Also by MICHAEL J. FORSYTH
* * *
The Red River Campaign of 1864 and the Loss by the Confederacy of the Civil War (McFarland, 2002)
The Camden Expedition of 1864 and the Opportunity Lost by the Confederacy to Change the Civil War
by MICHAEL J. FORSYTH
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers
Jefferson, North Carolina, and London
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGUING DATA ARE AVAILABLE
BRITISH LIBRARY CATALOGUING DATA ARE AVAILABLE
e-ISBN: 978-1-4766-0804-4
©2003 Michael J. Forsyth. All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Cover photograph: Union Major General Frederick Steele, commander of the Federal Department of Arkansas and the VII Corps (Massachusetts Commandery Military Order of the Loyal Legion and the U.S. Army Military History Institute)
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers
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For Nana
Acknowledgments
In writing this book I became indebted to a great number of people who provided me with assistance and encouragement. I would like to express my gratitude to the folks who did so much to enable my success.
First, I must thank God for blessing my life far beyond reasonable expectations. I would also like to thank my wife, Maryellen, and our children, Andrew and Ashley. I spent many long hours working away at completing my work and my family, as always, supported my work in spite of the inevitable papers and books I routinely left strewn around the house. They have always provided me with the foundation and steadiness I need to keep plugging away. For this and everything that you all do for me, I thank you.
Next, I want to express my thanks to Dr. Karl Roider of Louisiana State University. I first met ‘Doc. R’ five years ago as I began work on a master’s degree at the university. Since then Dr. Roider has never hesitated to provide advice and suggestions to improve my writing. In spite of a heavy schedule, Dr. Roider graciously agreed to read the manuscript. His insight helped immensely in my formulation of the thesis and supporting ideas. Once again, thank you Dr. Roider for your support.
Ms. Sheila Duckworth is the librarian of the United States Field Artillery School’s Morris Swett Technical Library. I met her while I was teaching at the school. As I began to work on this project, Ms. Duckworth enthusiastically found numerous sources for me, making my work infinitely easier. I cannot express how much I appreciate her selfless assistance in words, but I hope she will accept my heartfelt thanks. Without her the book would certainly have lacking.
Finally, I must thank my parents Jack and Edith Forsyth and grandmother, Jean Alviti. They provided me with the enduring tools to survive in a tough world and because of them I am a better person. Thank you.
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. “A mere demonstration will not be sufficient…”
2. The Rebel Commanders
3. The Yankee Commanders
4. Toward a Common Center?
5. Starting “in style”
6. A Change in Plans
7. “… a destroying mania had seized the rebels”
8. “I decided to fall back at once…”
9. “There was no dry place to lie down”
10. “There was nothing of the romance of war…”
11. Steele Loses a Campaign but Saves an Army
Appendix 1.Campaign Chronology
Appendix 2.Order of Battle
Bibliography
List of Names and Terms
Introduction
In 1864, a cornered and struggling Union force in Louisiana was saved from extinction by a federal offensive that has come to be known as the Camden Expedition. Though little remembered today, this expedition overcame the forces of the South’s Red River Campaign and, in so doing, prevented the Rebels from turning the war in their favor.
The Camden Expedition even more than the Red River Campaign is a forgotten chapter of American Civil War historiography since it occurred in a region considered a backwater to both sides during the war: Arkansas. By 1864 Arkansas was cut off from the eastern Confederacy after the fall of Vicksburg and seemingly unimportant in the larger scheme for winning the war. Yet, a complicated turn of events thrust this unknown Federal offensive onto center stage in determining the eventual outcome of the war. The Camden Expedition is a story of personal conflicts, arduous marches, desperate battles, and the strength of the human spirit. Because of the efforts of a small Union army in Arkansas, a larger one in Louisiana escaped danger and eventually exerted great influence in momentous battles in the East later that year. As a result of the sacrifices of the men in this tiny army, they enabled—albeit indirectly—the Union to win the war and sealed the fate of the Confederacy.
Camden is an intriguing study because of the influence it had on the war and the “might-have-beens” had the key characters made some different decisions. Since the Camden Expedition is such an obscure episode in the record of the Civil War, I would like to set the stage with a brief introduction. It will provide a quick snapshot of the situation in 1864 and the role Camden would play in winning the Civil War, particularly with respect to the national election. In addition, this introduction will provide a glimpse of the intriguing personalities of the opposing commanders who decided the fate of the expedition and the now quiet Arkansas fields where the armies collided.
Optimism ran high in the North as the war entered its fourth year. For the Confederacy, 1863 had been a disaster as their armies met with resounding defeats at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga. Rebeldom was suffering ever-increasing hardships as the Federal armies pressed in closer to the southern heartland and the blockade choked off trade with her ports. Now with a new general-in-chief, Ulysses S. Grant, at the helm it seemed only a matter of time before the Confederacy would collapse. This proved a hasty assumption as the tenacious Rebel commanders had other ideas.
