by Demosthenes
[32] Such, in consequence, is the state of our public affairs that if anyone read out your resolutions and then went on to describe your performances, not a soul would believe that the same men were responsible for the one and for the other. Take for instance the decrees that you passed against the accursed Megarians, when they appropriated the sacred demesne, that you should march out and prevent it and forbid it; in favour of the Phliasians, when they were exiled the other day, that you should help them and not give them up to their murderers, and should call for volunteers from the Peloponnese.
[33] ἅπαντα καλά, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῦτα καὶ δίκαια καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἄξια: τὰ ἔργα δὲ τἀπὸ τούτων οὐδαμοῦ. οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἀπέχθειαν διὰ τῶν ψηφισμάτων ἐκφέρεσθε, τῶν δ᾽ ἔργων οὐδενὸς κύριοι γίγνεσθε: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ψηφίσματα πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίωμα ψηφίζεσθε, τὴν δύναμιν δ᾽ οὐκ ἀκόλουθον ὧν ψηφίζεσθ᾽ ἔχετε.
[33] That, Athenians, was all very noble and right and worthy of our city; but the resultant action was simply of no account. So your hostility is expressed in your decrees, but action is beyond your control. Your decrees accord with the traditions of Athens, but your powers bear no relation to your decrees.
[34] ἐγὼ δὲ παραινέσαιμ᾽ ἂν ὑμῖν （καί μοι μηδὲν ὀργισθῆτε） ἔλαττον φρονεῖν καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀγαπᾶν πράττοντας, ἢ μείζω δύναμιν παρασκευάζεσθαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν Σιφνίοις ἢ Κυθνίοις ἤ τισιν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις οὖσι συνῄδειν ὑμῖν, ἔλαττον φρονεῖν συνεβούλευον ἄν: ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἔστ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ τὴν δύναμιν παρασκευάσασθαι παραινῶ: αἰσχρὸν γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰσχρὸν λιπεῖν τὴν τοῦ φρονήματος τάξιν, ἣν ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι παρέδωκαν.
[34] I, however, would advise you — do not be angry with me — either to humble yourselves and be content to mind your own affairs, or else to get ready a more powerful force. If I felt sure that you were Siphnians or Cythnians or people of that sort, I should counsel you to be less proud, but since you are Athenians, I urge you to get your force ready. For it would be a disgrace, men of Athens, a disgrace to desert that post of honor which your ancestors bequeathed to you.
[35] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀποστῆναι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν βούλησθε: πολλὰ γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου πέπρακται, καὶ τοὺς μὲν φίλους τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας αἰσχρὸν προέσθαι, τοῖς δ᾽ οὖσιν ἐχθροῖς οὐκ ἔνι πιστεῦσαι καὶ μεγάλους ἐᾶσαι γενέσθαι. ὅλως δ᾽ ὅπερ οἱ πολιτευόμενοι πεπόνθασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς — οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτοῖς, ὅταν βούλωνται, παύσασθαι — τοῦτο καὶ ὑμῖν περιέστηκε: πεπολίτευσθε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.
[35] But besides it is no longer in your power, even if you wished it, to hold aloof from Greek affairs. For you have many exploits to your credit from the earliest times, and it would be disgraceful to abandon the friends you have, while it is impossible to trust your enemies and allow them to grow powerful. In short, you stand in the same position as your statesmen stand to you — they cannot retire when they would; for you are definitely involved in the politics of Greece.
[36] ἔστι δ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεφάλαιον ἁπάντων τῶν εἰρημένων: οὐδέποθ᾽ ὑμᾶς οἱ λέγοντες οὔτε πονηροὺς οὔτε χρηστοὺς ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμεῖς τούτους, ὁπότερ᾽ ἂν βούλησθε: οὐ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὧν οὗτοι βούλονται στοχάζεσθε, ἀλλ᾽ οὗτοι ὧν ἂν ὑμᾶς ἐπιθυμεῖν οἴωνται. ὑμᾶς οὖν ὑπάρξαι δεῖ χρηστὰ βουλομένους, καὶ πάνθ᾽ ἕξει καλῶς: ἢ γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐρεῖ φλαῦρον οὐδέν, ἢ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ πλέον ἔσται μὴ ἔχοντι τοὺς πεισομένους.
