Why Nationalism

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Why Nationalism Page 17

by Yael Tamir


  the last hope of the needy.

  Historically, nationalism filtered down from the elites to the

  people; now it has changed direction, representing grassroots

  feelings and demands. It will ally with those who give it a hand. If

  liberal forces want to re- recruit “the people” they should recon-

  sider where they want to be placed on the N- G continuum.

  Their present interests pull in the global direction, but under-

  standing the long- term consequences of neoliberal globalism

  may lure them to move back in the opposite direction.

  Globalization complicated the choices of the elites. Dani

  Rodrik describes the political trilemma caused by hyperglobal-

  ization: hyperglobalization, he argues, is incompatible with

  democracy. We need then to decide. Rodrik’s preference is

  clear: “democracy and national self- determination should

  trump hyper- globalization. Democracies have the right to pro-

  tect their social arrangements, and when this clashes with the

  requirements of global economy, it is the latter that should give

  way.23 It is not the first time democracy and nationalism are on

  the same side of the fence. Once this realization sinks in, our

  choices wil be much simpler.

  18

  The Nationalism of the Affluent

  The crumbling down of the modern nation- state succumbing to

  the pressures of globalism on the one hand and localism on the

  other is also the origin of the second kind of nationalism. When

  political power is eroded and the state faces a legitimization cri-

  sis, members of minority nations are lured to question the exist-

  ing national/political status quo. Yet, unlike the nationalism of

  the vulnerable that seeks to strengthen the nation- state, separat-

  ist nationalism wishes to seize the moment and loosen existing

  political frameworks. In so doing it harks back to twentieth-

  century claims of national self- determination pointing to the

  historical injustice done to small nations who were never allowed

  to enjoy equal opportunities and were forced to merge into larger

  political frameworks that eradicated their unique identity.

  Inhabiting a distinct territory and sharing a common history,

  culture, and language, members of small nations turn to their dis-

  tinct identity to justify their demand for self- rule. As a standard

  type of nationalism, separatism aims to recruit the support of all

  fellow nationals, thus forming a cross- class coalition. In this sense

  it is an inclusive kind of nationalism that labors to make its

  reference group as large and prosperous as possible. Hence, for

  liberals, the political language separatists speak is much more

  palatable than that of the vulnerable— this, however, does not

  mean that separatist claims are more justified or applicable than

  other nationalist claims.

  The Nationalism of the Affluent • 143

  Presently, the most visible case of national separatism is that

  of Catalonia, but the Catalans are not alone. The creation of the

  European Union shifted power away from individual states to

  the European community; for members of small nations, being

  part of a particular nation- state thus became less of an asset

  (sometimes a burden). This inspired small nations to claim the

  independence they were refused. Consequently, separatist

  movements from the northern parts of Italy (Lombardy and

  Veneto) to Flanders, Scotland, the Faroe Islands, South Tirol,

  Corsica, and Kurdistan are gathering momentum, challenging

  the integrity of existing nation- states, demanding to carve for

  themselves an independent cultural and political sphere.

  Their claims force us to reexamine the birth of many of the

  modern nation- states, understanding why in the age of national

  self- determination so few nations were able to realize this vision,

  why there was “only one effective nationalism for ten potential

  ones.”1 The answer teaches us an important lesson regarding the

  nature of nationalism and its interaction with other political

  theories.

  The story of the small nations makes it clear that national ar-

  guments cannot survive on their own; their power comes from

  the ability to serve the needs of the emerging modern state. The

  nation had to help establish a state that could be, if not prosper-

  ous, then at least viable. The basic assumption was that for mod-

  ern states to function well they must be able to form a sizeable

  economy, have defensible borders, and nurture a prosperous

  cultural life. Nations that were too small to supply these elemen-

  tary goods could not pass the threshold of self- determination.

  The desire to overlap national aspirations with considerations of

  viability meant that small national groups were forced to join a

  large political framework. National movements gaining indepen-

  dence were therefore movements of national unification.

  144 • Chapter

  18

  Germany, France, and Italy (to mention a few) grew out of a

  merger of different national groups: Bretons, Normands, and

  Corsicans became French; Bavarians, North Westphalians, and

  Brandenburgians became German; and Sicilians, Lombardians,

  and Emilia Romagnians turned Italian.2 The result was that, like

  a Russian dol , each modern nation- state contained within itself

  a smaller nation(s). Which was the “real” nation? The definitional

  ambiguity of the term left the question open and the debate

  unresolved.

