by Demosthenes
[3] ἐγὼ δέ φημι δεῖν （καί μοι μὴ θορυβήσητ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μέλλω λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀκούσαντες κρίνατε）, ὡς περὶ τοῦ λαβεῖν ἐκκλησίαν ἀπεδώκαμεν, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ συνταχθῆναι καὶ παρασκευασθῆναι τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐκκλησίαν ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ παρασχεῖν ἕκαστον αὑτὸν μὴ μόνον ταῦτ᾽ ἀκούειν ἐθέλοντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πράττειν βουλόμενον, ἵν᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰς ἐλπίδας δι᾽ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἔχητε, καὶ μὴ τὸν δεῖνα μηδὲ τὸν δεῖνα πυνθάνησθε τί πράττει.
[3] My idea of our duty — do not drown with your clamor what I am about to say, but hear me before you judge — my idea is that, as we have devoted a meeting of the Assembly to the question of receiving the dole, so we ought also to devote a meeting to organization and to equipment for war; and everyone must show himself not merely ready to hear what is said, but also willing to act, so that you may depend on yourselves, Athenians, for your hopes of success, and not be always asking what service this individual or that is rendering.
[4] καὶ τὰ μὲν προσιόντα τῇ πόλει πάντα, καὶ ἃ νῦν ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων παραναλίσκετ᾽ εἰς οὐδὲν δέον καὶ ὅσ᾽ ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων ὑπάρχει, λαμβάνειν ὑμᾶς φημὶ χρῆναι τὸ ἴσον ἕκαστον, τοὺς μὲν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ στρατιωτικόν, τοὺς δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τὸν κατάλογον ἐξεταστικὸν ἢ ὅπως ἄν τις ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, στρατεύεσθαι δ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ μηδενὶ τούτου παραχωρεῖν,
[4] The total revenues of the State, including your own resources, now squandered on unnecessary objects, and the contributions of your allies, must be shared by each citizen equally, as pay by those of military age and as overseers’ fees, or whatever you like to call it, by those beyond the age-limit; and you must serve in person and not resign that duty to others,
[5] ἀλλὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς πόλεως οἰκείαν εἶναι, κατεσκευασμένην ἀπὸ τούτων, ἵν᾽ ἅμ᾽ εὐπορῆτε καὶ τὰ δέοντα ποιῆτε, καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἡγεῖσθαι ταύτης, ἵν᾽ ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ τοιαῦθ᾽ οἷάπερ νυνὶ συμβαίνῃ: τοὺς στρατηγοὺς κρίνετε, καὶ περίεσθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων ‘ὁ δεῖνα τοῦ δεῖνος τὸν δεῖν᾽ εἰσήγγειλεν,’ ἄλλο δ᾽ οὐδέν.
[5] but our army must be a national force, equipped from the resources I have named, so that you may be well provided for the performance of your task, and that we may have no repetition of what usually happens now, when you are always bringing your generals to trial and the net result of your exertions is the announcement that “So-and-so, the son of So-and-so, has impeached So-and-so.”
[6] ἀλλὰ τί ὑμῖν γένηται; πρῶτον μὲν οἱ σύμμαχοι μὴ φρουραῖς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ταὐτὰ συμφέρειν ὑμῖν κἀκείνοις ὦσιν οἰκεῖοι, ἔπειθ᾽ οἱ στρατηγοὶ μὴ ξένους ἔχοντες τοὺς μὲν συμμάχους ἄγωσι καὶ φέρωσι, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους μηδ᾽ ὁρῶσιν, ἀφ᾽ ὧν αἱ μὲν ὠφέλειαι τούτων εἰσὶν ἴδιαι, τὰ δὲ μίση καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἐφ᾽ ὅλην ἔρχεται τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ πολίτας τοὺς ἀκολουθοῦντας ἔχοντες τοὺς ἐχθρούς, ἃ νῦν τοὺς φίλους, ποιῶσιν.
[6] But what is to be the result for you? In the first place, that your allies may be kept loyal, not by maintaining garrisons among them, but by making their interests identical with yours; next, that our generals may not lead mercenaries to the plunder of our allies without even coming in sight of the enemy, so that the profit is all their own, while the State at large incurs the hatred and the abuse, but that they may have their own citizens at their back, and may so deal with our enemies as they now deal with our friends.
