by Demosthenes
[41] To spare you the tedium of a lengthy speech, men of Athens, I will sum up my suggestions and step down. I recommend you to equip your forces against your existing enemies, but I add that you must employ those same forces in self-defence against the King and against all who venture to do you wrong, though you must not set the example of wrong, either in word or in deed; and you must see to it that our actions, rather than the speeches delivered from this platform, are worthy of our fathers. If you act thus, you will be acting for the good both of yourselves and also of those who give you the contrary advice, since you will not have to be angry with them hereafter for errors you have committed now.
ὑπὲρ τῆς Ῥοδίων Ἐλευθερίας — FOR THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS
[1] οἶμαι δεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, περὶ τηλικούτων βουλευομένους διδόναι παρρησίαν ἑκάστῳ τῶν συμβουλευόντων. ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὐδεπώποθ᾽ ἡγησάμην χαλεπὸν τὸ διδάξαι τὰ βέλτισθ᾽ ὑμᾶς （ὡς γὰρ εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς, ἅπαντες ὑπάρχειν ἐγνωκότες μοι δοκεῖτε）, ἀλλὰ τὸ πεῖσαι πράττειν ταῦτα: ἐπειδὰν γάρ τι δόξῃ καὶ ψηφισθῇ, τότ᾽ ἴσον τοῦ πραχθῆναι ἀπέχει ὅσονπερ πρὶν δόξαι.
[1] Your duty, men of Athens, when debating such important matters, is, I think, to allow freedom of speech to every one of your counsellors. Personally, I never thought it a difficult task to point out to you the best policy — for, to speak plainly, you all seem to me to have discerned it already — but rather to induce you to put it into operation; for when a resolution has been approved and passed, it is no nearer accomplishment than before it was approved.
[2] ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἓν ὧν ἐγὼ νομίζω χάριν ὑμᾶς τοῖς θεοῖς ὀφείλειν, τὸ τοὺς διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ὕβριν ὑμῖν πολεμήσαντας οὐ πάλαι νῦν ἐν ὑμῖν μόνοις τῆς αὑτῶν σωτηρίας ἔχειν τὰς ἐλπίδας. ἄξιον δ᾽ ἡσθῆναι τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ: συμβήσεται γὰρ ὑμῖν, ἐὰν ἃ χρὴ βουλεύσησθ᾽ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, τὰς παρὰ τῶν διαβαλλόντων τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν βλασφημίας ἔργῳ μετὰ δόξης καλῆς ἀπολύσασθαι.
[2] Now, it is one of the blessings for which, I think, the gods deserve your gratitude, that the same men who not long ago attacked you in the wantonness of their pride, now find in you alone the hope of their salvation. You ought to be delighted at your present opportunity, because, if you decide aright, you will in fact succeed, with honor to yourselves, in silencing the evil tongues that traduce our city.
[3] ᾐτιάσαντο μὲν γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπιβουλεύειν αὑτοῖς Χῖοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα συνέστησαν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς τὸν τελευταῖον τουτονὶ πόλεμον: φανήσεται δ᾽ ὁ μὲν πρυτανεύσας ταῦτα καὶ πείσας Μαύσωλος, φίλος εἶναι φάσκων Ῥοδίων, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν αὐτῶν ἀφῃρημένος, οἱ δ᾽ ἀποδείξαντες ἑαυτοὺς συμμάχους Χῖοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι τοῖς ἀτυχήμασιν αὐτῶν οὐ βεβοηθηκότες,
[3] For we were charged by the Chians, Byzantines and Rhodians with plotting against them, and that was why they concerted the last war against us; but we shall be able to prove that whereas Mausolus, the prime mover and instigator in the business, while calling himself the friend of the Rhodians, has robbed them of their liberty, and whereas the Chians and Byzantines, who posed as their allies, never helped them in distress,
[4] ὑμεῖς δ᾽, οὓς ἐφοβοῦντο, μόνοι τῶν πάντων τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτοῖς αἴτιοι. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ταῦθ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων ὀφθῆναι ποιήσετε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι τοῦτο ποιεῖσθαι σύμβολον τῆς αὑτῶν σωτηρίας, ἐὰν ὑμῖν ὦσι φίλοι: οὗ μεῖζον οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμῖν γένοιτ᾽ ἀγαθόν, ἢ παρὰ πάντων ἑκόντων ἀνυπόπτου τυχεῖν εὐνοίας.
