by Demosthenes
As for the other amendment which you propose to introduce, that all the Greeks who are not parties to the peace should remain free and independent, and that if they are attacked, the signatories should unite to defend them, [31] you considered it both fair and generous that the peace should not be confined to Athens and her allies on the one side and Philip and his allies on the other, while those who are allies of neither are exposed to ruin at the hands of their stronger neighbors, but rather that your peace should extend its protection to them also, and that we should disarm and observe a real peace. [32] But Philip, although, as you have heard from his letter, he admits the justice of this amendment and consents to accept it, has robbed the Pheraeans of their city, placing a garrison in their citadel, in order, I suppose, to ensure their independence; he is even now engaged in an expedition against Ambracia, and as for the three Elean colonies in Cassopia — Pandosia, Bucheta, and Elatea — he has wasted their land with fire, stormed their cities, and handed them over to be the slaves of his own kinsman, Alexander. How zealous he is for the freedom and independence of the Greeks, you may judge from his acts. [33]
With regard to his repeated promises to you of substantial benefits, he complains that I am slandering and defaming him in the ears of the Greeks, for he says that he has never made you any promises at all. Such is the shamelessness of the man who stated in his letter, which is still to be seen in the Council House, that if peace was made he would confer such benefits on you as would stop the mouths of us, his opponents, benefits which he said he would put down in writing, if he were sure that the peace would be made. The inference was that all the good things that we were to enjoy on the conclusion of peace were ready for immediate delivery. [34] Peace has been concluded, but all the good things that we were to enjoy are still to seek, and upon the Greeks has come such ruin as you well know. Yet he promises in the present letter that if you will only trust his friends and advocates and will punish the wicked men who traduce him to you, he will confer substantial benefits. His benefits, however, will amount to this: [35] he will not restore your possessions, for he claims them as his own, and his rewards will not be delivered in this part of the world, for fear his motive should be misrepresented to the Greeks; some other country, it seems, some new quarter will be assigned for the bestowal of your rewards. [36]
As for the places held by you which he took in time of peace, violating the terms and breaking his engagements, since he has not a word to say but is clearly convicted of injustice, he expresses his willingness to refer the question to a fair and impartial court. But this is the only question that needs no such reference; the calendar is sufficient to decide it. [37] For we all know in what month and on what day the peace was made, and as surely also do we know in what month and on what day Fort Serreum and Ergisce and the Sacred Mount were captured. Surely these things were not done in a corner; they need no judicial inquiry; everyone can find out which came first, the month in which the peace was made or that in which the places were taken. [38]
Again, he says that he has restored all the prisoners that were taken in the war. Yet the man of Carystus, the agent of our city, for whose recovery you sent three embassies — Philip was so anxious to oblige you that he killed him and did not even allow you to recover his corpse for burial. [39]
With regard to the Chersonese, it is important to examine the terms of his dispatch to you and also to know what he is actually doing in the matter. For the whole of the land north of Agora, as being his own property and no concern of yours, he has handed over as a private estate to Apollonides of Cardia. Yet the boundary of the Chersonese is not Agora, but the altar of Zeus of the Marches, half way between Pteleum and the White Strand, [40] where there was going to be a canal across the peninsula. This is proved by the inscription on the altar of Zeus, which runs thus:
“The dwellers here have set this boundary-stone
Midway `twixt Pteleum and the Silver Strand,
And raised this altar fair, that men may own
That Zeus is Warden of our No Mans Land.”
Unknown
[41]
This district, however, of whose extent most of you are aware, he treats as his own, enjoying part himself and bestowing part on others, and so he brings all your property under his own control. Not only does he appropriate the land north of Agora, but he also orders you in his present letter to settle by arbitration any disputes you have with the Cardians to the south of Agora — the Cardians, who are settlers in your own territory! [42] They have a dispute with you; see whether it is about a trifle. They say that the land they live in is not yours, but their own, and that while your possessions there are held by grace in a foreign country, theirs are their own property on their own soil, and that this is admitted in a decree of your countryman, Callippus of the Paeanian deme. [43] And there they speak truth, for he did propose such a decree, and when I indicted him for a breach of the constitution, you acquitted him; that is how he has brought your claim into dispute. But if and when you submit your dispute with the Cardians to arbitration, to decide whether the land is yours or theirs, why not extend the principle to the other states of the Chersonese also? [44] Philip’s insolence is carried so far that he says that if the Cardians decline arbitration, he will be responsible for coercing them; as if you could not compel Cardians to do anything you wanted! He will make them do it, he says, since you cannot. Are not his favors to you great and manifest? [45] And this letter was actually commended by some Athenians, who merit your hatred much more than Philip. For whatever Philip does to thwart you, he is only aiming at advantage and glory for himself, but Athenians who make a parade of their goodwill to Philip, rather than to their own country, are wretches who deserve to perish at your hands unpitied, if you carry your brains in your heads and not trodden down in your heels. [46]
It now remains for me, in answer to this precious letter and to the speeches of the ambassadors, to propose the resolution which I conceive to be in accordance with justice and your interests.
