While the leaders grappled with the challenge of feeding the army, the individual soldiers did what they could to take care of themselves. Soldiers reportedly “took possession of all the cows, sheep, and hogs” in town to supplement their rations. One feisty lady drove away some would-be cow stealers with a “big stick.” Impressed by her spirit, the Yankees relented and left her cow. While the Union soldiers did not visit depredations on Camden, they were, nevertheless, unwelcome in town, especially the colored regiments. Most of the families in the city had close relatives in the Confederate army that lay just outside the limits of town. As a result, the Federal soldiers detected a quiet defiance among the citizenry. As Mrs. Stinson recorded in her memoir of the occupation, “I did not feel honored to have such people.”45
On April 20 the supply difficulties were somewhat relieved with the arrival of a 150-wagon supply train “laden with subsistence, ordnance and quartermaster stores.” The train contained 10-days half rations that included hardtack, bacon, salt and the Civil War soldiers’ most prized issue, coffee. As happy as the soldiers were about the arrival of chow, they became ecstatic that the wagons also held a delivery of mail. Andrew Sperry recalled that the letters delivered that day were more prized than any others they had received during the war. Many a veteran would remember with fondness “the good old mail we got at Camden.” This train was the one that had been delayed by the accident in the Arkansas River when the Adams and the Chippewa collided. Nathan Kimball had worked diligently to make up for the loss and within a couple of days of the accident pushed another supply package down the Arkansas to Pine Bluff. Here, Powell Clayton transloaded the cargo to wagons and sent them via Mt. Elba and Marks’ Mills to Camden. In addition to providing succor in the form of supplies, as important was the arrival of the wagons themselves. These nearly made up for the losses incurred at Poison Spring.46 If Steele could double this stockpile by making another trip to Pine Bluff for additional supplies, this would enable him to reach the Red and Banks’ beleaguered army.
On the 21st Steele received Captain Dunham, bearer of dispatches from General Banks whose army was located at Grand Ecore on the Red. The VII Corps commander had wavered in recent days in his resolve to continue southward due to the intractable supply situation. Banks, however, expressed the belief that he could still take Shreveport, but needed Steele’s assistance to do so. “The enemy is in larger force than was anticipated,” Banks started his letter, “The lines,” he continued, “upon which we operate are so far separated from each other that it is impossible for either of us to sustain effectively.” But, if Steele could move down to the Red, Banks concluded, “I am confident we can move to Shreveport without material delay.”47 When Steele read Banks’ dispatch dated April 15, he cast his very considerable doubts aside and strengthened his commitment to press on with the expedition.
If he had resolved outwardly to continue, privately he expressed shock at the “absurdity” of Banks’ request.48 In a letter responding to Banks, Steele reiterated his intention to march to the Red, but he also produced a full synopsis of the challenges that stood in his way. For one thing, Price had effectively stolen the initiative from Steele since the VII Corps had holed up in Camden. The Confederates had succeeded in delaying the VII Corps and prevented an early junction with Banks. Only three days previous Price’s formidable mounted arm had created a crisis of sustainment in the area as VII Corps’ supply and transportation assets were eviscerated at Poison Spring. Now a large reinforcement, numbering over 8,000 infantry, was moving north to join Price in order to counter any further progress by Steele. Nevertheless, Steele resolutely stated that “I desire to co-operate with you in the best manner possible.”49
Before he could “co-operate,” Steele had to open a line of communication free of enemy interdiction. He had laid out in great detail to Banks the inability of the VII Corps to forage or receive regular army rations. To remedy this, Steele suggested to Banks that perhaps he could assist in this vein by sending gunboats and transports up the Ouachita. Only days earlier, Steele had written to Halleck proffering the same course of action to open communication. This seemed a logical and easy to implement solution, but nature intervened to prevent this. Most of the Mississippi River Squadron under Admiral Porter had gone up the Red to support Banks’ army leaving only a small force to patrol the long Mississippi. In ascending the Red River, the squadron had made a passage of the falls above Alexandria, Louisiana, a difficult obstacle in times of low water. Soon after running the rapids above the town, the Red River fell to levels not seen in years due to an unseasonably dry spring. As a result, the boats were trapped above the falls, as they could not descend the river without wrecking the ships in the passage. This meant that navy would not be able to offer any assistance to Steele in the form of transport or fire support. With the preponderance of Porter’s naval forces involved in the Red River Campaign and regular patrols of the Mississippi, there were simply no naval vessels available that could open up a secure line via the Ouachita. Yet, Steele pledged to assist Banks in spite of all the factors that dictated calling off the expedition.50 The unconvincing tone of Steele’s reply to Banks reveals that he knew his promise was hollow and that he believed the whole endeavor represented nothing more than a forlorn hope. Further, the letter confirms that the initiative in the campaign had passed convincingly to the Confederates under Kirby Smith and Price in Arkansas.
