by Demosthenes
Now for a still greater absurdity. For it is provided in the compact that it shall be the business of the delegates at the Congress and those responsible for public safety to see that in the states that are parties to the peace there shall be no executions and banishments contrary to the laws established in those states, no confiscation of property, no partition of lands, no cancelling of debts, and no emancipation of slaves for purposes of revolution. But these speakers are so far from seeking to prevent any of these evils, that they join in promoting them. And do they not then deserve death — the men who promote in the various states those terrible calamities which, because they are so serious, this important body has been commissioned to prevent [16]
I will point out a further breach of the compact. For it is laid down that it shall not be lawful for exiles to set out, bearing arms, from the states which are parties to the peace, with hostile intent against any of the states included in the peace; but if they do, then that city from which they set out shall be excluded from the terms of the treaty. Now the Macedonian king has been so unscrupulous about bearing arms that he has never yet laid them down, but even now goes about bearing arms, as far as is in his power, and more so indeed now than ever, inasmuch as he has reinstated the professional trainer at Sicyon by an edict, and other exiles elsewhere. [17] Therefore if we are to keep this joint agreement, as these speakers say, the states that are guilty of these offences are excluded from our treaty. If, indeed, we ought to hush the matter up, we must never say that they are the Macedonian states; but if the men who are subservient to the Macedonian king against your interests never cease urging us to carry out the joint agreement, let us take them at their word, since their contention is just, and let us, as our oath demands, exclude the guilty parties from the treaty, and form a plan for dealing with men whose temper is so brutally dictatorial, and who are constantly either plotting or acting against us and mocking at the general peace. [18] What, I ask you, can they urge against the correctness of this view? Will they claim that the agreement stands good as against our city, but demur to it where it protects our interests? Does it really seem fair that this should be so? And if there is anything in the treaty that favors our enemies against our city, will they always make the most of it, but if there is anything that tells the other way and is at once just and advantageous to us, will they think that unremitting opposition is their peculiar duty? [19]
But to prove to you still more clearly that no Greeks will accuse you of transgressing any of the terms of the joint agreement, but will even be grateful to you for exposing the real transgressors, I will just touch upon a few of the many points that might be mentioned. For the compact, of course, provides that all the parties to the peace may sail the seas, and that none may hinder them or force a ship of any of them to come to harbor, and that anyone who violates this shall be treated as an enemy by all the parties to the peace. [20] Now, men of Athens, you have most distinctly seen this done by the Macedonians; for they have grown so arrogant that they forced all our ships coming from the Black Sea to put in at Tenedos, and under one pretence or another refused to release them until you passed a decree to man and launch a hundred war-galleys instantly, and you put Menestheus in command. [21] Is it not, then, absurd that others should be guilty of so many serious transgressions, but that their friends in Athens, instead of restraining the transgressors, should urge us to abide by the terms thus lightly regarded? As if there were a clause added, permitting some to violate them, but forbidding others even to defend their rights! [22] But was not the conduct of the Macedonians as stupid as it was lawless, when they committed such a gross violation of their oaths as deservedly went near to cost them their right to command at sea? Even as it is, they have supplied us with this unquestionable claim against them, whenever we choose to press it. For surely their violation of the joint agreement is not lessened because they have now ceased to offend. [23] But they are in luck, because they can make the most of your supineness, which prefers to take no advantage even of your due rights.
