by Yael Tamir
class differences, thus creating the conditions for internal mo-
bility, opening up for members of the lower classes a wide range
of political and economic opportunities. Sharing a language re-
duced training costs, encouraged people to move from one part
of the country to another, and enabled social and economic
change. The homogenization of culture and language served
both the economic need for professional adaptability and the
democratic demand for shared deliberations. Nationalism,
democracy, and the (internal) mobility of labor reinforced one
another, bringing the classes closer together, allowing dis-
course across different social groups, making the nation- state
the first political entity grounded in a social- cultural alliance
that gives place to the people as well as the elites.
Although nationalism started as a project of the elites, in order
for it to materialize, the elites had to gather the support of the
people. For that purpose, they have created a cross- class coali-
tion offering all citizens a set of valuable goods and opportuni-
ties. It is important to emphasize that for social cooperation to
prevail, participants need not attain identical goods and benefits;
it is sufficient that they secure for themselves significant benefits
History of the Cross- Class Coalition • 87
they could not have otherwise acquired. What were the benefits
the nation- state guarantees its members?
Democratic nationalism justified the creation of new politi-
cal units, thus allowing elites to concur on new grounds. Power
was transferred from the monarchs and their courts to the hands
of the many; political elites and state bureaucrats assumed the
task of fostering the new political institutions; intellectual and
creative elites joined forces to fashion the national culture and
narrative; financial and industrial elites worked together to pro-
duce the nation’s wealth; military elites and security forces were
recruited to defend the nation; the intellectual elites benefited
from nurturing the national sciences, while those who mastered
new professions— communication, music, sports, and the arts—
were encouraged to perform and create. Members of the different
elite classes thus benefited from the shift of power from monarchs
and autocrats into the hands of the nation. After seizing power
the elites turned to recruit the people to support and protect
their project. National movements, Tom Nairn claims, have in-
variably been
populist in outlook and sought to introduce lower classes into
political life. In its most typical version, nationalism assumed the
shape of a restless middle class and intellectual leadership trying
to set up and channel popular class energies into support for a new
state.4
In the days of the French Revolution the middle classes em-
ployed the idea of the nation to motivate the people to fight
against the old regime that had prevented them from acquiring
political rights. In the nineteenth century elites seeking new op-
portunities employed national justifications to enlist the masses
in their struggle for self- rule. In the age of decolonization the
88 • Chapter
12
intel igentsia col aborated with the middle classes in a struggle
against external oppressors in order to secure the political and
economic benefits inherent in independence. In their struggle
for political power and opportunities, the different classes walked
the same route. Although they did not enjoy the same benefits,
participation granted each and every member significant
paybacks; the most important of these was the acquisition of
citizenship, a right now secured to all.
While in previous periods, “possession was the only real
source of power, and no distinction was made between economic
and political power,”5 in the age of the nation- state, membership
in the nation became the relevant criteria for inclusion (and ex-
clusion). Wealth, education, skil s, and social status were stil
relevant for the distribution of power but could not be used as
benchmarks for participation in the political game. This unprec-
edented state of affairs offered extraordinary benefits to those
who had no wealth, education, or status, nor any prospect of ac-
quiring them. “Nationality elevated every member of the com-
munity which it made sovereign. It guaranteed status. National
identity is, fundamentally, a matter of dignity. It gives people a
reason to be proud.”6
By making them part of a social and collective political unit
the nation- state offered members of the lower classes a set of ir-
replaceable goods: by granting them education, teaching them
a common language, and ensuring their political rights, it al-
lowed fellow nationals to experience, within the national
sphere, unprecedented freedom.