[36] This, Athenians, is the sum of all that I have said. Your orators never make you either bad men or good, but you make them whichever you choose; for it is not you that aim at what they wish for, but they who aim at whatever they think you desire. You therefore must start with a noble ambition and all will be well, for then no orator will give you base counsel, or else he will gain nothing by it, having no one to take him at his word.
περὶ τῶν Συμμοριῶν — ON THE NAVY-BOARDS
[1] οἱ μὲν ἐπαινοῦντες, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς προγόνους ὑμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν μοι δοκοῦσι προαιρεῖσθαι κεχαρισμένον, οὐ μὴν συμφέροντά γ᾽ ἐκείνοις οὓς ἐγκωμιάζουσι ποιεῖν: περὶ γὰρ πραγμάτων ἐγχειροῦντες λέγειν ὧν οὐδ᾽ εἷς ἀξίως ἐφικέσθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναιτο, αὐτοὶ μὲν τοῦ δοκεῖν δύνασθαι λέγειν δόξαν ἐκφέρονται, τὴν δ᾽ ἐκείνων ἀρετὴν ἐλάττω τῆς ὑπειλημμένης παρὰ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐκείνων μὲν ἔπαινον τὸν χρόνον ἡγοῦμαι μέγιστον, οὗ πολλοῦ γεγενημένου μείζω τῶν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων πραχθέντων οὐδένες ἄλλοι παραδείξασθαι δεδύνηνται:
[1] Those who praise your ancestors, men of Athens, seem to me to choose an acceptable theme, which yet fails to do any real service to those whom they eulogize; for when they attempt to speak about achievements to which no words could possibly do justice, they earn for themselves the reputation of clever speakers, but leave their hearers with a lower estimate of the merits of those famous men. Indeed, I think the best testimony to their merits is the length of time that has elapsed, during which no other men have been able to surpass their achievements.
[2] αὐτὸς δὲ πειράσομαι τὸν τρόπον εἰπεῖν ὃν ἄν μοι δοκεῖτε μάλιστα δύνασθαι παρασκευάσασθαι. καὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει: εἰ μὲν ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες οἱ μέλλοντες λέγειν δεινοὶ φανείημεν ὄντες, οὐδὲν ἂν τὰ ὑμέτερ᾽ εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι βέλτιον σχοίη: εἰ δὲ παρελθὼν εἷς ὁστισοῦν δύναιτο διδάξαι καὶ πεῖσαι, τίς παρασκευὴ καὶ πόση καὶ πόθεν πορισθεῖσα χρήσιμος ἔσται τῇ πόλει, πᾶς ὁ παρὼν φόβος λελύσεται. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτ᾽, ἂν ἄρ᾽ οἷός τ᾽ ὦ, πειράσομαι ποιῆσαι, μικρὰ προειπὼν ὑμῖν ὡς ἔχω γνώμης περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα.
[2] For my own part, however, I shall confine myself to pointing out how you can best prepare for war. For this is how things stand. Even if all of us who are to address you should prove capable speakers, you would, I am sure, be no better off; but if someone, whoever he may be, could come forward and point out convincingly the nature and size of the force that will be serviceable to the city, and show how it is to be provided, all our present fears will be relieved. This is what I will try to do, if only I am able, first giving you briefly my views about our relations with the Great King.
[3] ἐγὼ νομίζω κοινὸν ἐχθρὸν ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ε�
�ναι βασιλέα, οὐ μὴν διὰ τοῦτο παραινέσαιμ᾽ ἂν μόνοις τῶν ἄλλων ὑμῖν πόλεμον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄρασθαι: οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὁρῶ κοινοὺς ἀλλήλοις ὄντας φίλους, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίους μᾶλλον ἐκείνῳ πιστεύοντας ἤ τισιν αὑτῶν. ἐκ δὴ τῶν τοιούτων νομίζω συμφέρειν ὑμῖν τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου τηρεῖν ὅπως ἴση καὶ δικαία γενήσεται, παρασκευάζεσθαι δ᾽ ἃ προσήκει πάντα καὶ τοῦθ᾽ ὑποκεῖσθαι.