The greatest humiliation, however, that we have suffered is that all the other Greeks and barbarians dread your enmity, but these upstarts alone can make you despise yourselves, sometimes by persuasion, sometimes by force, as if Abdera or Maronea, and not Athens, were the scene of their political activities. [24] Moreover, while they weaken your cause and strengthen that of your enemies, they at the same time admit unconsciously that our city is irresistible, because they bid her uphold justice by injustice, as though she could easily vanquish her enemies, if she preferred to consult her own interests. [25] And they have taken up a reasonable attitude; for as long as we, single-handed, can maintain an unchallenged supremacy at sea, we can devise other and stronger defences on land in addition to our existing forces, especially if by good fortune we can get rid of these politicians, who have for their bodyguard the hosts of tyranny, and if some of them are destroyed and others conclusively proved to be worthless. [26]
Such then, in the matter of the ships, has been the violation of the compact by the Macedonian king, in addition to the other cases mentioned. But the most insolent and overbearing exploit of the Macedonians was that performed quite recently, when they dared to sail into the Piraeus, contrary to our mutual agreement. Moreover, men of Athens, because it was only a single war-galley, it must not be regarded as a slight matter, but as an experiment made to see whether we should overlook it, so that they could repeat it on a larger scale, and also as a proof that they cared as little for these terms of agreement as for those that have been already mentioned. [27] For that it was an encroachment little by little and was meant to accustom us to suffering such intrusions into our harbors, is plain from the following consideration. For the mere fact that the man who sailed the ship in, and whom you ought to have put out of existence at once, galley and all, asked permission to build small boats in our harbor — does it not make it perfectly plain that their scheme was not so much to enter the harbor as to be inside it from the first? And if we tolerate small craft, a little later it will be war-galleys as well; and if at first we sanction a few, there will soon be many. [28] For they cannot allege as their excuse that there is plenty of timber for shipbuilding at Athens, where we import it with great trouble from distant parts, but that it is scarce in Macedonia, where there is a cheap supply for all who want it. No, they thought that they would build their ships here and also furnish them with crews in our harbor, though it is expressly stipulated in the joint agreement that nothing of the kind should be permitted; and they thought too that it would always be more and more in their power to do this. Thus on every hand they treat our city with contempt, thanks to their prompters here, who suggest to them everything they should do; [29] and thus with their help they have discovered that there is an indescribable slackness and feebleness in our city, and that we take no thought for the morrow, and that it never occurs to us to consider how the tyrant is carrying out the joint agreement. [30]
That agreement, men of Athens, I urge you to keep in the way that I have explained, and I would confidently assure you, with the authority that my age confers, that we shall at once be exercising our undoubted rights, and also making the safest use of those opportunities which impel us to secure our interests. For, indeed, there is this clause appended to the agreement, “if it is our wish to share in the common peace.” But the words “if it is our wish” mean also the opposite — if it is ever our duty to abandon our disgraceful submission to the dictates of others, or even our forgetfulness of those high ideals, which from time immemorial we have cherished in greater measure than any other people. Therefore, if you approve, Athenians, I will now propose that, as the agreement directs, we declare war on the transgressors.
ON THE FALSE EMBASSY
Translated by C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince
Since 357 BC, when Philip II of Macedon seized Amphipolis and Pydna, Athens was formally in a state of war against the Macedonians. In 347 BC, an Athenian delegation, comprising Demosthenes, Aeschine
s and Philocrates, was officially sent to Pella to negotiate a peace treaty with the King. Philip imposed his own harsh terms, which they were compelled to accept. Nevertheless, when an Athenian delegation, comprising once again Demosthenes, Aeschines and Philocrates, traveled in 346 BC to Pella to put Philip under oath for the final conclusion of the treaty, the King was campaigning abroad. He expected that he would hold safely any Athenian possessions that he might seize before the ratification. Growing anxious about the delay, Demosthenes insisted that the embassy should repair to the place where they would find Philip and swear him in without delay. Despite his suggestions, the Athenian envoys, including himself and Aeschines, remained in Macedonia, until Philip successfully concluded his excursion in Thrace. Finally, the Peace of Philocrates was sworn in Pherae, but Demosthenes accused later the other envoys of venality.
From this moment, a fierce and long judicial combat between Demosthenes and Aeschines commenced, during which five orations were delivered: three of Aeschines (Against Timarchus, On the False Embassy and On the Crown), the only speeches he ever wrote and two of Demosthenes (On the False Embassy and On the Crown).
Timarchus was a wealthy and powerful Athenian, whom Demosthenes wanted as an ally in his judicial assault against Aeschines. In 345 BC, Timarchus and Demosthenes accused Aeschines on a charge of high treason: (false embassy graphe), meaning that the accused envoys did not comply with the orders of the state because of bribery or high treason. Timarchus and Demosthenes argued that Aeschines was bribed by Philip. Aeschines counterattacked by claiming that his accuser Timarchus had forfeited the right to speak before the people as a consequence of youthful debauches that had left him with the reputation of being a whore. Timarchus had been the eromenos of many men in the port city of Piraeus, leading to the popular belief that he had done so not for noble pederastic reasons but more for financial gain. The suit succeeded and Timarchus was sentenced to atimia and politically destroyed. In 343 BC, the attack against Aeschines was renewed by Demosthenes in his speech On the False Embassy.