National solidarity supported the transformation of the
nation- state into a welfare state in which individuals enjoy full
membership, “not only as bearers of civic rights or as political
participants, but as mortals buffered by misfortune and unset-
tled by insecurity.”7 Society’s disinherited members were thus
History of the Cross- Class Coalition • 89
given permission to claim social benefits as well as protection
from tangible risks. This was one of nationalism’s greatest gifts,
allowing the less privileged to profit and to enjoy a set of social
goods and social services8 grounded in rights rather than in gen-
erosity or benevolence. Citizens need not beg to be allowed to
participate in the political sphere, to be educated, or to receive
welfare payments; they are able to demand these goods by vir-
tue of their political standing. Nationalism thus offered the
masses the most desirable benefit of all— human dignity. For
those who had no pedigree, no property, and no work, nothing
could be more valuable. Acquiring the legitimacy to make social
or political demands, and realizing these demands are entirely
different, matters. Many of the claims for welfare, health, and
education were left unmet; nonetheless, there is a world of dif-
ference between not receiving a service and not being able to
claim it.
Although it didn’t abolish the class structure or class differ-
ences, the nation- state gave members of all classes a reason to
participate in a collective effort to form a national political unit
that would benefit (albeit in different ways and to a different
extent) all its members. Marxists argued that nationalism was
an ideology capitalists used to ensure control over the national
markets, “a sort of cultural diversion to hide economic exploita-
tion.”9 Yet they failed to see that even those economically ex-
ploited acquired new political powers and social benefits; they
were no longer vassals but independent social agents.
The obligation to answer the needs of members of all social
classes was not the onl
y reason why the emergence of the modern
nation- state overlapped with that of the welfare state. Necessity
advanced the development of new systems of distribution; the
Great Wars fought by national armies, causing severe damages,
scarring the home front as well as the battlefields, sparing neither
90 • Chapter
12
rich nor poor, paved the way for inclusive social policies. Politi-
cal leaders were looking to preserve the social unity created by
the wars and extend it into better times: “Wartime hardships
created a sense of social cohesion and unanimity, and a wish to
continue the new spirit of equality into the peace and to temper
inherited class divisions.”10 This spirit was reflected in the pre-
amble of the French law of social security legislated soon after
the end of World War II (October 1945). The law was meant to
preserve “the spirit of brotherhood and reconciliation of
classes that marked the end of the war.”11 The feeling of shared
national destiny and shared responsibility was translated into dis-
tributive social policies offering new entitlements and rewards.
The newly created national social services, like national health
services and social security, benefited citizens and gave the
social contract a new meaning.
Hence, despite social and educational inequalities, it was logical
for the less wel - off to ally themselves with the national project.
Contrary to the Marxist claim, the wil ingness of the working
classes to participate in the formation of nation- states was not
motivated by false consciousness but by rational considerations.
While Marx understood well the motivating power of capital-
ists and their urge to create ever- growing markets, he failed to
understand the spirit of the workers. The nation- state offered
them gains far more valuable than an international class strug-
gle could have ever granted. Thus, to Marx’s disappointment, the
lower classes embraced nationalism and made it the most popu-
lar ideology of the twentieth century. National loyalties and
national struggles took precedence over class solidarity. The class
war was to be postponed for at least another century.
Part III
A Divided House
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it
was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of light, it was the
season of darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of
despair.
Char les Dickens, A Ta le of Two Cities
13
The Breakdown of the
Cross- Class Coalition
The spread of globalism alongside the enchantment with “the
end of history” enhanced the feeling that the West had entered
a steady equilibrium with no enemies to fight and endless eco-
nomic opportunities to enjoy. The state that was seen as a pro-
tector and an enabler in the post- world- wars period turned into
a menace that must be restrained. While the fear of despotism
and totalitarianism led liberals to restrict state involvement in the
public sphere,1 right- wing ideologists expressed a preference to
reduce state bureaucracy and regulatory powers in the name of
individual liberties and economic efficiency. Noninterference
and nonregulation became the new political and economic buzz-
words. This unexpected alliance forced the state, and with it the
nation, to withdraw from the public sphere, claiming moral and
cultural neutrality and practicing nonintervention. This was the
perfect moment for neoliberalism and globalism to take over.