[7] χωρὶς δὲ τούτων πολλὰ τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν ὑμετέραν ποθεῖ παρουσίαν, καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους πολέμους οἰκείᾳ χρῆσθαι δυνάμει συμφέρειν, καὶ πρὸς τἄλλα πράγματ᾽ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν ὑμῖν ἀπέχρη καὶ μηδὲν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν περιεργάζεσθαι ὅπως ἔχει, ἄλλος ἂν ἦν λόγος:
[7] But apart from this, many operations demand your actual presence, and beside the advantage of using a national force in a national quarrel, this is necessary on every other ground. For if you were content to let things slide and not worry about the state of Greece, it would be another matter.
[8] νῦν δὲ πρωτεύειν μὲν ὑμεῖς ἀξιοῦτε καὶ τὰ δίκαι᾽ ὁρίζειν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τὴν δὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἐφορεύσουσαν καὶ φυλάξουσαν δύναμιν οὔτε κατεσκεύασθ᾽ οὔτε κατασκευάζεσθε, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ πολλῆς μὲν ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐρημίας ὑμῶν ὁ Μυτιληναίων δῆμος καταλέλυται, ἐπὶ πολλῆς δ᾽ ἡσυχίας ὁ Ῥοδίων, ἐχθρός γ᾽ ὢν ἡμῖν, φαίη τις ἄν: ἀλλὰ μείζω χρὴ νομίζειν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν πρὸς τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς προαιρέσεως ἔχθραν, ἢ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς δήμους ὑπὲρ ὧν ποτ᾽ ἂν ᾖ.
[8] But, as it is, you claim to take the lead and to determine the rights of other states; yet neither in the past nor today have you furnished a sufficient force to superintend and secure this claim. On the contrary, it was when you stood utterly aloof and indifferent that the democracies of Mytilene and of Rhodes were destroyed. “Yes, but Rhodes was our enemy,” you may say.
[9] ἀλλ᾽ ἵν᾽ ἐκεῖσ᾽ ἐπανέλθω, φημὶ δεῖν ὑμᾶς συντετάχθαι, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ τε λαβεῖν καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἃ προσήκει σύνταξιν εἶναι. διελέχθην δ᾽ ὑμῖν περὶ τούτων καὶ πρότερον, καὶ διεξῆλθον ὡς ἂν συνταχθείητε, οἵ θ᾽ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ ἱππεῖς καὶ ὅσοι τούτων ἐκτός ἐστε, καὶ εὐπορία τις ἂν ἅπασι γένοιτο κοινή.
[9] But you should consider, men of Athens, that our hostility towards oligarchies, purely on the ground of principle, is stronger than our hostility towards democracies on any grounds whatever. But to return to my point. My view is that you must be brought under a system, and there must be a uniform scheme for receiving public money and for performing necessary services. I have addressed you before on this subject and have described the method of organizing you, whether you serve in the infantry or the cavalry or in other ways, and also how ample provision may be ensured for all alike.
[10] ὃ δέ μοι πλείστην ἀθυμίαν παρέσχεν ἁπάντων, ἐρῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρύψομαι, ὅτι πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ὄντων τούτων ἁπάντων, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς οὐδεὶς μέμνηται, τοῖν δυοῖν δ᾽ ὀβολοῖν ἅπαντες. καίτοι τοὺς μὲν οὐκ ἔστι πλείονος ἢ δυοῖν ὀβολοῖν ἀξίους εἶναι, τἄλλα δὲ μετὰ τούτων ὧν εἶπον τῶν βασιλέως
ἄξι᾽ ἐστὶ χρημάτων, πόλιν τοσούτους ὁπλίτας ἔχουσαν καὶ τριήρεις καὶ ἵππους καὶ χρημάτων πρόσοδον συντετάχθαι καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι.
[10] I will tell you without any concealment what has caused me most disappointment. It is that though the many reforms proposed were all of them important and honorable, no one remembers any of them, but everyone remembers the two obols. Yet these can never be worth more than two obols, but the other reforms, together with those that I proposed, are worth all the wealth of the Great King — that a city, so well provided with infantry, triremes, cavalry, and revenues, should be duly organized and equipped.