To continue any march south, Steele would have to press on with the stockpiling of supplies at the depot in Camden for without them the army was immobile and vulnerable. Captain Henry, Steele’s diligent chief quartermaster, made arrangements to supplement the stores at Camden in an attempt to ready the army for its advance south. While the Yankees busied themselves with preparing to push forward, the Confederates plotted the demise of their enemies. Large reinforcements were approaching Price’s headquarters at Woodlawn with Kirby Smith at the head of the column. With these and the ever-watchful cavalry, Price would have adequate forces to inflict a disaster upon the VII Corps. Storm clouds were definitely gathering over Camden and would inexorably force the Union army back to where it originated.
* * *
Notes
1. OR, Vol. 34, Part 3, 77–79.
2. Ibid., 147.
3. Lothrop, History of the First Iowa Cavalry, 161.
4. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 661, 668, and 680, and “The Federal Occupation of Camden as Set Forth in the Diary of a Union Officer,” AHQ (Autumn 1950), 214. The estimates of the quantity of corn contained by the Homer run as high as 5,000 bushels depending upon the source.
5. Richards, “The Camden Expedition,” 68.
6. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 661, 668, and 781.
7. Ibid., 680 and 682.
8. John G. Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River During the Years 1863–4–5,” Myron Gwinner Collection, United States Army Military History Institute, unpublished manuscript, 56 and 60; OR, Vol. 34, Part 3, 766–767.
9. OR, Vol. 34, Part 3, 766–767, and 781.
10. Ira D. Richards, “The Battle of Poison Spring,” AHQ (Winter 1959), 341–342; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 680 and 743–744.
11. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 818–819; and Richards, “The Battle of Poison Spring,” AHQ (Winter 1959), 342.
12. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 661–662.
13. Ibid., 662.
14. Ibid., 743–744; and Edwin C. Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 6–7.
15. Edwin C. Bearss, Steele’s Retreat from Camden, 7–8.
16. Marmaduke allowed Shelby’s Brigade to rest at Woodlawn since the brigade was spent from recent exertions on the trip from Arkadelphia to Camden.
17. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 818–819.
18. Richards, “The Battle of Poison Spring,” AHQ (Winter 1959), 342; and Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 12–13.
19. Bearss, Steele’s Retreat from Camden, 7–8 and 20–21; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 748.
20. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 744; Burke,
Official Military History of the Kansas Regiments, 414; and Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 21.
21. Britton, The Civil War on the Border, II, 282–283.
22. Ibid., 282; and Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 15–18.
23. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 819.
24. Henry Cathey, ed., “Extracts From the Memoirs of William Franklin Avera,” AHQ (Winter 1963), 102–103.
25. Annie H. Abel, The Indian as Participant in the Civil War, Vol. 2, 326–327.
26. Clement C. Evans, ed., Confederate Military History, X, 249; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 819, 826, 841, 847, and 849.
27. Britton, The Civil War on the Border, II, 284–285; and Burke, Official Military History of the Kansas Regiments, 419.
28. Burke, Official Military History of the Kansas Regiments, 418; Britton, The Civil War on the Border, II, 285; and Richards, “The Battle of Poison Spring,” AHQ (Winter 1959), 346.
29. Burke, Official Military History of the Kansas Regiments, 419; Richards, “The Battle of Poison Spring,” AHQ (Winter 1959), 346; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 846.
30. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 847.
31. Britton, The Civil War on the Border, II, 286.
32. Evans, ed., Confederate Military History, X, 249–250; Burke, Official Military History of the Kansas Regiments, 419; Britton, The Civil War on the Border, II, 286–287; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 745.
33. Richards, “The Battle of Poison Spring,” AHQ (Winter 1959), 345; and McLeod, “The Frontier Division in the Camden Expedition,” 11.
34. Richards, “The Battle of Poison Spring,” AHQ (Winter 1959), 347; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 745.
35. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 745–746.
36. Ibid., 820 and 842; and Richards, “The Battle of Poison Spring,” AHQ (Winter 1959), 348.
37. Lothrop, History of the First Iowa Cavalry, 182.
38. Zorn, ed., “Campaigning in Southern Arkansas: A Memoir by C. T. Anderson,” AHQ (Autumn 1949), 243; The Sable Arm, 176–177; Burke, Official Military History of the Kansas Regiments, 428; and Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 276.
39. Cathey, ed., “Extracts From the Memoirs of William Franklin Avera,” AHQ (Winter 1963), 103.
40. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 746; and McLeod, “The Frontier Division in the Camden Expedition,” 14.
41. Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 276; and Evans, ed., Confederate Military History, X, 250.
42. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 786.
43. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 90–91.
44. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 680; and Bearss, Steele’s Retreat from Camden, 42–43.
45. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 90–92; Ira D. Richards, “The Engagement of Marks’ Mills,” AHQ (Spring 1960), 53; and Elliot, ed., The Garden of Memory, Mrs. Virginia M. Stinson, “Memories,” 29–33.
46. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 680; Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 43; and Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 91.
47. OR, Vol. 34, Part 3, 161–162.
48. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 676.
49. OR, Vol. 34, Part 3, 267.
50. OR, Vol. 34, Part 3, 267–268, and Part 1, 661–662.
8
“I decided to fall back at once…”
The situation in Arkansas was nearing a critical point for the Union army in the latter days of April 1864. Even as General Banks in Louisiana despaired of the lack of support from Arkansas, substantial Rebel reinforcements were, ironically, heading north to deal with Steele’s small army. Steele had debated after the debacle at Poison Spring whether to continue south or pull back. If he retreated now the Confederates coming to Arkansas would achieve their purpose without a battle. This would leave open the prospect of Kirby Smith returning to Louisiana to finish off Banks and Porter. Richard Taylor would be most pleased by such a turn of events since he had clamored for Banks’ destruction rather that making a “goose chase” in Arkansas. Steele’s continuation of the expedition would further draw Smith northward and deny Taylor the opportunity to seal Banks’ fate on the Red. Despite his conviction that any further advance was foolish, Steele had pledged renewed efforts to drive to the Red in support of Banks. This ensured that Kirby Smith would remain in Arkansas long enough to allow Banks to escape his predicament along with the Union navy. Steele’s army would pay a heavy price at Marks’ Mill in the coming days because of the commanding general’s decision to press on.
On April 14 Thomas J. Churchill, Mosby M. Parsons, and John G. Walker staged with their respective divisions in Shreveport for a march north to Camden. The region between Shreveport and Camden, like most of southern Arkansas, lacked food and forage for man and animal. In order to subsist three divisions of infantry and draft animals, the army would require widely dispersed lines of march. As a result, Kirby Smith chose three separate avenues to move the army to Arkansas so that he could maximize the area from which he could obtain provisions. Churchill’s Division would move on the Wire Road paralleling the Red River to Magnolia, where the division would turn east to Camden. Parsons’ Division would take the Middle Road via Calhoun converging at Magnolia with Churchill and thence to Camden. Finally, Walker would strike out to the northeast to Minden and turn north to Camden.1 It would take about a week to move the divisions, reassemble, and prepare for combat if all went well.