ON THE CHERSONESE
Translated by J. H. Vince
This oration was delivered in 341 BC, shortly before Demosthenes’ famous Third Philippic speech. In 343 BC, the Macedonian arms were carried across Epirus and a year later Philip II of Macedon turned his military activities toward Thrace. He also imposed an amendment of the Peace of Philocrates in his favour. The war in Thrace lasted more than three years, and was one of Philip’s most difficult campaigns. When the Macedonian army approached the Chersonese, the Athenians became concerned about the future of this region. The Athenian general Diopeithes ravaged the maritime district of Thrace, angering Philip. The King sent a letter of reprimand to Athens, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Athenian troops from Cardia, which was occupied by the Macedonian army. Due to these conflicts, Demosthenes delivered On the Chersonese during a meeting of the assembly.
In the speech, Demosthenes urges and finally convinces his compatriots to support Diopeithes, although the general had previously committed certain injustices and was currently in exile. Demosthenes’ principle concern in On the Chersonese is to focus on Philip’s wrongs towards Athens.
Map of Chersonese (ancient name for Gallipoli)
A view of the Dardanelles
ON THE CHERSONESE
It should be the duty of all speakers, men of Athens, to give no expression to their hatred or their partiality, but to put forward just what each thinks the best counsel, especially when you are debating a question of urgent public importance. But since there are speakers who are impelled to address you, either as partisans or from some other motive, whatever it may be, you citizens who form the majority ought to dismiss all else from your minds, and vote and act in such a way as you think will best serve our city. [2] The really serious problem is the state of the Chersonese and Philip’s Thracian campaign, now in its eleventh month; yet most of the speeches have been confined to what Diopithes is doing or what he is going to do. For my part, when charges are brought a
gainst any of those whom you can legally punish whenever you like, I hold that it is open to you either to deal with their case at once or to postpone it; and it is quite unnecessary for me or anyone else to take a strong line on the subject of such charges. [3] But when our national enemy, with a strong force, is trying to forestall us in the neighborhood of the Hellespont, and when, if we are once too late, we shall never again be able to save the situation, then I think it is to our interest to complete our plans and preparations as quickly as we can, and not be diverted from our purpose by clamorous accusations about extraneous matters. [4]
I often wonder at the sort of speeches that are delivered here, but nothing, men of Athens, has surprised me more than what I heard uttered in the Council the other day, that your advisers are bound to put before you the plain alternative of fighting or observing the peace. [5] But the fact is, if Philip keeps quiet and does not retain any of our territory contrary to the terms of peace, and does not form a general coalition against us, there is nothing more to be said and we must simply observe the peace, and I perceive a readiness to do so on your part at any rate; but if the oath that we took and the terms on which we made peace are published for all men to read, [6] and if it is proved that from the first, even before Diopithes set sail with colonists, whom they now accuse of having started hostilities, Philip has unfairly taken much that is ours, about which your decrees denouncing him still stand good, and that he is all the time repeatedly seizing the property of the other Greeks and of the barbarians, and so equipping himself for an attack upon us, what do they mean by saying that we must either make war or keep peace? [7] For we have no choice in the matter, but there remains the most righteous and most necessary task of all, which these gentlemen deliberately pass over in silence. What then is that task? To defend ourselves against the aggressor. Or perhaps they mean that if Philip keeps his hands off Attica and the Piraeus, he is neither injuring our city nor provoking hostilities. [8] But if they ground their plea upon this principle, if this is their interpretation of the peace, it is obvious to all that their argument is assuredly impious and intolerable and dangerous to Athens; and it follows besides that their own words flatly contradict their indictment of Diopithes. For why on earth are we to give Philip leave to do everything else, provided he keeps clear of Attica, while Diopithes is not allowed to help the Thracians, or else we shall have to admit that he is starting a war? [9] Yes, you may say, as to that indeed the speakers are proved wrong, but the mercenaries are really acting abominably in ravaging the shores of the Hellespont, and Diopithes is wrong in detaining the merchantmen, and we must not sanction it. Very well; be it so. I have no objection. [10] Only I think that, if their advice is really given in perfect good faith, even as they are trying to break up the force belonging to our city by bringing charges before you against the commander, who provides for its maintenance, so they are bound to show that Philip’s force will also be disbanded, if you accept their advice. If not, you must observe that they are merely reducing our city to the same plight that has already caused her to forfeit all her existing advantages. [11] For I need not tell you that Philip owes his successes to nothing in the world more than to his being the first in the field. For the man who always keeps a standing army by him, and who knows beforehand what he wants to do, is ready in an instant for anyone that he chooses to attack, while it is only after we have heard of something happening that we begin to bustle about and make our preparations. [12] Hence, I believe, it results that Philip, quite at his leisure, keeps whatever he assails, while we are too late, and whatever we have spent has been lavished in vain; we have succeeded in showing our enmity and our will to thwart him, but by being too late for action we only incur additional ignominy. [13]