[4] it is to you, whom they dreaded, to you alone of all the states that they owe their deliverance. By making this clear to all, you will teach the democrats in every state to consider friendship with you as the pledge of their safety, and no greater advantage could you have than to win from all men their voluntary and unsuspecting goodwill.
[5] θαυμάζω δ᾽ ὅτι τοὺς αὐτοὺς ὁρῶ ὑπὲρ μὲν Αἰγυπτίων τἀναντία πράττειν βασιλεῖ τὴν πόλιν πείθοντας, ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ Ῥοδίων δήμου φοβουμένους τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον. καίτοι τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας ὄντας ἅπαντες ἴσασι, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ ‘κείνου μεμερισμένους.
[5] I am surprised to see the same men urging the city, in the interests of the Egyptians, to oppose the King of Persia, but dreading him where the Rhodian democracy is concerned. Yet everyone knows that the Rhodians are Greeks, while Egypt is a division of the Persian Empire.
[6] οἶμαι δ᾽ ὑμῶν μνημονεύειν ἐνίους, ὅτι ἡνίκ᾽ ἐβουλεύεσθ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῶν βασιλικῶν, παρελθὼν πρῶτος ἐγὼ παρῄνεσα, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ μόνος ἢ δεύτερος εἰπεῖν, ὅτι μοι σωφρονεῖν ἂν δοκεῖτε, εἰ τὴν πρόφασιν τῆς παρασκευῆς μὴ τὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἔχθραν ποιοῖσθε, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζοισθε μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας ἐχθρούς, ἀμύνοισθε δὲ κἀκεῖνον, ἐὰν ὑμᾶς ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειρῇ. καὶ οὐκ ἐγὼ μὲν εἶπον ταῦτα, ὑμῖν δ᾽ οὐκ ἐδόκουν ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμῖν ἤρεσκε ταῦτα.
[6] Some of you, I suppose, remember that when you were discussing Persian affairs, I was the first to come forward with advice, and I believe I was the only speaker, or perhaps one out of two, to say that I should think it prudent in you not to make your hostility to the King the pretext for your preparations, but while equipping yourselves against your existing enemies, to defend yourselves against him too, if he attempted to do you wrong. Nor did I fail to convince you that I was right, but you, too, approved of my suggestion.
[7] ἀκόλουθος τοίνυν ὁ νῦν λόγος ἐστί μοι τῷ τότε ῥηθέντι. ἐγὼ γάρ, εἰ βασιλεὺς παρ᾽ αὑτὸν ὄντα με σύμβουλον ποιοῖτο, ταὔτ᾽ ἂν αὐτῷ παραινέσαιμ᾽ ἅπερ ὑμῖν, ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶν αὑτοῦ πολεμεῖν, ἐάν τις ἐναντιῶται τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὧν δὲ μηδὲν αὐτῷ προσήκει, τούτων μηδ᾽ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν.
[7] My present speech, then, is the sequel of my former one. For indeed, if the King admitted me to his presence and asked me for my advice, I should give him the same that I gave you — to defend his own subjects, if any of the Greeks attacked them, but to claim no sovereignty over those who owed him no allegiance.
[8] εἰ μὲν οὖν ὅλως ἐγνώκατ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅσων ἂν βασιλεὺς ἐγκρατὴς γένηται φθάσας ἢ παρακρουσάμενός τινας τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, παραχωρεῖν, οὐ καλῶς ἐγνώκατε, ὡς ἐγὼ κρίνω: εἰ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πολεμεῖν, ἂν τούτου δέῃ, καὶ πάσχειν ὁτι
οῦν οἴεσθε χρῆναι, πρῶτον μὲν ὑμῖν ἧττον δεήσει τούτων, ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐγνωκότες ἦτε ταῦτα, ἔπειθ᾽ ἃ προσήκει φρονεῖν δόξετε.
[8] Now if you make it a general principle, men of Athens, to abandon to the King all places that he has got into his power, whether by surprise or by deceiving some of the inhabitants, then your principle is, I think, a wrong one; but if you feel that in the cause of justice you are bound to go to war and face the consequences, then, in the first place, the more you are determined on such action, the less frequently will it be necessary, and secondly, you will be showing the proper spirit.