[11] τί οὖν ταῦτα νῦν , φαίη τις ἄν, λέγω; ὅτι φημὶ δεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν πάντας μισθοφορεῖν δυσχεραίνουσί τινες, τὸ δὲ συνταχθῆναι καὶ παρασκευασθῆναι παρὰ πάντων χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκιμάζεται, ἐντεῦθεν ἄρξασθαι τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ προθεῖναι περὶ τούτων τῷ βουλομένῳ γνώμην ἀποφήνασθαι. ὡς οὕτως ἔχει: ἂν μὲν ὑμεῖς νῦν πεισθῆτε τούτων καιρὸν εἶναι, ὅταν αὐτῶν εἰς χρείαν ἔλθητε, ἕτοιμ᾽ ὑπάρξει: ἂν δ᾽ ἀκαιρίαν ἡγησάμενοι παρίδητε, ὅταν δέῃ χρῆσθαι, τότ᾽ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε παρασκευάζεσθαι.
[11] Why then, you may ask, do I choose the present time for these remarks? Because I think that, as the principle that all citizens should serve for pay is displeasing to some people, and yet the advantage of organization and equipment is approved by all, you ought to begin the business at this point, giving everyone a chance of stating his views on the subject. For the case stands thus: if you are convinced that now is the opportunity for these reforms, all things will be ready when the need of them arrives, but if you pass over the opportunity as unsuitable, then, just when you want to use them, you will be compelled to begin your preparations.
[12] ἤδη δέ τις εἶπεν ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοί που λέγων, οὐχ ὑμῶν τῶν πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν διαρρηγνυμένων εἰ ταῦτα γενήσεται, ‘τί δ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐκ τῶν Δημοσθένους λόγων ἀγαθὸν γέγονεν; παρελθὼν ὑμῶν, ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ἐνέπλησε τὰ ὦτα λόγων, καὶ διέσυρε τὰ παρόντα, καὶ τοὺς προγόνους ἐπῄνεσεν, καὶ μετεωρίσας καὶ φυσήσας ὑμᾶς κατέβη.’
[12] It has been before now remarked, men of Athens, by some speaker — not one of the great body of citizens, but one of those who are likely to have a fit if these reforms are carried out— “What good have we ever got from the speeches of Demosthenes? He comes forward, whenever he thinks well, fills our ears with phrases, denounces our present state, extols our ancestors, and then descends from the platform after raising our hopes and inflating our pride.”
[13] ἐγὼ δ᾽ εἰ μὲν ὑμᾶς δυναίμην ὧν λέγω τι πεῖσαι, τηλικαῦτ᾽ ἂν οἶμαι τὴν πόλιν πρᾶξαι ἀγαθὰ ὥστ᾽, εἰ νῦν εἰπεῖν ἐπιχειρήσαιμι, πολλοὺς ἂν ἀπιστῆσαι ὡς μείζοσιν ἢ δυνατοῖς: οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο μικρὸν ὠφελεῖν οἶμαι, εἰ τὰ βέλτιστ᾽ ἀκούειν ὑμᾶς συνεθίζω. δεῖ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν βουλόμενόν τι ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ἀγαθὸν τὰ ὦτα πρῶτον ὑμῶν ἰάσασθαι: διέφθαρται γάρ: οὕτω πολλὰ καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ βέλτιστ᾽ ἀκούειν εἴθισθε.
[13] But if I could only induce you to accept any of my proposals, I think that I should confer such benefits on the State that if I tried to describe them now, many of you would disbelieve them, as being too good to be true. And yet even this too I consider no mean benefit, if I accustom you to listen to the best advice. For he who would benefit the State, Athenians, must first purge your ears, for they have been poisoned; so many lies have you been accustomed to hear — anything, in fact, rather than the best advice.