Do not, therefore, fail to observe, Athenians, that at present all else is mere talk and pretence; the real object of this scheming and contriving is that you should stay at home, with no Athenian force in field, while Philip, without the least trouble, settles everything to suit his wishes. For you must first note what is going on at the present moment. [14] He is now established in Thrace with a large force, and is sending for considerable reinforcements from Macedonia and Thessaly, according to the statements of those on the spot. Now, if he waits for the Etesian winds to blow and marches to the siege of Byzantium, do you think that the Byzantines will remain in their present state of infatuation and will not call upon you and demand your help? [15] I think not. Nay, even if there are others whom they distrust more than us, I think they will rather admit such within their walls than surrender their city to Philip — if indeed he does not forestall them by capturing it. Therefore, if we cannot sail from Athens, and if there is no force ready to help them on the spot, their doom is sealed. [16] “Because,” you say, “the wretched creatures are infatuated and stupid beyond measure.” Quite so, but still we are bound to preserve them in the interests of Athens. And then again we are not certain of another thing, that he will not attack the Chersonese. Indeed, if we may judge from the letter which he sent you, he means to take vengeance on the settlers there. [17] If, therefore, our present force is still in being, it will be able both to save the Chersonese and to make raids upon Philip’s territory. But if it is once disbanded, what shall we do if he marches against the Chersonese? “Bring Diopithes to trial,” you say. And how will that help matters? “Well, then, we will set out from Athens ourselves.” But suppose the winds will not let us? “But surely Philip will not attack.” And who will go bail for that? Do you not observe and consider, men of Athens, [18] what season of the year is upon us — the season at which certain people think it their duty to keep the Hellespont clear of you and hand it over to Philip? What if he quits Thrace and never approaches the Chersonese or Byzantium — for you must take that also into your reckoning — but turns up at Chalcis and Megara, just as he did at Oreus not long ago? Will it be better to make our stand here and let the war spread to Attica, or to contrive some employment for him away yonder? I prefer the latter. [19]
Therefore, knowing and weighing these facts, it is the duty of all of you, not surely to try to disparage and break up the force that Diopithes is doing his best to provide for the state, but to provide an additional force yourselves and to keep him well supplied with funds and in every way to give him your loyal co-operation. [20] For suppose someone should ask Philip, “Tell me, which would you prefer? That the troops now serving with Diopithes, whatever their character may be” — for I am not discussing that— “should prosper and win credit at Athens and grow in numbers with the co-operation of the government, or that a few accusers and detractors should cause them to be broken up and destroyed?” I think he would choose the latter. And what Philip would pray the gods to vouchsafe him, are some of us here trying to compass? And do you still ask how our interests are sacrificed everywhere? [21]
I want therefore to examine frankly the present state of our affairs, and to find out what we are doing ourselves now and how we are dealing with the situation. We refuse to pay war-taxes or to serve in person; we cannot keep our hands off the public funds; we will not pay Diopithes the allowances agreed upon, nor sanction the sums that he raises for himself; [22] but we grumble and criticize his methods, and ask what he intends to do, and all that sort of thing; and yet, while maintaining that attitude, we refuse to perform our own tasks; with our lips we praise those whose speeches are worthy of our city, but our actions serve only to encourage their opponents. [23] Now, you have a habit of asking a speaker on every occasion, “What then must be done?”; but I prefer to ask you, “What then must be said?” Because, if you are not going to pay your contributions, nor serve in person, nor keep your hands off the public funds, nor grant Diopithes his allowances, nor sanction the sums that he raises for himself, nor consent to perform your own tasks, I have nothing to say. You who have gone so far in granting license to those whose object is fault-finding and calumny, that even about what they say he is going to do, even on that ground they accuse him in advance and you listen to
them — what can anyone say? [24]
