by Demosthenes
AGAINST ARISTOCRATES
Translated by A. T. Murray
Men of Athens, I beg that none of you will imagine that I have come here to arraign the defendant Aristocrates from any motive of private malice, or that I am thrusting myself so eagerly into a quarrel because I have detected some small and trivial blunder, but if my judgement and my views are at all right, the purpose of all my exertions in this case is that you may hold the Chersonese securely, and may not for the second time be cheated out of the possession of that country. [2] If, then, it is your desire to learn the truth about this business, and to give a righteous and legitimate verdict on the indictment, you must not confine your attention to the mere phrasing of the decree, but also take into consideration its probable consequences.
Had it been possible for you, at a first hearing, to discover the trick that had been played, you would not, perhaps, have been deceived at the outset; [3] but, inasmuch as one of our grievances is that certain persons make speeches and move resolutions designed to avert your suspicions and put you off your guard, you must not be greatly astonished if we convince you that this decree also is so worded that, while apparently offering some personal protection to Charidemus, it really robs our city of an honest and effective safeguard for the Chersonese. [4]
You will be well advised, men of Athens, to grant me your attention, and give a favorable hearing to what I have to say. I am not one of the orators who worry you; I am not one of the politicians who enjoy your confidence; yet I undertake to convince you of the importance of this transaction; and therefore, if you will cooperate with me to the best of your power and listen to me with goodwill, you will avert this peril, and at the same time you will overcome the reluctance of any of us plain citizens who may believe himself able to do the State a good turn. And he will so believe, if only he is satisfied that it is not difficult to get a hearing in this court; [5] though at present many of us, — inexpert speakers, perhaps, and yet better men than the experts — so dread this ordeal that they never think even of examining any public question. You may be sure that I for one, as Heaven is my witness, would never have dared to lay this indictment, if I had not thought it entirely dishonorable that at this time, when I see people engaged in a project to the disadvantage of our commonwealth, I should hold my peace, and close my lips, — I who, on a former occasion, when I sailed for the Hellespont in command of a war-galley, spoke out and denounced certain men who, in my judgement, were doing you wrong. [6]
I am not ignorant that Charidemus is regarded by some as a benefactor of Athens. But if I can find ability to tell you what I mean, and what I know him to have done, I hope to prove that, so far from being our benefactor, he is particularly ill-disposed to us, and that exactly the wrong conception has been formed of his character. [7] If, men of Athens, the most serious offence committed by Aristocrates had been that in his decree he was so solicitous for the safety of such a man as I undertake to prove Charidemus to be that he provided a special and illegal penalty, in case anything happened to him, I should have tried to deal with that point at once, for the purpose of proving that the man is very far from deserving the favour of this decree. There is, however, a much graver iniquity involved in the decree, of which you must first be informed, and against which you must take precaution. [8]
It is essential that at the outset I should explain to you the circumstances to which you owe the secure possession of the Chersonese, for in the light of that knowledge you will get a clear perception of the wrong that has been committed. The circumstances, men of Athens, are these. On the demise of Cotys three persons instead of one became kings of Thrace — Berisades, Amadocus, and Cersobleptes; and the natural result was that they competed with one another and that they all flattered you and courted your favour. [9] Well, men of Athens, certain persons who wanted to put a stop to that state of affairs, to get rid of the other kings, and to put Cersobleptes in possession of an undivided monarchy, contrived to equip themselves with this provisional resolution. If one listened only to the wording, they were far from appearing to pursue any such purpose; and yet such was in fact their main object, as I will proceed to explain. [10] On the death of Berisades, one of the three kings, Cersobleptes, in violation of a sworn treaty concluded with you, began to levy war upon the sons of Berisades and upon Amadocus; and it was at once foreseen that Athenodorus would come to the aid of the sons of Berisades, and Simon and Bianor to that of Amadocus, the former being related by marriage to Berisades and the two latter to Amadocus. [11] Accordingly the persons I have mentioned began to consider by what means those commanders might be compelled to remain inactive, so that, the rival princes being friendless, Charidemus, who was striving to win the monarchy for Cersobleptes, might make himself master of the situation. The first plan was to get a decree enacted by you, making any man who should kill Charidemus liable to arrest; and the second was that Charidemus should receive from you a general’s commission. [12] For neither Simon nor Bianor, both of whom had been admitted to your citizenship, and who were, apart from that, thoroughly well affected towards you, was likely to take the field against a general of yours while Athenodorus, an Athenian citizen by birthright, would never dream of doing so, nor would he incur the criminal charge set up by the decree, which would certainly be brought against those commanders, if anything happened to Charidemus. By these means, the kings being denuded of allies, and impunity provide for themselves, they hoped easily to drive them out and seize the monarchy. [13] Of such intentions and of such artifices they are accused by the evidence of facts; for, at the moment when they began hostilities, Aristomachus of Alopece visited you as their ambassador, and in his oration before the assembly, not content with commending Cersobleptes and Charidemus and enlarging on their generous sentiments towards you, [14] he declared that Charidemus was the only man in the world who could recover Amphipolis for Athens, and advised you to appoint him as general. But this preliminary resolution had already been drafted and preconcerted by them, in order that, if you should be captivated by the promises and expectations which Aristomachus held out to you, it might be ratified there and then by the Assembly, and no impediment might remain. [15] Yet what more ingenious and cunning device could these men have concocted to obtain the expulsion of the other kings, and the subjection of the whole realm to the monarch whom they preferred, than when they intimidated the commanders who would otherwise have supported the two rivals, and put them on their guard against that spiteful accusation which they might reasonably expect to encounter by the operation of this decree; and when on the other hand they conferred upon the man who was scheming to get the monarchy for one king, and was laying plans entirely opposed to your interests, such ample licence to proceed without fear? [16]