[9] ὅτι δ᾽ οὐδὲν καινὸν οὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ λέγω νῦν κελεύων Ῥοδίους ἐλευθεροῦν, οὔθ᾽ ὑμεῖς, ἂν πεισθῆτέ μοι, ποιήσετε, τῶν γεγενημένων ὑμᾶς τι καὶ συνενηνοχότων ὑπομνήσω. ὑμεῖς ἐξεπέμψατε Τιμόθεόν ποτ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βοηθήσοντ᾽ Ἀριοβαρζάνῃ, προσγράψαντες τῷ ψηφίσματι ‘μὴ λύοντα τὰς σπονδὰς τὰς πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα.’ ἰδὼν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνος τὸν μὲν Ἀριοβαρζάνην φανερῶς ἀφεστῶτα βασιλέως, Σάμον δὲ φρουρουμένην ὑπὸ Κυπροθέμιδος, ὃν κατέστησε Τιγράνης ὁ βασιλέως ὕπαρχος, τῷ μὲν ἀπέγνω μὴ βοηθεῖν, τὴν δὲ προσκαθεζόμενος καὶ βοηθήσας ἠλευθέρωσε:
[9] To prove that there is precedent both for my proposal to free the Rhodians and for your action, if you adopt it, I will remind you of some things that you have done, and that successfully. You are the men, Athenians, who once sent Timotheus to the help of Ariobarzanes, adding this clause to your instructions, “provided that he does not violate our treaty with the King.” Timotheus, seeing that Ariobarzanes was in open revolt from the King and that Samos was garrisoned by Cyprothemis, who had been stationed there by Tigranes, the King’s viceroy, abandoned his intention of helping the satrap, but invested the island and used his force to liberate it;
[10] καὶ μέχρι τῆς τήμερον ἡμέρας οὐ γέγονεν πόλεμος διὰ ταῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως οὐδεὶς ὑπέρ τε τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν πολεμήσειεν ἂν καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ μὲν ὧν ἐλαττοῦνται μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ πάντες πολεμοῦσιν, ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφίενται μέν, ἐάν τις ἐᾷ, ἐὰν δὲ κωλυθῶσιν, οὐδὲν ἠδικηκέναι τοὺς ἐναντιωθέντας αὐτοῖς ἡγοῦνται.
[10] and to this very day you have not been involved in war on those grounds. For no one would go to war as readily for aggrandizement as for the defence of his own possessions; but while all men fight desperately to keep what they are in danger of losing, it is not so with aggrandizement men make it, indeed, their aim, but if prevented, they do not feel that they have suffered any injustice from their opponents.
[11] ὅτι δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐναντιωθῆναί μοι δοκεῖ τῇ πράξει ταύτῃ νῦν Ἀρτεμισία τῆς πόλεως οὔσης ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, μίκρ᾽ ἀκούσαντες σκοπεῖτε εἴτ᾽ ὀρθῶς λογίζομαι ταῦτ᾽ εἴτε μή. ἐγὼ νομίζω, πράττοντος μὲν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ πάνθ᾽ ὡς ὥρμηκε βασιλέως, σφόδρ᾽ ἂν Ἀρτεμισίαν πειραθῆναι περιποιῆσαι Ῥόδον αὐτῷ, οὐ τῇ βασιλέως εὐνοίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ βούλεσθαι πλησίον αὐτῆς διατρίβοντος ἐκείνου μεγάλην εὐεργεσίαν καταθέσθαι πρὸς αὐτόν, ἵν᾽ ὡς οἰκειότατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἀποδέχηται:
[11] But since I believe that neither would Artemisia now oppose this action on our part, if our State were once committed to it, give me your attention for a little and consider whether my reasoning is sound or not. I think that if the King’s designs in Egypt were meeting with any success, Artemisia would make a big effort to secure Rhodes for him, not from any goodwill towards him, but because, while he is in her neighborhood, she would like to put him under a great obligation, so that he may give her as cordial a recognition as possible.
[12] πράττοντος δ᾽ ὡς λέγεται, καὶ διημαρτηκότος οἷς ἐπεχείρησεν, ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν νῆσον ταύτην, ὅπερ ἔστιν, ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ἂν εἶναι βασιλεῖ χρησίμην ἐν τῷ παρόντι, τῆς δ᾽ αὑτῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιτείχισμα πρὸς τὸ μηδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν παρακινεῖν. ὥστε μοι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔχειν μὴ φανερῶς αὐτῆς ἐνδούσης, ἢ ‘κεῖνον λαβεῖν βούλεσθαι. οἶμαι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ βοηθήσειν αὐτήν, ἂν δ᾽ ἄρα τοῦτο ποιῇ, φαύλως καὶ κακῶς.