Now, some of you ought to be told the possible result of all this. I shall speak freely, for indeed I could not speak otherwise. All the generals that have ever set sail from your land — if I am wrong, I submit myself to any penalty — raise money from the Chians, from the Erythraeans, from whatever people they can, I mean of the Greeks of Asia Minor. [25] Generals with only one or two ships raise less; those with a larger fleet raise more. Also those who pay do not pay the sum, be it large or small, for nothing; they are not such madmen. No, they purchase for the merchants sailing from their own harbors immunity from injury or robbery, or a safe conduct for their own ships, or something of that sort. They say that they are granting “benevolences.” That is the name for these exactions. [26] And so too in this case, while Diopithes has a force with him, it is perfectly plain that all these people will pay up. For where else do you suppose that he looks for the maintenance of his troops, if he gets nothing from you and has no private fortune to furnish their pay? To the sky? No, indeed; it is from what he can collect or beg or borrow that he keeps things going. [27] So those who denounce him to you are simply warning everybody not to grant him a penny, because he will be punished for what he intends to do, apart from what he has done or what he has acquired for himself. That is what they mean when they cry, “He intends to besiege the towns! He is betraying the Greeks!” Do any of these gentlemen really care about the Asiatic Greeks? — and yet they would, I expect, be better champions of other countries than of their own. [28] That, too, is the meaning of the dispatch of a second general to the Hellespont. For if Diopithes is acting outrageously in detaining the merchantmen, a note, men of Athens, a brief note, could put a stop to all this at once; and there are the laws, which direct us to impeach such offenders, but not, of course, to mount guard over ourselves, at such a cost and with so large a fleet; for that would be the height of madness. [29] No, against our enemies, who are not amenable to the laws, it is right and necessary to maintain troops, to send out fleets, and to raise funds; but against ourselves we have these resources, a decree, an impeachment, and a dispatch-boat. Those are what right-minded citizens would employ; malignants, bent on the ruin of the State, would do as these men are doing. [30] And that there are some men of this type among you, though bad enough, is not the real evil; but you who sit here are by now in such a mood that if anyone comes forward and asserts that the cause of all our evil is Diopithes or Chares or Aristophon, or any other citizen that he happens to name, you at once agree and applaud the truth of the remark. [31] But if anyone rises and tells you the real truth and says, “Nonsense, Athenians! The cause of all these evils and all these troubles is Philip, for if he had kept quiet, our city would have been free from trouble,” you cannot gainsay it, but you seem to me to be vexed and to feel that you are, as it were, losing something. [32] But as to the reason for this — and in Heaven’s name, when I am pleading for your best interests, allow me to speak freely — some of our politicians have been training you to be threatening and intractable in the meetings of the Assembly, but in preparing for war, careless and contemptible. If, then, the culprit named is someone on whom you know you can lay hands in Athens, you agree and assent; but if it is someone whom you cannot chastise unless you overcome him by force of arms, you find yourselves helpless, I suppose, and to be proved so causes you annoyance. [33] For it ought to have been the reverse, men of Athens; all your politicians should have trained you to be gentle and humane in the Assembly, for there you are dealing with rights that concern yourselves and your allies, but in preparing for war they should have made you threatening and intractable, because there you are pitted against your enemies and rivals. [34] As it is, by persuasive arts and caresses they have brought you to such a frame of mind that in your assemblies you are elated by their flattery and have no ear but for compliments, while in your policy and your practice you are at this moment running the gravest risks. For tell me, in Heaven’s name, if the Greeks should call you to account for the opportunities that your carelessness has already thrown away, and should question you thus: [35] “Men of Athens, do you send us embassies on every occasion to explain how Philip is plotting against us and all the other Greeks, and how we must be on our guard against that man, and all that sort of thing?” — （we are bound to admit it and plead guilty, for that is just what we do）— “And yet, you most futile of mortals, when that man has been out of sight for ten months, cut off from all chance of returning home by disease, by winter, and by war, [36] have you neither liberated Euboea nor regained any of your lost possessions? On the other hand, while you stay at home, at leisure and in health” — （if indeed they could say that men who behave thus are in health）— “Philip has set up two despots in Euboea, entrenching one right over against Attica and the other as a menace to Sciathus; [37] but you — have you never cleared away these obstacles, even if you had no further ambitions, and have you tamely submitted? Undoubtedly you have stood aside from his path and made it abundantly clear that, were he to die ten times over, you at least will make no further move. Then why do you pester us with your embassies and your complaints?” If these are their words, what are we to say, Athenians? How are we to answer? For my part, I cannot tell. [38]