If the liberal state must remain forever a philosophically empty
form, argues the French philosopher Jean- Claude Michéa, “what
else is there than the Market which can fill the pages it leaves
blank, and in the end takes on the task of pronouncing the mor-
als? The political liberalism of Benjamin Constant is not a one-
way ticket. It always includes, whether you like it or not, the
return to Adam smith.”2 When the idea of laissez- faire settled in
94 • Chapter
13
as a major guarantor of freedom, privatization, deregulation, and
free trade were quick to follow. Poverty replaced class, and char-
ity is substituted with welfare.
With the spread of globalism and neoliberalism, the powers
newly acquired by citizens were becoming more and more vac-
uous and less applicable in everyday life. Globalism depreciated
the value of the benefits offered by the nation- state. To begin
with, it created a democratic deficit, eroding the influence of citi-
zens over decisions that shape their lives. Those who had just
recently entered the political sphere suddenly found out that the
state was slowly succumbing to external forces (international or
regional organizations, NGOs, and transnational corporations)
over which they had little, or no, influence. Consequently, no-
tions such as self- rule or independence became more opaque
than ever. Under such circumstances citizens
constitute less and less of an entity capable of expressing a collec-
tive sovereignty; they are mere juridical subjects, holders of rights
and subjected to obligations, in an abstract space whose territorial
boundaries have been increasingly vague.3
The erosion of national citizenship influenced not only the po-
litical standing of individuals but also their economic status.
The allocation of social and political status on the basis of mere
membership that was typical of the national way of thinking gave
way to a neoliberal understanding of status grounded in skil s and
performance. Never had competence been so intensively pur-
sued; those who have the required skil s are offered unlimited
opportunities, those who don’t are left behind. The skills and
competencies required for mobility and adaptation are no lon-
ger grounded in any particular national feature. National cultures,
and especially national languages, are of little use to members of
the mobile classes (and may even be an obstacle). If I want my
Breakdown of the Coalition • 95
children to enter the global market, their first language should
be English (or Mandarin) rather than Hebrew and they should feel
more at home wherever their iPhone and computer have
easier access to Wi- Fi than in the town where they were born and
raised. Rather than their fellow Israelis, their compatriots would
be other English speakers, users of social media, fans of globally
watched reality shows, megastars and celebrities they follow on
Instagram or Facebook, and their peers, graduates of elite schools
and Ivy League universities, players in the global market. When
the value of national languages and cultures is depreciated, the
eagerness to support them declines. Having less of a political and
economic motivation to invest in the making and remaking of
the nation, the mobile elites shift their interests and resources
else
where. National ties become relics of the past— sentimental
perhaps but of decreasing social and economic value.
National public education is the main victim of globalization.
It was the jewel in the national crown, nurturing citizenship
skil s, opening up new professional opportunities, and easing
mobility within the boundaries of the national economy. Estab-
lished in order to teach the national language, transmit the
national heritage, enhance national identity, and strengthen
bonds of solidarity among fellow nationals, public (national)
education served to consolidate the society and bridge social and
economic gaps. Today, it is outdated. In order to prepare chil-
dren for a global world it must give up some of its most notable
achievements.
It is clear why those who favor globalism regard national edu-
cation as ineffective and opt for private schools they can shape
to fit their purposes. Others are also dissatisfied. They had high
hopes—education was supposed to be a social game changer, yet
once the doors of the classroom were opened to include all
members of the society, the newcomers found that schooling
96 • Chapter
13
could offer neither mobility nor economic success. Now they
realize that their children will be better educated yet poorer than
their parents. Their frustration is further intensified by the fact
that traditional education systems are unable to provide children
with the skills necessary to succeed in the global economy.
National education thus reveals itself as less of a salvation than
anticipated. Fifty years ago, Yvonne Roberts asserts,
education was the magic word, facilitating social mobility no mat-
ter how deprived a child’s background. Recent research tel s us this
is no longer the case. On the contrary, in the unevenness of its de-
livery, it appears to be the cause of social exile for too many young
people.4
The inability of national education to play its designated mo-
bilizing and integrative role is one of the main reasons that the
state lost the respect of its citizens. This is particularly true since
the language of educational equal opportunities kept dominat-
ing the political discourse long after it was proven vacuous.5 The
gap between state promises and the ability to fulfill them con-