  The “threshold of state viability” was defined by Friedrich List.

  For nations to be able to prosper, he claimed, they must have a

  large population and an extensive territory endowed with mani-

  fold national resources; these, he concluded, were the essential

  requirements of normal nationality.

  A nation restricted in the number of its population and in territory,

  especially if it has a separate language, can only possess a crippled

  literature and crippled institutions for promoting art and science.

  A small state can never bring to complete perfection within its ter-

  ritory the various branches of production.3

  The assertion that nations that fall below a critical mass have

  no historical justification for self- determination shattered the

  political dreams of the small nations, condemning them to social,

  cultural, and political annihilation.4 List acknowledged the fact

  that, “There were too many of them [nations],”5 and some were

  condemned to oblivion. This was not taken to be a pressing

  moral or political difficulty or a violation of national or individual

  rights but a reflection of “moral luck,” “the order of nature,” “the

  survival of the fittest.”

  Taking for granted that a viable high culture sustaining a mod-

  ern state and a modern economy “cannot fal below a certain

  minimal size, and that there is room for only a limited number

  The Nationalism of the Affluent • 145

  of states on this earth,” the merging of small nations into larger

  ones was portrayed as a necessity, a victory of utilitarianis
m over

  nationalism. This is well expressed in the work of the British phi-

  losopher John Stuart Mil . Despite his enthusiastic support for

  self- rule and national self- determination, Mill was convinced that

  the assimilation of smaller nations into bigger ones was no

  more than a blessing:

  Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial for a Breton

  or a Basque of French Navarre to be a member of the French

  nationality . . . than to sulk on his own rocks, the half- savage relic

  of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without par-

  ticipation or interest in the general movement of the world. The

  same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish highlander as

  members of the British nation.6

  Needless to say, neither the Basques, the Scots, nor members of

  any other small nation accepted this description, but they were

  on the wrong side of history.

  Given the power of utilitarian arguments to determine

  the construction of future states, why didn’t they replace na-

  tionalism as a ruling ideology? The answer sends us back to the

  opening chapters of this book: the maximization of utilitarian

  considerations— be they political, economic, or cultural—

  cannot serve as a good enough political justification for the

  establishment of independent political units. Modern states

  aspire to ground their existence in arguments that go beyond

  utility, or else their legitimacy will be questioned if and when

  their functionality is eroded.

  Utilitarian arguments are never conclusive and cannot answer

  the most basic question of all: whose utility are we seeking to

  maximize? Obviously, different individuals, regions, and local

  units evaluate utility differently. Think, for example, of the

  146 • Chapter

  18

  Northern League advocating the creation of a new state for It-

  aly’s wealthier regions, wishing to free itself from the burdens

  of the poorer south. Utility calculations of the north col ide with

  those of other regions and of the Italian state as a whole. Who

  is to judge which one of the conflicting interests should take

  priority over the others? One could obviously try to develop

  tools of optimization, maximizing the utility of the greater num-

  ber of individuals, but then why stop at the Italian border

  rather than looking across it?

  The case of the Donetsk People’s Republic, which, following

  a referendum, declared independence from the Ukraine, sharp-

  ens the dilemma of whose interests determine the future of a

  land: those inside the contested area, those nearby, or anyone

  else who has a vested interest. The more disputed an issue is,

  the less likely it is to find an adequate democratic or utilitarian

  answer.

  Moreover, as utilitarian arguments are grounded in particu-

  lar circumstances, when these change they produce new answers

  to old questions. Once again Europe is an excellent example: the

  emergence of the European Union changed the balance of utili-

  tarian arguments, undermining the importance of the viability

  argument. Thus, contrary to the expectations of its founders, the

  European Union did not lead to postnationalism but to the re-

  emergence of small nations’ nationalism. Indeed, today’s sepa-

  ratist nationalism is the nationalism of small affluent nations that

  were oppressed by the threshold principle and were excluded

  from the national discourse not because they lacked national

  spirit but because of utilitarian considerations. They are now

  setting out to gain self- determination, aspiring to free them-

  selves of the nation- state they were forced to join and revive

  their historical national identity. Yet their states would not let

  them go.