In his speech Demosthenes points out that he accuses Aeschines not only of his actions during the second embassy (346 BC) but of his actions during the first embassy as well (347 BC). He argues that the defendant favoured Philip and accuses him of the dilatoriness of the envoys. Aeschines is held personally responsible by the orator for his stance in Pella and for misguiding the Athenian people. As far as Thebes, Thrace and Phocis, Philip’s intentions as interpreted and presented to the Assembly by Aeschines were never materialised. Thereby, the deceitful promises and assertions of the defendant allowed Philip to fulfill undisturbed his plans. Such a stance against the city allows just one explanation: corruption and venality of the defendant. Aeschines was bribed by Philip. Throughout his speech Demosthenes strives to prove the bribery through indications, but he has no undisputed evidence.
In his response, Aeschines exposes all the events of the two embassies, although the official graphe refers only to the second one. He tries to explain the reversal of his stance towards Philip after seizing of Olynthus. He argues that he was also deceived and that, if the hopes he gave to the people were not fulfilled, this was the outcome of luck. Henri Weil regards his speech as an advocacy of credulity, incompetence, and blindness. Aeschines is also criticized for not disclosing any coherent and stable political thought in his speech. He is however lauded for his eloquence, although it is argued that the essence falls sort of the form.
Aeschines was finally acquitted by the narrow margin of thirty votes by a jury which may have numbered as many as 1,501. It is believed that in 343 BC, Demosthenes narrowly failed to defeat Aeschines, but he still managed to attain his political objective. Thirteen years later, in 330, Demosthenes’ victory would be overwhelming, following the delivery of On the Crown.
Aeschines by Giorgio Sommer
ON THE FALSE EMBASSY
Citizens of Athens, I do not doubt that you are all pretty well aware that this trial has been the center of keen partisanship and active canvassing, for you saw the people who were accosting and annoying you just now at the casting of lots. But I have to make a request which ought to be granted without asking, that you will all give less weight to private entreaty or personal influence than to the spirit of justice and to the oath which you severally swore when you entered that box. You will reflect that justice and the oath concern yourselves and the commonwealth, whereas the importunity and party spirit of advocates serve the end of those private ambitions which you are convened by the laws to thwart, not to encourage for the advantage of evil-doers. [2]
Now I observe that men who enter public life with honest intentions, even after they have submitted to scrutiny, do still acknowledge a perpetual responsibility. But Aeschines, the defendant, reverses this practice. Before coming into court to justify his proceedings, he has put out of the way one of the men who called him to account, and the others he is constantly threatening. So he is trying to introduce into politics a most dangerous and deplorable practice; for if a man who has undertaken and administered any public function can get rid of accusers not by his honesty but by the fear he inspires, the people will soon lose all control of public affairs. [3]
While I have entire confidence that I shall prove that this man is guilty of serious delinquencies, and that he deserves the most severe punishment, yet, in spite of that assurance, I have a misgiving, which I will explain to you quite frankly. It appears to me, men of Athens, that the trials which come before you are affected quite as much by the conditions of the hour as by the facts; and I am afraid that the long lapse of time since the embassy has inclined you to forget or to acquiesce in these iniquities. [4] I will, then, suggest a method by which you may nevertheless reach a just conclusion and give a righteous verdict today. By consideration among yourselves, gentlemen, you should form a true conception of what should be included in the vindication which the state requires of any ambassador. He is responsible then, in the first place, for the reports he has made; secondly, for the advice he has offered; thirdly, for his observance of your instructions; then there is the question of times and opportunities; and, to crown all, whether he has done his business corruptly or with integrity. [5] Why are these the topics of inquiry? Your conclusions are derived from the ambassador’s reports: you reach a right decision if they are true, a wrong decision if they are false. The advice of ambassadors you regard as the more trustworthy because it is given by men who presumably understand their own mission. [6] No ambassador, then, ought ever to be convicted of defective or mischievous counsels. Thirdly, when he has been expressly instructed what to say and what to do by resolution of the Assembly, it is his duty to conduct his business according to such instructions. Very well; but how does the question of time arise? Because, men of Athens, in important transactions opportunities