Upon assuming command of all the Union armies, General Grant brought a war-winning strategy to the office. It involved a coordinated offensive by all Federal armies directed against the primary Confederate armies still in the field. By placing unstoppable pressure on the South’s smaller armies, eventually they would collapse. The key to the strategy was to ensure that all of the North’s vast resources focused on destroying the slowly withering southern capabilities. Here the strategy skewed. Before assuming command, Grant’s predecessor, Major General Henry W. Halleck, set everything in motion for a campaign west of the Mississippi—away from the heartland. The effort, known as the Red River Campaign, represented a major diversion from Grant’s program for 1864. A key component of Halleck’s Red River invasion was to mount another smaller offensive from Arkansas in order to “co-operate” with the Federal troops moving through the Red River Valley. Grant allowed it to continue after taking command because he believed Federal forces in Louisiana and Arkansas could wrap up the campaign before the scheduled jump off date for his spring offensives and he did not want to embarrass his former boss, Halleck, by countermanding his previous orders. It did not work out as planned.
Confederate forces west of the Mississippi under General Edmund Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor quickly defeated and cornered a much larger Union army under Major General Nathaniel P. Banks. When it appeared the Rebels had Banks’ army and a large Union fleet in the Red River on the ropes, the Confederates abruptl
y stopped. Why? Because the Federal army moving southward from Arkansas toward Louisiana threatened the hinterland of Smith’s Trans-Mississippi Department confusing Smith as to which column represented the Federal main effort in the region. This Union force under Major General Frederick Steele was the Federal VII Army Corps—also known as the Department of Arkansas—moving down from Little Rock in accordance with Halleck’s original scheme.
Kirby Smith, over the vociferous objections of Richard Taylor, stripped Taylor of most of his men in Louisiana and moved into Arkansas to join General Sterling Price’s small army in defeating Steele. Sterling Price had successfully stopped Steele’s column with his robust cavalry column and forced him into Camden in search of forage for the army. With Steele effectively stymied, Smith actually had no need to turn north for Arkansas. However, Price had successfully lobbied for a counter-offensive against Steele in preparation for an invasion of Missouri—Price’s home state. Taylor, a Louisianan, failed to convince Smith of the need to press the advantage in his home state. Conflicts of personality figured prominently in the decisions made by Smith.
The Federals had handed the Confederates a golden opportunity to turn the war in their favor. The Union had diverted 50,000 men from the main effort in the east to an unnecessary sideshow west of the Mississippi. Capturing or destroying a large portion of the Union army could have had a detrimental effect on public morale in the North and, as a result, Lincoln’s reelection bid. However, the Confederates failed because of a rigid strategic vision, infighting, and confusion created by the Camden Expedition.
Camden almost did not happen. Steele, commander of the Federal Department of Arkansas, had serious reservations about his role in supporting the Red River Campaign with a movement south. Many factors made an offensive in southern Arkansas prohibitive, and Steele attempted to find a way out of making the attempt. Correspondence streamed between Arkansas and Washington as Steele made his case to the Federal high command. Eventually, a direct order forced Steele’s hand, and he lurched southward toward the Red River Valley. This saved the sizeable Union Army of the Gulf from destruction. What if Steele had won in his lobbying effort to avoid making the march?
I contend that had Steele not received the order to move, disaster would have stricken not only the Army of the Gulf, but the entire Union cause. This is because the army cornered by the Confederates in Louisiana later escaped and went on to make significant contributions to the final outcome of the war. Their efforts not only enabled the Union to win battles, it helped seal the fate of the Confederacy when Abraham Lincoln won reelection. With the series of disasters that befell the Union cause in early 1864 it is debatable whether Lincoln could have won without the men from the Army of the Gulf.
Therefore, the small Union army under General Frederick Steele that never numbered more than 15,000 men made a contribution to the war effort far beyond its small size. The minor and seemingly insignificant Camden Expedition helped extract a much larger army from danger and distract the attention of the Rebel high command. Steele’s men braved quarter rations, torrential rains, mud, and horrific combat in a forlorn offensive. Though on the surface this expedition appeared a failure for the Union by immediately tangible measures, it actually proved fortuitous when considered in a strategic context. The evidence suggests that had Smith not turned north to Arkansas but pressed the advantage in Louisiana, the Confederates could have destroyed Banks and the Union fleet. Because Steele’s men marched south from Little Rock as ordered, they saved an army and, more significantly, their cause.
1
“A mere demonstration will not be sufficient…”
At first examination the 1864 Camden Expedition appears as nothing more than a failed Union invasion in a backwater theater of the Civil War. Indeed, it is largely ignored by contemporary historians as most have chosen to write about the momentous events that occurred in the East. To date only one full-length account of the expedition exists and it is simply a narrative of the events.1 However, on further investigation this minor Federal offensive had a great deal of influence, not only in the Trans-Mississippi region, but also in the larger context of the war as a whole. Probably the most interesting aspect of the expedition is the fact that it almost did not happen.