[14] οἷον （ὅπως δὲ μὴ θορυβήσει μοι μηδείς, πρὶν ἂν ἅπαντ᾽ εἴπω） ἀνέῳξαν δήπου πρώην τινὲς τὸν ὀπισθόδομον. οὐκοῦν οἱ παριόντες ἅπαντες τὸν δῆμον καταλελύσθαι, τοὺς νόμους οὐκέτ᾽ εἶναι, τοιαῦτ᾽ ἔλεγον. καίτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, （καὶ σκοπεῖτ᾽ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγω） οἱ μὲν ταῦτα ποιοῦντες ἄξι᾽ ἐποίουν θανάτου, ὁ δῆμος δ᾽ οὐ διὰ τούτων καταλύεται. πάλιν κώπας τις ὑφείλετο: μαστιγοῦν, στρεβλοῦν πάντες οἱ λέγοντες, τὸν δῆμον καταλύεσθαι. ἐγὼ δὲ τί φημί; τὸν μὲν ὑφαιρούμενον θανάτου ποιεῖν ἄξια, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνοι, τὸν δῆμον δ᾽ οὐ διὰ τούτων καταλύεσθαι.
[14] Let me give you an instance, and let no one interrupt me till I have finished my story. You know that a day or two ago the treasury of the Parthenon was broken into. So the speakers in the Assembly, one and all, cried that the democracy was overthrown, that the laws were null and void, and so on. And yet, Athenians, though the culprits — mark whether my words are true — deserved death, it is not through them that the democracy is endangered. Again, a few oars were stolen. “Scourge the thieves torture them,” cried the orators; “the democracy is in danger.” But what is my opinion I say, like the others, that the thief deserves death, but not that the democracy is endangered by such means.
[15] ἀλλὰ πῶς καταλύεται, οὐδεὶς λέγει οὐδὲ παρρησιάζεται. ἐγὼ δὲ φράσω: ὅταν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, φαύλως ἠγμένοι, πολλοὶ καὶ ἄποροι καὶ ἄοπλοι καὶ ἀσύντακτοι καὶ μὴ ταὐτὰ γιγνώσκοντες ἦτε, καὶ μήτε στρατηγὸς μήτ᾽ ἄλλος μηδεὶς ὧν ἂν ὑμεῖς ψηφίσησθε φροντίζῃ, καὶ ταῦτα μηδεὶς λέγειν ἐθέλῃ μηδ᾽ ἐπανορθοῖ, μηδ᾽ ὅπως παύσεται τοιαῦτ᾽ ὄντα πράττῃ, ὃ νῦν ἀεὶ συμβαίνει.
[15] The real danger to democracy no one is bold enough to name; but I will name it. It is in danger when you, men of Athens, are wrongly led, when in spite of your numbers you are helpless, unarmed, unorganized and at variance, when no general or anyone else pays any heed to your resolutions, when no one cares to tell you the truth or set you right, when no one makes an effort to remedy this state of things. And that is what always happens now.
[16] καὶ νὴ Δί᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἕτεροί γε λόγοι παρερρυήκασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ψευδεῖς, καὶ πολλὰ τὴν πολιτείαν βλάπτοντες, οἷον ‘ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ὑμῖν ἐστιν ἡ σωτηρία,’ καὶ ‘δεῖ τῇ ψήφῳ τὴν πολιτείαν ὑμᾶς φυλάττειν.’ ἐγὼ δ᾽ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν ὑμῖν τὰ δικαστήρια τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους δικαίων ἐστὶ κύρια, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὅπλοις δεῖ κρατεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πολιτείας.
[16] Yes, by heavens, men of Athens, and there are other phrases, false and injurious to the State, that have passed into your common speech, such as “In the law-courts lies your salvation,” and “It is t
he ballot-box that must save the State.” I know that these courts are sovereign to uphold the rights of citizen against citizen, but it is by arms that you must conquer the enemy, and upon arms depends the safety of the State.
[17] οὐ γὰρ τὸ ψηφίσασθαι τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ποιήσει τὸ νικᾶν, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μετὰ τούτων κρατοῦντες τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ ψηφίζεσθαι καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε ποιεῖν ὑμῖν ἐξουσίαν καὶ ἄδειαν παρασκευάσουσι: δεῖ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὅπλοις φοβερούς, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις φιλανθρώπους εἶναι.
[17] For resolutions will not give your men victory in battle, but those who with the help of arms conquer the enemy shall win for you power and security to pass resolutions and to do what you will. For in the field you ought to be terrible, but in the courts sympathetic.