[12] But if the reports are true and he has failed in all his attempts, she must argue that this island would be of no use to him at present-which is true enough — but might serve as a fortress to overawe Caria and check any move on her part. Therefore I think she would rather that you had the island, if not too obviously surrendered by her, than that he should get it. I do not, indeed, expect that she will send any help to the Rhodian government, or if she does, it will be feeble and half-hearted;
[13] ἐπεὶ καὶ βασιλέα γε, ὅ τι μὲν ποιήσει μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμ᾽ ἔγωγ᾽ ὡς οἶδα, ὅτι μέντοι συμφέρει τῇ πόλει δῆλον ἤδη γενέσθαι πότερ᾽ ἀντιποιήσεται τῆς πόλεως τῆς Ῥοδίων ἢ οὔ, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν ἰσχυρισαίμην: οὐ γὰρ ὑπὲρ Ῥοδίων βουλευτέον, ὅταν ἀντιποιῆται, μόνον, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν πάντων Ἑλλήνων.
[13] while as to the King, I should not like to say that I know what he is actually going to do, but that it is to our advantage that he should at once make it clear whether he is going to claim Rhodes or not — that I should maintain positively. For when he does claim it, you will have to take counsel, not for the Rhodians only, but for yourselves and all the Greeks.
[14] οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἰ δι᾽ αὑτῶν εἶχον τὴν πόλιν οἱ νῦν ὄντες ἐν αὐτῇ Ῥόδιοι, παρῄνεσ᾽ ἂν ὑμῖν τούτους ἑλέσθαι, οὐδ᾽ εἰ πάνθ᾽ ὑπισχνοῦνθ᾽ ὑμῖν ποιήσειν. ὁρῶ γὰρ αὐτοὺς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὅπως καταλύσωσι τὸν δῆμον, προσλαβόντας τινὰς τῶν πολιτῶν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔπραξαν, πάλιν ἐκβαλόντας τούτους: τοὺς οὖν μηδετέροις πιστῶς κεχρημένους οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὑμῖν βεβαίους ἡγοῦμαι γενέσθαι συμμάχους.
[14] And yet, even if the party at present in possession held Rhodes by their own strength, I should not have advised you to take their side, even if they promised to do everything you wished. For I notice that at the start, in order to overthrow the democracy, they enlisted some of the citizens on their side, and when they had succeeded, sent them into banishment again. Now men who have been faithful to neither side could never, I am sure, become steadfast allies to you.
[15] καὶ ταῦτ᾽ οὐδεπώποτ᾽ εἶπον ἄν, εἰ τῷ Ῥοδίων δήμῳ μόνον ἡγούμην συμφέρειν: οὔτε γὰρ προξενῶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὔτ᾽ ἰδίᾳ ξένος αὐτῶν οὐδείς ἐστί μοι. οὐ μὴν �
�ὐδ᾽ εἰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀμφότερ᾽ ἦν, εἰ μὴ συμφέρειν ὑμῖν ἡγούμην, εἶπον ἄν, ἐπεὶ Ῥοδίοις γε, εἰ οἷόν τε τοῦτ᾽ εἰπεῖν τῷ συναγορεύοντι τῇ σωτηρίᾳ αὐτῶν, συγχαίρω τῶν γεγενημένων. τοῦ κομίσασθαι γὰρ τὰ ὑμέτερ᾽ ὑμῖν φθονήσαντες τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐλευθερίαν ἀπολωλέκασι, καὶ παρὸν αὐτοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ βελτίοσιν αὐτῶν ὑμῖν ἐξ ἴσου συμμαχεῖν, βαρβάροις καὶ δούλοις, οὓς εἰς τὰς ἀκροπόλεις παρεῖνται, δουλεύουσιν.
[15] Moreover I should never have made this proposal, had I thought that it would benefit the Rhodian democrats alone, for I am not the official patron of that party, nor do I count any of them among my private friends. Yet even if both these motives had been present, I should not have proposed it, if I had not thought that it would benefit you, since I share in your satisfaction at the fate of the Rhodians — if one who is pleading for their deliverance may be permitted to say so. For they grudged you the recovery of your rights, and now they have lost their own liberty; they spurned an alliance with you who are Greeks and their betters, and now they are slaves of barbarians, slaves of slaves, whom they admitted into their citadels.