Next came Steuben’s turn. He was isolated at Point of Fork, because British cavalry intercepted most communications. “No letters from General Greene or from you, my dear marquis, for six days,” he complained on June 3. “I write everywhere, I send express messengers everywhere, but I get nothing…. It is as though I were in Kamchatka here.” He did not know where either Lafayette or Cornwallis was. The baron still thought he was under orders to go to Greene when he had removed the stores from his post, because he had not received later orders canceling those instructions.58
On June 5, Lieutenant Colonel John Graves Simcoe approached Point of Fork with 100 cavalry and 300 infantry. Steuben sent the stores across the Fluvanna and lost only a thirty-man rear guard when the redcoats stormed in. Simcoe could not cross the river to chase him, because he lacked boats. Instead, he deployed his troops along the river and lit campfires to exaggerate his strength, and the baron concluded that this was the advance guard of the entire British army. The stores belonged to the state rather than to the Continental Army, so Steuben abandoned them to save his men from annihilation. He marched to Albemarle Old Court House, blocking Simcoe.59
At first, Lafayette was not too concerned about what had happened. Nothing had been lost “but what was left on the point,” he told Steuben, and directed him to resume recruiting. But once the young man brooded on something he could work himself into a lather. He advised Washington, “The conduct of the Baron, my dear general, is to me unintelligible. Every man woman and child in Virginia is roused against him. They dispute even on his courage but I cannot believe their assertions.” Lafayette thought Steuben had had enough troops to defend Point of Fork and the stores, but now both his militia and his Continental levies had deserted him. He also said that “every officer and soldier both in the regulars and militia are so much exasperated against the Baron and cover him with so many ridicules that after I have obtained a jonction with him I do not know where to employ him without giving offense.”60
Steuben was the most unpopular officer in Virginia. He had been in the state since December, trying to raise men and matériel, but he lacked the political and diplomatic skills to succeed in the quarrelsome state. While his “goddams” echoed over the landscape, he alienated nearly everyone who should have supported him. It was not the state alone that carried the blame for his inability to raise men, arms, and supplies.61
Washington promised Lafayette that he would remove Steuben from “the quarter where he is so unpopular.” But the marquis soon cooled off. His orders to the baron after Point of Fork were at first stiff, lacking the courtesies he had always paid him. Before long, he was sending him to round up men and supplies, had him in charge of training, and ended his orders with expressions of “sincere attachment.” Steuben fell ill in early July and went on sick leave near Charlottesville. He was not too weak to get into a war with the state legislature, which investigated him for the loss of state property at Point of Fork. Lafayette defended him, and when Nelson presented formal charges, the marquis put him off.62
After Charlottesville and Point of Fork, Lafayette faced two highly mobile forces, Tarleton’s and Simcoe’s, on his right flank. He stepped up his “bush fighting,” as it was called in Virginia, slowing Cornwallis down. He shifted westward, into the forested hills, off passable roads and onto narrow tracks. The hardwood forest, with islands of pines, contained a dense undergrowth that hampered the enemy cavalry.
It was a miserable campaign on both sides. Thorns and brambles tore the men’s clothing, and poison ivy ruptured their skin. Chiggers, ticks, and mites feasted on American and redcoat alike, while stands of water hosted leeches and breathed out clouds of mosquitoes. The Americans backed up slowly, blocking every step of the way, riflemen sniping at the enemy. Tarleton lost track of Lafayette on June 13, telling Cornwallis, “I will immediately inform your Lordship if he does not keep a proper distance.” Lafayette kept in touch, just not too closely. “The Americans retreated in such a manner,” the marquis recalled, “that the front guard of the enemy arrived on the spot just as they quitted it, and…they retarded as much as possible the enemy progress.”63
GOD GRANT THAT THE PUBLIC DOES NOT PAY FOR MY LESSONS
Wayne had finally connected with Lafayette on June 10, at the Rappahannock. On the fifteenth, Cornwallis cancelled the pursuit. Lafayette crowed to La Luzerne, “Lord Cornwallis seemed not to like this hilly terrain and withdrew toward Richmond. We make it seem we are pursuing him, and my riflemen, their faces smeared with charcoal, make the woods resound with their yells; I have made them an army of devils and have given them plenary absolution.” The war was as much for public opinion as it was for the landscape, to deny Cornwallis’ claims that the southern states belonged to Britain. To that end, “I try to let my movements give his the appearance of a retreat. Would to God there were a way to give him the appearance of a defeat.”