  The Nationalism of the Affluent • 147

  Quite confusingly, in these separatist debates the term nation

  is used on both sides of the fence: the Spanish nation- state and

  the Catalan region, the Belgian state and Flanders, Italy and

  Lombardy— all claim the title of nation, thus revealing the mul-

  tinational character of nation- states. Section II of the Spanish

  Constitution explicitly expresses this complexity, emphasizing

  the fact that the Spanish nation is “the common and indivisible

  homeland of all Spaniards.” Yet it also “recognizes and guaran-

  tees the right to self- government of the nationalities and regions

  of which it is composed and the solidarity among them al .”7 Why

  must Spain be taken to be “indissoluble” and “indivisible”? Why

  cannot this unity be questioned? These questions are raised

  by the Catalans, the Basques, the Lombards, the Scots, leaving

  the old nation- states speechless as they witness their own national

  arguments being used against them.

  What is there to be found at the end of a slippery slope that

  starts with challenging the unity of existing political units? Here

  is a somewhat comic but in another sense challenging answer:

  Those opposing the demands of Catalonia for independence

  have created Tabarnia, a fictitious region that wants indepen-

  dence from Catalonia. Initiated in the broad coastal strip that

  stretches from Tarragona to Barcelona, Tabarnia “is a good-

  humored backlash against what many see as the imposition of

  an independence agenda on a part of Catalonia that has never

  voted for secessionist candidates.” Tabarnia went viral, gaining

  the support of tens of thousands of individuals who signed a

  petition in favor of its independence, using the same arguments

  and language as the Catalonians use against Spain. Their slogan—

  “Barcelona is not Catalonia”— echoes the secessionists’ own

  “Catalonia is not Spain. “Tabarnia claims that the Barcelona area

  does not benefit from the wealth the city creates, much as Cata-

  lan separatists complain the region contributes more to the

  148 • Chapter

  18

  Spanish state than it gets back.”8 And Tabarnia isn’t the end of

  it; the Balkanization of states and regions could be endless, and

  none is protected from challenges to its unity.

  As the threshold argument is no longer effective, the only

  other utilitarian argument that comes to the rescue of larger

  nation- states is state integrity. Being afraid of the process of Balkanization, the European Union now made it axiomatic; the EU

  is reluctant to recognize new states, even if, as in the case of

  Kosovo, NATO was involved in forcing Serbia to withdraw from

  its territories in order to allow it to gain independence. The Eu-

  ropean Commission adheres to the Prodi doctrine, arguing “that

  a breakaway state should have to leave the bloc and could then

  be let back only if it had gained independence in accordance with

  the constitutional law of the member state it left.” Moreover, in

  order to join the union, any new state must win “the unanimous

  agreement of all others.”9 These declarations are meant to mellow

  separatist aspirations, warning small nations they would be left on

  their o
wn, unable to enjoy the protective umbrel a of the union.

  And yet separatists still feel this is the right moment to tackle

  the weakening state. Motivated by their relative affluence, they

  fight to secure their members’ prosperity and to be freed from

  their social and economic obligations to less affluent regions,

  keeping the fruits of social production within their territory.

  Once again it becomes obvious that one’s place along the G- N, or

  the “separate– not separate,” continuum is highly influenced by

  socioeconomic conditions. The people of Catalonia are much

  more liberal and affluent than the vulnerable both in the United

  States and in Europe, but their interests point in the national

  direction— and this is where they stand.

  As economic interests are not evenly distributed even

  within small nations, disagreements are likely to occur within

  The Nationalism of the Affluent • 149

  Catalan election results 2017

  Percentage of people voting for pro-independence parties

  %

  Below 45

  45-50

  51-55

  Above 55

  Lleida

  Girona

  64.2%

  63.7%

  Barcelona

  44.0%

  Tarragona

  49.5%

  Figure 7. 2017 Catalan election results.

  Source: Catalan government.

  separatist regions. The map in Figure 7 showing the 2017 election results in Catalonia echoes other maps presented in this book,

  with the megacities (Barcelona in the Catalan case) being more

  heterogeneous, open to the world, and less enthusiastic about

  independence than the more homogenous and less prosperous

  interior lands that favor independence.

  150 • Chapter

  18

  Why do Catalans want self- rule? Would they be as enthusi-

  astic about it if they were less affluent? Is a desire to keep one’s

  wealth at home enough to make one a nationalist? These ques-

  tions demonstrate how difficult it is to separate national aspira-

  tions and economic interests. The mere fact that an economic

  demand marries itself to nationalism allows it to be heard, but

  does not automatically make it just. From the point of view of

  justice, the attempts of the vulnerable to use nationalism in order

  to re- create a cross- class coalition seem justified as much as the

  attempts to use it to re- create white supremacy are unwarranted.

 

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