Major General Frederick Steele’s Department of Arkansas, far removed from the major theaters of the war in 1864, seemed unimportant in the big scheme for winning the war. However, plans laid in Washington would thrust the department onto the larger stage. The high command in Washington planned the Camden Expedition as a secondary effort in support of the Red River Campaign slated for spring 1864. The campaign up the Red failed miserably, but could have been disastrous if not for Steele’s thrust into southern Arkansas. The expedition forced the Rebel high command west of the Mississippi to choose how to allocate their meager resources to meet two simultaneous invasions into the heart of the region. As a result of the decisions made by the Confederate commanders, the Rebels lost one of their last significant opportunities to win the war. In short, the failed Camden Expedition saved Federal forces in the Red River Valley from certain destruction because the mere presence of Steele at Camden forced the Confederates to deal with the threat. Without Camden, the Rebels could destroy the Union Army of the Gulf on the Red and deprive the Federal war effort of 30,000-plus veteran soldiers and possibly win the war.
Though the Camden Expedition fades into obscurity when compared to the Overland and Atlanta Campaigns in the East, it represented one of the Confederacy’s most successful defensive efforts. The small, austere Confederate District of Arkansas initially performed an admirable delaying action to prevent Steele’s rapid advance through southern Arkansas. This retrograde movement forced Steele to slow his rate of march while effectively depleting his commissary stores in a barren country. As a result, Federal forces diverted to Camden to establish a base of supply and launch details to forage the countryside. Rebel Major General Sterling Price’s vigilant cavalry successfully ambushed the scattered Federal detachments and created a crisis at the Union headquarters. After midnight deliberations, the Yankees decided to retreat back to their starting point at Little Rock. Following a final meaningless engagement at Jenkins’ Ferry, the Federal army pulled into the Arkansas capital. The losses in the expedition paint a grim picture of the Union invasion while conversely demonstrating the still potent striking power of the Confederacy’s Trans-Mississippi army.
The following chart contrasts the losses of the two armies in the Camden Expedition2:
Camden Expedition Comparative Loss Chart
The irony of the great success enjoyed by the Confederates is that the victory of Camden unwittingly allowed a more significant Union force in Louisiana to escape destruction. As previously noted the Camden Expedition was part of a larger military offensive, the Red River Campaign. Major General Henry Wager Halleck conceived the idea to conduct a two-pronged offensive into the heart of the Trans-Mississippi region. In late 1863 he set wheels in motion that would result in the offensive.
[I]t is necessary … that the flag be restored to some one point in Texas, that can be best and most safely effected by a combined military and naval movement up the Red River to Alexandria, Natchitoches, or Shreveport, and the military occupation of northern Texas…. By adopting the line of the Red river you retain your connexion with your own base and separate still more the two points of the rebel confederacy. Moreover, you cut northern Louisiana and southern Arkansas entirely off from supplies and reinforcements from Texas…. I write this simply as a suggestion, and not as a military instruction.3
The main effort centered in the vital Red River Valley where Major General Nathaniel P. Banks commanded over 30,000 combat veterans. Banks’ objective was Shreveport, Louisiana, the de facto Confederate capital of the Trans-Mississippi Department. From here the Federal authorities could consolidate power over the entire region by controlling commerce on the Red and clearing out any remaining Confederates in Texas.4
As a part of
the campaign, Halleck wrote Banks on January 4, 1864, outlining further details of a move southward by Steele from Little Rock to link up with Banks in the vicinity of Shreveport. In his dispatch he instructs that “as soon as you have sufficient water in the Atchafalaya and Red rivers, you operate in that direction [and] Steele’s army … should be directed to the same object.” Once the two forces combined, Banks was to move back to New Orleans with a portion of his force for a planned assault on Mobile. Steele would then take over command of Union forces on the Red to clear the region of Confederates and reestablish Federal authority.5 The plan, however, quickly fell apart as both Banks and Steele ran into trouble shortly after embarking on their separate courses.
Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, commander of the Federal Army of the Gulf, escaped destruction of his force when the bulk of the pursuing Confederate army turned north to drive back the VII Corps in Arkansas. Courtesy Massachusetts Commandery Military Order of the Loyal Legion and the United States Army Military History Institute.
As Shelby Foote points out in his Narrative, “the most difficult of all maneuvers was the combination of widely divided columns.”6 With this in mind it is easy to understand how the widely divided Union columns with a Rebel army interposed between them came to grief. One participant noted that “it was hardly possible [for Banks] to communicate with Steele.” A quick glance at a map of the Trans-Mississippi Department shows that Banks and Steele would be separated by over 150 airline miles of hostile territory or twice that distance via river. With communications as primitive as they were in 1864, cooperation between the two Federal commanders was impossible.7 As a result, Steele did not have knowledge of the trouble Banks had run into on the Red.
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 1