[3] I admit that he is the common enemy of all the Greeks; yet I would not on that account advise you to undertake a war against him by yourselves apart from the rest, for I observe that the Greeks themselves are by no means common friends of one another, but that certain of them repose more confidence in the King than in some of their neighbors. From this state of things I conclude that it is to your interest to be careful that your grounds for entering on war shall be equitable and just, but to proceed with all the necessary preparations, making that the foundation of your policy.
[4] ἡγοῦμαι γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς Ἕλληνας, εἰ μὲν ἐναργὲς τι γένοιτο καὶ σαφὲς ὡς βασιλεὺς αὐτοῖς ἐπιχειρεῖ, κἂν συμμαχῆσαι καὶ χάριν μεγάλην ἔχειν τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνον ἀμυνομένοις: εἰ δ᾽ ἔτ᾽ ἀδήλου τούτου καθεστηκότος προαπεχθησόμεθ᾽ ἡμεῖς, δέδι᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ τούτοις μετ᾽ ἐκείνου πολεμεῖν ἀναγκασθῶμεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν προνοούμεθα.
[4] For I believe, Athenians, that if there were clear and unmistakable signs of the King’s hostile intentions, the other Greeks would join with us, and would be deeply grateful to those who would stand up for them and with them against his attacks; but if we force on a war, while his aims are still obscure, I am afraid, men of Athens, that we shall be obliged to encounter, not only the King, but also those whom we are minded to protect.
[5] ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπισχὼν ὧν ὥρμηκεν, εἰ ἄρ᾽ ἐγχειρεῖν ἔγνωκε τοῖς Ἕλλησι, χρήματα δώσει τισὶν αὐτῶν καὶ φιλίαν προτενεῖται, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἰδίους πολέμους ἐπανορθῶσαι βουλόμενοι καὶ τοῦτον τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντες τὴν κοινὴν ἁπάντων σωτηρίαν παρόψονται. εἰς δὲ τὴν ταραχὴν ταύτην καὶ τὴν ἀγνωμοσύνην παραινῶ μὴ προκαθεῖναι τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν.
[5] For the King, suspending his designs — if he really intends to invade Greece — will distribute money among them and tempt them with offers of friendship, while they, anxious to bring their private quarrels to a successful issue and keeping that object in view, will overlook the common safety of all. Into such a welter of confusion and folly I beseech you not to plunge our country.
[6] οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἴσης ὁρῶ τοῖς τ᾽ ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι καὶ ὑμῖν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα τὴν βουλὴν οὖσαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνων μὲν πολλοῖς ἐνδέχεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ τῶν ἰδίᾳ τι συμφερόντων διοικουμένοις τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀμελῆσαι, ὑμῖν δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀδικουμένοις παρὰ τῶν ἀδικούντων καλόν ἐστιν λαβεῖν ταύτην τὴν δίκην, ἐᾶσαί τινας αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ γενέσθαι.
[6] For indeed, as regards your policy towards the King, I see that you are by no means on the same footing as the other Greeks; for many of them it is, I suppose, possible to pursue their private interests and abandon the cause of their countrymen, but for you, even when wronged by them, it would not be honorable to exact such a penalty from the wrong-doers as to leave any of them under the heel of the barbarian.
[7] ὅτε δ᾽ οὕτω ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει, σκεπτέον ὅπως μήθ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ γενησόμεθ᾽ οὐκ ἴσοι, μήτ᾽ ἐκεῖνος, ὃν ἡμεῖς ἐπιβουλεύειν ἡγούμεθα τοῖς Ἕλλησι, τὴν τοῦ φίλος αὐτοῖς δοκεῖν εἶναι πίστιν λήψεται. πῶς οὖν ταῦτ᾽ ἔσται; ἂν ἡ μὲν δύναμις τῆς πόλεως ἐξητασμένη καὶ παρεσκευασμένη πᾶσιν ᾖ φανερά, φαίνηται δὲ δίκαι᾽ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ φρονεῖν αἱρουμένη.