Nor is it only these considerations that prove that such was the purpose for which the resolution was moved: the decree itself supplies evidence of great weight. After drafting the words “if any person put Charidemus to death,” and omitting any proviso of what Charidemus might be doing, whether for or against your advantage, the mover forthwith added, “he shall be liable to seizure and removal from the territory of our allies.” [17] Now no man who is an enemy of ours as well as of Charidemus will ever enter allied territory, whether he has put him to death or not, and therefore it is not against such men that this retribution has been directed. The man who will be alarmed by this decree, and will be on his guard against be coming our certain enemy, is one who is a friend of ours, and also an enemy of his, if he should attempt anything inimical to us. And that man is Athenodorus, or Simon, or Bianor, kings of Thrace, or any other man who may wish to lay you under obligation by restraining Charidemus when he is trying to act in opposition to you. [18]
Such, men of Athens, are the purposes for which the provisional resolution was moved, in the hope that it would be ratified by a deluded Assembly; and such the reasons why we, desiring to frustrate its ratification, have brought this present indictment. As I have undertaken to prove three propositions, — fir
st that the decree is unconstitutional, secondly that it is injurious to the common weal, and thirdly that the person in whose favour it has been moved is unworthy of such privilege, — it is, perhaps, fair that I should allow you, who are to hear me, to choose what you wish to hear first, and second, and last. [19] Consider what you prefer, that I may begin with that. — You wish me to deal first with the illegality? Very well; I will do so. There is a favour which I not only ask but claim from you all, — with justice, as I am inclined to think. I beg that none of you, men of Athens, taking a partisan view, because you have been deceived in Charidemus and look on him as a benefactor, will give an unfriendly hearing to my remarks on the point of law. Do not, for that reason, rob yourselves of the power to cast an honest vote, and me of the right to present my whole case as I think fit. You must listen to me in the manner following, — and observe how fairly I will put it. [20] When I am discussing the point of law, you must disregard the person, and the character of the person, in whose favour the decree has been proposed, and attend to the question whether it is legal or illegal, — that and that alone. When I am bringing the man’s deeds home to him, and relating in what fashion you have been overreached by him, you must look only at the transactions, — do I relate them accurately or untruly? [21] And when I inquire whether or not the enactment of this decree is conducive to the public good, dismiss everything else and watch my reasoning on that point, — is it sound or unsound? Listen to me in that manner, and you will get a better understanding of what you ought to know, by looking at one question at a time, instead of inquiring into all the issues at once, while I shall have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. On every topic my remarks shall be brief. [22]
Now take and read the actual statutes, that I may prove thereby the illegality of their proposal.”One of the Laws of the Areopagus Concerning Homicide
The Council of the Areopagus shall take cognizance in cases of homicide, of intentional wounding, of arson, and of poisoning, if a man kill another by giving poison.” [23]
Stop there. You have heard the statute, men of Athens, and you have also heard the decree. Let me tell you how you will more readily grasp the arguments on the question of illegality. Consider the status of the person in whose favour the decree has been proposed: is he an alien, a resident alien, or a citizen? If we call him a resident alien, we shall not be telling the truth; and if we call him an alien, we shall be doing him wrong, for it is only fair to him to admit the validity of that grace of the people by which he was made a citizen. It seems, then, that we must treat him as a citizen in our arguments. [24] Now I beg you to observe how candidly and honestly I am going to treat the question; for I assign him to that class which entitles him to the greatest respect, though I do deny his right to acquire illegally privileges not enjoyed by us who are citizens by birthright, — the privileges, I mean, which the defendant has specified in this decree. In the statute it is provided that the Council shall take cognizance of homicide, intentional wounding, arson, and poisoning, if a man kills another by giving him poison. [25] The legislator, while he presumes the killing, has nevertheless directed a judicial inquiry before specifying what is to be done to the culprit, and thereby has shown a just respect, men of Athens, for the religious feeling of the whole city. I say of the whole city, because it is impossible that all of you should know who the manslayer is. He thought it scandalous to give credit to such accusations, when made, without a trial; and he conceived that, inasmuch as the avenging of the sufferer is in our hands, we ought to be informed and satisfied by argument that the accused is guilty, for then conscience permits us to inflict punishment according to knowledge, but not before. [26] Moreover he argued that before the trial is held such expressions as “if a man kill,” “if a man rob a temple,” “if a man commit treason,” and the like, are merely phrases of accusation: they become definitions of crime only after trial and conviction. To a formula of accusation he thought it proper to attach not punishment, but only trial; and therefore, when enacting that, if one man killed another, the Council should take cognizance, he did not lay down what should be done to the culprit if found guilty. [27] So much for the legislator; but what of the author of the decree? “If any man kill Charidemus,” he says. So he defines the injury in the same phrase, “if any man kill,” as the legislator; but the sequel is not the same. He struck out submission to trial, and made the culprit liable to immediate seizure; he passed by the tribunal appointed by law, and handed over to the accusers, to be dealt with as they chose, a man untried, a man whose guilt is not yet proven. [28] When they have got him, they are to be allowed to torture him, or maltreat him, or extort money from him. Yet the next ensuing statute directly and distinctly forbids such treatment even of men convicted and proved to be murderers. Read to the jury the statute that follows.”Law
It shall be lawful to kill murderers in our own territory, or to arrest them as directed on the first turning-table, but not to maltreat or amerce them, on penalty of a payment of twice the damage inflicted. The Archons, according to their several jurisdictions, shall bring cases into court; for any man who so desires and the court of Heliaea shall adjudicate.” [29]