by Yael Tamir
the last hope of the needy.
Historically, nationalism filtered down from the elites to the
people; now it has changed direction, representing grassroots
feelings and demands. It will ally with those who give it a hand. If
liberal forces want to re- recruit “the people” they should recon-
sider where they want to be placed on the N- G continuum.
Their present interests pull in the global direction, but under-
standing the long- term consequences of neoliberal globalism
may lure them to move back in the opposite direction.
Globalization complicated the choices of the elites. Dani
Rodrik describes the political trilemma caused by hyperglobal-
ization: hyperglobalization, he argues, is incompatible with
democracy. We need then to decide. Rodrik’s preference is
clear: “democracy and national self- determination should
trump hyper- globalization. Democracies have the right to pro-
tect their social arrangements, and when this clashes with the
requirements of global economy, it is the latter that should give
way.23 It is not the first time democracy and nationalism are on
the same side of the fence. Once this realization sinks in, our
choices wil be much simpler.
18
The Nationalism of the Affluent
The crumbling down of the modern nation- state succumbing to
the pressures of globalism on the one hand and localism on the
other is also the origin of the second kind of nationalism. When
political power is eroded and the state faces a legitimization cri-
sis, members of minority nations are lured to question the exist-
ing national/political status quo. Yet, unlike the nationalism of
the vulnerable that seeks to strengthen the nation- state, separat-
ist nationalism wishes to seize the moment and loosen existing
political frameworks. In so doing it harks back to twentieth-
century claims of national self- determination pointing to the
historical injustice done to small nations who were never allowed
to enjoy equal opportunities and were forced to merge into larger
political frameworks that eradicated their unique identity.
Inhabiting a distinct territory and sharing a common history,
culture, and language, members of small nations turn to their dis-
tinct identity to justify their demand for self- rule. As a standard
type of nationalism, separatism aims to recruit the support of all
fellow nationals, thus forming a cross- class coalition. In this sense
it is an inclusive kind of nationalism that labors to make its
reference group as large and prosperous as possible. Hence, for
liberals, the political language separatists speak is much more
palatable than that of the vulnerable— this, however, does not
mean that separatist claims are more justified or applicable than
other nationalist claims.
The Nationalism of the Affluent • 143
Presently, the most visible case of national separatism is that
of Catalonia, but the Catalans are not alone. The creation of the
European Union shifted power away from individual states to
the European community; for members of small nations, being
part of a particular nation- state thus became less of an asset
(sometimes a burden). This inspired small nations to claim the
independence they were refused. Consequently, separatist
movements from the northern parts of Italy (Lombardy and
Veneto) to Flanders, Scotland, the Faroe Islands, South Tirol,
Corsica, and Kurdistan are gathering momentum, challenging
the integrity of existing nation- states, demanding to carve for
themselves an independent cultural and political sphere.
Their claims force us to reexamine the birth of many of the
modern nation- states, understanding why in the age of national
self- determination so few nations were able to realize this vision,
why there was “only one effective nationalism for ten potential
ones.”1 The answer teaches us an important lesson regarding the
nature of nationalism and its interaction with other political
theories.
The story of the small nations makes it clear that national ar-
guments cannot survive on their own; their power comes from
the ability to serve the needs of the emerging modern state. The
nation had to help establish a state that could be, if not prosper-
ous, then at least viable. The basic assumption was that for mod-
ern states to function well they must be able to form a sizeable
economy, have defensible borders, and nurture a prosperous
cultural life. Nations that were too small to supply these elemen-
tary goods could not pass the threshold of self- determination.
The desire to overlap national aspirations with considerations of
viability meant that small national groups were forced to join a
large political framework. National movements gaining indepen-
dence were therefore movements of national unification.
144 • Chapter
18
Germany, France, and Italy (to mention a few) grew out of a
merger of different national groups: Bretons, Normands, and
Corsicans became French; Bavarians, North Westphalians, and
Brandenburgians became German; and Sicilians, Lombardians,
and Emilia Romagnians turned Italian.2 The result was that, like
a Russian dol , each modern nation- state contained within itself
a smaller nation(s). Which was the “real” nation? The definitional
ambiguity of the term left the question open and the debate
unresolved.
The “threshold of state viability” was defined by Friedrich List.
For nations to be able to prosper, he claimed, they must have a
large population and an extensive territory endowed with mani-
fold national resources; these, he concluded, were the essential
requirements of normal nationality.
A nation restricted in the number of its population and in territory,
especially if it has a separate language, can only possess a crippled
literature and crippled institutions for promoting art and science.
A small state can never bring to complete perfection within its ter-
ritory the various branches of production.3
The assertion that nations that fall below a critical mass have
no historical justification for self- determination shattered the
political dreams of the small nations, condemning them to social,
cultural, and political annihilation.4 List acknowledged the fact
that, “There were too many of them [nations],”5 and some were
condemned to oblivion. This was not taken to be a pressing
moral or political difficulty or a violation of national or individual
rights but a reflection of “moral luck,” “the order of nature,” “the
survival of the fittest.”
Taking for granted that a viable high culture sustaining a mod-
ern state and a modern economy “cannot fal below a certain
minimal size, and that there is room for only a limited number
The Nationalism of the Affluent • 145
of states on this earth,” the merging of small nations into larger
ones was portrayed as a necessity, a victory of utilitarianis
m over
nationalism. This is well expressed in the work of the British phi-
losopher John Stuart Mil . Despite his enthusiastic support for
self- rule and national self- determination, Mill was convinced that
the assimilation of smaller nations into bigger ones was no
more than a blessing:
Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial for a Breton
or a Basque of French Navarre to be a member of the French
nationality . . . than to sulk on his own rocks, the half- savage relic
of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without par-
ticipation or interest in the general movement of the world. The
same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish highlander as
members of the British nation.6
Needless to say, neither the Basques, the Scots, nor members of
any other small nation accepted this description, but they were
on the wrong side of history.
Given the power of utilitarian arguments to determine
the construction of future states, why didn’t they replace na-
tionalism as a ruling ideology? The answer sends us back to the
opening chapters of this book: the maximization of utilitarian
considerations— be they political, economic, or cultural—
cannot serve as a good enough political justification for the
establishment of independent political units. Modern states
aspire to ground their existence in arguments that go beyond
utility, or else their legitimacy will be questioned if and when
their functionality is eroded.
Utilitarian arguments are never conclusive and cannot answer
the most basic question of all: whose utility are we seeking to
maximize? Obviously, different individuals, regions, and local
units evaluate utility differently. Think, for example, of the
146 • Chapter
18
Northern League advocating the creation of a new state for It-
aly’s wealthier regions, wishing to free itself from the burdens
of the poorer south. Utility calculations of the north col ide with
those of other regions and of the Italian state as a whole. Who
is to judge which one of the conflicting interests should take
priority over the others? One could obviously try to develop
tools of optimization, maximizing the utility of the greater num-
ber of individuals, but then why stop at the Italian border
rather than looking across it?
The case of the Donetsk People’s Republic, which, following
a referendum, declared independence from the Ukraine, sharp-
ens the dilemma of whose interests determine the future of a
land: those inside the contested area, those nearby, or anyone
else who has a vested interest. The more disputed an issue is,
the less likely it is to find an adequate democratic or utilitarian
answer.
Moreover, as utilitarian arguments are grounded in particu-
lar circumstances, when these change they produce new answers
to old questions. Once again Europe is an excellent example: the
emergence of the European Union changed the balance of utili-
tarian arguments, undermining the importance of the viability
argument. Thus, contrary to the expectations of its founders, the
European Union did not lead to postnationalism but to the re-
emergence of small nations’ nationalism. Indeed, today’s sepa-
ratist nationalism is the nationalism of small affluent nations that
were oppressed by the threshold principle and were excluded
from the national discourse not because they lacked national
spirit but because of utilitarian considerations. They are now
setting out to gain self- determination, aspiring to free them-
selves of the nation- state they were forced to join and revive
their historical national identity. Yet their states would not let
them go.
The Nationalism of the Affluent • 147
Quite confusingly, in these separatist debates the term nation
is used on both sides of the fence: the Spanish nation- state and
the Catalan region, the Belgian state and Flanders, Italy and
Lombardy— all claim the title of nation, thus revealing the mul-
tinational character of nation- states. Section II of the Spanish
Constitution explicitly expresses this complexity, emphasizing
the fact that the Spanish nation is “the common and indivisible
homeland of all Spaniards.” Yet it also “recognizes and guaran-
tees the right to self- government of the nationalities and regions
of which it is composed and the solidarity among them al .”7 Why
must Spain be taken to be “indissoluble” and “indivisible”? Why
cannot this unity be questioned? These questions are raised
by the Catalans, the Basques, the Lombards, the Scots, leaving
the old nation- states speechless as they witness their own national
arguments being used against them.
What is there to be found at the end of a slippery slope that
starts with challenging the unity of existing political units? Here
is a somewhat comic but in another sense challenging answer:
Those opposing the demands of Catalonia for independence
have created Tabarnia, a fictitious region that wants indepen-
dence from Catalonia. Initiated in the broad coastal strip that
stretches from Tarragona to Barcelona, Tabarnia “is a good-
humored backlash against what many see as the imposition of
an independence agenda on a part of Catalonia that has never
voted for secessionist candidates.” Tabarnia went viral, gaining
the support of tens of thousands of individuals who signed a
petition in favor of its independence, using the same arguments
and language as the Catalonians use against Spain. Their slogan—
“Barcelona is not Catalonia”— echoes the secessionists’ own
“Catalonia is not Spain. “Tabarnia claims that the Barcelona area
does not benefit from the wealth the city creates, much as Cata-
lan separatists complain the region contributes more to the
148 • Chapter
18
Spanish state than it gets back.”8 And Tabarnia isn’t the end of
it; the Balkanization of states and regions could be endless, and
none is protected from challenges to its unity.
As the threshold argument is no longer effective, the only
other utilitarian argument that comes to the rescue of larger
nation- states is state integrity. Being afraid of the process of Balkanization, the European Union now made it axiomatic; the EU
is reluctant to recognize new states, even if, as in the case of
Kosovo, NATO was involved in forcing Serbia to withdraw from
its territories in order to allow it to gain independence. The Eu-
ropean Commission adheres to the Prodi doctrine, arguing “that
a breakaway state should have to leave the bloc and could then
be let back only if it had gained independence in accordance with
the constitutional law of the member state it left.” Moreover, in
order to join the union, any new state must win “the unanimous
agreement of all others.”9 These declarations are meant to mellow
separatist aspirations, warning small nations they would be left on
their o
wn, unable to enjoy the protective umbrel a of the union.
And yet separatists still feel this is the right moment to tackle
the weakening state. Motivated by their relative affluence, they
fight to secure their members’ prosperity and to be freed from
their social and economic obligations to less affluent regions,
keeping the fruits of social production within their territory.
Once again it becomes obvious that one’s place along the G- N, or
the “separate– not separate,” continuum is highly influenced by
socioeconomic conditions. The people of Catalonia are much
more liberal and affluent than the vulnerable both in the United
States and in Europe, but their interests point in the national
direction— and this is where they stand.
As economic interests are not evenly distributed even
within small nations, disagreements are likely to occur within
The Nationalism of the Affluent • 149
Catalan election results 2017
Percentage of people voting for pro-independence parties
%
Below 45
45-50
51-55
Above 55
Lleida
Girona
64.2%
63.7%
Barcelona
44.0%
Tarragona
49.5%
Figure 7. 2017 Catalan election results.
Source: Catalan government.
separatist regions. The map in Figure 7 showing the 2017 election results in Catalonia echoes other maps presented in this book,
with the megacities (Barcelona in the Catalan case) being more
heterogeneous, open to the world, and less enthusiastic about
independence than the more homogenous and less prosperous
interior lands that favor independence.
150 • Chapter
18
Why do Catalans want self- rule? Would they be as enthusi-
astic about it if they were less affluent? Is a desire to keep one’s
wealth at home enough to make one a nationalist? These ques-
tions demonstrate how difficult it is to separate national aspira-
tions and economic interests. The mere fact that an economic
demand marries itself to nationalism allows it to be heard, but
does not automatically make it just. From the point of view of
justice, the attempts of the vulnerable to use nationalism in order
to re- create a cross- class coalition seem justified as much as the
attempts to use it to re- create white supremacy are unwarranted.