[7] But as long as this is so, we must take care that we are not involved in war at a disadvantage, and that the King, whom we believe to have designs against the Greeks, does not win the credit of appearing as their friend. How then can this be ensured? If we make it plain to all that our forces are already marshalled and equipped, but equally plain that our policy is founded on sentiments of justice.
[8] τοῖς δὲ θρασυνομένοις καὶ σφόδρ᾽ ἑτοίμως πολεμεῖν κελεύουσιν ἐκεῖνο λέγω, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν χαλεπὸν οὔθ᾽ ὅταν βουλεύεσθαι δέῃ, δόξαν ἀνδρείας λαβεῖν, οὔθ᾽ ὅταν κίνδυνός τις ἐγγὺς ᾖ, δεινὸν εἰπεῖν φανῆναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ προσῆκον, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν κινδύνων τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ἐν δὲ τῷ συμβουλεύειν φρονιμώτερα τῶν ἄλλων εἰπεῖν ἔχειν.
[8] To your rash advisers, who are so eager to hurry you into war, I have this to say, that it is not difficult, when deliberation is needed, to gain a reputation for courage, nor when danger is at hand, to display skill in oratory; but there is something that is both difficult and essential — to display courage in the face of danger, and in deliberation to offer sounder advice than one’s fellows.
[9] ἐγὼ δ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίζω τὸν μὲν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς βασιλέα χαλεπὸν τῇ πόλει, τὸν δ᾽ ἀγῶνα τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου ῥᾴδιον ἂν συμβῆναι. διὰ τί; ὅτι τοὺς μὲν πολέμους ἅπαντας ἀναγκαίως ἡγοῦμαι τριήρων καὶ χρημάτων καὶ τόπων δεῖσθαι, ταῦτα δὲ πάντ᾽ ἀφθονώτερ᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἔχονθ᾽ ἡμῶν εὑρίσκω: τοὺς δ᾽ ἀγῶνας οὐδενὸς οὕτω τῶν ἄλλων ὁρῶ δεομένους ὡς ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, τούτους δ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν κινδυνεύουσι πλείους ὑπάρχειν νομίζω.
[9] I believe, men of Athens, that the war with the King is a difficult undertaking for our city, though any conflict which the war involved might prove easy enough. Why so? Because the first requisites for every war are necessarily, I suppose, fleets and money and strong positions, and I find that the King is more fully supplied with these than we are; but for the actual conflict I observe that nothing is needed so much as brave soldiers, and of these we and those who share the danger with us have the better supply.
[10] τὸν μὲν δὴ πόλεμον διὰ ταῦτα παραινῶ μηδ᾽ ἐξ ἑνὸς τρόπου προτέρους ἀνελέσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν ἀγῶνα ὀρθῶς φημι παρεσκευασμένους ὑπάρχειν χρῆναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος μὲν ἦν τις τρόπος δυνάμεως ᾗ τοὺς βαρβάρους οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν ἀμύνασθαι, ἕτερος δέ τις ᾗ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, εἰκότως ἂν ἴσως φανεροὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον �
�γιγνόμεθ᾽ ἀντιταττόμενοι:
[10] That is why I advise that we should not on any grounds be the first to plunge into war, but for the conflict we must be properly equipped from the start. If indeed there were one kind of force suitable for defence against Persians and another for defence against Greeks, then we might reasonably be suspected of marshalling ourselves against the King;
[11] ἐπεὶ δὲ πάσης ἐστὶ παρασκευῆς ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος καὶ δεῖ ταὔτ᾽ εἶναι κεφάλαια τῆς δυνάμεως, τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνασθαι δύνασθαι, τοῖς οὖσι συμμάχοις βοηθεῖν, τὰ ὑπάρχοντ᾽ ἀγαθὰ σῴζειν, τί τοὺς ὁμολογουμένως ἐχθροὺς ἔχοντες ἑτέρους ζητοῦμεν; ἀλλὰ παρασκευασώμεθα μὲν πρὸς αὐτούς, ἀμυνούμεθα δὲ κἀκεῖνον, ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειρῇ.