was right! The “Imagine” vision

  served a certain class better than others, and it was these benefi-

  ciaries who promoted it as a universal vision.

  For globalists, borders are an unnecessary interruption, a hur-

  dle blocking the free flow of capital, skil s, and wealth. Hence,

  they preach free trade and open borders, but the concept of an

  “open border” is an oxymoron; borders are meant to be closed,

  to draw a distinction between what is in and what is out; cross-

  ing the border must be the exception and not the rule.

  Borders are by no means a nationalist idea. No social contract

  and no system of distribution can function as an open political

  framework. This is especially true in a democracy. The legitimacy

  of kings and tyrants does not derive from the boundaries of the

  exact territory they govern or the population found under their

  sovereignty. The legitimacy of a democratic regime depends on

  the support it gathers among its citizens. The question of who

  is a member thus gains special importance.

  Empires moved people around: send them to exile or bring

  them back home. The will of the ruler and his interests were

  good enough reasons to include or exclude individuals from a

  political unit. In a democracy the people choose their leader;

  the concept of “the people” must therefore precede that of the

  sovereign. Granting sovereignty to the people and recognizing

  members of the various social strata as political equals are basic

  tenets of both nationalism and democracy.

  Unlike other identities, nationalism “connects a group of

  people to a particular geographical place. . . . It is this territorial

  element that has forged the connection between nations and

  states, since as we have already noted a state is precisely a body

  that claims legitimate authority over a geographical area.”1 This

  36 • Chapter

  5

  sense of connectedness turns a place into a home, and this

  homely feeling makes people care about the state and wish to

  participate in its making. Democratic activism is geographically

  situated— as virtuous individuals we can join others in a struggle

  to defend their democracy— but it is our democracy that we

  have an obligation to shape.

  Democracy was thus

  born with the sense of nationality, the two are inherently linked, and

  neither can be ful y understood apart from this connection. Nation-

  alism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world,

  contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon.2

  In order for citizens to participate in the democratic process, they

  must show interest, act, and assume responsibility. The likeli-

  hood that they will do so depends on their ability to see the

  political framework as their own. Only then can social trust be

  created and a motivation for long- term investments kindled.

  Here again, there is nothing specifically nationalistic in this

  way of thinking; political institutions crave to form long- term

  political bonding, and for that matter they must create a com-

  munity that is neither momentary nor meaningless. Open bor-

  ders and unrestricted immigration are therefore a democratic

  challenge as much as they are a national one. The major differ-

  ence between the liberal- democratic and the national concep-

  tions of bordered political communities lies in the ethos of their

  formation. While liberal conceptions of membership are

  grounded in voluntarism, national conceptions of membership

  rely on history and fate. Individuals are assumed to be born into

  a nation rather than choose to belong to it. This is not a minor

  difference. Yet, true voluntarism is enjoyed by only a fortunate

  few. The thousands of refugees who sail the seas in wobbly boats

  fleeing their demolished homelands and searching for shelter

  Nutopia • 37

  Economic Class as percentage of

  total immigration: historical averages and 2016-2017 levels

  0%

  20%

  40%

  60%

  80%

  100%

  1991-1995

  42%

  94,600

  37,100

  1996-2000

  58%

  59,000

  26,000

  2001-2005

  59%

  64,000

  29,500

  2006-2010

  60%

  65,600

  26,000

  2011-2015

  62%

  67,100

  25,900

  2016 levels

  54%

  80,000

  55,800

  2017 levels

  58%

  84,000

  40,000

  Economic

  Family

  Refugees

  Other

  Figure 1. Economic class as percentage of total immigration.

  soon find out that free movement is not for everyone. The movers

  who are welcome in the new homeland are mostly those who can,

  due to exceptional talent or wealth, choose to leave their place of

  birth and make a new one their home. Even liberal states like

  Canada and Australia choose their immigrants to fit their needs.

  A brief look at Figure 1 wil make things clearer. In Canada,

  one of the most liberal countries from the point of view of im-

  migration policy, more than 50 percent of those allowed to enter

  have required skil s or enough wealth to be seen as productive

  additions to the social structure, and less than 20 percent (about

  60,000 out of 300,000 immigrants, less than 1 percent of the

  Canadian population) are refugees.3

>   In fact, movement across borders, as such, is much less com-

  mon than we think. Only 3.3 percent of the world’s population

  lives outside their country of birth. It is therefore fair to con-

  clude that political reality (even in the most liberal of states)

  does not encourage or allow open movement. In reality, concep-

  tions of membership lean much more in the direction of destiny

  than choice.

  38 • Chapter

  5

  Immigration policies, even generous ones, do not offer

  principles of demarcation; they take closure as a given and

  determine a set of exceptions to the rule, nor do they challenge

  existing borders or the rights of members to determine mem-

  bership rights; on the contrary, they are grounded in the right

  of political entities to determine who and how many can join in.

  Refuges and asylum seekers are an exception to the rule. In such

  cases the obligation to save lives and prevent harm overrides the

  right of members to determine the nature of their communion.

  Yet even in these cases, defining the rules, determining who is

  to be considered as a refugee, is the prerogative of members.

  How can such a decision be made, by whom? What are the

  principles that would make it fair, and when would it be unac-

  ceptable? The scope of this text does not allow me to dwell on

  these important questions but only to argue that all solutions

  presuppose closure and some restricted degree of free

  movement— hence no society is a voluntary association of

  people gathering together out of their own free wil . The liberal

  and the national ways of thinking converge in real life.

  Closure would have been morally and politically less trou-

  bling if political units were constructed in a logical way, their

  borders drawn on the basis of some democratic practice or

  principles of justice. Unfortunately, no such principle has been

  found. Questions of demarcation have no democratic answer;

  one could indeed vote or hold a referendum, yet the outcomes

  depend on the identity of those who answer the question (as

  well as on the phrasing of the question itself); we are then

  caught in a vicious circle.

  For example, a referendum regarding the political future of

  Catalonia will have a different result if it allows the participation

  of all Spanish citizens or only the Catalonians. As the group de-

  fines the result as much as the result defines the group, the

  Nutopia • 39

  legitimacy question cannot find a proper answer in procedure

 

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