Lafayette was so happy in Virginia that he was not sure he wanted to leave the state, even to attack New York. It was “so extraordinary,” he gushed, “to command at my age anything honored by the name of an army that I shall remain in the South as long as I shall be opposed, as commander, to Lord Cornwallis.” This was his way of repaying Washington for the confidence he had placed in him. Still thinking that the main scene of action would be New York, however, he planned to return to his adoptive father’s side as soon as he had driven His Lordship out of Virginia.64
Cornwallis’ army was footsore, ragged, demoralized by the sniping, and frustrated. Lafayette shadowed him to Richmond and onward when the redcoats left the capital on June 21, 1781, headed for Williamsburg. He advised Greene, “What Lord Cornwallis means I do not know but this retreat will not read well in newspaper. I follow and one would think I pursüe him.” The fate of the southern states, the marquis believed, depended on the preservation of his own army. Accordingly, “I had rather loose some share of glory than to risk a defeat by which Virginia would be lost.”65
Now that Lafayette appeared victorious, volunteers flocked to him, adding about 3,000 militia to his over 1,500 Continentals. Governor Nelson placed himself under the marquis’ command at the head of the state troops, and Lafayette called him “the best that the state of Virginia could choose.” He fired off a stream of orders to Wayne and Steuben to push on after Cornwallis, until late on the twenty-second Wayne protested that his men were worn out after covering twenty-two miles that day. The Pennsylvanians beat up Simcoe on the Chickahominy, keeping him from destroying stores and rounding up cattle; casualties were 160 British and 37 American. Wayne had “the best ground to believe that the [lads?] do not like our night manoeuvres,” he told Lafayette.66
While Lafayette enjoyed himself in the fields and woodlots on the Virginia Peninsula, his adoptive father fretted because he had not heard from him lately. At the end of June he told his young friend that Rochambeau’s army was approaching his, which he had moved to Peekskill to be nearer New York. “Be assured my dear marquis,” he said, “that my anxiety to hear from you is increased by my sincere regard for you and by the interest I take in every thing which concerns you.”67
News from Lafayette was already on its way. “The ennemy have been so kind as to retire before us,” he said with a snicker. Twice Cornwallis had avoided a fight, bent on continuing his retreat. “Our numbers are I think exagerated to them, and our seeming boldness confirms the opinion.” He thought Cornwallis had about 4,000 men (the real figure was nearer 7,000), 800 of them mounted, and had just received 600 reinforcements, while the American side numbered about 4,000, mostly militia, only 1,500 regulars and 50 dragoons. Having driven the enemy about 100 miles, Lafayette claimed victory, because “His Lordship did us no harm of any consequence, lost an immense part of his former conquests and did not make any in this state.” He thought it all would make a great impression on world opinion, unless Cornwallis turned on him.68
The redcoats occupied Williamsburg on June 25, and rested there. Lafayette closed up on the place two days later
. He told Wayne to lighten his baggage to allow a quick move against any attempt by the enemy to board ship, although he did not think that likely. With harvest approaching, he was losing his militia. “Many and many men are daily deserting,” he complained to Nelson. On July 4, 1781, the marquis informed Greene that he had fulfilled his orders. He had been told to hold his ground in Virginia, he reminded him. He not only had done that but had recovered all of the state except what was guarded by the guns of the Royal Navy. “We never encamp in a body, and our numbers are much exagerated.” He had learned a lot since Barren Hill. Whenever Cornwallis sent troops to make a jab at the Americans, “a detachement marches against them and they generally retire. Children sing when they are affraïd.”