are often short-lived: once willfully surrendered and betrayed to the enemy, they cannot be recovered, do what you will. [7] Next, as for the question of bribery or no bribery, of course you are agreed that it is a scandalous and abominable offence to accept money for acts injurious to the commonwealth. The author of the statute, however, made no such distinction; he forbade the acceptance of rewards absolutely, holding, as I suppose, that the man who takes them and is thereby corrupted can no longer be trusted by the state as a judge of sound policy. [8] If, then, I can establish by clear proofs that the reports of the defendant, Aeschines, were entirely untruthful, and that he prevented the Assembly from hearing the truth from me; that his counsels were totally opposed to your true interests; that he disobeyed all your instructions when on embassy; that by his waste of time many important opportunities were lost to the city; and finally that for all these delinquencies he, as well as Philocrates, accepted presents and rewards; pronounce him guilty and exact a penalty adequate to his crimes. But if I fail to prove all these five charges, or any one of them, then call me an impostor, and acquit him. [9]
I have many further charges to add, such as must excite universal abhorrence; but, by way o
f preface, I will first remind you of what doubtless most of you remember, — of the party with which Aeschines at first ranged himself in politics, and of the speeches which he thought fit to make in opposition to Philip. In this way I hope to satisfy you that his early acts and speeches supply abundant proof of his present corruption. [10] Aeschines, then, was the first man in Athens, as he claimed at the time in a speech, to perceive that Philip had designs against Greece, and was corrupting some of the magnates of Arcadia. It was he who, with Ischander, son of Neoptolemus, as his understudy, addressed the Council, and addressed the Assembly, on this subject, and persuaded them to send ambassadors to all the Greek states to convene a conference at Athens for the consideration of war with Philip. [11] It was he who afterwards, on his return from Arcadia, gave a report of the fine long orations which he said he had delivered as your spokesman before the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis in reply to Philip’s champion Hieronymus, and he made a long story of the enormous harm which corrupt statesmen in the pay of Philip were doing not only to their own countries but to the whole of Greece. [12] So on the strength of his policy at that time, and of the sample he had exhibited of his conduct, he was actually appointed as one of the ambassadors when you were induced by Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, Ctesiphon and others, who had brought entirely misleading reports from Macedonia, to send an embassy to negotiate peace with Philip. He was chosen, not as one who would make traffic of your interests, not as one who had any confidence in Philip, but as one of the party that was to keep an eye on the rest, for in view of his early speeches, and of his known hostility to Philip, it was natural that you should all have such an opinion of the man. [13] Then he came to me and proposed that we should act together on the embassy, being especially urgent that we should jointly keep watch upon that infamous scoundrel Philocrates. And until after our return from the first embassy I at least, men of Athens, had no suspicion that he was corrupt and had already sold himself. For apart from the speeches which, as I said, he had made on former occasions, he rose at the first of the two assemblies at which you discussed terms of peace, and began with an exordium which I believe I can repeat to you in the very words he used: [14] “If Philocrates, men of Athens, had given many days to studying how best he could thwart the peace, I do not think he could have found a better way than the present proposal. Such a peace as this I for one will never advise the city to make, so long as a single Athenian remains alive; yet I do say that we ought to make peace.” In such terms he spoke, concisely and with moderation. [15] And then on the next day, when the peace was to be ratified, when I supported the resolutions of our allies, and did what I could to secure fair and equitable terms, and when the people sympathized with my purpose and refused to hear a word from the contemptible Philocrates, up jumped the very man who had made the speech I have quoted in the head of all of you only the day before, and addressed you in support of Philocrates, [16] using language for which, as Heaven is my witness, he deserves to die many times over. He told you that you ought to forget the achievements of your forefathers; that you should not tolerate all that talk about old trophies and sea-fights; and that he would draft and enact a law forbidding aid to any Greeks who had not previously brought aid to you. This speech the shameless reprobate found courage to make while the ambassadors, whom you summoned from the Greek cities at his own suggestion, before he had sold himself, were standing at his elbow and listening to what he said. [17]