The column crossed a pontoon spanning the Red on April 15–16 for Arkansas, encamping just north of Shreveport. From here each division fanned out on its respective route to make the junction with Price’s army in Arkansas. Sergeant Joseph Blessington of Walker’s Texas Division was in the column that day and recorded the excitement that swept through the ranks as they stepped north. The officers chirped with pride at the recent victories in Louisiana over Banks and speculated as to their prospects in Arkansas. Over the next two days the Texas Division made over 42 miles before passing through the village of Minden. The citizens of Minden greeted the gray infantry with “enthusiasm [that] seemed to know no bounds.” The pleasant welcome lifted the footsore soldiers’ spirits many of whom “were thoroughly fagged out.” Here the division halted to await orders for continuing the move.2
Kirby Smith rode ahead to establish contact with Price at Woodlawn in order to confer about what their combined force should do about Steele’s army at Camden. Price informed Smith that Camden could not be taken by storm due to the impressive works erected by the Confederates the previous autumn and winter. The fortifications surrounded the city and were firmly occupied now by the Federals they were built to keep out. Rather than a direct assault that would cost many lives, Smith surmised that perhaps the army should take an indirect approach. If the army could slash around in the rear of the VII Corps operating on the line of communication, the Confederates would force Steele out into the open. This would enable Smith to engage Steele on his own terms defeating or possibly destroying the Federal army. Before the Confederates could do this, Smith would need the pontoon bridge over the Red, since they would have to span the Ouachita to move around Steele’s flank. The delay in waiting for the pontoon train would cost the Rebels a few days in the move north.3
Rather than waste time with three divisions idle, Smith momentarily considered sending Walker’s Division back to Taylor to assist in placing continued pressure on Banks in Louisiana. Elated, Taylor began to plan for the prospect of receiving his most reliable subordinate back for work against the Army of the Gulf. Smith dumbfounded Taylor on the 20th when he abruptly ordered Walker to continue the march to Woodlawn. Smith had opted to put in all available forces against Steele rather than making a piecemeal effort between Arkansas and Louisiana. After much deliberation, Smith declared that “the field for important military operations is opened by the capture or dispersion of Steele’s force.” In accordance with Smith’s intent, Walker’s Division took to the road again on the 22nd with the pontoon bridge slowly heading for Camden. All of this angered Taylor who could not understand Smith’s seemingly indecisive process of decision-making.4 The rift between these two talented commanders continued to widen w
ith each passing day and the prospects of closing it seemed ever more remote.
Smith’s first order of business in Arkansas was to push cavalry over the Ouachita to begin operations on Steele’s lines of communication with Little Rock, Pine Bluff, and DeVall’s Bluff. Smith, it seems, felt that Price’s efforts in this facet of the campaign lacked appropriate energy. Smith aimed to inject some fire into Price and summarily ordered him to form a task force for the purpose of disrupting Steele’s supply lines. Price now flew into action assigning Brigadier General James Fagan to command a four-brigade strike force consisting of the three brigades of his own division—Cabell’s, Dockery’s, and Crawford’s—and Shelby’s now rested troopers. For ease of command and control Fagan organized his unit into a small corps of two divisions. Shelby would command one division comprising his own brigade and Crawford’s, and Cabell the other with his own brigade and Dockery’s.5
Fagan started with his division to El Dorado Landing below Camden on April 22. Here Fagan planned to ferry his 3,000 troopers over the Ouachita. From there they would strike out to the northeast to cut Steele’s ability to communicate with Pine Bluff. Shelby had moved on the 20th to Matlock’s Ford above Camden. His brigade of about 1,000 men made a wide arc around Steele’s army before dropping to the south to meet Fagan on the far side of the Ouachita opposite El Dorado. Shelby, always noted for vigilance and initiative, had scattered several scout detachments on the roads leading from Camden to keep watch on Steele. Shelby’s alert troopers detected a long train moving out of Camden on the 22nd apparently destined for Pine Bluff. Upon receiving word of this development, Shelby quickly relayed the news to Fagan. Shelby’s courier reached Fagan late on the 23rd, too late it turned out to act on the intelligence that day. Fagan allowed his men to rest for the night while he plotted the demise of the latest foray by the hungry Federals.6
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 20