Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes

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Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes Page 420

by Demosthenes


  [17] That this is not a violation of the law, he could not possibly assert nor could you be brought to believe it. But I understand that he will put before you some such plea as this — that the Council was not to blame for the shortage of ships, but the treasurer of the shipbuilders, who absconded with two and a half talents, and so the business ended in a fiasco. But I must first express my surprise that he should have demanded a crown for the Council to reward a fiasco. I thought such honors were reserved for successes. Next, I have another consideration to put before you.

  [18] οὔ φημι δίκαιον εἶναι περὶ ἀμφοῖν λέγειν, καὶ ὡς οὐ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἡ δωρειὰ δέδοται, καὶ ὡς οὐ διὰ τὴν βουλὴν οὐκ εἰσὶν αἱ τριήρεις. εἰ μὲν γὰρ διδόναι καὶ μὴ ποιησαμένῃ προσήκει, τί τοῦτο δεῖ λέγειν, δι᾽ ὅντινα δήποτ᾽ οὐ πεποίηνται; εἰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔξεστι, τί μᾶλλον, ἂν διὰ τὸν δεῖν᾽ ἢ τὸν δεῖν᾽ ἐπιδείξῃ μὴ πεποιημένας, ἐκείνῃ προσῆκε λαβεῖν;

  [18] I submit that it is not fair to combine the two pleas, that the gift was not illegal and that the Council are not responsible for the lack of ships. For if it is right to give them the reward even when they have not built the ships, what need is there to say who is responsible for the omission? But if it is not right, why were the Council any the more entitled to it, because he can point to this or that man as responsible for the shortage?

  [19] χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν αἵρεσιν ὑμῖν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι διδόναι, πότερ᾽ οἴεσθε δεῖν προφάσεις καὶ λόγους ἀκούειν τῶν ἀδικούντων ὑμᾶς ἢ ναῦς κεκτῆσθαι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τούτου ταῦτ᾽ ἀποδέξεσθε, ἔσται δῆλον ἁπάσαις ταῖς βουλαῖς ὅτι δεῖ πρόφασιν πιθανὴν ἐξευρεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, οὐχὶ τριήρεις ποιήσασθαι: ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὰ μὲν χρήματ᾽ ἀναλωθήσεται, ναῦς δ᾽ οὐχ ἕξεθ᾽ ὑμεῖς.

  [19] Apart from that, it seems to me that such arguments offer you a choice, whether you think you ought to hear excuses and pleas from men who have done you harm, or whether you ought to have some ships. For if you accept the defendant’s plea, it will be clear to every future Council that their business is to find you plausible excuses, not to build you ships, with the result that your money will be spent, but there will be no ships for you.

  [20] ἐὰν δ᾽, ὡς ὁ νόμος λέγει καὶ δεῖ τοὺς ὀμωμοκότας, πικρῶς καὶ ἁπλῶς τὰς μὲν προφάσεις ἀνέλητε, φανῆτε δ᾽ ἀφῃρημένοι τὴν δωρειὰν ὅτι τὰς ναῦς οὐ πεποίηνται, πάντες, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεποιημένας ὑμῖν παραδώσουσι τὰς τριήρεις, πάντα τἄλλα παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ἑορακότες ἀσθενέστερα τοῦ νόμου γεγενημένα. ὅτι τοίνυν οὐδ᾽ αἴτιος ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ πεποιῆσθαι τὰς ναῦς, τοῦτο σαφῶς ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω: ἀνελοῦσα γὰρ ἡ βουλὴ τὸν νόμον, τοῦτον ἐχειροτόνησεν αὐτή.

  [20] But if, as the law says and as your oath enjoins, you sternly and absolutely reject their excuses, and make it clear that you have withheld the reward because they have not built the ships, then every Council, men of Athens, will deliver to you the ships duly built, because they will see that in your eyes everything else is of less consequence than the law. Now I shall show you clearly that no other human being is responsible for the shortage of ships; for the Council, having made the law null and void, elected this treasurer themselves.

  [21] ἔτι τοίνυν ἐπιχειρεῖ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ τῆς ἑταιρήσεως νόμου, ὡς ὑβρίζομεν ἡμεῖς καὶ βλασφημίας οὐχὶ προσηκούσας κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ ποιούμεθα. καὶ φησὶ δεῖν ἡμᾶς, εἴπερ ἐπιστεύομεν εἶναι ταῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ, πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας ἀπαντᾶν, ἵν᾽ ἐκεῖ περὶ χιλιῶν ἐκινδυνεύομεν, εἰ καταψευδόμενοι ταῦτ᾽ ἐφαινόμεθα: νῦν δὲ φενακίζειν αἰτίας καὶ λοιδορίας κενὰς ποιουμένους, καὶ ἐνοχλεῖν οὐ δικασταῖς τούτων οὖσιν ὑμῖν.

  [21] Again, with regard to the law of prostitution, he tries to make out that we are insulting him and attacking him with baseless calumnies. He says too that if we believed the charges true, we ought to have faced him in the Court of the Thesmothetae, and asked a fine of a thousand drachmas if our charges had been proved false; as it is, we are trying to hoodwink you by accusations and idle abuse, and are confusing you by matters outside your jurisdiction.

  [22] ἐγὼ δ᾽ οἴομαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς πρῶτον μὲν ἐκεῖνο λογίζεσθαι παρ᾽ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι πάμπολυ λοιδορία τε καὶ αἰτία κεχωρισμένον ἐστὶν ἐλέγχου. αἰτία μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, ὅταν τις ψιλῷ χρησάμενος λόγῳ μὴ παράσχηται πίστιν ὧν λέγει, ἔλεγχος δέ, ὅταν ὧν ἂν εἴπῃ τις καὶ τἀληθὲς ὁμοῦ δείξῃ. ἔστι τοίνυν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας ἢ τεκμήρια δεικνύναι δι᾽ ὧν ἐμφανιοῦσι τὸ πιστὸν ὑμῖν, ἢ τὰ εἰκότα φράζειν, ἢ μάρτυρας παρέχεσθαι: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ᾽ ἐνίων αὐτόπτας ἐστὶ καταστῆσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἐπιδεικνύῃ τίς τι τούτων, ἱκανὸν νομίζετ᾽ ἔλεγχον ἔχειν ὑμεῖς εἰκότως τῆς ἀληθείας ἑκάστοτε.

  [22] But I think you ought first of all to reflect in your own minds that abuse and accusation are very far removed from proof. It is an accusation when one makes a bare statement without supplying grounds for believing it; it is proof when one at the same time demonstrates the truth of one’s statements. Those, therefore, who are proving a case must supply evidence sufficient to establish its credibility with you, or must advance reasonable arguments, or must produce witnesses. Of some facts it is impossible to put eye-witnesses in the box, but if one can establish any of these tests, you rightly consider in every case that you have a sufficient proof of the truth.

  [23] ἡμεῖς τοίνυν οὐκ ἐκ λόγων εἰκότων οὐδὲ τεκμηρίων, ἀλλὰ παρ᾽ οὗ μάλιστα δίκην ἔστι λαβεῖν τούτῳ, ταῦτ᾽ ἐπιδείκνυμεν — ἄνδρα παρεσχηκότα γραμματεῖον, ἐν ᾧ τὰ τούτῳ βεβιωμέν᾽ ἔνεστιν, ὃς αὑτὸν ὑπεύθυνον ποιήσας μαρτυρεῖ ταῦτα. ὥσθ᾽ ὅταν μὲν λοιδορίαν ταῦτα καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι φῇ, ὑπολαμβάνεθ᾽ ὡς ταῦτα μέν ἐστιν ἔλεγχος, ἃ δ᾽ οὗτος ποιεῖ, ταῦτα λοιδορία καὶ αἰτία: ὅταν δ᾽ ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας προσῆκεν ἐπαγγέλλειν ἡμῖν, ἐκεῖνο ὑπολαμβάνετε, ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ποιήσομεν † † † καὶ νῦν προσηκόντως περὶ τοῦ νόμου λέγομεν.

  [23] We then base our proof, not on probabilities nor on circumstantial evidence, but on a witness from whom the defendant may easily obtain satisfaction — a man who has prepared a document containing an account of the defendant’s life, and who makes himself responsible for this evidence. So that when Androtion says that this is mere abuse and accusation, reply that this is proof, bu
t that abuse and accusation describe his own performance; and when he says that we ought to have denounced him to the Thesmothetae, reply that we intend to do so, and that we are now quite properly citing this statute.

  [24] εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλον τιν᾽ ἀγῶν᾽ ἀγωνιζομένου σου ταῦτα κατηγοροῦμεν, δικαίως ἂν ἠγανάκτεις: εἰ δ᾽ ὁ μὲν νῦν ἐνεστηκὼς ἀγών ἐστιν παρανόμων, οἱ νόμοι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐῶσι λέγειν οὐδὲ τὰ ἔννομα τοὺς οὕτω βεβιωκότας, ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἐπιδείκνυμεν οὐ μόνον εἰρηκότ᾽ αὐτὸν παράνομα, ἀλλὰ καὶ βεβιωκότα παρανόμως, πῶς οὐχὶ προσήκει λέγειν περὶ τούτου τοῦ νόμου δι᾽ οὗ ταῦτ᾽ ἐλέγχεται;

  [24] For if we were bringing these charges against him in any other kind of trial, he could have just cause of complaint; but if the present trial is one that concerns illegal proposals, and if men who have led a life like his are forbidden by the laws to make even a legal proposal, and if we prove that he has not only made an illegal proposal but has also led an illegal life, then is it not proper to cite this law which determines his illegal status?

  [25] καὶ μὴν κἀκεῖνό γε δεῖ μαθεῖν ὑμᾶς, ὅτι τοὺς νόμους ὁ τιθεὶς τούτους Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πολλούς, οὐδὲν ὅμοιος ὢν τούτῳ νομοθέτης, οὐχ ἑνὶ ἔδωκε τρόπῳ περὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἑκάστων λαμβάνειν δίκην τοῖς βουλομένοις παρὰ τῶν ἀδικούντων, ἀλλὰ πολλαχῶς. ᾔδει γάρ, οἶμαι, τοῦθ᾽ ὅτι τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι πάντας ὁμοίως ἢ δεινοὺς ἢ θρασεῖς ἢ μετρίους οὐκ ἂν εἴη. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὡς τοῖς μετρίοις δίκην ἐξαρκέσει λαβεῖν, οὕτω τοὺς νόμους θήσει, μετ᾽ ἀδείας ἔσεσθαι πολλοὺς πονηροὺς ἡγεῖτο: εἰ δ᾽ ὡς τοῖς θρασέσιν καὶ δυνατοῖς λέγειν, τοὺς ἰδιώτας οὐ δυνήσεσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τούτοις τρόπον λαμβάνειν δίκην.

  [25] Moreover you should grasp this fact, that Solon, who framed these and most of our other laws, was a very different kind of legislator from the defendant, and provided not one, but many modes of procedure for those who wish to obtain redress for various wrongs. For he knew, I think, that for all the citizens to be equally clever, or bold, or moderate folk, was impossible. If, then, he was going to frame the laws to satisfy the moderate man’s claim to redress, many rascals, he reflected, would get off scot-free, but if he framed them in the interests of the bold and the clever speakers, the plain citizen would not be able to obtain redress in the same way as they would.

  [26] δεῖν δ᾽ ᾤετο μηδέν᾽ ἀποστερεῖσθαι τοῦ δίκης τυχεῖν, ὡς ἕκαστος δύναται. πῶς οὖν ἔσται τοῦτο; ἐὰν πολλὰς ὁδοὺς δῷ διὰ τῶν νόμων ἐπὶ τοὺς ἠδικηκότας οἷον τῆς κλοπῆς. ἔρρωσαι καὶ σαυτῷ πιστεύεις: ἄπαγε: ἐν χιλίαις δ᾽ ὁ κίνδυνος. ἀσθενέστερος εἶ: τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἐφηγοῦ: τοῦτο ποιήσουσιν ἐκεῖνοι. φοβεῖ καὶ τοῦτο: γράφου.

  [26] But he thought that no one should be debarred from obtaining redress in whatever way he can best do so. How then will this be ensured? By granting many modes of legal procedure to the injured parties. Take a case of theft. Are you a strong man, confident in yourself? Arrest the thief; only you are risking a thousand drachmas. Are you rather weak? Guide the Archons to him, and they will do the rest. Are you afraid even to do this? Bring a written indictment.

  [27] καταμέμφει σεαυτὸν καὶ πένης ὢν οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις χιλίας ἐκτεῖσαι: δικάζου κλοπῆς πρὸς διαιτητὴν καὶ οὐ κινδυνεύσεις. οὐδέτερον βούλει τούτων: γράφου. κατοκνεῖς καὶ τοῦτο: ἐφηγοῦ. τούτων οὐδέν ἐστι ταὐτό. τῆς ἀσεβείας κατὰ ταὔτ᾽ ἔστ᾽ ἀπάγειν, γράφεσθαι, δικάζεσθαι πρὸς Εὐμολπίδας, φαίνειν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον σχεδόν.

  [27] Do you distrust yourself, and are you a poor man, unable to find the thousand drachmas? Sue him for theft before a public arbitrator, and you will risk nothing. In the same way for impiety you can arrest, or indict, or sue before the Eumolpidae, or give information to the King-Archon. And in the same way, or nearly so, for every other offence.

  [28] εἰ δή τις ὡς μὲν οὐχὶ κακοῦργός ἐστι μὴ λέγοι, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἀσεβής, ἢ ὅ τι δήποτ᾽ εἴη δι᾽ ὃ κρίνοιτο, διὰ ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐκφεύγειν ἀξιοίη, εἰ μὲν ἀπηγμένος εἴη, διότι πρὸς διαιτητὴν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ λαχεῖν ἢ γράφεσθαι χρῆν, εἰ δὲ πρὸς διαιτητῇ φεύγοι, ὅτι χρῆν σ᾽ ἀπάγειν, ἵν᾽ ἐκινδύνευες περὶ χιλιῶν, γέλως ἂν εἴη δήπουθεν. οὐ γὰρ τόν γε μηδὲν πεποιηκότα δεῖ περὶ τοῦ τρόπον ὅντινα χρὴ διδόναι δίκην ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς οὐ πεποίηκ᾽ ἐπιδεικνύναι.

  [28] Now just suppose that a man, instead of rebutting the charge of crime or impiety or whatever else he may be tried for, should claim his acquittal on these grounds-in the case of an arrest, that you might have brought an action before an arbitrator and that you ought to have indicted him, or, if he is defendant in an arbitrator’s court, that you ought to have arrested him, so that you might risk a fine of a thousand drachmas. Surely that would be a farce. A defendant, if innocent, need not dispute the method by which he is brought.to justice: he ought to prove hat he is innocent.

  [29] τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον, Ἀνδροτίων, καὶ σὺ μὴ διὰ ταῦτ᾽ οἴου σοι προσήκειν μὴ δοῦναι δίκην εἰ γράφεις ἡταιρηκώς, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας ἔσθ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐπαγγελία: ἀλλ᾽ ἢ δεῖξον οὐ πεποιηκότα ταῦτα σεαυτόν, ἢ δίκην ὕπεχ᾽ ὧν γέγραφας τοιοῦτος ὤν: οὐ γὰρ ἔξεστί σοι. εἰ δέ σε μὴ πάντας ὅσους διδόασιν οἱ νόμοι τρόπους τιμωρούμεθα, χάριν ἡμῖν ὧν παραλείπομεν, ἐκείνων ἔχε, μὴ διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀξίου μηδένα δοῦναι τρόπον δίκην.

  [29] In just the same way, if you, Androtion, propose a decree after having been guilty of prostitution, do not imagine that you ought to escape punishment because we might also have denounced you to the Thesmothetae, but either prove that you are innocent or submit to punishment for any decrees that you have proposed, being what you are; or you have no right to propose them. If we do not punish you by every process that the laws allow, be grateful to us for those that we omit: do not on that ground claim to pay no penalty at all.

  [30] ἄξιον τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὸν θέντα τὸν νόμον ἐξετάσαι Σόλωνα, καὶ θεάσασθαι ὅσην πρόνοιαν ἐποιεῖτο ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἐτίθει νόμοις τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ὅσῳ περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον ἐσπούδαζεν ἢ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος οὗ τιθείη τὸν νόμον. πολλαχόθεν μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ἴδοι τοῦτο, οὐχ ἥκιστα δ᾽ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ νόμου, μήτε λέ
γειν μήτε γράφειν ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ἡταιρηκόσιν. ἑώρα γὰρ ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑμῶν ἐξὸν λέγειν οὐ λέγετε, ὥστε τοῦτ᾽ οὐδὲν ἡγεῖτο βαρύ, καὶ πόλλ᾽ ἂν εἶχεν, εἴ γε κολάζειν ἐβούλετο τούτους, χαλεπώτερα θεῖναι.

  [30] Now it is worth your while, men of Athens, to study too the character of Solon, who framed this law, and to observe what care he took of the constitution in all the laws, how much more zealous indeed he was for the constitution than for the matter on which he was legislating. This may be seen in many ways, but especially from this law, which forbids persons guilty of prostitution to make speeches or to propose measures. For he saw that the majority of you do not avail yourselves of your right to speak, so that the prohibition seemed no great hardship, and he could have laid down many harsher penalties, if his object had been the chastisement of these offenders.

  [31] ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦτ᾽ ἐσπούδασεν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀπεῖπεν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ τῆς πολιτείας. ᾔδει γάρ, ᾔδει τοῖς αἰσχρῶς βεβιωκόσιν ἁπασῶν οὖσαν ἐναντιωτάτην πολιτείαν ἐν ᾗ πᾶσιν ἔξεστι λέγειν τἀκείνων ὀνείδη. ἔστι δ᾽ αὕτη τίς; δημοκρατία. οὔκουν ἐνόμιζεν ἀσφαλές, εἴ ποτε συμβήσεται γενέσθαι συχνοὺς ἀνθρώπους κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους εἰπεῖν μὲν δεινοὺς καὶ θρασεῖς, τοιούτων δ᾽ ὀνειδῶν καὶ κακῶν μεστούς:

 

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