Cornwallis had left Williamsburg, headed for Jamestown. Spy reports said he would send two regiments to New York and camp the rest at Portsmouth, across Hampton Roads. If the troops shipping out headed south, Lafayette promised Greene whatever aid he could give.69
Then the boy general pushed his luck, almost too far, when he marched out to follow Cornwallis, with Wayne and 500 men in the van. On July 6, 1781, Lafayette thought he might catch Cornwallis astride the James River, only partly embarked for Portsmouth. He caught up with Wayne early in the afternoon and received contradictory reports about whether most of the enemy or only a rear guard remained ashore. He ordered up the rest of the Continentals. While waiting for them to arrive, Wayne skirmished with Tarleton’s outposts, his riflemen doing considerable damage. They were on the main road between Williamsburg and Jamestown, and Wayne did not realize that Cornwallis was drawing him into a trap. About a mile down the road, hidden behind some woods, was almost his entire army.
The reinforcements reached Green Spring Plantation at about five o’clock and would have to cross about 400 yards of marshy ground to join Wayne. Wayne still thought he faced only a rear guard, but Lafayette suspected that things were not as they appeared. He led three battalions and three guns across the swamp, keeping the rest in reserve at Green Spring. Wayne now had 900 men and deployed them for an attack. The marquis rode around his right to see, if he could, whether the main body of redcoats was still on the near side of the river. He saw them and rushed back to stop Wayne from getting drawn into a general engagement.
He was too late, and so was Cornwallis, who could have attacked earlier but waited until he had enough of Lafayette’s corps in hand to make his blow decisive. Wayne sent a detachment to the left to capture an enemy gun, but it was repulsed and fell back. The noise persuaded His Lordship that Lafayette’s main body was on the scene. He sprung his trap.
Wayne, seeing a tidal wave of redcoats about to sweep over him, faced what he later called “a choice of difficulties.” If he retreated, it could turn into a panic. If he made a stand, his men would be slaughtered, because the enemy line overlapped both his flanks. That left just one thing to do. Mad Anthony charged with bayonets, storming straight at the enemy through a hail of grapeshot and musket fire. His troops made it to within seventy yards of the British line, stunning the redcoats. Lafayette galloped into the middle of the fight to salvage a situation he had failed to prevent. The marquis’ horse was gutted by a cannonball, but the two generals steadied the line and conducted an orderly withdrawal.
As the Americans returned to Green Spring, they looked back and saw the smoke still hanging over the field, choking the British, who were swatting at swarms of insects and wondering what had happened to them. Cornwallis had underestimated “the boy” again. But it had been costly for both of them. Of his 900 men, Wayne lost twenty-eight killed, ninety-nine wounded, and twelve missing, along with two guns. The enemy lost seventy-five killed and wounded out of 7,000. It was too late to pursue Lafayette, so that was the end of the action.70
It had been what British generals called “a near-run thing.” Lafayette issued a general order the next day giving entire credit to Wayne and his men for their spirited engagement. He sent an effusive report in the same line to Greene, with copies to the newspapers. Despite grumbling from Virginians that he had almost thrown away the whole campaign, Lafayette emerged as the greater hero.71
Green Spring was just an incident in an otherwise brilliant campaign, an amazing performance for a twenty-three-year-old. Lafayette had justified Washington’s faith that he could handle an isolated command. Greene also felt vindicated in trusting him. Lafayette was celebrated on two continents as the young hero who had run Cornwallis out of Virginia, although that was an exaggeration. Greene deserved credit for his strategic genius farther south, where he kept other British forces from combining with Cornwallis. Cornwallis and Clinton together contributed to the young general’s triumph, the first by his contempt for “the boy.” Clinton had opposed Cornwallis’ Virginia campaign from the beginning, then bombarded him with contradictory orders to advance, withdraw, send men to New York or elsewhere, or expect reinforcements.
Charles, Earl of Cornwallis. He was the only man who ever inspired fear in Lafayette, who outfoxed him in Virginia. (AUTHOR’S COLLECTION)
Whoever deserves partial credit, the whole thing would not have happened without Lafayette’s persistence, boldness, imagination, and enthusiastic leadership. Rochambeau’s chaplain said that for Americans the Virginia Campaign made the title “marquis” a “beloved symbol which rouses their admiration and gratitude.”72
Lafayette sent Wayne across the river to keep an eye on Cornwallis in Portsmouth and pulled the rest of his army back to Malvern Hill, where he could cover all roads. Then he reported to Washington. “Agreably to your orders I have avoided a general action,” he said slyly, “and when Lord Cornwallis’s movements indicated it was against his interest to fight I have ventured partial engagements. His Lordship seems to have given up the conquest of Virginia.” He was proud of himself and hoped his adoptive father also would be proud of him.73
Still, he had just had a close call. “This devil Cornwallis is much wiser than the other generals with whom I have dealt,” he confessed to Noailles. “He inspires me with a sincere fear, and his name has greatly troubled my sleep. This campaign is a good school for me. God grant that the public does not pay for my lessons.”74
TWELVE
The Fifth Act Has Just Ended
(JULY-DECEMBER 1781)
I see another snarl of men,
A digging graves they told me,
So tarnal long, so tarnal deep,
They ’tended they should hold me.
Yankey doodle keep it up,
Yankey doodle dandy,
Mind the music and the step,
And with the girls be handy.
—EDWARD BANGS
As Cornwallis settled into Portsmouth, Lafayette heard from Vergennes. The French government was arranging a loan in Holland for 10 million livres, he said. Since the United States had no credit, King Louis had agreed to stand as the principal borrower. “I beg you not to let General Washington be unaware of that point.” Louis’ government could not afford any more grants or loans. “France is not inexhaustible,” the foreign minister pointed out. He thought the Americans could be doing more to help themselves.1
Franklin said more positively that he thought “it was a wise measure to send Col Laurens” to France. His mission had been successful, although both would like to have wrung more money out of the French government. The Doctor agreed with Vergennes, however. “This court…does every thing it can for us,” he observed. “Can we not do a little more for ourselves?”2
The most interesting news came from the marquis de Castries, the new minister of marine. He had advised Laurens that there would be a sizable French fleet in American waters later in the summer, but withheld details. He told Lafayette something that neither Washington nor Laurens knew—de Grasse’s West Indies fleet was ordered to the Chesapeake. “If with such powerful assistance we maintain for a few months the naval superiority you desire,” the minister pleaded, “we shall have no reproach to fear from you.”
Although Laurens had not
obtained everything he requested, he should be satisfied, Castries suggested, because he was going home with 20 million livres’ worth of silver money and merchandise. This, the minister hinted, was more a result of Lafayette’s incessant pleadings than of Laurens’ mission.3
YOU WILL THEREFORE NOT REGRET YOUR STAY IN VIRGINIA
Rochambeau also learned that de Grasse was under orders to sail north from the West Indies later in the summer, with a powerful fleet, a pile of hard money, and hundreds of troops. He did not tell Washington about that, but advised that they ought to get together. They met in Hartford, Connecticut, on May 21, 1781, then rode five miles south to Wethersfield, where they conferred the next day. It was a lovely place. One French officer said that “it would be impossible to find prettier houses and a more beautiful view.”4
The generals circled each other like wary boxers. With the latest French naval commander, the marquis de Barras, unwilling to ferry troops to the Chesapeake, Washington focused on New York. Either the place would be conquered or the British would reinforce it with troops from the South, taking the pressure off Greene and Lafayette. Rochambeau agreed, or so it appeared. But if he left Newport, he asked, what would protect the fleet there, or the bulk stores at Providence? Washington replied that militia could guard the stores, and Barras could relocate to Boston. Rochambeau posed a hypothetical question: what if a superior French naval force became available on the American coast? Washington replied that it could help attack New York, or it might “be directed against the enemy in some other quarter as circumstances shall dictate.” His mind was open, but Rochambeau thought he had a fixation on New York.
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