Steele’s letter troubled Halleck immensely. Halleck, like Sherman, realized that a failure by Steele to conduct a full-scale operation in Arkansas would jeopardize Banks’ thrust in Louisiana. The Confederate cavalry under Price would quickly identify Steele’s demonstration for what it actually was, a ruse. If this happened Kirby Smith would certainly mass all Trans-Mississippi forces against Banks. This made the prospect of restoring the flag to Texas much more difficult to attain. Upon receipt of Steele’s dispatch he immediately responded stating that “I advise that you proceed to co-operate in the movement of Banks and Sherman on Shreveport, unless General Grant orders otherwise.” Halleck, now Grant’s chief of staff in Washington, could not order Steele to carry out the original plan. Halleck then appealed to Grant in a telegram that the new general-in-chief give Steele “positive orders … to move in conjunction with them for Red River.” He also added that “Sherman and Banks are of the opinion that Steele can do much more.”41 In effect, Halleck also discounted Steele’s objections in favor of the opinion of two generals unfamiliar with the situation in Arkansas.
Halleck’s logic was not lost on General Grant. While he had not supported the Red River Campaign, Grant realized that if the campaign had any chance to succeed Steele would have to conduct a full-scale offensive to link up with Banks near Shreveport. Grant’s motivation to see Banks succeed had nothing to do with an interest in the events west of the Mississippi. He wanted Banks to take Shreveport and then turn over responsibility for “defence [sic] of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.” This is because he wanted Banks’ army ready to conduct operations against Mobile in consonance with his offensives in Virginia and Georgia. Grant was so adamant that Banks wrap up the Red River Campaign quickly that he instructed him to abandon the “main object” if he could not take Shreveport in ten to fifteen days.” In twin letters written on the 15th of March Grant reassured Banks that “I have directed General Steele to make a real move, as suggested by you, instead of a demonstration.”42 To Steele he sent a curt note stating:
Move your force in full cooperation with General N. P. Banks’ attack on Shreveport. A mere demonstration will not be sufficient. Now that a large force has gone up Red River it is necessary that Shreveport and the Red River should come into our possession.43
The stage was now set for a clash of armies far from the primary seat of the war. More than 50,000 Union soldiers now moved from widely scattered locations toward a rendezvous in the vicinity of Shreveport. Meanwhile, General Edmund Kirby Smith was working frantically to concentrate the 30,000-odd available Rebel forces and attempt to determine which Federal army constituted the greatest threat to his department. The Federal move represented an unfavorable diversion of forces away from the Confederate vitals. Kirby Smith understood the nature of what the Federals had done by sending such a large force into the Trans-Mississippi region. However, his Fabian policy—a reflection of the Davis administration’s territorial defense—diminished the eventual outcome of the campaign. Confederate squabbling among Smith, Taylor, and Price created a paralysis in the high command in the Trans-Mississippi Department. But, this paralysis of leadership would not have materialized if Steele had been successful in lobbying Halleck and Grant to call off the Camden Expedition. Indeed, Smith’s task would have been much simpler had he only to deal with Banks. Banks might have met destruction in the Red River Valley, altering the outcome of the war. This did not happen as Steele reluctantly launched his forlorn expedition. While the tactical outcome would appear a disaster, Camden redeemed Banks’ army to fight on other fields.
* * *
Notes
1. E. B. Long with Barbara Long, The Civil War: Day by Day, 700–702.
2. Anne J. Bailey, “The Abandoned Western Theater: Confederate National Policy Toward the Trans-Mississippi Region,” Journal of Confederate History, 35–37.
3. Ibid., 36; and E. B. Long with Barbara Long, The Civil War: Day By Day, 700–702.
4. Bailey, “The Abandoned Western Theater: Confederate National Policy Toward the Trans-Mississippi Region,” Journal of Confederate History, 47–49; and Lynda L. Crist, Mary S. Dix, and Kenneth Williams, eds., The Papers of Jefferson Davis, vol. 9, 279.
5. Bailey, “The Abandoned Western Theater,” Journal of Confederate History, 48–49.
6. Ibid., 49–51 and 54; and Parks, General Edmund Kirby Smith, 257.
7. OR, Vol. 34, part 2, 814.
8. Gabor S. Borbitt, Jefferson Davis’s Generals, essay by James M. McPherson, “Jefferson Davis and Confederate Strategies,” 164.
9. Robert L. Kerby, Kirby Smith’s Confederacy: The Trans-Mississippi South, 1863–1865, 245.
10. As quoted in Michael B. Dougan, Confederate Arkansas: The People and Policies of a Frontier State in Wartime, 105–106.
11. Crist, Dix, and Williams, eds., The Jefferson Davis Papers, Vol. 9, 372; Robert Garlick Hill Kean, Inside the Confederate Government, 131; John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, Vol. 8, 266–280; and John Hay, Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay, 77.
12. Report of the Joint Committee, XVIII-XXII; Foote, The Civil War, vol. 3, 26.
13. Donald D. Jackson, Twenty Million Yankees, 149–150; Foote, The Civil War, vol. 3, 103; and John C. Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, 149.
14. Ludwell Johnson, Red River Campaign, 10–11 and 45–48.
15. Carr “Papers.” From a March 20, 1864, letter from Clark Carr to Eugene Carr expressing the importance of the Ten Percent Plan to the Administration.
16. Palmer, Frederick Steele: Forgotten General, 8; and Steele “Papers,” from letters dated December 10, 1863, and January 24, 1864, written by Mr. G. S. Miller and provisional Union Governor Isaac Miller complimenting Steele’s “conciliatory” policy.
17. Johnson, Red River Campaign, 9–17 and 47–48.
18. Williams, ed., Military Analysis of the Civil War, essay by U. S. Grant, III, “Military Strategy of the Civil War,” 10.
19. U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, II, 127.
20. OR, Vol. 32, Part 3, 245–246 and Vol. 33, 827.
21. Report of the Joint Committee, XXIV-XXV.
22. U. S. Army Field Manual 3–0, Operations, 5–7.
23. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 494.
24. U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, II, 139; and Williams, ed., Military Analysis of the Civil War, essay by U. S. Grant, III, “Military Strategy of the Civil War,” 9–10.
25. Crist, Dix, and Williams, eds., The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Vol. 8, 100.
26. Foote, The Civil War, Vol. 3, 101–103.
27. Larry H. Nelson, Bullets, Ballots, and Rhetoric: Confederate Policy for the U. S. Presidential Contest of 1864, 25–26; David E. Long, The Jewel of Liberty, 96–101; Oscar A. Kinchen, Confederate Operations in Canada, 219; and Crist, Dix, and Williams, eds. The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Vol. 10, 368–369.
28. Report of the Joint Committee, XXIV-XXXI.
29. OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 1027–1030, and Part 1, 516; and B&L, E. Kirby Smith, “The Defense of the Red River Valley,” IV, 369–370.
30. OR., Vol. 34, Part 1, 494.
31. Jeffery S. Prushankin, “A Crisis in Command,” M.A. thesis, Villanova University, 26–27; Castel, General Sterling Price, 137–138 and 142; Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 145 and 157, 159–160; and Robert L. Kerby, Kirby Smith’s Confederacy, 247–248.
32. Castel, General Sterling Price, 172–173; Ira D. Richards, “The Camden Expedition,” M.A. thesis, University of Arkansas, 20–22; Mike Fisher, “The Camden Expedition,” M.A. thesis, Pittsburg State College, 26–27; OR, Vol. 34, Part II, 1028–1029.
33. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 167–168 and 657.
34. Ibid., Part 2, 15–16 and 55–56.
35. Ibid., 144–145, 246–247, 305, 415, and 491.
36. Ibid., 422–424.
37. Ibid., 372, 448–449 and 483–484; and Steele “Papers,” from a dispatch dated February 28, 1864, from Steele to Banks.
&n
bsp; 38. OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 267 and 449.
39. Ibid., 517–518 and 522–523.
40. Ibid., 546–547; and Report of the Joint Committee, XXXI-XXXII.
41. Report of the Joint Committee, XXXII.
42. Ibid., 383–384.
43. OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 616.
5
Starting “in style”
Frederick Steele belatedly began making preparations to conduct operations upon receiving Grant’s message. General Banks’ force including Porter’s naval flotilla was already well under way by the 15th of March. A day earlier troops from Sherman’s army under Brigadier General Andrew Jackson Smith had captured the formidable earthwork on the Red known as Fort DeRussy. Within two more days lead elements would reach Alexandria, only 90 miles from Shreveport. Meanwhile, Steele was still in Little Rock, over 150 miles from the capital of the Trans-Mississippi having made little effort to begin any advance. In addition to Steele’s lack of preparedness, some major obstacles stood in the way of success. These included a poor rail transportation network, an obstructed river, lack of accumulated supplies, the election, dispersion of his forces, and the vigilant forces under Sterling Price. Grant’s peremptory order afforded Steele little time to make careful arrangements for offensive operations. Nevertheless, the longer Steele waited, the more vulnerable to destruction he made Banks’ move up the Red. Therefore, Steele hastily issued orders to his quartermaster and subordinate commanders to prepare to move south within a week. Herein, lay the seeds of tactical failure, yet the expedition salvaged Banks from strategic disaster.
On March 17, 1864, a frustrated Steele issued his initial orders to concentrate his small army for the expedition. He instructed General Thayer commanding the Frontier Division at Fort Smith “to cooperate in a movement toward the Red River.” Thayer was to leave sufficient forces behind to secure his district yet mass as much of his division as possible to make the march. Thayer and Steele would move nearly simultaneously, converging on Arkadelphia. Under optimal conditions it should have taken about a week for the separate columns to reach the link-up point.1
Thayer immediately began making arrangements to carry out his orders, but issues conspired to slow his efforts. First, there was an on-going tug-of-war in the Union command west of the Mississippi over which department had authority to give Thayer orders. The Frontier Division had previously operated under the command of the Department of Kansas, but in February the War Department had detached the Frontier Division and placed it under Steele’s Department of Arkansas. After a series of dispatches between all parties the War Department settled the dispute with orders positively placing Fort Smith and Thayer’s division under command of Steele’s department.2 Second, Thayer’s Frontier District suffered under a constrained logistic situation similar to Steele’s at Little Rock. There was no rail service to Fort Smith from supply depots in eastern Arkansas. Additionally, the Arkansas River proved unable to support Thayer’s needs and he had inadequate stockpiles to begin the movement. Steele had instructed Thayer to “depend upon the country for meat and corn meal.” But, as Thayer pointed out, “the resources of the country [are] exhausted by the rebel troops.” Therefore, Thayer concluded that his move south would prove difficult, but the resolute general stated, “I mean to be at Arkadelphia before the 1st of April.”3
Steele struggled to make hasty plans to push his scattered command forward. Steele’s supply situation at Little Rock proved intractable in the winter of 1863–64. The reasons for this were twofold and the repercussions of it would have far-reaching negative effects on the Camden Expedition. Little Rock seemingly had many advantages with reference to transportation. The Little Rock & Memphis Railroad had been started in the 1850s to connect the city to Memphis, Tennessee and the Arkansas River provided water transport linking the VII Army Corps to the Mississippi. The railroad had not been completed by the start of the war resulting in a fifty-mile gap between Madison and De Vall’s Bluff. Additionally, the Little Rock & Memphis had different gauges further complicating the movement of supplies because of the requirement to transload rolling stock.4 The line between Duvall’s Bluff and Little Rock proved unreliable in delivering as well because it frequently required repairs from normal wear and as a result of Rebel raids. This caused a want of supplies for man and animal alike in simply subsisting the army in camp. One soldier recorded in a post-war account that “for several days about the last of January … the troops at Little Rock, had actually no rations on hand for several meals.”5 Before the army could execute a major offensive, it had to stockpile sufficient supplies to move. Steele complained in a report of “a want of long forage [and] our loss in animals has been very heavy” producing a lack of haul capacity of the draft animals when the expedition kicked off.6 It would be difficult for Steele to move artillery and quartermaster stores with gaunt horses and mules in the days to come.
The river also proved unreliable, as events would have it. Early spring is the rainy season in Arkansas which, under normal conditions, should have resulted in a rise in the level of the water. This had not yet occurred making movement of food, forage and ammunition prohibitive. Admiral Porter filed a report confirming the status of the river. “At present,” he wrote, “half his [Steele’s] supplies are blocked up in Arkansas River, with low water, and some of his transports sunk on snags.”7 The commander of Porter’s 6th Division, Mississippi Squadron, confirmed Porter’s assertion and added that the very nature of the Arkansas “afforded great facilities” for setting ambushes to interdict transports.8 Price’s aggressive cavalry commanders would surely take advantage of the geography to further exacerbate Steele’s situation.
Steele issued orders to alleviate the transportation and supply problems. His Field Order #1 emphasized that the army would need to live off the land to supplement the scanty rations available. Yet, even as Steele issued the order he understood that obtaining adequate sustenance on the march would be difficult since the Rebels had previously picked over the area. He wrote:
The proposed expedition is through a country scant of supplies. The troops composing the Command [sic] will undoubtedly have hardships to encounter, which the General Commanding doubts not they will cheerfully endure for the expected results. The country must yield all it can of food and forage, without bringing starvation upon the people. This fact will not, however, justify plundering or indiscriminate seizure of anything. Commanders of Divisions will avail themselves of every opportunity to supply their commands, but always under lawful direction and accountability….”9
Steele also required strict accountability of ammunition. Austere transportation on the march would require that ordnance stores remain tightly controlled to prevent carelessness or indiscriminate expenditure.10 Without such measures Steele knew he would never successfully reach Shreveport. Even with his regulations he would not achieve this goal.
Steele’s next challenge was to determine the best route of march. The route had to facilitate ease of resupply while enabling the VII Corps to reach Shreveport at the proper time to link up with Banks. To this end there were three possibilities. Each had potential advantages and drawbacks that the commanding general had to consider. The routes included the old Military Road via Arkadelphia, or Pine Bluff, and finally by way of Camden. The route through Camden was the shortest route, but it led through lowlands that could make it difficult to pass an army. The onset of the spring rains would surely transform the dirt roads into quagmires. Pine Bluff-Monroe made sense in that Steele could use the Arkansas and Ouachita to supply the army as he moved. Steele, however, had “serious objections” to using this route because he believed Price’s large mounted arm would slip in behind his line of march threatening Little Rock. This left the Military Road. While it was more roundabout, the road conditions would support the passage of the army while keeping Price to his front forcing him back on Shreveport. Banks exhorted Steele to move via Monroe in order to mass forces at Natchitoches. From there Banks could then move on the Trans-Mississ
ippi capital with an irresistible army forcing Kirby Smith to defend Shreveport or abandon it for Texas. Steele rejected the advice concluding that moving via Arkadelphia was the most judicious choice. He therefore issued orders to commence movement by this route early on the morning of March 23.11
The total strength of Steele’s Department of Arkansas in March came to approximately 16,000 men of all arms. This included about 5,000 in Thayer’s Frontier Division, 5,100 in Frederick Salomon’s 3rd Division, VII Army Corps, 3,400 in Eugene Carr’s cavalry division, and 2,500 at the Pine Bluff garrison. From these Steele would assemble a striking column to conduct the expedition while leaving enough troops behind to garrison Fort Smith, Little Rock, and Pine Bluff. Steele had already issued orders to Thayer to effect a link up at Arkadelphia. In this force Steele would personally lead the 3rd Division and the cavalry division, for a total strength of around 12,000 once both columns had combined. The garrison at Pine Bluff commanded by Colonel Powell Clayton would launch a supporting effort with about 1,100 men to prevent Confederate forces in his front from reinforcing their main force to the west. Steele would leave about 4,000 behind to secure the rear areas with Colonel Nathan Kimball commanding at Little Rock. The large Confederate mounted forces worried Steele, as they would surely slip around his flanks to attempt to capture Little Rock or Pine Bluff or cut his tenuous supply lines. However, to move with less than this number was to risk a decisive defeat in enemy country. Accordingly, Steele issued the appropriate directives to assemble the army for movement on March 23. Steele also lodged pleas with the War Department to recall furloughed veteran regiments in order to beef up his meager forces along “the line of the Arkansas.”12
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 12